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MIMANSA: THE SECRET OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS — Rs. 30/

BY
N. V. THADANI

FROM SANKHYA TO VEDANTA (*To follow*)
(*A Translation of Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeshika, Yoga, and Vedānta Systems of Philosophy*)

BY
N. V. THADANI

MIMANSA:

THE SECRET OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS

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MIMANSA:

THE SECRET OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS

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BHARATI RESEARCH INSTITUTE
DELHI
1952

By the Same Author

THE MYSTERY OF THE MAHABHARATA

IN FIVE VOLUMES

VOLUME I. A VISION OF THE VEDAS

VOLUME II. THE SYSTEMS OF HINDŪ PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

VOLUME III. THE EPIC AND ITS ESSENCE

VOLUME IV. THE EXPLANATION OF THE EPIC, PART I

VOLUME V. THE EXPLANATION OF THE EPIC, PART II

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असतो मा सद्गमय
तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय
मृत्योर्मामृतं गमय ॥

(बृ. उ., १, ३, २७)

Lead us from falsehood into Truth;
From darkness into living Light;
From death to Immortality

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad, I, iii, 27.

ABBREVIATIONS

Adi P.	*Adi Parva* of the *Mahābhārata*
Ait. Ar. Up.	*Aitareya Araṇyaka Upanishad*
AV.	*Atharva Veda*
BhG.	*Bhagavad Gītā*
Chh. Up.	*Chhāndogya Upanishad*
Kaush. Up.	*Kaushītaki Upanishad*
MBh.	*Mahābhārata*
MM.	*The Mystery of the Mahābhārata*
MS.	*Mīmānsā Sūtras*
MWD.	Monier William's Sanskrit English Dictionary
NS.	*Nyāya Sūtras*
RV.	*Rig Veda*
SBE.	The Sacred Books of the East
SK.	*Sāṅkhya Kārikā*
SS.	*Sāṅkhya Sūtras*
SBr.	*Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*
Sānti P.	*Sānti Parva* of the *Mahābhārata*
Tait. Up.	*Taittirīyaka Upanishad*
Up.	*Upanishad*
VS.	*Vaiśeshika Sūtras*
Ved. S.	*Vedānta Sūtras*
YS.	*Yoga Sūtras*

SYMBOLS

The letters of the *Sanskṛt* alphabet, when used in words, have been printed as is shown on p.ccxlv, n. In the absence of diacritical marks in capitals and Roman type, italic type has been used. Proper names beginning with a long vowel, and the letter *ś*, have been printed in italic type; and a reference may, if necessary, be made to the Glossary or the Index for an indication of their correct pronunciation.

GENERAL EDITOR'S NOTE

Mīmānsā means a reverent study leading to a scientific quest of Truth; and it was this search after Truth, leading to the solution of the great problem of life, that engaged the attention of the ancients in the past. The real problem of life is the attainment of happiness, and the avoidance of its opposite,—misery and pain; and the ancients tried to examine it at all levels and from all points of view. They reflected for long, and realised that pleasure is but a passing episode in an endless course of pain, and permanent happiness can be attained only when there is a total extinction of pain. The author of the *Sāṅkhya*,—so called because it signifies reflection—accordingly declared that the chief aim of a man's life is to secure freedom from sorrow and pain. But the great question was how to bring it about; and this meant a knowledge of the cause of pain and the means of attaining to happiness; and an inquiry into this problem gave rise to a harvest of speculations which are stored up in the different systems of Hindu Philosophy. They have their different points of view; but they are all agreed that Good is the source of happiness, and Evil of pain; and the one is called Dharma, and the other Adharma. Dharma is the law of life, and its breach is Adharma. But if this law (Dharma), the observance of which makes for a never-failing and perennial source of happiness, be really true and unerring, it cannot be laid down by mortal man, subject to all the infirmities of flesh and blood; and so it is said to emanate from an impersonal source,—the

Holy Vedas—the *apaurusheya* (impersonal) revelation in the verbal form of *Brahman*.

The Veda is accordingly said to be the transcendent authority, the sovereign voice (*nirapeksha rava*) of the Primeval Being; and what it enjoins is Dharma, and what it prohibits is Adharma. It is believed to contain the ancient traditional knowledge of the Hindus, handed down to us from the immemorial past; but the contents and language of this mine of thought are difficult to understand. At places it is unintelligible, at others it is incongruous, and at others again it is self-contradictory and appears to be meaningless. This problem had faced a number of thinkers even in the past, and they tried to study the text carefully and to interpret it correctly. This was done in the best and most perfect manner in the *Mīmānsā*, which, because it formulated the principles of interpretation of the Veda, came to be regarded as the philosophy and art of interpretation. It is for this reason that it occupies, according to tradition, not only a pre-eminent place among the systems of Hindu Philosophy, but is believed to govern them all. Indeed, it is a common saying of the classical Pandits that "Logic, Grammar and the like only grind the mill, but it is the *Mīmānsaka* (knower of *Mīmānsā*) alone who ordains the *Sāstras*."[1]

Tradition tells us that there are three avenues of scholarship,—study of words (*pada*), of sentences (*vākya*), and authority in regard to interpretation (*pramāṇa*),—and they relate to Grammar, Logic and *Mīmānsā* respectively—the last being the most important of all. The *Mīmānsaka* was accordingly given the

[1] *Anye ghāraṭṭikās sarve, nūnam śāstra-kṛto vayam.*

pride of place in the assemblies of great thinkers in the past, and a number of panegyrics[1] have been composed in his honour by those who knew the importance of this system.

The reason why the *Mīmānsā* occupies such a pre-eminent position is not far to seek. It defines Dharma or the law of life; it lays down the correct method of interpretation of the Vedas and removes the conflict of authorities; and it gives a verdict on contentious issues and supplies maxims of universal application. This immense store of knowledge is contained in the *Sūtras* of *Jaimini*, popularly called the *Mīmānsā* (or *Pūrva-Mīmānsā*) *Sūtras*. Their language is simple and straightforward, though it differs a great deal from later classical *Sanskṛt*, which has undergone a number of changes with the lapse of time.

These *Sūtras* have been explained by *Sabara-svāmin*, who has been followed by a number of scholars. But, as they have all been led to believe that they refer to Vedic ceremonies and a system of ritualistic practices, they have tried to interpret the *Sūtras* in their light, with the result that the whole system has come to be regarded as dealing with ritual and the laws and practices of various sacrifices, while its more truly philosophic spirit and idea has been forgotten and lost. Indeed, what was meant to illustrate the method of interpretation of the Vedas, has been taken to be the subject-matter of the system itself; and so we have been carried very far away

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[1] There are well-known panegyrics like
Mīmānsā-śāstra-yugma-śrama-vimala-manā mārgyatām mādṛśo' nyaḥ—

"Let one other like me be found whose mind is crystallised by his labours in the study of both parts of the *Mīmānsā*."

from the original idea of its author. Thus, when in more recent years it has come to be studied again as a part of the principal systems of Hindu Philosophy, a great Indian thinker seriously maintains that "it is unnecessary to say much about the unsatisfactory character of the *Pūrva-Mī-nānsā* as a system of Philosophy"[1]

All the six systems of Philosophy, of which the *Mī-nānsā* is one, are closely connected together, and present an integrated development of thought: they are consistent in themselves and with one another, so that, when all their speculations are put together, they constitute a complete whole. But this becomes clear only when the *Sūtras* are interpreted in their proper perspective, and not with a particular bias or prepossession. Indeed, it is this predilection of critics and commentators during several centuries in the past that has led the reader astray from the simple and direct treatment of their subject-matter, and caused so much confusion about their character.

It is possible to interpret the text of the Sacred Books in many ways; but there are three principal methods of interpretation,—the grammatical method, the logical method, and a symbolic method. Every text should be approached by means of the first method, and the sense yielded by it should be put together in a logical manner. But if that does not yield a rational or consistent meaning, a resort may be had to the third method. Indeed, it has been observed that "the names occurring in them (the Vedas) are of universal applicability, and do not have any historical reference. *Viśvā-*

[1] *Indian Philosophy* by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. II, p. 428.

mitra means 'the all-friendly' and not any historical character[1];" and in view of the abstract character of the Sacred Books of the Hindus, it is essential that the different systems of Philosophy and other basic texts should be properly interpreted and made available to the reader.

The Bharati Research Institute, Delhi, has been started to fulfil this long-felt need, and to help in the advancement of a proper knowledge of the Sacred Books of the Hindus. It is proposed to bring out two series at present,—entitled a Library of Hindu Philosophy and Religion, and a Library of Sanskrit Classics. The first series opens with the present volume,—a rendering of the *Mīmānsā*,—one of the six great systems of Hindu Philosophy, the importance of which need not be re-emphasised. It is a free, but an accurate, translation of *Jaimini's Mīmānsā Sūtras*, made without reliance on any *Bhāshya*, *Vṛtti*, or school of thought of this system. The *Sanskṛt* text has also been appended for ready reference.

The whole work is purely original, and the author of this volume, Dr. N.V. Thadani, has devoted thirty years of life to a study of the Sacred Books. His earlier work in this field,—*The Mystery of the Mahābhārata*—was published in five volumes about eighteen years ago; but it met with scant recognition on account of the novelty of its approach to the Epic, which it regarded as an account of the different systems of Hindu Philosophy and Religion in story-form, and tried to explain it as such in accordance with the method of interpretation now discovered in the *Mīmānsā*. Dr. Thadani has since widened his field of inquiry, and translated the *Sūtras* of all the six systems of Hindu Philosophy,

[1] *Indian Philosophy* by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. II, p. 392.

and the present volume is the first to be published in this series.

The present writer must admit that, as he had been initiated into *Sāstric* studies from the orthodox point of view,—when he saw Dr. Thadani's rendering of the *Sūtras* for the first time, he was filled with no small misgiving about the possibility of its yielding any satisfactory results. But when he examined the entire method of rendering them more carefully, and found how close was its fidelity to grammatical rules, he felt that it could not be rejected out of hand; and before long he saw that the whole idea was consistent throughout, and maintained a uniform level of thought. He then remembered that there were suggestions of this line of thought even among ancient scholiasts, and felt that Dr. Thadani's translation could not in reason be set aside.

Indeed, the one thing that would be patent to even the most casual reader of this work is that it contains a complete unity of thought and expression throughout. According to the *Sāstras*[1] there is a fourfold consistency of interpretation: consistency as regards inter-related systems of thought (*Sāstra-saṅgatiḥ*); consistency within the system itself (*Adhyāya saṅgatiḥ*); consistency of each topic with the rest (*pāda saṅgatiḥ*); and consistency between all sections (*Adhikaraṇa saṅgatiḥ*). The learned author has been chiefly concerned with consistency in all its aspects; and though he differs widely from the available interpretations of the various systems of thought recognised by the orthodox scholars, his work

[1] Introduction to *Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā* (N. S. Edition), p. 4.

cannot fail to strike not only as grammatically correct, but also as wholly consistent in its own way.

Dr. Thadani has further amplified and illustrated his scheme of thought in an exhaustive INTRODUCTION, which too will be found to be equally consistent.

We believe that the work will bear fruit, and the devoted labours of many years will open a new vista for inquiry and research along new lines, and lead scholars to a fresh study of our Sacred Books, and to re-interpret them according to the method of interpretation explained by *Jaimini* in the *Mīmānsā*. The present volume will be followed by a rendering of the five remaining systems of Hindu Philosophy at an early date.

Hari-śayanī Ekādaśī,
Vikram Samvat, 2009.
BHARATI RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
DELHI.

S. N. SHASTRI,
HON. DIRECTOR

PREFACE

It is not without some hesitation that I am releasing the present work,—a translation of the *Mīmānsā Sūtras* of *Jaimini*,—the longest and, perhaps, the least understood of all the six principal systems of Hindu Philosophy,—for a more regular course would have been to begin with the *Sāṅkhya*, and then go on to the other systems. But, for reasons explained in the INTRODUCTION, it has been necessary to do so, in order that the reader may be able to form an idea of the real character of the Sacred Books of the Hindus.

The present work is an attempt at a simple, but a reasonably accurate, translation of the original text. A purely literal rendering of a work, even in a modern language, would make difficult reading; and an English version of so simple a book as the *Bhagavad Gītā* has often to deviate from the original idiom to be understood. This difficulty is greatly increased in the case of the *Sūtras* of Hindu Philosophy; for they are not short, pithy, and independent utterances of great truths, as is commonly believed,—but brief, exact, and clearly defined statements of great ideas, which are closely knit together and need to be properly understood. It would have been possible to translate each *Sūtra* literally and separately; but, while that may have been more exact and accurate, it would have broken up the unity of thought and continuity of expression of the work as a whole,—and that was perhaps even more important. It was accordingly necessary to steer a middle course, and that has been attempted in the present work.

PREFACE

A correct translation of the text depends on three main factors: appropriate meanings of words used in the *Sūtras*, a just connection between the parts of a *Sūtra*, and a proper correlation between one *Sūtra* and another. But it is not always easy to satisfy these conditions, simple as they appear to be; for words in *Sanskṛt* have often a large number of meanings, out of which a proper selection has to be made; and a wrong choice can heap error on error without end. Indeed, the chief difficulty in getting at a properly connected meaning of the text would be due to this; and it is complicated by the idea, commonly held by scholars, that each *Sūtra* is complete or almost complete in itself. Nor is the language of the text always free from ambiguity, and extreme conciseness has often been gained at the expense of clarity of expression; while a total absence of punctuation within a *Sūtra* makes it difficult to disentangle its parts. But, even as the author of the *Vedānta Sūtras* tells us, it requires calmness, patience, and devotion to the task to be able to enter into the spirit of the text; and once we succeed in grasping its form and mode of expression, it is not difficult to get at the correct meaning; and the whole idea is then found to be consistent and continuous from end to end. This applies not only to the *Mīmānsā*, but to all systems of Philosophy composed in this form.

I should like to take this opportunity of thanking all those who have assisted me or lightened my task. I am very grateful to DR. S. N. SHASTRI of Hindu College, who, at great cost of time and trouble, has gone through the entire rendering, *Sūtra* by *Sūtra*, and made some very valuable suggestions. He has also read some of the proofs and interested himself in the publication of the work. I am also very thankful to the authorities of the SRI AUROBINDO ASHRAM at Pondicherry, for the

assistance they have rendered in printing the book,— more specially the MOTHER, DR. INDRA SEN, and MR. N. D. GUPTA, Manager of the Press. But my deepest debt of gratitude is due to my wife who, with rare self-denial, has lightened my task, and enabled me to do my work. It was she who started me on the study of the *Mahābhārata* thirty years ago, and has throughout been a source of great comfort to me.

Delhi, June, 1952 N. V. THADANI

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE MIMANSA

INTRODUCTION:

THE SECRET OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS

I

THE PROBLEM OF THE SACRED BOOKS

THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS—The sacred books of the Hindus present a number of problems which have yet to be solved. They have been tackled by various scholars from time to time, but their essential enigma remains. The nineteenth century, and more specially its latter half, witnessed a great awakening of interest in *Sanskṛt* among European scholars, and it has spread to America in more recent years. But the result has fallen short of expectation; and philosophy and religion have, for the most part, given place to history, philology, anthropology, archæology and antiquarian research. The modern scholar would not indeed deny the moral and spiritual significance of the sacred books; but they are for him but relics of a bygone age, with values and problems entirely different from his own. The Vedas are believed to be the earliest record of the genius of man; but however important to the student of antiquity, it would not be easy to define their moral and spiritual worth, or contribution to the solution of the problems of life. They are said to be four in number,—*Rik*, *Sāma*, *Yajur*, and *Atharva*; and of these the first, which is the oldest, appears to be but a collection of hymns addressed to a

number of gods. Some of these are indeed unique in their search after the Infinite; and a number of them have all the characteristics of great poetry. But even a modern Indian philosopher is obliged to refer to them as consisting of "half-formed myths or crude allegories, obscure gropings or immature compositions", although he also finds "a freshness and simplicity and an intellectual charm, as of the breath of spring or the flowers of the morning, about these first efforts of the human mind to comprehend and express the mystery of the universe."[1] The *Sāma Veda* is said to be purely liturgical, containing a number of hymns taken from the *Rig Veda*, and meant to be sung at sacrifices. The *Yajur*, like the *Sāma*, is also said to serve the same purpose, and to contain a number of sacrificial formulæ, even as its name is believed to imply; while the *Atharva*, which appears to be a later addition and was not included among the original set, is said to contain a number of incantations and charms against evil and disease.

THE DIFFICULTY OF UNDERSTANDING—The student of the Vedas has not found it easy to understand them; and both Indian and foreign scholars have formed their own opinions, ranging from their being but "primeval childlike naïve prayer of the *Rig Veda*" to "allegorical representations of the attributes of the Supreme Deity"; while some would regard them as "sacrificial compositions of a primitive race which attributed great importance to ceremonial rites". At the same time the *Rig Veda* is said to be "a work representing the thought of successive generations of thinkers, and so contains within it different strata of thought." The late Sri Aurobindo Ghosh was one of the few among recent thinkers

Indian Philosophy by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, I, 66.

who believed that the Vedas are "replete with suggestions of secret doctrines and mystic philosophies, and looked upon the gods of the hymns as symbols of psychological functions". He was of the opinion that the *Rig Veda* belongs to the early period of human thought, "when the spiritual and psychological knowledge of the race was concealed, for reasons now difficult to determine, in a veil of concrete and material figures and symbols, which protected the sense from the profane, and revealed it to the initiated. One of the leading principles of the mystics was the sacredness and secrecy of self-knowledge, and the true knowledge of the gods. This wisdom was, they thought, unfit for,—perhaps even dangerous to—the ordinary human mind, or, in any case, liable to perversion and misuse and loss of virtue, if revealed to vulgar and unpurified spirits. Hence they favoured the existence of an outer worship, effective but imperfect, for the profane, but an inner discipline for the initiate, and clothed their language in words and images which had equally a spiritual sense for the elect, and a concrete sense for the mass of ordinary worshippers. The Vedic hymns are conceived and constructed on these principles." But Sri Aurobindo Ghosh did not explain how all this could be proved to be true, and modern scholars have not been able to follow his lead.[1]

DIVISIONS OF THE VEDAS—The Vedas are the earliest of the sacred books of the Hindus, and all other works are said to be derived from them. Each Veda is divided into two principal parts,—*Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa*; and of these the former is said to be a collection of hymns addressed to a number of gods, and is called *Samhitā*; while the latter con-

Indian Philosophy by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. I, 68-70.

sists of two parts,—*Vidhi* or directions relating to sacrifices, and *Artha-vāda* or explanation of legends connected with the *Mantras*. It is said that out of the *Brāhmaṇa* part of the Vedas arose two sections of Vedic literature,—*Sūtras* or aphoristic rules relating to the performance of all kinds of sacrifices, and *Upanishads*, believed to be an exposition of the secret doctrine of the Vedas, and the source of all the great systems of Hindu Philosophy.

SRUTI AND SMRITI—The Vedas, with their *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* parts, as well as the *Upanishads*, are called *śruti*, believed to be revealed knowledge orally communicated to some privileged persons by the Supreme Spirit himself. They are said to have heard and not composed it themselves, and it is for this reason that the works are called *śruti* or "that which is heard". This was succeeded by a vast body of literature, classified as *smṛti*, for it was believed to have been remembered, as the word signifies; and it is said to include the six *Vedāṅgas* or "limbs" of the Vedas, the *Sūtras*, including those of the six systems of philosophy, the Law-books of *Manu*, the great Epics of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, the eighteen *Purāṇas*, and the *Nīti-śāstras*.

THE PROBLEM—But a great body of this literature is difficult to understand;and even when we are able to get what we believe to be the literal meaning of words, they do not appear to make much sense, or have a bearing on what we should regard as of some moral and spiritual value to human life. The *Upanishads* indeed contain a considerable body of matter of this kind, and the *Mahābhārata* includes the *Bhagavad Gītā* and a number of discourses on philosophy and religion; but a substantial portion of even these works is difficult to

grasp. Nor is it easy to see in what sense the *Upanishads* can be described as an exposition of the secret doctrine of the Vedas, when we do not know what that doctrine is; and the Vedas themselves, as we understand them, do not appear to justify the claim that they are a revelation of truth made by the Supreme Spirit himself. The Epics and the *Purāṇas* have their own problems too. The *Rāmāyaṇa* has been described as a Veda; but it is difficult to see in what sense it can be regarded as such; nor is even the life of *Rāma*, believed to be an embodiment of perfection, free from criticism or blame when examined in the light of the text as composed by *Vālmīki*. The *Mahābhārata*, on the other hand, claims to be the fifth or the last of the Vedas; and we are told, in all seriousness, that "that which is in it, is elsewhere; and that which does not occur in it, occurs nowhere else". It would be difficult to conceive of a greater exaggeration if the Epic be as it is commonly understood. The problem of the *Purāṇas* is similar too. They are eighteen in number, and are said to be sacred, and to treat of five great topics,—the creation of the universe, its destruction and renovation, the genealogy of gods and the patriarchs, the rule of the *Manus*, and the history of the Solar and the Lunar races; but it would be difficult to conceive of anything more fantastic than what they appear to contain.

The difficulty of understanding the ideas of the ancients is not limited to these works alone; and the *Sūtras* of the six principal systems of Hindu Philosophy are still, for the most part, believed to be unintelligible; and most of our present knowledge of these systems is based on certain commentaries of eminent scholars rather than their text.

All these books are believed to be sacred, and the orthodox are required to accept without question all that they contain; but no one has, so far, been able to explain in a clear,

reasoned, and sustained manner what exactly they teach, or the basis of their claim to be regarded as sacred.

THE PROBLEM OF HINDUISM—The problem of Hinduism or the systems of religion that go under that name, is perhaps more difficult still. While there are a large number of gods of the Vedas, the principal deities of the Hindus are three, —*Brahmā*, *Siva* and *Vishṇu*—said to be the great Trinity of the Creator, Destroyer, and Sustainer of the universe; but even this distinction is not based on any exact interpretation of the sacred books. Again, while there are innumerable temples dedicated to both *Siva* and *Vishṇu* still in existence in the country, the worship of *Brahmā*, believed to be the Creator, has all but disappeared. Then we have Jainism and Buddhism too as among the great systems of religion that had their origin in India; but while Jainism still remains, its more liberal counterpart, Buddhism, has but few traces left. *Buddha*, the reputed founder of Buddhism, is said to be an "incarnation" or embodiment of the idea of *Vishṇu*, the highest of the Hindu triad; and yet his *Hīnayāna* school is purely agnostic, and he himself is said to have remained silent when questioned about the existence of God.

The problem of castes, customs and religious laws,—of rites, ceremonies and sacrifices,—and of rules, forms and modes of worship—still prevalent among the Hindus, is equally intricate; and there are not a few who, finding no rational answer, maintain that Hinduism is but a general name for the life of the people of a country, with a common social order, and held together by common customs, traditions, and laws,—culture and forms of worship—rather than a clearly defined system of thought and religion.

THE GREAT QUESTION—The problem, as stated above, is

undoubtedly a difficult one, and there are not a few who believe that it cannot be solved. A number of attempts have from time to time been made in the past to answer these questions; but all that has been achieved is either an expression of high, but unsubstantiated, opinion regarding the greatness of the sacred books, or the formation of separate sects with simpler doctrine and more clearly definable creed. The modern thinker appears to have reconciled himself to the general decline of faith as an inevitable consequence of the scientific spirit of the present day; and the only religion he can accept is that which can transform science itself into philosophy, and reason into faith. And the great question is,—Can there be such a system of religion? and have the sacred books of the Hindus any contribution to make to the formation of such a one?

II

THE SECRET OF THE SACRED BOOKS

THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM—The solution of the problem of the sacred books can lie only in the contents of the sacred books themselves. If what we have been taught to understand of them be all that they contain,—if the Vedas be but hymns of praise addressed to the gods, and the gods themselves the beings that they are; if the *Sūtras* must still remain unintelligible; and if the "stories" of the Epics and the *Purāṇas* be nothing but impossible accounts of imaginary deeds, or, in any case, a record of events of a world far removed from our own,—we must remain content with the estimate that is generally formed of these works, and cease to think of them as anything more than

an exuberant flight of fancy of a "primitive" people. Indeed, all that we can do in such a case is to sift the fine from the gross, and salvage what we can; and so there are not a few who, unable to find any connection between the "story" of the *Mahābhārata* and the teachings of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, believe that the latter is but an interpolation, cleverly introduced into the Epic to enable it to partake of its popularity, and make it more current among the people; and so would separate it from the main work.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE TEXT—But have we really understood the language of the text of the sacred books, and is it impossible to get some other meaning out of it? This question may well be asked, for these books were composed in the *Sanskṛt* language long before modern nations learned the art of writing; and the earliest, the Vedas, are, according to some, believed to have been written more than five thousand years ago; while few would place them later than 1200 to 1500 B.C.

Language is a record of human thought in relation to ideas, objects, and actions; and the history of a number of modern languages shows that a thousand years are enough to bring about such a change in the human mind, that few, if any, can understand what has been written in the earliest works. This is true of the English language, whose record is unbroken by any great invasion or cataclasm; and there are few, if any, among Englishmen today who can understand the earliest works composed in the old Anglo-Saxon. The same is equally true of a number of modern Indian languages; and it should not be a matter for surprise if a similar change has taken place in *Sanskṛt* too. The earliest of the sacred books, the Vedas, are more than three thousand five hundred years old; and the difficulty of understanding the original

sense of the language of the text can easily be grasped when we realise that the *Sūtras* or the "aphorisms" of the six principal systems of philosophy, which are of a later date, are still "unintelligible". If this be the case with the *Sūtras*, the language of which appears to be simple and easy to grasp, there should be little wonder if the original meaning of words used in the earlier works has been forgotten or lost,—specially as the country has been subjected to many invasions from time to time, and a number of ancient records must have been destroyed or defaced.

Indeed, if we could re-discover the original meaning of the text of the sacred books, we should be able to reveal their secret; and then it might well be that we find that the traditional view of their character is really true; and that the Vedas, even as the word literally signifies, are books of scientific knowledge, dealing with the laws of Nature and the life of man; and then the idea of their "revelation" would be similar to that of modern discoveries when they are the result of accident or good fortune, rather than persistent human effort. The *Upanishads* may then appear to be a clearer exposition of these laws; the *Vedāngas* as the real "limbs" or parts of the Vedas or the knowledge they contain; the six systems of philosophy as an expression of the same idea in a still clearer form; the Epics and the *Purāṇas* as an account of these systems in story-form; and the great systems of religion, which form part of Hinduism,—with all its array of architectural design, statuary and carving, painting, music, and poetry,—the essence of all the fine arts—together with their gods, forms of worship, ritual and "sacrifices", but as a magnificent attempt to live in the light of the teachings of the sacred books,—or science refined into philosophy, and both sublimated into religion or the art of perfect life. This may mean that the original idea of the sacred

books and the different systems of philosophy and religion has been forgotten and lost, and what remains is very different from their ancient conception. But the question still remains,—Can all this be proved?

A RETROSPECT—It is seventeen years since the last of the five volumes of *The Mystery of the Mahābhārata* was published; and I tried to show in that work that the gods of the Vedas represented the great forces of Nature, and their corresponding forms in man; and that their real meaning could be obtained by dividing their names into parts in the same manner as we obtain the meaning of the sacred syllable OM by dividing it into its letters,—A, U, M. I applied this method of interpretation to the story of the *Mahābhārata*, and showed how it transformed the whole of it into an account of the different systems of philosophy and religion; and explained that it was for this reason that the Epic claimed to contain all the great truths of life in the world. The essential character of the *Mahābhārata* is described in its opening chapter, where *Vyāsa*, its celebrated author, is said to have composed the "story" after he had arranged the Vedas; and we are told that its ideas have been expressed in an intricate form, and it has to be understood in the light of the teachings of all the sacred books,—the *śruti* and the *smṛti*. I pointed out that the Epic is accordingly a "story" of what is contained in the Vedas and later works, and should be understood in their light.

The work met with a mixed reception. While there were some who believed that this was the correct method of interpreting the sacred books, and there was adequate authority for it in the sacred books themselves,—there were a number of those who were of the opinion that it was inconceivable that a whole work like the *Mahābhārata*,—the longest in

literature—could have been composed in a form where the names of all the principal characters, and innumerable other words, had to be broken into parts to be understood. They were prepared to concede that a few of them could perhaps represent objects of Nature or ideas of philosophy, but could not imagine that this could be true of all. The European scholar found in it a great deal that ran counter to what he had learned to believe of the ancients and their life; while the Indian was not prepared to substitute his *Kṛshṇa*, whom he had loved so well as a human being in real flesh and blood, for a deity who could to him be only an abstraction of an image or an idea, however perfectly personified.

I felt, however, that there were two principal tests applicable to a work of this kind,—its character as described in the book itself, and consistency of explanation in accordance with it. There could indeed be no doubt that the *Mahābhārata* has been described in the Epic itself as a "story" of the Vedas, and as containing the sense of all the sacred books. We are told that it explains their "mystery", and deals with the problems of life and death, the great phenomena of Nature, the divisions of Time, and the language, customs and manners of the people.[1] But the main story, as we read it,—narrating the rivalries of the *Kaurava* and *Pāṇḍava* princes —has little to do with these questions. The *Bhagavad Gītā* is indeed a part of the Epic; but it appears to have so little connection with the story, that there are not a few who believe that it is an interpolation; and the introductory statement in regard to the character of the Epic is believed to be an exaggeration, common to writers of that age, and intended only to impress the reader.

I felt, however, that this was not possible; and if there was

[1] *Adi P.* I, i, 17-70; 80-87; 252-256.

a method of interpretation by means of which the "story" itself could be transformed into a description of ideas,—and consistently so throughout—and all its strange and fantastic notions disappeared, it could not lightly be rejected. The method of interpretation was based primarily on the division of words into parts, and was warranted by the practice of the ancients themselves; and I thought that there could not, in reason, be any objection to its application over the whole range of the *Mahābhārata* or even the entire body of the sacred books, provided the text remained unchanged and only made better and a more rational sense; and the meanings assigned to the parts of words,—letters and syllables—were in general accord with admitted usage and consistent throughout. I realised, however, that if the characters who figure in the Epic were symbolic of ideas and objects, they should retain their attributes, wherever they appeared in any sacred work; and, as the *Mahābhārata* had a number of such characters,—specially gods and the sages—who figure in a number of sacred books from the Vedas downwards, I felt that the Epic could not stand alone as a "story" of different systems of philosophy and religion, and that all other similar works must be of the same kind. I had found that this method of interpretation had given a new meaning to the gods of the Vedas as well as the "story" of the *Mahābhārata*, and thought that the real idea of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa* must be similar too.

I accordingly applied the same method of interpretation to the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and found that it too was transformed into a "story" of different systems of philosophy, though on a smaller scale than the *Mahābhārata*; and the conflict between *Rāvaṇa* and *Rāma* was changed into an exposition of the difference between the system of *Brahmā* and the dualistic school of *Vishṇu;* and it was for this reason that *Rāvaṇa*

has been described in the Epic as a "descendant" of *Brahmā*, and *Rāma* as half an "incarnation" or embodiment of the idea of *Vishṇu*. I then desired to understand the idea of all the ten principal "incarnations" of *Vishṇu*,—the Fish, the Tortoise, the Boar, the Man-Lion, the Dwarf, *Paraśurāma*, *Rāmachandra*, *Kṛshṇa*, *Buddha*, and *Kalki*—and studied the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa* for the purpose. I applied the same method of interpretation, and found that their idea was exactly the same, and that they described the evolution of the idea of God in the same manner as the *Mahābhārata* dealt with the progress of Man from Nature unto God.

All this was the result of this method of interpretation, based primarily on the division of words used in the text into their parts, so that the text itself remained unchanged; and it transformed a number of strange, extraordinary and fantastic "stories" into simple and consistent accounts of different systems of philosophy and religion, and so placed the ideas of the ancients in an entirely new light. There were the same names, the same words, the same parts, and their meanings were throughout the same,—transforming so many "stories" in works believed to have been composed in different ages, into the same systems of philosophy and religion, with all their points of contact and conflict intact. It then occurred to me that, if all this was true, the main ideas of the Epics and the *Purāṇas* must be found in the systems of philosophy themselves. I had studied these systems in the original,—all but the *Pūrva-Mīmānsā*—(for that is how the *Mīmānsā* is generally called), with such assistance as I could secure, before writing *The Mystery of the Mahābhārata*; but the *Sūtras* had, for the most part, remained unintelligible to me; and most of my conclusions were based on what I could gather from the *Upanishads* and the *Mahābhārata*.

I now believed that these *Sūtras* could not really be unintelligible. I also felt that there must be some mention somewhere of a method of interpretation which had yielded such extraordinary results, and had such a wide range of application from the Vedas to the Epics and the *Purāṇas*. Nor was I disappointed. I found that the *Sūtras*, though difficult in parts, yielded, on the whole, to an easy rendering, and contained even more than what I had expected. They were not separate utterances, as is commonly believed; nor was each *Sūtra* complete in itself,—an idea which has caused so much confusion about them and rendered them unintelligible. I found that they were connected with one another, and could be grouped together into paragraphs, conveying correlated ideas; nor, with the exception of the *Mīmānsā*, did they require much of an explanation to understand them. They also contained a reference to the method of interpretation which I had followed in my study of the sacred books. While there is a broad mention of it in *Nyāya* and a passing reference in the *Vaiśeśika* and *Vedānta*, the *Mīmānsā* examines it at considerable length, and explains the reasons for its adoption. It tells us also of a number of other things, and constitutes, even as tradition has taught us to believe, an introduction to the real study of the Vedas; and, as the same ideas have been repeated or amplified in later works, it may be said to contain the secret of the sacred books. It describes the Law of Dharma or good and intelligent action, and tells us that that is the subject-matter of the Vedas, and that the gods are but personifications of the great forces of Nature acting in accordance with this law. It also points out that a number of the hymns of the Vedas make little sense as they are, and that not a few contain strange, extraordinary and inconsistent statements. That, it observes, has deliberately been done to invite special atten-

tion to the necessity of finding out a different method of interpretation of the text. It then goes on to explain that there is such a method, and if we understand the text in its light, the whole idea would be transformed into an exposition of the laws of life. It explains and illustrates this method at considerable length, and tells us that the same has to be applied to all sacred books,—the *śruti* as well as the *smṛti*. It has accordingly been necessary to publish the whole of the *Mīmānsā* first, so as to enable the reader to grasp the fundamental idea of the sacred books, and the method of interpreting them; and the rest will follow in due course.

III

THE SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY

Connected Systems of Thought—But the *Mīmānsā* does not stand alone, and needs to be understood in its relation to the other systems of philosophy, each of which is called a *Darśana*, which means "a vision or a point of view". Indeed, it would be found on examination, that they are all but different points of view from which we can survey the great problem of life. Life is too large to be seen from a single angle; and so the ancients conceived of the idea of examining it from six different points of view, according to the instrument of knowledge used for the purpose; and it is for this reason that these systems are spoken of as *Darśanas*. We shall presently see what these points of view are; but it follows from this that each of them, taken by itself, should be incomplete; while all of them, taken together, include all that the ancients knew at the time. Unfortunately, however, each of them has been regarded as a complete system by itself; or they are at

best taken in pairs,—with the result that there has been a great deal of confusion and conflict of thought in regard to their real idea. Indeed, as has been observed, the original *Sūtras* are generally regarded as unintelligible; and the student has, for the most part, been obliged to be guided by the opinion of commentators who, though extremely learned and eminent in their own way, confined themselves to but a few of these systems, and regarded them as complete; but, finding that they did not fit into their own scheme of thought, imported their own ideas into them. Nor did they feel bound to limit their exposition to the language of the *Sūtras*, which they conceived to be but independent utterances, complete in themselves, and more like pivots of thought, round which a great body of ideas,—their own and of the ancients—could move; and so they felt free to make their own contributions to these systems.

But a proper study of the *Sūtras* shows that they are not only not unintelligible, but that a single thread of thought runs through all of them; and that, while each system constitutes its own special body of thought, it serves as a stepping stone to the following one; and all of them, taken together, make a great indivisible whole,—so that, as the *Sāṅkhya* is the first and *Vedānta* the last—the question posed in the first *Sūtra* of the former has its final answer in the last *Sūtra* of *Vedānta*.

This is not a mere statement of a personal opinion, for the character of the systems of philosophy has been described in the *Vedānta Sūtras* themselves, and the whole idea may be summarised as follows:—

> All systems of philosophy are equally important, for no single system can be regarded as all-comprehensive; and the whole range of thought has been divided among them just as we may divide the number hundred into parts to enable us to understand it. At the

same time each of them has its own point of view; and we approve of this division, for it enables us to appreciate them (III, iv, 9-14).

But there are some who believe that these divisions are arbitrary, and this has led to a conflict of opinion (III, iv, 15-16).

But, so far as we are aware, this is the view only of those who have a limited experience of the laws of life, and it is rejected by *Jaimini*[1]. According to *Bādarāyaṇa*,[2] we can prove our point, for this division is based on reason, and we can clearly explain its whole principle, which is not meant merely to glorify these systems (III, iv, 17-21).

It is not difficult to do so, for we are able to get the meaning of the text from the words themselves. There is no uncertainty about them, because they are all properly described. Nor are there any symbolic expressions like "kindling the fire", etc.; and there is a proper connection of cause and effect in their ideas, which have their counterparts in the *śruti*. But it is necessary to have calmness and self-control to be able to understand them[3] (III, iv, 22-27)

Division of Thought in the Systems—A proper study of the systems of philosophy will show that they are characterised by clearly defined divisions of thought. Thus we might observe that all knowledge is from the known to the unknown; and the known is the world of Nature around us, while its knower is Man. All knowledge is accordingly based on the relation between the two,—Nature and Man—out of which arises the idea of the Unknown, which we may describe as the Unmanifest or God. The *Sāṅkhya*, the first of these systems of philosophy, accordingly makes a rapid survey of all that the ancients knew of the great principles of Nature; and, assuming it to be the supreme creator of things, examines the different problems of life in its light.

[1] The celebrated author of the *Mīmānsā*.

[2] The celebrated author of the *Vedānta Sūtras*.

[3] It would be found on examination that this is the real character of the language of the *Sūtras*. They are accordingly not only not unintelligible, but, comparatively speaking, easy to understand.

It has, therefore, no place for God as a creator in its scheme; and its final conclusion is that the soul of man is different from all that is in Nature, and that it can attain to freedom from sorrow and pain,—the end of all our quest in the world—by devoting itself to pure self-knowledge, and refraining from all action which arises from Nature or *Prakṛti.*

The whole problem thus resolves itself into the attitude of man to knowledge and action on the one hand, and the idea of Nature or God as the supreme creator of the universe, on the other. As the knower of all this is man, we can examine it in the light of his different faculties,—his senses, mind, *ahaṅkāra*[1] (or the I-as-an-actor), intellect and the soul; and corresponding to these we have the five remaining systems of philosophy,—*Nyāya*, *Vaiśeshika*, *Mīmānsā*, *Yoga*, and *Vedānta*. As we shall presently see, *Nyāya* deals with the question in the light of the function of the senses, conceives of God as a mere on-looker of things, and lays special emphasis on knowledge as the goal of life. The *Vaiśeshika* does so in the light of the character of the mind, conceives of an Unknown Power which has a share in the shaping of things, and, while stressing the importance of knowledge, brings out the idea of action too. The *Mīmānsā* considers it in the light of the character of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, ever ready to act,—conceives of action as of the essence

[1] The word *ahaṅkāra,—aham-kāra,* means literally "*(aham)* I as an *(kāra)* actor". This is the original idea of the word; and its meaning as egosim, or something that needs to be repressed, is a subsidiary one. It is sometimes identified with *abhimāna,* which is said to be an erroneous conception regarding one's self or the soul,—the meaning being that the soul is really not an actor, but when through an error of thought we regard it as such, it may be described as *ahaṅkāra. Ahaṅkāra* is thus the soul erroneously conceived to be an actor; but when we distinguish it from the soul, it may e said to be an instrument of action like the senses, mind, etc.

of life, and as including knowledge itself, and speaks of the great forces of Nature as acting intelligently and for the benefit of all, and so sustaining the universe. *Yoga* examines it in the light of the character of the intellect, gives God a special place in the scheme of life, and, though it admits the importance of action, still concludes on knowledge as the final end. Lastly, *Vedānta* examines the whole problem in the light of the character of the soul itself which, unlike the *Sāṅkhya*, it does not regard as altogether different from all that is in Nature; and so it conceives of *Brahma* or God as including all that is in the universe, and regards knowledge and action but as counterparts of the same energy of the soul; and tells us that real freedom is achieved only when a person attains to equilibrium in the midst of action and the experience of pleasure and pain. As will be observed, *Vedānta* contains the most trenchant criticism of the *Sāṅkhya*, and its last *Sūtra* provides an answer to the question raised in the opening *Sūtra* of that system.

PAIRS OF SYSTEMS—All human faculties are connected together, and some of them in a special way; and corresponding to this the six systems of philosophy are often grouped together into three pairs,—*Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeshika*, and *Mīmānsā* and *Vedānta*,—also called *Pūrva-Mīmānsā* and *Uttara-Mīmānsā* respectively. The *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are grouped together, because, as we have observed, *Yoga* is based on the character of the intellect, and the *Sāṅkhya* too, though it has its own ideas of Nature, soul, and God, —attempts to evolve a rational system of thought and to provide a rational soultion to the fundamental problem of life, —freedom from sorrow and pain; and so both *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are based on the character of the intellect, although their conclusions are not the same; and it is for this reason

that the *Bhagavad Gītā* speaks of the basic identity of the two.[1]

Similarly, as *Nyāya* is based on the character of the senses, and *Vaiśeshika* on that of the mind,—and there is a vital connection between the two, there is a corresponding connection between these systems, and they too are often taken together.

There is a similar connection between *ahaṇkāra* and the soul. According to the *Sāṅkhya*, *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor evolves out of the intellect, because action can take place only after there is a decision to act,—and the latter is the function of the intellect. Again, the *Sāṅkhya* maintains that all things in the universe, including the intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, the senses, the "elements" and their properties, —indeed everything except the soul—is a creation of Nature or *Prakṛti*; and so it attempts to make a clear distinction between *ahaṅkara* and the soul. But it does not succeed, because it is obliged to admit that, though the soul is, according to it, different from *ahaṅkāra*, it identifies itself with it through lack of knowledge, and imagines that it is an actor itself; and it cannot explain why, since it is really so different, it should be affected by ignorance, and do so. The question is really answered by *Vedānta*, which tells us that the soul is for ever linked up with a "subtle body", which partakes of the character of the essence of the intellect, mind, and the senses, and so cannot be dissociated from all that is in Nature. It accordingly maintains that the soul and *ahaṅkāra* are but two aspects of the same entity; and when the soul is engaged in action, it is spoken of as *ahaṅkāra*; and when it is not, we speak of it as soul. And corresponding to this there is a close connection between the *Mīmānsā* and *Vedānta*,—based on the character of *ahaṅkāra* and the soul respectively; and so

BhG. V. 4-5.

the one is spoken of as *Pūrva* and the other as *Uttara-Mīmānsā*,—the beginning and end of all philosophy.

A JOINT WORK—All this would, however, be possible only if all these systems of philosophy were composed at the same time, and their authors collaborated with one another; and an examination of their form and subject-matter warrants such a conclusion.[1] Indeed, there are clear references to *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeshika* and *Yoga* in the *Sāṅkhya*; while *Vedānta* constitutes the most powerful criticism of this system. At the same time the opinions of *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa*,—the celebrated authors of *Mīmānsā* and *Vedānta*—quoted freely in their respective systems, go clearly to show that they were contemporaries.

THE PROBLEM OF DATES—It would indeed be difficult, if not impossible, to fix the chronology of the sacred books,—even of the systems of philosophy—with any degree of accuracy, for the ancients had their own conception of Time; and so we have, for the most part, to depend on internal evidence,—that of the works themselves. There are, however, not a few who would assign widely different dates to these systems, so that the question of their being a joint work of contemporaries cannot, so far as they are concerned, arise. Some of them would go so far as to maintain that the *Sāṅkhya*, in its present form, was composed in about the fourteenth century A.D., mainly on the ground that we have no certain knowledge of its reputed author, *Kapila*; and *Mādhava*, the author of the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, who lived in the

[1] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan is of the opinion that the whole tone and manner of composition of the *Sūtras* suggests that they belong apparently to the same period, and believes that these systems must have existed in some form before the Christian era (*Indian Philosophy*, II, 23).

sixteenth century A.D., makes no mention of the *Sāṅkhya*, and gives an account of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of *Iśvara-kṛshṇa* instead.[1] In this connection it may be of interest to point out that *Iśvara-kṛshṇa* himself refers to the *Muni* (who can only be *Kapila*)[2], as the author of the work on which he had based his own; and states that it consists of sixty topics, and that he had written his own after a careful study and grasp of the original, and had omitted its short tales and subjects of controversy.[3] An examination of the *Sūtras* of the *Sāṅkhya* in its present form will show that the statement of *Iśvara-kṛshṇa* is true in every part,—for this system really consists of sixty topics, and the character of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* is indeed as its author has described it to be. As *Isvara-kṛshṇa* is believed to have lived in the first century A.D., this may enable us to fix the date of the *Sāṅkhya* and other systems, as also of still earlier works.

It has been stated by *Iśvara-kṛshṇa* that he had composed the *Kārikā* after properly understanding the original text, implying that it was not easy to understand the *Sāṅkhya* even in his days. These *Sūtras* are still believed to be largely unintelligible; but it may be presumed that they were not exactly so in his time,—still not quite easy to grasp. The history of modern languages shows that it takes nearly a thousand years for the original forms of expression to lose their meaning; and, if we apply the same test to *Sanskṛt*, the *Sūtras* of the *Sāṅkhya*, which appeared to be difficult to understand even in the days of *Iśvara-kṛshṇa*, must have been composed before the eighth century B.C. Indeed, as all the six systems

[1] *Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāshya* by Richard Garbe, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. II, Preface, p. ix. Also *Indian Philosophy* by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, II, 255-256.

[2] Cf. BhG. X, 26.

[3] *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, LXIX-LXXIII.

of philosophy must have been composed at the same time, the date of composition of all would be the same.

We can fix the approximate date of composition of the Vedas in the same manner. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the original meaning of the Vedas had been lost in the days of *Jaimini*,—that is, the eighth century B.C. Indeed, it appears from what has been stated in the *Mīmānsā*, that the original idea of even the *smṛtis*,—the Epics and the *Purāṇas*—had all but disappeared. The latter works must accordingly have been composed a few hundred years earlier,—that is, between 1500 and 2000 B.C., while the Vedas a few hundred years earlier still,—that is, between 2000 and 2500 B.C. The Vedas may indeed belong to a still earlier period, for they have always been regarded as sacred, and persistent attempts must have been made not only to preserve their original form, but also their original meaning. In any case they are not likely to be earlier than about three thousand B.C., and there can be little wonder if their original meaning has been forgotten or lost.

AN ESSENCE OF THE SACRED BOOKS—As the systems of philosophy contain an essence of the sacred books, it would be convenient to give a summary of their *Sūtras*, as that will enable the reader not only to have a proper idea of the place of the *Mīmānsā*, but also to understand the range of thought of the ancients and the character of the sacred books.

IV

THE SANKHYA SYSTEM

THE SANKHYA—The *Sāṅkhya* is the first of the six principal

systems of philosophy, and is said to have been composed by the celebrated ascetic *Kapila*. The word *Sāṅkhya* means "relating to numbers", as well as "rational, discriminative"; and this system partakes of both these characteristics, for it enumerates certain topics or categories of ideas, and at the same time is essentially rational in its outlook,—maintaining that we can attain to freedom from the sorrows of life by means of pure knowledge or discrimination.

SIX CHAPTERS AND SIXTY TOPICS—It is divided into six chapters and, as the author of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* has observed, deals with sixty topics,—twenty-seven in the first, nine in the second, six in the third, four in the fourth, twelve in the fifth, and two in the last. There is little repetition of thought in the first two chapters, and only a few points are re-emphasised in the following three; but the whole idea is summed up again in the last chapter, and so it contains only two new topics. It would be convenient to give a summary of the whole.

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF LIFE

The object of a man's life is to put an end to all pain, for freedom from pain alone is real freedom. The soul is kept in bondage by *Prakṛti*, but it cannot be so for ever (1-33).

Life is governed by a number of laws,—of change, of cause and effect, of death, and of action and actionlessness, all of which require knowledge to understand (34-59). But the knowledge of things not visible to the eye is acquired by means of inference. All knowledge has a bearing on *Prakṛti* or Nature; and we can know by means of inference that it is originally in a state of rest, and then evolves into its various forms of life,—intellect, *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, mind, the senses of knowledge and action, and the "elements" and their properties (60-66).

Prakṛti is the first cause of things,—including intellect, *ahaṅkāra* and the mind; and the first cause can neither be the atom, nor action, nor the soul (67-85).

It is necessary to have knowledge to understand all this; and, in order to have knowledge, we must know the means of acquiring it. There are three such means,—*pratyaksha* or sense-perception, *anumāna* or inference, and *śabda* or the testimony of the true and the wise; and it is necessary to understand their scope and character (86-103).

In this connection we must remember that the soul is not an actor, but only an experiencer of the result of action. It is something real, for the unreal cannot exist (104-120).

In order to understand the problem of life, we must know the real significance of destruction and creation, the character of substances and the three *Guṇas*, and the function of the intellect and the soul; and this will enable us to understand the meaning of freedom and bondage (121-164).

I[1]. THE OBJECT OF HUMAN LIFE—The whole object of a man's life is to put an end to all kinds of pain; but the remedy for this is not physical (1-6).[2]

II. FREEDOM AND ITS IMPORTANCE—Freedom means freedom from pain; and it implies that a person should know what it is, and it should be possible for him to attain it (7-11).

III. THE SOUL AND ITS BONDAGE—The soul is eternal,—that is, it is not subject to time or place. But it is kept in bondage by *Prakṛti* or Nature; and it is not an actor, though it is associated with *Prakṛti*. But it cannot be kept in bondage for ever. The association of the soul with *Prakṛti* or Nature is its bondage; but it does not arise from ignorance, for ignorance does not inhere in the soul (12-33).

IV. THE LAW OF CHANGE—All things, except the soul, are subject to change (34-37).

[1] The Roman figures refer to the numbers of topics in this system.

[2] The figures in brackets refer to the numbers of *Sūtras* in the text.

V. The Law of Cause and Effect—It is necessary to understand the relation of cause and effect, and have a knowledge of the laws of Nature (38-41).

VI. The Law of Death—There is also the law of Death; but a knowledge of it cannot put an end to pain (42-47).

VII. The Law of Action and Actionlessness—The object of life,—namely, cessation of pain, cannot be achieved by means of any course of action; and so we may conclude that we can succeed only by means of actionlessness or renunciation of all action (48-59).

VIII. Prakriti and its Creation—The knowledge of things not visible to the eye is obtained by means of inference; and it is by its means that we understand that there is at first a state of equilibrium of the three *Guṇas*; and it is this that is called *Prakṛti*.[1] Then, when the course of life begins, we can understand that *Prakṛti* evolves into intellect, *ahaṅkāra* (the I-as-an-actor, which includes the mind),[2] the five subtle properties of the five great "elements", the ten senses,

[1] We cannot understand the idea of action without reference to a state of rest. Indeed, there has to be a state of rest, however brief, before there can be action. The evolution of *Prakṛti* or Nature into different forms of life is a form of action; and so it must be preceded by a state of rest or equilibrium. As, however, we cannot know the original state of the substance out of which all life evolves, we come to the conclusion that it must be one of rest before it begins to act; and we do so by means of inference.

The *Sāṅkhya* does not explain the idea of the *Guṇas* in any detail; and that is done by the following systems.

[2] The *Sāṅkhya* tells us that the mind arises out of *ahaṅkāra* (II, 18-19), but does not explain how. That is done by *Nyāya*, which tells us that "its origin lies in its connection with the result of previous action" (III, ii, 60).

and the five great "elements".[1] All these, together with the soul, make a total of twenty-five[2] (60-66).

IX. PRAKRITI IS THE FIRST CAUSE OF THINGS—When we trace the origin of things through an uninterrupted series of objects, we find that the only conclusion at which we can arrive is that *Prakṛti* is the original cause of things (67-70).

X. CREATION OF INTELLECT, AHANKARA, AND MIND—From *Prakṛti* arises *Mahat* or the intellect, the first activity of which is the mind, and the last *ahaṅkāra*;[3] and the latter acts by means of the senses of knowledge and action (71-73).

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[1] The *Sāṅkhya* does not describe the "elements" or their attributes, or the ten senses or their connection with the "elements" and their attributes. That is done by the following systems. It may be explained as follows:—

"ELEMENTS":	ETHÈR	AIR	FIRE	WATER	EARTH
ATTRIBUTES:	Sound	Touch	From	Taste	Smell
SENSES OF KNOWLEDGE:	Ears	Skin	Eyes	Tongue	Nose
SENSES OF ACTION:	Legs	Arms	Tongue (for speech)	Organ of Creation	Organ of Excretion

The ancient idea of an "element" was different from that of the present-day science. It was conceived as a great "elemental" substance, or a great and fundamental object of Nature.

[2] The total of twenty-five is made up of (1) *Prakṛti* in a state of rest or unmanifest form; (2-4) intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, and mind; (5-9) the five great "elements"; (10-14) the five attributes of the "elements"; (15-19) the five senses of knowledge; (20-24) the five senses of action; and (25) *purusha* or the individual soul.

This is the idea of *purusha* (individual soul) and *Prakṛti* in the *Sāṅkhya*; and it has no place for God as a creator in its scheme.

[3] The special characteristic of the intellect is decision; of the mind desire; and of *ahaṅkāra* action. This statement of the *Sāṅkhya* means that decision and desire are closely connected together, and are followed by action. We have already been told that *ahaṅkāra* arises from the intellect; and the *Sāṅkhya* tells us more clearly in the following chapter (II, 18-19) that the mind is produced from *ahaṅkāra*. The present statement needs therefore to be understood in its proper light. How the mind arises from *ahaṅkāra* is explained by *Nyāya*.

XI. THE ATOM IS NOT THE ORIGINAL CAUSE OF THINGS—When we trace the original cause of things through an uninterrupted series of objects, we come at last to the atom. But it cannot be regarded as the original cause of things, because it is derived from something else (74-80).

XII. ACTION IS NOT THE ORIGINAL CAUSE—Action cannot be regarded as the original cause, for it has an origin itself (namely, the actor) (81).

XIII. THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS NOT THE ORIGINAL CAUSE—Nor can we regard the individual soul as the original cause, because it is subject to birth, and it is only the perfect one that is not born again. Again, things give birth to their likes; and so, if the soul had been the original cause, it would have created only souls, and not the objects we see (82-85).

XIV. THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE—It is necessary to have a correct notion of things, which requires proper means of acquiring definite knowledge. There are three such means,—*pratyaksha* or the evidence of the senses, *anumāna* or inference, and *śabda* or the testimony of the true and the wise. We can prove anything by means of these (86-88).

XV. PRATYAKSHA—*Pratyaksha* is the knowledge of a real substance with a real form, acquired by means of impressions that it makes on us. However, it cannot prove the existence of God (89-92).

XVI. THE EXISTENCE OF COD CANNOT BE PROVED—It is impossible to prove the existence of God,—for we can conceive of Him only as free or not free, and in either case He cannot be regarded as the original creator of life. But His idea can

correspond to that of a liberated soul; but that will only be a magnified conception of such a soul, which is itself not an actor, and can only be regarded as an on-looker of things (93-99).

XVII. ANUMANA—*Anumāna* or inference consists in an uninterrupted appearance of certain things, which are known to be always connected with or dependent on one another (100).

XVIII. SABDA—*Sabda* or oral authority is the teaching of a true and trustworthy person, and is a valid means of acquiring knowledge like *anumāna* (101-103).

XIX. THE SOUL IS NOT AN ACTOR—Pleasure abides in the mind and not the soul; and the soul is not an actor, but only an experiencer of the result of action. Hence it cannot be an actor, for it cannot be both an actor and experiencer at the same time (104-107).

XX. THE UNREAL CANNOT EXIST—If an object is out of reach of the senses or is minute, we can know of it by means of the effect it produces; but an unreal thing cannot be proved to exist like a man with horns. Nor can we say that there is action when there is apparently none (108-120).

XXI. THE MEANING OF DESTRUCTION—Destruction is really dissolution or absorption into the original cause or principle from which a thing emanates, and not annihilation or reduction to nothingness (121).

XXII. THE LAW OF BIRTH—Things give birth to things like their own (122-123).

XXIII. Character of Substances—A thing that is produced out of something else cannot be eternal or all-pervading. It is subject to action or change, is distinct from and dependent on other things, and has its own characteristics and form; but it is not altogether different from all other things (124-125).

XXIV. The Three Gunas—All created things are characterised by the three *Guṇas* and a state of unconsciousness, all of which belong to *Prakṛti*, which is accordingly the original cause of all. Love, hate, and insensibility are the different characteristics of the three *Guṇas*, which affect all creatures, though they may have different or opposite qualities in respect of one another (126-128).

XXV. The Function of the Intellect—There is a difference between cause and effect, though they have something in common too; and it is the function of the intellect to point out all this. But intellect has its own limitations too; and it is for this reason that we have to think of *Prakṛti* or the soul as superior to it. It is the function of the intellect to infer cause from effect; and we cannot deny its existence, nor that of Dharma or the moral law of life (129-138).

XXVI. The Character of the Soul—The soul is different from the body, which is dependent on it. It is different from the body because it is without any *Guṇas*; and, as it is the latter that make for action, the soul cannot act. It can only be an experiencer or on-looker of things. It is different from the body, because a thing is said to be lifeless and is cast away when the soul ceases to abide in it. It is different from the intellect and the mind, for the latter partake of the *Guṇas*, whereas the soul does not. We cannot deny the existence

of the soul,—for it is the soul that feels pain, the removal of which is the chief object of a man's life. The state of sound sleep also proves the existence of the soul and its difference from the body (139-148).

There are an infinite number of souls, each different from the other,—for the birth of each is different; but the same soul may occupy different bodies in different births, for it is born again and again. The form of the body can be changed, but not of the soul dwelling in it. In any case we must agree that it is the same soul that dwells in the same body during a life-time. The sacred books all agree that the same soul is born again and again; and that is so because of its attachment to the world; and the body in which it is born is the visible form of its bondage (149-159).

XXVII. FREEDOM AND BONDAGE—The two states of existence,—life in this world and freedom from bondage—are inconsistent with each other. We cannot deny that there is bondage; and the very idea of indifference to the world is a proof of its reality. But the soul is not an actor, and only believes that it is so under the influence of the intellect, to which it is closely allied, and which darkens its light of pure knowledge (160-164).

CHAPTER II

THE LAW OF ACTION

The whole world exists either for the sake of the soul or of *Prakṛti*; and the proof of it lies in the nature of desire and the character of *Prakṛti* (1-6).

Desire arises from the mind or the intellect; and we must know the nature of both, which involves that of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor too (7-19). At the same time we must safeguard against certain

errors in regard to the idea of action and the character of the mind (20-27).

Action involves the function of the senses as well as of *prāṇa* or vital breath; and it is of many kinds. It can be painful as well as not painful; but it is only when all kinds of actions come to an end that a person feels happy and free (28-35).

There are a number of factors of action,—the senses, mind, *ahaṅkāra*, intellect, as well as an Unseen Power (36-47).

XXVIII. THE PURPOSE OF THE UNIVERSE—The whole world exists either for the sake of the soul or of *Prakṛti*; and the proof of it lies in the nature of desire and the real character of *Prakṛti* (1-6).

XXIX. THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF DESIRE—Desire of all kinds arises from the mind or the intellect, and creation itself is the result of desire. All this exists for the sake of the soul, as we find from an examination of country, time and place (7-12.)

XXX. INTELLECT—Intellect means the understanding of objects by means of mental effort, and its special function is to settle Dharma (13-15).

XXXI. AHANKARA—*Ahaṅkāra* is an erroneous conception regarding one's self, and it acts in association with the ten senses and the mind and the five properties of the "elements" (16-17).

XXXII. MIND—The mind is characterised by the quality of goodness, and is produced from *ahaṅkāra*. It dwells within, and functions through the senses of knowledge and action (18-19).

XXXIII. CERTAIN IDEAS AND ERRORS—We see that *ahaṅkāra* can act, but not material things. We also know that a

person must cease to act, but not at the commencement of his life, and the idea of it arises when he thinks of death. It is only confused people who mix up things and believe that, since the senses are different, there can be no unity in action; and they hold that the mind is of the nature of the senses. There are some who believe that the difference between things arises from the effect of the passage of time (20-27).

XXXIV. THE SENSES—The senses of knowledge and action have their respective attributes which do not change, and their special functions are to see, hear, etc. The whole manner of action is affected by *prāṇa* or vital breath; and the action of the senses can be regular as well as irregular (28-32).

XXXV. ACTION AND ITS CESSATION—There are five kinds of activity,—painful and not painful; and when they all cease, a person attains to calmness, aversion to all desire, and health of body and mind, and his whole life becomes fragrant and beautiful (33-35).

XXXVI. THE FACTORS OF ACTION: AN UNSEEN POWER, THE SENSES, MIND, AHANKARA, AND INTELLECT—There is an Unseen Power; and when we say that all action is for the sake of the soul, it is because we give prominence to the idea of this Power. Action consists of thirteen parts,—the function of the ten senses—and the mind, *ahaṅkāra* and the intellect, which constitute an internal organ. Of these the most important is the intellect, for it puts together or arranges all things. We know this by means of memory and inference; but we cannot trace the origin of the intellect, for it is not self-illuminated. But it is the most powerful factor of action, and it is for that reason that it is honoured most (36-47).

CHAPTER III

MAN AND THE UNIVERSE

There is a law of life according to which things with special characteristics arise from those which are without such special characteristics; and the whole world is subject to this law (1-5).
But the ultimate origin of all things is beyond what is differentiated or not differentiated. Nevertheless, the birth of a creature is the effect of a cause; for the soul is always accompanied by a "subtle body", which is the cause of its birth and the difference between individuals that we see (6-13).
The soul is small like an atom, but all things exist for its sake; and this vast universe cannot be destroyed (14-22).
But the soul seeks freedom from its bondage, and that can arise only from knowledge, and the elimination of all desire (23-36). Desire is associated with objects, which can all be classified (37-45); and *Prakṛti* itself is said to consist of the three *Guṇas* (46-50).
Freedom consists in freedom from the action of *Prakṛti*, and the recurrence of birth and death; and it can be achieved only by refraining from all action (51-57). *Prakṛti* acts entirely for the sake of the soul; and the soul can make itself free by means of knowledge, and when the two become indifferent to each other (58-81). It is possible to achieve this freedom, for the impressions of previous actions made on the soul can become fainter and fainter, till at last they finally disappear, and the soul becomes free for ever (82-84).

XXXVII. THE LAW OF EVOLUTION—Things with special characteristics arise from those which are without such special characteristics. The body, with its differentiated parts, arises in the same manner, and so also the whole world out of its seed (1-5).

But the origin of things is beyond what is differentiated or not differentiated. It is said that a creature is born of its parents; but it is not so; for the birth of a body is an effect, the cause of which lies in a previous birth. There is a "subtle body" which accompanies the soul through all its transmigrations, and it consists of seventeen parts; and the difference between individuals is due to their different actions in a previous state of existence (6-13).

XXXVIII. THE SOUL AND THE WORLD—When we understand the nature of the soul we come to the conclusion that it must be small like an atom, and is covered by a body which is made up of food. We also find that the course of activity of all things is for the sake of the soul (14-16).

XXXIX. THE UNIVERSE CANNOT BE DESTROYED—The body consists of the five "elements", although there are some who say that it consists of only four, or even one. In any case we know that the "elements" do not possess any consciousness, and that this vast universe cannot be destroyed (17-22).

FREEDOM AND BONDAGE[1]—Freedom arises from knowledge, and bondage from its opposite. But events which occur in a normal, natural course, do not make for bondage; nor does freedom mean freedom from everything, real as well as unreal (23-28).

XL. ELIMINATION OF DESIRE—When a person has no desire to act, all his actions may be said to have been done. Desire is destroyed by means of meditation, which comes of restraint of action, concentration of mind, a certain posture of the body, and one's own effort. Control is effected by means of suspension of breath; the posture should be steady as well as comfortable; while effort should be in conformity with one's own stage of life. All this can be attained by means of indifference to worldly objects and constant discipline (29-36).

XLI. DIFFERENT DIVISIONS OF THINGS—Bondage is of five kinds; the incapacity to act of twenty-eight kinds; satisfaction

[1] This is not a new topic, and may be said to be a continuation of XXVII.

of nine kinds; attainment of eight kinds; while the intermediate divisions of these are of similar kinds; and we can describe all things in this manner. The attainment of objects is achieved by means of deliberation, inference, etc.; but there can be no freedom without renouncing everything (37-45).

XLII. PRAKRITI AND ITS GUNAS—There are a number of divisions of what relates to the great forms and forces of Nature; and the whole universe has been created in this manner. It is characterised by the *Guṇas*, of which the highest is *Sattva*, the lowest *Tamas*, and the intermediate one *Rajas* (46-50).

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM[1]—The action of *Prakṛti* is like that of a born slave for its master. There is a recurrence of birth and evolution into higher and higher forms of life by its means. It is in accordance with the same law that there is sorrow born of old age and death; and we can get rid of it not by plunging into action, but by refraining from it. He who does so attains to all knowledge, and may be said to have done all his deeds. It is possible to prove the existence of an *Iśvara* or God of this kind,—namely, a soul that is free (51-57).

THE ACTION OF PRAKRITI[2]—As *Prakṛti* cannot be the experiencer of its own actions, they are all performed for the sake of the soul, though unconsciously so. It acts without any self-interest of its own, like a servant for its master, because it is its nature to do so (58-62).

[1] This is not a new topic, and is a continuation of XXVII.
[2] This is not a new topic, and may be said to be a continuation of XXXVIII.

THE FREEDOM OF THE SOUL[1]—When the pure soul acquires knowledge, it ceases to have any interest in *Prakṛti*; and it attains to freedom either when it becomes indifferent to *Prakṛti*, or the latter become indifferent to it, or when both become indifferent to each other. But, in spite of the desire of the soul to make itself free, it continues in its bondage through lack of discrimination, because of the service rendered to it by *Prakṛti*. But there is always a cessation of action when the purpose of action has ceased to be served; and so when *Prakṛti* ceases to serve the purpose of the soul, the latter becomes free. The bondage and freedom of the soul do not arise by themselves; for there can be no bondage except through lack of discrimination on the part of the soul, and the devotion of *Prakṛti* to it; and freedom is attained by means of discrimination. In this way a person can make himself free even during his life-time (63-81).

The continued existence of the body is like a wheel that goes round and round for ever; and the proof of the possibility of freedom lies in the fact that the impressions of actions made on the soul can be made fainter and fainter,—till at last they finally disappear. But it is only when, as a result of discrimination, there is a complete end to sorrow, that a person can become free (82-84).

CHAPTER IV

FUNCTION OF INTELLECT AND THE MIND

The function of the intellect is discrimination, and it has a bearing on the idea of pleasure and pain as well as desire. There is dis-

[1] This is not a new topic, but a continuation of XXVII

crimination when we understand reality; pleasure arises on receiving, and pain in losing a thing; and association with objects makes for desire (1-10). But he who is without desire or hope is happy (11-12).

There are a number of ways of attaining to happiness; but it would be improper to refrain from performing necessary actions (13-21).

Desire is the cause of re-birth; but he who is without attachment attains to discrimination and freedom (22-28). However, good advice has little effect on an impure mind (29-32).

XLIII. DISCRIMINATION—There is discrimination when we understand reality, as in the case of the King's son.[1] We can also get it from instruction meant even for some one else. But it requires repeated teaching, and a fatherly regard of the preceptor for his pupil (1-4).

XLIV. PLEASURE AND PAIN—A person becomes glad or sorry according as he gains or loses a thing. A serpent is relieved when it casts off its skin, and a person when he renounces all action (5-7).

DESIRE[2]—Thinking intently on an object makes for its bond, even though there be no means of attaining it. Association with objects, however trifling, is a hindrance in the path, because it creates desires; and that is so even if their number be only two (8-10).

XLV. THE CAUSE OF HAPPINESS AND THE MEANS TO ATTAIN IT—He who is without desire or hope is happy; and he continues to be so if he refrains from actions, and lives where he can (11-12).

There are a number of ways of attaining to happiness. In

[1] There are a number of references to "stories" in this chapter, to which a reference has been made by the author of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* (SK. LXII)

[2] This is not a new topic, and is but a continuation of XXIX.

seeking knowledge from teachers or books, we should glean the very best; and concentration means one-pointedness. But it would be very improper to fail to perform necessary actions, —even through forgetfulness. A person should reflect, honour his teachers, and practise continence; and he can achieve success by devoting himself to whatever form or idea he wishes to pursue (13-21).

Desire is the cause of re-birth; and even if a person gain all he seeks, he is born again. But he who is without attachment attains to discrimination,—for bondage arises from association with objects, and there can be no abatement of desire through indulgence (22-28).

XLVI. AN IMPURE MIND—Good advice has no effect on an impure mind,—at least not commensurate with the character of the advice. In any case, a person cannot realise his goal through wealth or power (29-32).

CHAPTER V

GOD AND NATURE

Prayer has no necessary connection with the existence of God. If we believe that there is God who comes to our help in time of need, we must associate Him with desire; and if we do so, we cannot conceive of Him as free. We cannot associate Him with action, for all actions are not good (1-12).

Action is a characteristic of *Prakṛti* or Nature, and discrimination arises from knowledge (13-19). But if we believe that all action is performed by *Prakṛti*, it does not mean that we destroy the basis of Dharma (20-26). Dharma implies an idea of reality, which is produced by means of an innate power. We cannot properly describe or prove it, but its existence cannot be denied (27-38). It is also dealt with in the Vedas, which deal with the problem of action. The idea of the soul has a bearing on that of the intellect which, in its turn, refers to this innate power (39-51). All this means knowledge, and can be expressed by means of language (52-60).

The separate existence of the soul and Nature means that there can be no monistic conception of life (61-65).

Intellect is the first to arise from *Prakṛti*; but intellect and joy are two different things; and it is only by means of pure intellect or discrimination that a person can make himself free (66-68).

The intellect is not all-pervasive; nor is the mind (69-71); but it can enable us to understand the nature of freedom (72-86). It also enables us to understand the nature of an atom (87-90), and attain to peace in the midst of change (91-101). It is by means of the intellect that we can understand the nature of our body and its functions (102-110); and the four different kinds of creatures that exist in the world (111-112); and it is also by its means that we can distinguish between the body and the soul, and understand the nature of action (113-125). But it makes us realise that there is nothing permanent in the world (126-129).

XLVII. Belief in God and Prayer—Prayer for success has no necessary connection with God. It really means pursuit of virtuous actions, understanding the effects of causes, and following the precepts of the sacred books. The fact that certain effects follow from certain causes does not require belief in the existence of God; for we can succeed through self-help. It is only when we do not think so, that we get the popular idea of God,—one who helps in time of need. But we cannot believe in such a God without reference to desire, which is the basis of all action; and if we associate God with desire, we cannot conceive of Him as free. If we believe that His action arises out of association with the powers of Nature,—even that postulates desire. If, however, we believe that there is an essence of goodness in desire, and so we can associate it with Him,—we must regard everything as good or belonging to God. But that, as we know, cannot be proved. Indeed, we cannot associate God with action, for the sacred books agree that all action is a characteristic of Nature, and so is performed by it (1-12).

XLVIII. Importance of Knowledge—Detachment does not arise from ignorance, but from knowledge. Indeed,

the origin of the world itself is from knowledge; and if we destroy knowledge, we destroy the whole world (13-19).

. XLIX. DHARMA AND BELIEF IN PRAKRITI—If we believe that all action is performed by *Prakṛti*, it does not mean that we destroy the basis of Dharma. Those who understand Dharma know that it refers to the function of the inner organ; and there is no objection to this on the part of those who believe that it is *Prakṛti* who creates (20-26).

L. AN INNATE POWER—The idea of reality is produced by means of an innate power; but it cannot be adequately described or specified. For instance, we know that it exists in the growth of a tree, but cannot easily prove it; but if we admit that it exists within a tree, we cannot deny it in the case of man. In every action there must be the association of two things,—the signifier and the thing signified; but this does not mean that action is obligatory (27-38).

LI. THE CHARACTER OF THE VEDAS—We cannot easily understand the meaning of the Vedas; but we know that the idea of Dharma does not arise from sacrifices, and a person can be freed from bondage by developing his own inner energy. We cannot regard the Vedas as eternal, because they are said to deal with the problem of action; nor do they deal with the real problem of the soul. Indeed, the real state of the soul has a bearing on the function of the intellect, which may be seen in the manifestation of our inner energy, the existence of which cannot be denied (39-51).

LII. THE USE OF LANGUAGE—There can be no real knowledge of that which does not exist or cannot be described

in words. The meaning of a word is not self-explanatory; and a word is but an effect of a cause, and cannot be eternal. If, however, we agree that an effect follows a cause as a result of action, we must also agree that the action which produces the result must exist too (52-60).

LIII. IMPOSSIBILITY OF MONISM—When we understand the character of the soul as something different from all that is in Nature, we see that there can be no monistic conception of life. Indeed, there can be no such conception even if we deny the existence of the soul, for it would be contradictory to the evidence of the senses. But a monistic view is not possible if we agree that both Nature and the soul exist (61-65).

LIV. INTELLECT AND JOY—Intellect and joy are two different things, and there is no necessary presence of joy in the exercise of the intellect. The primary object of action is the cessation of pain, and the idea of joy is a secondary one; and it is only by means of indifference to the world that a person can make himself free from the bondage of life (66-68).

THE MIND AND INTELLECT[1]—Whether we think of the mind as an instrument of action or an organ of sense, it cannot be regarded as all-pervasive; and the course of action of the intellect is similar too. The mind consists of parts, each of which is connected with an organ of sense (69-71).

LV. THE NATURE OF FREEDOM—We cannot be certain about the existence of anything except Nature and the soul;

[1] This is not a new topic, and may be included in XXX and XXXII.

and the latter is merely an experiencer of the result of action. At the same time we cannot identify freedom with joy. Freedom is not the elimination of some particular characteristic, or the destruction of some particular form, or even of all things; nor can it be attained by means of some particular mode of life by one who merely refrains from action. It does not consist in possession,—of a kingdom, or good fortune, or even supernatural powers, or an *Indra* like state; nor does it consist in the knowledge of the "elements", or of the six categories or sixteen kinds of things[1] (72-86).

THE ATOM[2]—The atom is not eternal, because it is the effect of a cause, and consists of parts. The law of *pratyaksha* or the evidence of the senses does not require that a thing should have a physical form; and the primary measures are only two,—small and large (87-90).

LVI. IMPERMANENCE—Although all things are transient, he who is tranquil can understand the totality of things by means of *Yoga* and his innate power (91-95).

Knowledge and the fact of possessing it are two different things, and there is no permanent bond between them because both of them are subject to change. There is thus no permanent bond between things, because the intellect itself, which perceives Dharma, is not permanent. When we have a proper understanding of things, we find that neither action nor an object of desire is permanent (96-101).

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[1] This is a reference to the *Vaiśeshika* and *Nyāya* systems of thought. According to the former, supreme good is attained by means of a knowledge of six categories of things; and according to the latter by means of a knowledge of sixteen things.

[2] This is not a new topic, and may be included in XI.

LVII. The Body and its Function—The body does not consist of the five "elements" alone; for instance, it has a mind, without which the senses cannot act. The different senses perform different functions; and the function of an object is different from its parts,—main as well as subsidiary. This, however, does not mean that a function is a substance. At the same time there is no difference in the material causes of things, even though the countries or places be different. Thus the meaning of a name arises from the explanation of the cause of a thing, and is the same everywhere (102-110).

LVIII. Four Kinds of Creatures—There are four kinds of creatures,—germs, plants, creatures born of an egg, and creatures born from the womb. They are different from one another; but there is one thing common to all,—the "element" Earth (111-112).

The Body and the Soul[1]—The action of the body does not commence with the action of *prāṇa* or vital breath, but with the function of the senses. But the latter do not act of their own accord; and there is something within that experiences their function, because of which we get the idea of experience. That is the soul, which is the master, and the rest are its servants. The soul can understand its true character in a state of *Samādhi* or profound meditation, when the perceiver and the object perceived become identified, or in a state of deep dreamless slumber, or of freedom from worldly existence. The first two make for action again, but not the third; for he who is without attachment is reborn but once; the rest again and again (113-125).

[1] This is not a new topic, and may be included in XXVI and LVII.

IMPERMANENCE[1]—Everything in the world is impermanent; but this does not mean that we deny the powers that can be acquired by means of *Yoga*. However, no gross "element" has any consciousness or intelligence either by itself or in combination with other things (126-129).

CHAPTER VI

THE SOUL AND FREEDOM

We cannot deny the existence of the soul or its difference from the body (1-4); but it is only when there is a complete cessation of sorrow that a person can be said to be happy (5-9).

The soul is really without any attachment or *Guṇas*; and it is only want of discrimination that brings about its bondage (10-16). But it can become free; and he who is liberated is not bound again (17-23); and it can do so by means of discrimination (24-31).

Prakṛti is the original cause of all things,—all except the soul (32-44); and there is a multiplicity of souls, because we see that all creatures are different from one another (45-51). At the same time we cannot deny that the world is real, and that the actor is *ahaṅkāra* and not the soul (52-58). But it is the soul that understands, and is the principle of life within us (59-66).

Thus we conclude that the efficient cause of action is *Prakṛti*, and it is closely associated with the soul. But whatever the cause of this association, the chief object of a man's life is to put an end to it all, for it is the cause of our pain (67-70).

THE SOUL AND THE BODY[2]—We cannot deny the existence of the soul or its difference from the body. The very idea of possession implies the existence of a possessor; and the latter can only be a living creature with a soul, and not a thing made of stone (1-4).

[1] This is not a new topic, and is included in LVI.

[2] This is included in XXVI and LVII.

PLEASURE AND PAIN[1]—It is only when there is a complete cessation of sorrow that a person can be said to be happy. Pain arises from sorrow; but pleasure does not satisfy our desires; for we know that there is no one who is happy in this world. Sorrow is of many forms; and even pleasure may be said to be a kind of sorrow. But the absence of joy does not mean that action is not performed for the sake of the soul (5-9).

THE SOUL AND THE GUNAS[2]—If the soul can be without attachment, it means that it cannot have any *Guṇas* or the attributes of Nature, which do not belong to the soul, and are ascribed to it through want of discrimination (10-11).

LACK OF DISCRIMINATION[3]—This absence of discrimination is without a beginning; but it is not eternal like the soul, and can be destroyed by means of knowledge, as darkness is by light. But it is the cause of the soul's bondage, which cannot be explained otherwise (12-16).

THE MEANING OF FREEDOM[4]—He who is liberated cannot be bound again, for otherwise there would be no difference between freedom and bondage. Liberation is the same thing as the removal of obstacles; and it is only the best who can be free (17-23).

LIX. MEDITATION—Meditation is more important than a particular posture of the body, for it alone can make for

[1] This is included in XLIV.

[2] This is included in XXIV and XXVI.

[3] This may be included in XLIII.

[4] This is not a new topic, and is included in FREEDOM AND BONDAGE and THE NATURE OF FREEDOM,—XXVII, LV.

the suppression of the evil influences of our actions. Indeed, if there is want of discrimination, there can be a wrong course of action even if a person is without attachment; for discrimination alone can destroy attachment as well as confusion of thought (24-31).

PRAKRITI AND THE SOUL[1]—If we agree that *Prakṛti* is the original cause, it can only be the cause of all things other than the soul. When we examine and analyse objects up to the atom, we find that there is action similar to that of *Prakṛti* in every case; and so we conclude that it is *Prakṛti* that is supreme. But even when objects are combined with one another, we find that there is no destruction of any part,—not even of an atom. But this does not mean that we should regard *Prakṛti* as superior to everything; for we see that all its actions are meant for the sake of the soul; and when the latter is liberated, there is no need for any of its things,—not even experience (32-44).

MULTIPLICITY OF SOULS AND DUALISM[2]—There is a multiplicity of souls, because we see that they are all different from one another; and we have to admit a state of dualism, —*Prakṛti* and the souls. But this can lead to a conflict, for we cannot say which of the two comes first and which last. In any case we cannot regard the Universal Spirit, who is pure thought, as the creator of inanimate things; for were it possible, there would be no meaning in withdrawal from the objects of life (45-51).

LX. REALITY OF THE WORLD—We cannot deny that the

[1] This is not a new topic, and is included in VIII, IX, XXI, etc.
[2] This is included in XXVI and LIII.

world is a real one; that the actor is *ahaṅkāra* and not the soul; and that experience abides in thought, which partakes of its actions. The moon and other heavenly bodies revolve because the cause of their creation is real, and their knowledge arises as an inference of an effect from a cause. The reality of the world is proved by means of an uninterrupted series of events; and that is the very basis of the idea of release from the bondage of life (52-58).

THE SOUL[1]—There is an entity within us which understands the course of actions, and pervades everything; but, as it acts as a substitute for something else, it has knowledge of experience, place, and time. When it is not present, the body decays; and we cannot say that it is some unknown power, for we can easily know it. That is the soul; but, as it is without any *Guṇas*, it cannot act; and so we conclude that all actions are performed by *ahaṅkāra*, and have nothing to do with God (59-66).

CONCLUSION[2]—The efficient cause of action is *Prakṛti*, and its relation to the soul is like that of possession and possessor. There are some who say that the soul comes to be associated with *Prakṛti* through want of discrimination, while others believe that it is so because of the "subtle body" which accompanies it throughout its series of births. But whatever the cause, the chief object of a man's life is to put an end to it (67-70).

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[1] This is not a new topic and is included in XIX, XXVI, etc.

[2] This is obviously not a new topic.

V

OBSERVATIONS ON THE SANKHYA

THE SANKHYA AND OTHER SYSTEMS—Thus ends the *Sāṅkhya*, with its sixty topics, to which the author of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* has referred; and it constitutes the great foundation of thought upon which the remaining systems have been reared. Indeed, to understand the *Sāṅkhya* is to understand the basis of all these systems, for they too deal with the same topics, but from different points of view, and are but an amplification, commentary or criticism of its ideas and conclusions. For instance, the *Sāṅkhya* believes that the chief object of a man's life is to put an end to all kinds of pain, and that is possible only by means of pure knowledge and renunciation of action. As, however, the idea and scope of this knowledge has not been defined by the *Sāṅkhya*, *Nyāya* explains what it is, and tells us that it consists in the knowledge of sixteen categories of things, which are condensed into six by the *Vaiśeshika*. The *Mīmānsā* correlates both knowledge and action in its idea of Dharma; and *Yoga*, while admitting that renunciation of action is the ultimate goal of life, seeks to reconcile knowledge with action so long as it lasts. But *Vedānta* attempts to eliminate the difference between the two by showing that knowledge itself is a form of action, and that there can be no action without knowledge; and so we have to look for a solution of the problem in some other direction.

THREE HEADS OF COMPARISON—The different conclusions of the *Sāṅkhya* accordingly lend themselves to a variety of opinion, and it is this that is presented by the other systems. It would be convenient to group together the main ideas of

the *Sāṅkhya* under three heads,—*Prakṛti*, Soul, and God—and compare them briefly with those of other systems; and that will enable us to understand the latter in their proper perspective.

PRAKRITI—With regard to *Prakṛti* or Nature, the *Sāṅkhya* tells us that it is the supreme creator of life,—of all things except the soul; and the idea of its evolution is obtained by means of inference. It is necessary to understand what this means.

MAN AS A MICROCOSM—There can be no idea of existence without knowledge; and, according to the ancients, existence and knowledge are synonymous terms. Again, knowledge, so far as man is concerned, is limited to human knowledge,—that is, all that it is possible for man to know; and it is conditioned by his faculties,—the senses acting in association with their objects, mind, *ahaṅkāra* (I-as-an-actor or ego), intellect and the soul; and is limited to what they can grasp, and to the objects to which they can react. There may be many things in the universe; but if we are not aware of them, or they are beyond our reach,—they do not exist so far as man is concerned. Hence, all of life that exists for man in the universe consists of what lies within and without him,—the soul, intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, senses and their objects; and it is for this reason that he was conceived to be a microcosm,—a miniature of the universe.

PRAKRITI AS A CREATOR—The *Sāṅkhya* does not conceive of *Prakṛti* as a creator of the soul. Indeed, it could not do so, for it would have rendered nugatory its own conception of freedom from the bondage of life; and so its evolution is limited to the intellect and the rest, while the soul is said to have an independent existence of its own.

THE MEANING OF PRAKRITI—The *Sāṅkhya* defines *Prakṛti* as a state of equilibrium or rest of the three *Guṇas* or the attributes of objects, which arise out of it; and this obviously means that, as evolution or creation is a kind of action, we can form a proper idea of it only with reference to a previous state of rest. *Prakṛti* may accordingly be said to be "a great action in the making",—and that indeed is the literal meaning of the word[1]. It is also unmanifest in its original state, and becomes manifest when it evolves into different forms of life.

THE PROCESS OF ACTION—We have observed that the evolution of *Prakṛti* into intellect and the rest is a form of action; and if, as the *Sāṅkhya* tells us, its idea is based on inference,—it can only mean that it is based on the idea of the process of action from a state of rest in the case of man.

Now we find that before an action can take place, there must be a decision to act; and the latter is a function of the intellect. Thus, the first form of activity, following a state of equilibrium or rest, is that of the intellect; and so the *Sāṅkhya* tells us that *Mahat* or Intellect is the first to arise from *Prakṛti* in its state of equilibrium or rest.

The next stage in the process of action is the necessity of the existence of an actor; and that is *Ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor which, as the *Sāṅkhya* tells us, arises out of the Intellect.

But the actor cannot act without desire, which is an attribute of the mind; and so the Mind is said to arise out of *Ahaṅkāra* in the next order of creation.

Again, the mind cannot function without reference to the

[1] *Prakṛti* or *pra-kṛti* means "(*pra*) great (*kṛti*) action"; or "(*kṛti*) action (*pra*) going forth". It may therefore be said to be a fountain of great action, or a great action about to "go forth" or make things manifest.

senses of knowledge and action; and so they are the next in order to arise.

Finally, as the senses cannot function without reference to their objects, we have the great "elements" and their properties to complete the tale.

A GENERAL AGREEMENT—That is how the idea of *Prakṛti* and its evolution may be said to have been obtained by means of inference; and, as there can be little difference of opinion on the subject, there is, except for some clarification on certain points, little reference to it in the remaining systems.

THE SOUL—The central idea of the *Sāṅkhya*, in connection with the chief problems of life, refers to the soul.

According to the *Sāṅkhya*, the soul exists, for we cannot deny its existence; and it is because of its existence in the body that all the other faculties of man are able to act. But it is altogether different from *Prakṛti* and all that arises from it; and we say so because we find that, at one time or another, it desires to make itself free from all association with the latter. Were it of the same kind, it would not have this desire.

The desire to become free postulates that the soul understands the nature of freedom; and that is possible only if it has been free at some time. Hence we may assume that the soul, before it is born for the first time or comes to be associated with *Prakṛti*, is free.

It is not possible to explain how the soul came to be associated with *Prakṛti* for the first time; but we cannot deny that it dwells in the body and so is associated with it, and desires to make itself free. Its chief problem accordingly is how to secure this freedom.

It is, however, possible to say that this association is caused

by some inexplicable attraction between *Prakṛti* and the soul. But it is this that is the primary cause of all human sorrow and pain, which it is the object of a man's life to bring to an end.

The world is full of sorrow, for there is no one who is really happy. Indeed, there is no real joy in life; and pleasure itself may be said to be a form of pain, for it soon turns into it.

The principal cause of this sorrow and pain is action or change,—conceived in its widest significance; and it is all due to *Prakṛti* or Nature, which is subject to incessant change.

The soul feels this pain because of its association with the body, which is a part of *Prakṛti* or Nature, and so subject to change. Indeed, it feels it still more because, through some strange misconception, it imagines itself to be an actor,—though it is really not so—and so identifies itself with *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, which is a part of Nature and abides within the body like the intellect, mind, and the senses, which too have been created by *Prakṛti*.

This being so, the soul can make itself free again only by understanding its true character as soul, as something altogether different from *ahaṅkāra* and all other faculties or organs of the body. Then, if it ceases to have any association with *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, and refrains from all action or association with action, it can make itself free from all that belongs to Nature or *Prakṛti*. There are thus two means of attaining to freedom,—self-knowledge and a complete renunciation of action.

But this self-knowledge implies a perfect knowledge of all that is in Nature, for without it the soul cannot come to regard itself as something altogether different from it. Further, a complete renunciation of action can be achieved only by stages or degrees,—for a person must act so long as he lives;

and, as it is not possible to acquire perfect knowledge during one life-time, he must pass through many lives to be able to do so. Hence we must agree that the same soul is born again and again.

There is thus an almost endless continuity of life and its experiences; and death is only an interval between two lives.

We find that there are innumerable souls in innumerable bodies, and each is different from the other; and, if all this is in accordance with a law and not due to the arbitrary will of an irresponsible creator, the only explanation of this difference is that the same soul is born again and again; but each soul is at a different stage of its journey of life; and, as the actions and experiences of each are different, the souls are different too.

Life means action; and so there is action when a soul is born. Then, as the soul continues to live, it must associate itself with action all the time. Action arises out of desire, and is followed by a result; and so there are impressions produced by actions, which are followed by other actions. Hence, these impressions of actions may be said to be the cause of other actions.

As the soul has to associate itself with actions, it must also associate itself with the impressions of these actions.

The soul is said to be without a body; but that is so only in its real essence, when it makes itself free. So long as it is associated with action, it remains encased in what may be called a "subtle body",—which is composed of seventeen parts,—the intellect, mind, and the essence of the ten senses, and five properties of the great "elements". It is this "subtle body" that contains a record of the experiences of the soul, —the impressions of actions with which it has associated itself; and so it is by means of it that further actions take place.

As we have to agree that the same soul is born again and again, we must also agree that this "subtle body" accompanies the soul even after death, and cannot be destroyed so long as the soul is born; for it is the cause of its future actions in the world; and it is by its means that it can acquire more and more knowledge or experience of Nature, whereby it can attain to perfection and become free. The soul accordingly commences its journey of life at the stage where it leaves it at the time of previous "death"; and this continues till it acquires all knowledge or experience, becomes perfect, and is made free.

Now the question is how can the soul, passing through this series of births, attain to final freedom in the end? This, the *Saṅkhya* tells us, is possible only when it acquires perfect knowledge of all that is in Nature or *Prakṛti*. But *Prakṛti* is an intelligent power, for its first form of life is *Mahat* or Intellect. It also acts, for it is the creator of *Ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor. At the same time it is characterised by goodness too,—for it is the creator of the Mind, which has desire for its attribute, and there is an element of goodness inherent in all desire so far as the doer of the deed himself is concerned. The action of *Prakṛti* is, accordingly, intelligent, and is designed to do good,—primarily to itself, and then to the soul.

According to the *Saṅkhya* the object of the soul is to acquire perfect knowledge of all that is in Nature or *Prakṛti*; but this is possible only if *Prakṛti*, which is both intelligent and good, is willing to impart this knowledge to the soul; for the soul has no means of compelling it to do so. Indeed, the instruments of intellect, mind, and the senses, by means of which the soul may be said to acquire this knowledge, are all a creation of *Prakṛti*, and so subject to its control; and so it is necessary that *Prakṛti* itself should help the soul to acquire knowledge of itself, and make it free. It may, there-

fore, be said to have an affection for the soul, by means of which it attracts it for the first time, and again and again when it is re-born; but finally makes it free.

All action begins with desire, and ends when it is satisfied; and when there is no further desire, there can be no further action. Thus, when *Prakṛti* has manifested all that it has to the soul, it has nothing more to show, and all its action towards the soul comes to an end. Similarly, when all desire of the soul to know more and more of *Prakṛti* is satisfied, it has nothing more to desire, and no further purpose in action. In this manner all mutual attraction and action and inter-action between *Prakṛti* and the soul comes to an end, and the soul becomes for ever free.

But this process is gradual. As more and more of knowledge means less and less of action, the soul associates itself with less and less of new actions during the latter part of its series of births; and in this manner the impressions of previous actions recorded on its "subtle body" become fainter and fainter, till at last it comes to a stage when it is born for the last time, and associates itself with the least action. There are no new impressions of actions, and the old impressions made on its "subtle body" have all died away; and so now the soul is pure soul in itself, and becomes for ever free, —never again to be drawn into the tangles of *Prakṛti*.

A CRITICISM—This, in brief, is the main idea of the *Sāṅkhya* in regard to the character of the soul, and the manner of its attaining to freedom. But it contains a number of points which lend themselves to a sharp difference of opinion; and so it is small wonder that the remaining systems have apparently conflicting points of view. For instance, we find that the *Nyāya* idea of the soul is very vague; but the *Vaiśeshika* goes to the other extreme, and conceives of as a substance,

characterised by both desire and action, and no more eternal or non-eternal than the "element" Air; and, consistently with this idea, it maintains that freedom from the bondage of life can be attained not by means of renunciation of action, but by means of action performed in accordance with the highest nature of the soul. The *Mīmānsā* and *Yoga* take us a step or two further, but the idea is still confused; and it is only when we come to *Vedānta* that we find that the soul, being inseparable from its "subtle body", cannot be regarded as altogether different from all that is in *Prakṛti*. Again, we find that knowledge itself may be regarded as a form of action; and so knowledge and action may be said to be but counterparts of the same energy of the soul; and, as the latter has *prāṇa* or vital breath for its vehicle, we may be said to know as well as to act with each breath that we draw. Finally, we see that the very idea of freedom of the soul, as propounded by the *Sāṅkhya*, and the manner in which it is said to be achieved, is an impossible one; for it depends on the possibility of a total elimination of the impressions of all previous actions recorded on the "subtle body". This is inconceivable, for, though they might be made fainter and fainter, they can never be annihilated; for the last birth, whenever it takes place,—being a form of action, must leave an impression on the "subtle body" of the soul, and result in a future birth again. Indeed, it is as impossible to conceive of a total destruction of action as it is of zero which, as we know, is essentially an imaginary number and, strictly speaking, inconceivable. Thus, the association of the soul with *Prakṛti*, however begun, can never come to an end. *Vedānta*, accordingly, gives us a pure monistic view of life, where *Prakṛti* itself is conceived to be but a form of *Brahma* or God; and *purusha* and *Prakṛti*, or the soul and its "subtle body" have always lived together and will do so for ever. Indeed,

the soul is said to be born when, in addition to its "subtle body" it comes to possess the "gross" one too,—consisting of the five "elements". *Vedānta* accordingly maintains that the freedom of the soul is achieved not by breaking its bond with *Prakṛti*, as the *Sāṅkhya* would have us believe, but by a life of equanimity in the midst of all actions, and the experience of pleasure and pain.

THE IDEA OF GOD IN THE SANKHYA—The idea of God can only correspond to that of our highest conception of the soul, for there is no other way of thinking of Him.

The highest conception of the soul, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, is that, in its purest state, it is characterised by knowledge alone, and is not an actor; and it is also something altogether different from all that is in *Prakṛti*, and has nothing to do with it.

The *Sāṅkhya* accordingly cannot conceive of God as an actor or creator, and realises that any other idea of the Deity would be irrelevant. It has accordingly no place for God as a creator in its scheme. It has, however, no objection to a God who is like a liberated soul,—that is, one who exists, but has nothing to do with life and its problems: only such a God can be of little use to any one.

THE IDEA OF GOD IN OTHER SYSTEMS—The idea of God in *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeshika*, and, to a certain extent, even in *Yoga*, is an extension of what it is in the *Sāṅkhya*. *Nyāya* is prepared to admit that He exists, but believes that He can neither provide nor prevent the results of actions, which are really performed by man. The *Vaiśeshika* does not refer to Him by name as *Iśvara;* but, like the *Sāṅkhya*, mentions the existence of an Unseen Power, which acts in a variety of ways, specially in the case of extraordinary

actions. The *Mīmānsā* like the *Vaiśeshika*, does not refer to God,—but rather to a number of gods who, unlike the Unseen Power, are manifest as the great forms and forces of Nature,—governed by a law which is both intelligent and good. *Yoga*, on the other hand, tells us of an *Iśvara* or God who is omniscient and absolute, devotion to whom is essential for success in life as well as to attainment of freedom; but He is conceived to be a special kind of *purusha* or the individual soul, somewhat like the liberated soul of the *Sāṅkhya*, but with more clearly defined attributes,—for *Yoga* does not state that He creates. It is only when we come to *Vedānta* that the *Mīmānsā* idea of the gods, and the *Sāṅkhya* idea of *Prakṛti* as a good and intelligent Power, are expanded into that of *Brahma* or God, who is a good and intelligent creator,—omniscient and absolute,—and who includes all that is in Nature or *Prakṛti*, and yet is something more. Indeed, He is *Prakṛti* itself made divine by partaking of the character of goodness, intelligence as well as joy (*Sat-chit-ānanda*), and the fusion of its idea into that of God. According to the *Sāṅkhya*, there is a principle of goodness and intelligence, but not of joy, in the universe,—not even in good or intelligent action; and what appears to be pleasure is but a form of pain. *Vedānta*, on the other hand, tells us that life is based fundamentally on the principle of joy; and there is joy both in the process of its creation and continuance; and death is but a door to another form of life; and so when we believe that the great forces of Nature partake of the character of goodness, intelligence, as well as joy in their working, we transform Nature itself into *Brahma* or God. As the idea of goodness, intelligence, and joy is also expressed in terms of Sacrifice, we might say that Sacrifice transforms Nature itself into *Brahma* or God. This is pure monism of God in *Vedānta*, the

highest conception of the Deity that the mind of man can grasp, and the culmination of all ancient thought on the subject.

THE BASIC IDEA OF SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY—We have observed that the different systems of philosophy examine the great problems of life from different points of view, and it is this that accounts for the difference between them. But a little reflection will show that there is a fundamental unity of thought underlying all of them. The *Sāṅkhya*, as we have seen, is an attempt at an all-inclusive survey of the many problems of life; but a study of the remaining systems shows that their approach is a more restricted one. This can be explained on the assumption that each of them attempts to survey the same field from a limited angle. We have seen that the *Sāṅkhya* examines the problem of life in the light of its idea of *Prakṛti* as the supreme creator of things,—all except the soul; but in the five remaining systems the centre of thought shifts from *Prakṛti* to Man and his faculties,—the senses, mind, *ahaṅkāra*, intellect, and the soul respectively. Man indeed thinks and acts as a single unit, involving the function of all his faculties; but it is possible to lay special stress on any one of them at a particular moment of times, and say that he looks at things in the light of his intellect, or his desires (mind), or his senses. It is in this sense that *Nyāya* may be said to examine the problem of life in the light of the point of view of the senses; *Vaiśeshika* of the mind; *Mīmānsā* of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor; *Yoga* of the intellect; and *Vedānta* of the soul. This would explain their differences and divisions, as well as their points of contact and conflict. This would also explain how the six systems can be grouped into three pairs,—*Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, *Nyāya* and *Vaiśe-*

shika, and *Mīmānsā* and *Vedānta* (also called *Pūrva-Mīmānsā* and *Uttara-Mīmānsā*); and a reference to this has already been made.[1]

This theory of the relation between the five systems of philosophy and the five faculties of man is based on the contents of the systems themselves. As they are all concerned with the chief problems of life, in which the soul occupies the most central place, we should be able to understand the basic idea of each in the light of its conception of the soul; and we find that *Nyāya* considers the idea of the soul with special reference to the function of the senses, *Vaiśeshika* of the mind, *Mīmānsā* of *ahaṅkāra*, *Yoga* of the intellect, and *Vedānta* of the real character of the soul itself. According to *Nyāya* an object is perceived by means of the senses, but only when they function in direct contact with the soul. It is not anxious to specify who the "director" of the senses is, and would be content to call it the "knower", —only to explain that the knower can only be the soul.[2] The *Vaiśeshika* tells us that it is only when the mind functions in close connection with the soul, that we can get a clear idea of the soul.[3] The *Mīmānsā* speaks of the soul as an actor, and tells us at the same time that the main factor in action is *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, which may be regarded as an aspect of the soul when the latter is said to engage in action.[4] *Yoga* tells us that the idea of the soul can be grasped by means of reason and reflection, which are a special attribute of the intellect.[5] Finally, *Vedānta* bases its whole conception of life, including Nature as well

[1] See p. xix
[2] NS. III, i, 1-3, 12-20.
[3] VaiS. IX, i, 11.
[4] MS. IX, iii, 21-24.
[5] YS. I, 16-17.

as God, on its idea of the soul,—regarded as inseparable from its "subtle body", and as knower and actor combined together into one.[1]

It has been necessary to give a brief account of the different systems of philosophy in this form; and their text may now be summarised in some detail.

VI

THE NYAYA SYSTEM

THE PLAN OF NYAYA—The word *Nyāya* has a number of meanings in *Sanskṛt*,—"an original type, or that into which a thing goes back; a plan, system; a logical argument; etc."; and *Nyāya*, coming after the *Sāṅkhya*, may be said to give us a pattern of thought which serves as a model for all other systems. There is an undoubted plan underlying the sixty topics of the *Sāṅkhya*; but its treatment of the problems of life is not exactly systematic, and it keeps true to its own type, as indicated by its name.

Nyāya, on the other hand, though limited in its scope, is more systematic. The *Sāṅkhya* emphasises the importance of knowledge as a means of attaining to freedom from pain; and *Nyāya* tells us what kind of knowledge this should be. The highest happiness, it tell us in the opening *Sūtra* of the work, arises from a knowledge of the essence of sixteen "categories" of things; and the rest of it is devoted to an examination of each one of them. It is divided into five chapters, with two parts to each chapter; and the subject-matter of the sixteen "categories" is divided among them.

[1] This will be found to be the main subject-matter of *Vedānta*.

The plan of the whole work is simple in the extreme. The first *Sūtra* of the first part of the first chapter tells us what these sixteen "categories" are; and the next *Sūtra* tells us that the freedom of the soul arises when pain, natural activity, and faults arising from false knowledge disappear; and the remaining part of the whole chapter, with both its parts, is devoted to a definition of terms used in connection with these "categories."

The first of these "categories" relates to the means of acquiring knowledge; and the first part of the second chapter is devoted to a detailed examination of the principal means, while the second part deals with some other problems of acquiring knowledge.

The second "category" relates to the objects to be known, which are said to be twelve in number; and the first part of the third chapter deals with four, and the second part with three more, of these.

In the first part of the fourth chapter the remaining five of these "objects" are dealt with; and then the author goes on to consider ten out of the fourteen remaining "categories" in the second part of this chapter.

In the first part of the fifth chapter three more out of the remaining four "categories" are dealt with; while the second part of this chapter ends with an examination of the last "category".

The text may now be summarised as follows:—

CHAPTER I

PART I

THE SIXTEEN CATEGORIES: THE DEFINITION OF TERMS

The highest happiness arises from a knowledge of the sixteen "categories" of things; and the freedom of the soul arises when pain, natural activity, and faults arising from false knowledge disappear (1-2).

There are four means of acquiring knowledge; and the objects to be proved are twelve in number (3-22). In the same manner we may define some more "categories" of things (23-41).

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF NYAYA—The highest happiness arises from a knowledge of the essence of sixteen "categories" of things: (1) the means of acquiring knowledge; (2) the objects to be known; (3) doubt; (4) motive or purpose in action; (5) instances; (6) admitted or established truth; (7) different parts of an argument or syllogism; (8) the process of reasoning; (9) the art of drawing conclusions; (10) discussion; (11) disputation; (12) carping criticism; (13) fallacies; (14) quibbles; (15) the real nature of things; and (16) inability to carry on an argument because of impossibility of agreement on the first principles (1).

THE FREEDOM OF THE SOUL—The freedom of the soul arises when pain, natural activity, and faults arising from false knowledge disappear (2).

I. THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE—There are four means of acquiring knowledge,—sense-perception, inference, analogy or instances,[1] and testimony of the trustworthy and the wise (3-8).

[1] The *Sāṅkhya* gives us only three means of acquiring knowledge,—

II. THE OBJECTS TO BE PROVED—The objects to be proved are twelve in number,—(i) soul; (ii) body; (iii) senses; (iv) objects of the senses; (v). intellect; (vi) mind; (vii) activity; (viii) faults; (ix) state after death; (x) fruit of action; (xi) pain; and (xii) emancipation of the soul (9-22).

III. DOUBT—Doubt arises from a peculiar connection of cause and effect, a number of similar perceptions, contradictions, and irregularities of perception and non-perception (23).

IV. PURPOSE IN ACTION—Purpose in action is the aim that causes action (24).

V. INSTANCES—An instance is that which enables common people to understand a thing in the same manner as an expert (25).

VI. AN ADMITTED TRUTH—An admitted truth means complete agreement in regard to an essential principle. It is of two kinds,—universal and particular. A universal established truth is that in which each part of an idea or object is consistent with all its essential parts. A particular established truth is that which can be conclusively proved in connection with a similar idea too. An established truth by agreement is that which has been accepted after special examination (26-31).

VII. DIFFERENT PARTS OF A SYLLOGISM—There are five parts of a syllogism: (a) a statement of the proposition; (b) reason

sense-perception, inference, and testimony of the trustworthy and the wise. *Nyāya* adds one more,—analogy or instances.

for the statement; (c) illustration; (d) drawing near to the conclusion; and (e) conclusion (32-39).

VIII. The Process of Reasoning—The process of reasoning is an examination of an object in order to understand its course of nature or character (40).

IX. The Art of Drawing Conclusions—The art of drawing conclusions consists in making a definite statement about an object after examining it from all sides (41).

PART II

THE DEFINITION OF TERMS

(Continued)

We may define the remaining "categories" in the same manner (1-20).

X. Discussion — Discussion consists in a criticism of the means of acquiring knowledge, reasoning and proof (1).

XI. Disputation — Disputation includes all that is contained in discussion; and it is a censurable form of giving expression to quibbles, the real nature of a thing, and inability to carry on an argument for want of agreement on the first principles (2).

XII. Carping Criticism — Carping criticism consists in taking up a very strong attitude on the opposite side (3).

XIII. Fallacies — A fallacy consists in an argument which

is wide of the mark, is inconsistent, is identical with the question itself, is similar to the thing to be proved, or is untimely,—that is, when the reason for it has ceased to be applicable (4-9).

XIV. Quibbles — Quibbling consists in so breaking up the language of a statement as to produce a doubt in regard to its meaning. It is of three kinds: perverting the sense of language, of fundamental notions, and of the mode of treatment of the question (10-17).

XV. The Real Nature of a Thing — The real nature of a thing consists in understanding its original or essential nature from similar as well as dissimilar characteristics (18).

XVI. Inability to Carry on an Argument from Impossibility of Agreement on the First Principles— Inability to carry on an argument from impossibility of agreement on the first principles consists in erroneous notions and want of understanding; and it is of many kinds (19-20).

CHAPTER II

PART I

THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE

The first "category" is the means of acquiring knowledge, and it is important, because it makes for disappearance of doubt; and when doubt disappears, we can understand the properties of things (1-7).

We cannot say that there are no proper means of acquiring knowledge (8-20); and they are really four in number,—sense-perception, inference, analogy, and oral evidence or the testimony of the trustworthy and the wise; and it is necessary to understand their character and scope (21-68).

DOUBT — Doubt disappears when we understand similar as well dissimilar properties of things. It disappears as a result of mental effort; but it is a mental effort itself, and so long as it continues, the mental effort continues too (1-7).

THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE — It is sometimes said that there are no proper means of acquiring knowledge, because they cannot be valid for all time. But we have to make the best use of all the means we have; and the fact that we cannot have any that are valid for all time does not mean that we can deny their validity altogether. But it is even possible to show that certain things are true for all time. For instance, if it is proved that there is sound, it is also proved that there is an instrument that produces it; and that is true for all time. What is, however, required is that there should be a balance between a thing to be proved and its evidence (8-20).

SENSE-PERCEPTION — There can be no sense-perception if the soul and the mind do not participate in it. As knowledge is a characteristic of the soul, it participates in sense-perception, which is a form of knowledge; and the mind participates in it too, because it is its characteristic to prevent simultaneousness of perception (21-25).

It is because of sense-perception that the connection between a sense-organ and its object is expressed by means of the same word (26-30).

INFERENCE — Sense-perception has its own limitations, and cannot take us very far; whereas we wish to have perfect knowledge,—the knowledge of the whole. Indeed, if there were no proof regarding the whole, we shall find that it is not possible to understand anything properly; and that is

so because the mind is always attracted to the idea of the whole and dwells on it; and so it makes use of inference to understand things (31-38).

There are some who maintain that there is no such thing as present time. But were there no present time, we should be unable to grasp anything,—not even the past and the future (39-43).

ANALOGY — There are some who believe that analogy is not a conclusive means of acquiring knowledge. But analogy, by its very definition, consists in the demonstration of what is not perceptible by means of what is perceptible; and so it would be of no value if the comparison were indistinct. Indeed, its special value consists in enabling us to sum up the whole idea, and to say that it is so and so in specific and not general terms (44-48).

ORAL AURHORITY OR TESTIMONY OF THE TRUSTWORTHY — There are some who believe that oral authority or testimony of the trustworthy is a kind of inference, because the object itself is not perceptible and has to be inferred. Indeed, so far as their practical application is concerned, the two are not different; but the value of oral testimony consists in the fact that, because the information is conveyed by a trustworthy person, there is a firm conviction in regard to its import. There are certain things, like satisfaction, a burning heart and a splitting head, which cannot be perceived; and in such cases the testimony of a trustworthy person is our only means of acquiring knowledge. But there are some who believe that it is not worthy of being regarded as a means of acquiring knowledge because it is susceptible to a number of faults,—falsehood, inconsistency of statement, and repetition. But this is not a valid objection, for these

defects arise not from the nature of the means, but from the defect of the act, the actor, and the manner of producing a result. Its real defect, however, arises from a difference of time when a statement is made, as also from translation,—for they may alter the whole idea. The Vedic hymns and the science of medicine are authoritative,—but their authority is derived from the statements of trustworthy persons (49-68).

PART II

SOME MORE PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE

There are some who believe that there are four other means of acquiring knowledge,—traditional instruction, inference from circumstances, equivalence, and proof from non-existence. But these are really included in the original four (1-8).

In this connection it is necessary to have a proper idea of certain things: existence and non-existence (9-14); essential and secondary attributes (15-16); perception and non-perception (17-23),—including the atom (24-30); identity and difference (31-32); and existence and eternity (33-38). The use of language is important too,—specially with reference to the language of the Vedas, and it is necessary to understand their method of interpretation (39-69).

OTHER MEANS OF ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE—There are some who believe that, in addition to these four, there are four other means of acquiring knowledge,—traditional instruction, inference from circumstances, equivalence, and proof from non-existence. But all these are really included in the original four (1-8).

THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE—When we describe a thing as non-existent, it does not mean that it is devoid of everything,—including non-existence. For instance, before a thing is born, it appears to be non-existent;

but it is only in a metaphorical sense that we say that such a thing is non-existent. So long as the fundamental notion of a thing remains, we cannot say that it is non-existent; but we can speak of even eternal things as non-eternal in a metaphorical sense (9-14).

THE IDEA OF ESSENTIAL AND SECONDARY ATTRIBUTES—There is no contradiction between the essential and secondary attributes of a thing (15-16).

THE IDEA OF PERCEPTION AND NON-PERCEPTION—Before we have spoken, a thing may be said to be unperceived; and the same effect is produced by means of covering or concealing; and so not speaking is like concealment so far as perception is concerned. But as non-perception is characterised by non-perceptibility, we cannot find its cause, for what cannot be perceived is intangible. It is, however, not correct to say that all intangible things are imperceptible (17-23).

THE ATOM—We know that the atom, which is intangible, exists and is eternal. It may be argued that since it is imperceptible, we cannot know what lies within it. But we know that something does, for we are taught about it; only we may not be able to know what exactly lies within it, for a further study may lead to something else (24-30).

IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE—The idea of difference arises from things that are different, and of identity from things that are identical. But there can be no real identity, because no two things are exactly alike (31-32).

EXISTENCE AND ETERNITY—A thing is said to be eternal when we cannot perceive the cause of its destruction. But if a thing is perceivable, but is not perceived, it would be an

invalid argument to say that it does not exist. But if we are unable to perceive the cause of the destruction of an object, and our inability to do so persists, we may conclude that it is permanent (33-38).

THE USE OF LANGUAGE: THE LANGUAGE OF THE SACRED BOOKS AND THE METHOD OF THEIR INTERPRETATION—We find that there are separate parts of a word or a compound; and we are taught to make a change, and substitute one part for another, which may raise a doubt as to its exact idea. But if a word expressed the idea of an object exactly according to the requirements of each case, there would be no reason for changing its form. But when we find that the whole idea of the text has become unbalanced, and we are filled with a doubt as to its exact meaning, it implies that it is necessary to make a change.[1] For instance, when we find that there is an improper statement about a good man, we have the option to change the form of a word to understand its meaning. But this is not the only test; and a change of form may become necessary if we find that there is a conflict with the idea of Dharma; for when the form of words is changed, the objects described are found to conform to Dharma, and we do not find any transgression. There are, however, certain words like gold etc., the form of which does not require any change, because they are not connected with any transgression. There is a principle underlying this method of changing the form of words in order to understand their meaning: words

[1] The change of form of a word, as the *Mīmānsā* has explained at considerable length, means its division into parts,—letters or syllables or both, as may be necessary. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that if we deal with the text of the Vedas in this manner, their hymns of praise would be transformed into laws of Nature; and, as this method applies to the *smṛti* too, it would transform "stories" into systems of philosophy.

expressing the idea of permanence do not require any change; those expressive of impermanence do. In certain cases, however, the form of words expressing even the idea of permanence may also be changed, if the objects described are beyond the grasp of the senses, and there is a doubt about their character as permanent. But in all cases where a state of transience is described, it is necessary to change the form of words. The reason for this change of form is that there is no restriction in respect of what may be described in the sacred books, and this absence of restriction is expressed in terms of absence of restriction in the use of words (39-56).

There are certain cases where the form of words must necessarily be changed; and such are expressions relating to unexpected characteristics, misfortune, destruction, deterioration, excess, diminution, ambiguity, or some secret matter; and this change becomes necessary because the idea or object deviates from a natural or normal state. A word is made up of two things,—basic form and terminations; and we have to divide it into parts because the common meaning of words in their juxtaposition in the text gives rise to a doubt as to whether the outward form, the constituent parts, and the real nature of a thing have been properly described (57-69).

CHAPTER III

PART I

THE OBJECTS TO BE KNOWN

The second "category" refers to the objects to be known; and, in this connection, we must understand how an object can be perceived (1-3).

Then we must know the nature of the soul, the body, the senses, and the objects of the senses,—the first four of the objects to be known (4-73).

AN OBJECT OF SENSE—An object of sense is commonly perceived by means of sight and touch; but it is not always so. We are able to perceive it because of its sphere of activity, and the existence of the soul (1-3).

THE SOUL AND THE BODY—The existence of the soul is proved by the fact that there is no sin in burning a dead body, whereas we cannot burn a living body even though we believe that the soul is eternal. Indeed, he who ventures to do so is punished with death himself (4-6).

THE SENSES—When the left eye sees an object, it is grasped by the rest of our faculties, because there is recognition. But this recognition does not lie in the eye,—for there is another entity that perceives it too, and that refers to our own self; and it is this that makes for unity of perception (7-11).

Whenever there is perception, the senses undergo some kind of change; but this change is not due to memory, even though it be regarded as an attribute of the soul (12-14).

While thinking of the problem of perception, it is not necessary to bring in the soul, because we have the mind; and the main point is that there should be a knower and, so far as perception is concerned, it is a mere matter of name whether we call it mind or the soul. We know that there is a knower, because of the experience of memory, joy, fear, and sorrow; but the knower does not change from time to time like a flower (15-20).

Desire is inborn within us, as we find from the desire of a new-born child drawn to its mother's breasts; and this act is

natural like the attraction of iron towards a loadstone. Indeed, a child is born with its own characteristics like any other object that can be made, and it is possible to know its inherent qualities. Similarly, we can say that a body consists of earth, water, and fire from a perception of these qualities in it. It is in this manner that a body is said to consist of four or five "elements" (21-31).

As there is perception with as well as without eyes, there is a doubt in regard to the idea of the perceiver. We can grasp things both great as well as small,—even an atom—in this manner. An atom is perceived by means of a special close contact of a ray of light with an object; and even if we are unable to perceive it by means of our senses, it does not mean that it does not exist; for its existence can be inferred. This principle of perception is based on the knowledge of the nature and attributes of an object (32-38).

The essential feature of human effort is that there is an orderly arrangement of the senses brought about by action. This is necessary for the removal of obstacles, both internal and external, that may lie in our way. A number of things can be seen or inferred in this way, and it would be irrelevant to deny their use (39-55).

THE OBJECTS OF THE SENSES—The objects of the senses are of five kinds; and there is an identity between the senses and the objects to which they correspond. There are five properties of the "elements",—smell, taste, form, touch, and sound. Of these the first four, from smell to touch, are the properties of Earth; the properties of Water are taste, form, and touch; of Fire form and touch, and of Air touch only; and of Ether only sound (56-63).

It may be argued that this is not so, on the ground that our senses tell us that each "element" has but one attribute.

But this is really not so; for our senses tell us that Earth and Water have each more than one property,—only one of them is the most important, and predominates over the rest; and we believe that it is its only property because of its preponderance. This is also due to the fact that we perceive these properties by means of our senses, and only one of them can function at a time. There is, however, an exception in the case of sound; but that is due to heterogeneity in the different qualities of things (64-73).

PART II

THE OBJECTS TO BE KNOWN

(Continued)

The next three objects to be known are the intellect, mind, and activity. We must know the character and functions of the intellect (1-24); the character and functions of the mind (25-55); and the connection between them and activity (56-72).

A CASE OF DOUBT—There may be a doubt in regard to the perception of sound, because Ether and Air have similar properties. At the same time they have their own special spheres of action, and so we do not perceive it (sound) arise in both simultaneously (1-4).

THE FUNCTION OF THE INTELLECT—Perception occurs in regular succession, and not simultaneously; and absence of perception arises not so much because of pre-occupation with something else, as because of absence of a proper method of approach to an object. We do not judge as we see; and when we see that one thing is produced out of another and a different one, it is really a case of inference arising out of the disappearance of the first substance (5-16).

Even when an object disappears or is destroyed, knowledge remains; and, in any case, there is no destruction of the mind, for there is no simultaneous perception of objects, which is due to the existence of the mind. Even if knowledge be regarded as an attribute of the soul, our conclusion remains the same,—namely, that it cannot be destroyed. (17-20).

Absence of knowledge arises from inability to understand the cause of a thing. If we do not perceive the cause of the destruction of an object, and if it continues to exist, we may say that it is permanent; but when we recognise a state of impermanence, it means that one kind of perception is cancelled by another (21-24).

THE FUNCTION OF THE MIND—The mind functions not in association with the soul, but within the body. It is characterised by quick motion, and so does not come into conflict with the function of the soul, which has memory for its attribute, but no fixed time for remembrance. The action of the soul consists in those forms of knowledge which are spontaneous and do not require any special association with anything; and there is no simultaneous recollection because there is no simultaneous attention or any other expression of any other form of knowledge (25-33).

There is commencement and cessation of action because of desire and aversion on the part of the knower; and the cause of desire and aversion is not the mind, but the soul (34-39).

Memory belongs to the soul because of its own nature as knower; and it arises from contemplation, intentness on an object, repeated study, awareness of characteristic marks, name, resemblance, possession, vicinity, dependence, association, sequence of things, performance of the same

work, opposition, pre-eminence, occurrence, cessation, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, fear, making a request, activity, love, and good deeds and evil deeds. It arises because we can, as it were, seize action, which is transient, in this way. When we remember a thing in this manner, we admit its existence which might otherwise have been denied (40-45).

There is no doubt about the character of a substance when we perceive its qualities as well as the qualities of other substances, and compare and contrast the two (46-55).

THE MIND AND ITS ACTIVITY—There is only one mind because there is no simultaneity of knowledge. It may sometimes appear as though we can perceive a number of actions simultaneously; but the perception of these actions is really like the sight of a circle of light made by a moving firebrand; and we imagine that they are simultaneous because of the quick movement of the mind. The mind is minute like an atom; and its origin lies in its connection with the result of previous action, and is not due to the character of the parents of the child or to food. Were it to arise in this manner, it could not be governed by a law,—unless we admit that the origin of the body itself, like the origin of the union of the parents of the child, is action. This union is deliberate, and cannot be effected by some Unseen Power; for, were it so, the same Power should bring about emancipation too. This union is brought about by the activity of the mind; and, as it cannot be destroyed, it would appear as though birth must continue without end, and death itself become irrelevant, and it should be possible to conceive of an eternal state of existence. But it is not possible to argue in this manner, because we know that there is no such state (56-72).

CHAPTER IV

PART I

THE OBJECTS TO BE KNOWN

(Continued)

The five remaining objects to be known are faults, state after death, fruit of action, pain, and emancipation of the soul; and so we must understand the character of faults (1-9), state after death (10-18), the fruit of action (19-53), pain (54-61), and emancipation of the soul (62-67).

FAULTS—Faults may be classified under three heads,—with reference to the different meanings of love, hate, and delusion. But, so far as the character of a large number of persons, like an army, is concerned, they may be of many kinds; and in the case of erroneous reasoning, they refer to lapses of reason. Of these delusion is the worst, because in the case of one who is not deluded, the rest do not arise (1-9).

STATE AFTER DEATH — If we believe that the soul is eternal, it means that we believe that there is a future life. It is not manifest; but there is no inconsistency in it, because what is manifest arises from what is unmanifest; and things arise by means of an uninterrupted succession of events (10-18).

THE FRUIT OF ACTION — When there is no fruit of the actions of a man, it is said that *Iśvara* or God is the cause of this failure. But we cannot say so, for there is no fruit or result in the absence of a man's actions; and since it is caused by his actions, there is no reason for any reference to God (19-21).

When people are unable to find the cause of a substance,

they sometimes say that it has no cause. But that which appears to have no cause itself arises from something that has a cause; and the expressions "having a cause" and "having no cause" should be understood in their relative sense, and there is no necessary contradiction between them (22-24).

We cannot say that there is nothing eternal in the world, because, so far as we are aware, there is a regular order of things, which continues without end. However, we cannot say that all things are eternal, because we see that there is a cause of their birth and death. But when we understand the origin of things, we find that the idea of eternity is there too. Nevertheless, we cannot prove it, because all things that we see in the world are subject to change (25-33).

Even though things are different from one another, they have still a number of characteristics derived from a common source (34-40).

It is necessary for the intellect to devote itself to a single purpose in order to understand its cause (41-43).

As the result of some actions arises immediately, and of others after a time, it is possible to have a doubt in regard to the nature of result. There are some who believe that there can be no real result of an action after a lapse of time, because the cause itself has been destroyed. But the result of an action, before it has appeared, may be said to be like the fruit of a tree before it has appeared; and it cannot be said to be either existent, or non-existent, or existent-non-existent. What, however, our intellect can prove is that it is non-existent; but we have to understand the sense in which the term is used. Nor is there any inconsistency in comparing the result of an action with the fruit of a tree, —for the term "fruit" can refer to son, cattle, wife, and a number of other things (44-53).

PAIN — We cannot say that the result of birth is unmixed pain, because there is joy too in its midst (54-55).

But there seems to be no end to pain in the world, so much so that it seems that it is not possible to attain to joy or emancipation from the bondage of life. But this is a mistaken view, and is not supported by the Vedas,—only we have to interpret their text aright (56-61).

EMANCIPATION FROM BONDAGE — Final joy or emancipation from the bondage of life is like the absence of pain of one who is in deep sleep and sees no dreams; and such a one is not inclined to associate himself with things again; for actions are caused by desire or deliberate intention; and so long as they last, so will pain (62-67).

PART II

TEN MORE CATEGORIES

We can now make a rapid survey of ten more "categories",—motive (1-3), doubt (4-6), admitted truth and its instances (7-10), different parts of an argument, process of reasoning, art of drawing conclusions (11-15), discussion (16-49), disputation, and carping criticism (50-51).

MOTIVE — Motive is associated with *ahaṅkāra*, which acts; and when we understand that action gives rise to faults, *ahaṅkāra* ceases to act. The cause of faults is attraction for the attributes of objects, as well as the objects of desire themselves; and the cause of this attraction is an erroneous conception of all things, taken as a whole as well as in parts (1-3).

DOUBT — Doubt arises because of conflict between know-

ledge and ignorance, and it comes to an end when we understand the cause of things. Similarly, if there be no activity, there can be no doubt (4-6).

ADMITTED TRUTH AND ITS INSTANCES — The idea of admitted truth and its instances can easily be illustrated (7-10).

DIFFERENT PARTS OF AN ARGUMENT, PROCESS OF REASONING, AND THE ART OF DRAWING CONCLUSIONS — All these are connected together, and their idea can easily be illustrated (11-15).

DISCUSSION — The idea of discussion can also be easily illustrated (16-49).

DISPUTATION AND CARPING CRITICISM — Disputation and carping criticism are like a fence made of branches of thorn, designed to protect the growth of a seed; and they are meant for the purpose of preserving our understanding of reality (50-51).

CHAPTER V

PART I

THREE MORE CATEGORIES

The next three "categories" are fallacies, quibbles, and the real nature of a thing; and it is necessary to understand them (1-43).

FALLACIES, QUIBBLES, AND THE REAL NATURE OF A THING — Fallacies and quibbles arise from similarities; and so also the idea of the real nature of a thing. These similarities are of twenty-four kinds; and they should be properly understood. (1-43).

PART II

THE LAST CATEGORY

The last "category" refers to inability to carry on an argument because of impossibility of agreement on the first principles; and we have to understand what that means (1-24).

INABILITY TO CARRY ON AN ARGUMENT FOR WANT OF AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES — There are twenty-four situations of unfitness to carry on an argument because of impossibility of agreement on the first principles; and it is necessary to understand them (1-24).

VII

THE VAISESHIKA SYSTEM

THE PLAN OF THE VAISESHIKA — The plan of the *Vaiśeshika* is similar to that of *Nyāya*. The word is derived from *viśesha*, and means "special, distinguished, etc."; and, as the two systems are closely allied, it may be regarded as a special form of presentation of the same ideas of *Nyāya*.

DIVISION INTO CHAPTERS — The whole work is divided into ten chapters, with two parts to each chapter; and, as in the case of *Nyāya*, the opening *Sūtras* give us an idea of its subject-matter. It is said to be Dharma, which is defined to be that which brings about the highest good; and this highest good is said to consist in the knowledge of six things,—substance, attributes of a substance, action, the common properties of things, the special properties of things, and the intimate relation of objects by means of their similarities and

dissimilarities; and the whole work is devoted to a detailed examination of each one of these questions in the same manner as in *Nyāya*.

In the first part of the first chapter we are told of the subject-matter of the *Vaiśeshika*, and the six "categories" of things, the knowledge of which makes for the highest good; and then the author proceeds to describe three of these, —substance, attributes of a substance, and action. In the second part he goes on to consider the fourth,—the common properties of things.

In the second chapter he deals with the fourth and fifth "categories",—the common and special properties of things.

In the third chapter he examines the relation of objects through their similarities and differences,—the last "category" of knowledge.

In the fourth chapter he again examines the attributes of substances, and attempts to classify them; while in the fifth, he deals with the factors of action; and the sixth is devoted to a consideration of intelligent and good actions.

In the last four chapters we have a further examination of the attributes of things; and that completes this system.

It may now be summarised as follows:—

CHAPTER I

PART I

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE VAISESHIKA: SIX CATEGORIES OF THINGS

The subject-matter of the *Vaiśeshika* is Dharma, and Dharma is that which makes for the highest good (1-3).

The highest happiness or good arises from a knowledge of the real nature of six things,—substance, attributes of a substance,

action, common properties of things, special properties of things, and the intimate relation of objects by means of their similarities and dissimilarities (4).

It is necessary to understand all this; and so let us deal with the characteristics of the first three,—substance, attributes of a substance, and action (5-31).

DHARMA — The subject-matter of the *Vaiśeshika* is Dharma; and Dharma is that which enables us to ascertain the nature of prosperity and of the highest happiness or good (1-3).

SOURCE OF HIGHEST HAPPINESS — The highest happiness or good arises from a knowledge of the real nature of six things, —substance, attribute, action, common properties of things, special properties of things, and the intimate relation of objects by means of their similarities and differences (4).

SUBSTANCES — Substances are of nine kinds: Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Soul, and Mind (5).

ATTRIBUTES — The attributes of things are colour or form, taste, smell, touch, name, measure or value, individuality, union and division, priority and posteriority, intelligent ideas, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and efforts (6).

ACTION — Action consists in throwing a thing up or down, bending, stretching out, and the manner of going (7).

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBSTANCE, ATTRIBUTE AND ACTION — The common characteristics of substance, attribute and action are that they exist, are not eternal, inhere in an object, are effect and cause, and possess general and special properties (8).

If a substance and attribute have the same origin, they are identical in character. Substances produce substances and

attributes other attributes; but action cannot produce action (9-11).

A substance cannot destroy effect or cause; attributes can destroy both; and action can counteract effect (12-14).

The marks of a substance are that it is characterised by action and attributes, and is the material cause of other substances. The marks of an attribute are that it abides in a substance, is devoid of other attributes, is not the cause of combinations and divisions, and is the same in all cases. The marks of an action are that it abides in a single indivisible substance, and is the cause of combinations as well as divisions (15-17).

Substance and attribute are a common cause of substance, attribute and action; while action is the common cause of combination, separation, and quick motion, and is not a cause of substance (18-22).

One substance may be the common effect of many substances; but one action cannot be the effect of a number of actions (23-27).

Colour or form can be the joint effect of a number of colours or forms (28).

An act of throwing up implies weight, effort, and direct material contact (29).

Combinations and divisions are characteristic of action; but action is not the cause of substance or action (30-31).

PART II

THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THINGS

After this we have to understand the idea of the common properties of things; and they refer to cause and effect (1-3), notion

of reality (4-6), and the nature of existence (7-10). We have also to understand how we can get the idea of a substance (11-12), attribute of a substance, and action (13-16), as well as of existence (17).

CAUSE AND EFFECT — If there be no cause, there can be no effect; but this does not mean that if there be no effect, there is no cause (1-3).

NOTION OF REALITY — The notion of reality is a fundamental one, for we find that things have a continuous course of existence. But the characteristics of a substance, attributes of a substance, and action can be universal as well as special (4-6).

EXISTENCE—That is existence by which a substance, attributes of a substance, and action are said to be what they are. But existence is different from all these; and in spite of its presence in attributes and action, is neither an attribute nor an action (7-10).

A SUBSTANCE — The idea of a substance can be explained by getting hold of a number of substances (11-12).

ATTRIBUTES AND ACTIONS — In the same manner the nature of attribute and action can be explained by means of a number of attributes and actions (13-16).

STATE OF EXISTENCE — We say that there is a state of existence, because objects that are said to exist possess certain common properties, and do not possess certain other properties, and are characterised by one common state, which is called existence (17).

CHAPTER II

PART I

COMMON AND SPECIAL PROPERTIES OF SUBSTANCES

We find that substances have common as well as special properties, and it is necessary to understand them. For instance, the great "elements",—Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ether—have such properties, and we should know what they are (1-31).

PROPERTIES OF THE "ELEMENTS" — Earth has properties of form, taste, smell, and touch. Water has form, touch, and taste; Fire has form and touch; and Air has touch. These properties are not seen in Ether (1-5).

SPECIAL ATTRIBUTE OF FIRE — We find that a number of things change their form when brought into contact with fire; and this enables us to understand the special attribute of Fire, — namely, form (6-8).

CHARACTER OF AIR — Touch is the attribute of Air; but it is not the touch of visible things,—for Air itself is not visible. It is a substance, but does not possess the state of a substance. It is a substance, because it is characterised by action and attributes; but, as it does not possess the state of a substance, it is sometimes said to be eternal. The expansion of Air is a mark of its variety of forms; but even in a close contact with Air, nothing visible can be seen (9-19).

CHARACTER OF ETHER — Going out and going in are the characteristic marks of Ether; and they take place at the same time, because this is not a case of action, but only of contact,—for Ether is only in contact with an object (20-23).

Sound is an attribute of Ether and of nothing else,—neither Air, nor mind, nor the soul (24-27).

Ether is a substance like Air, and no more eternal (or non-eternal) than the latter. It is real because we know that it exists; and it exists because we know that sound is its special attribute (28-31).

PART II

COMMON AND SPECIAL PROPERTIES OF SUBSTANCES

(Continued)

The "elements" have their special properties too (1-5). In the same manner we can understand the character of Time (6-9), Space (10-20), and Sound (21-37).

SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF "ELEMENTS" — Smell is the special attribute of Earth, cold of Water, and heat of Fire (1-5).

CHARACTER OF TIME — The character of Time is that it belongs to the future, present, and the past,—and is swift. It is a substance like Air, and eternal (or non-eternal) like it. It is real because we know that it exists, and has certain definite characteristics. It is also a factor of action; and things that are not subject to Time are said to be permanent, and those that are, impermanent (6-9).

CHARACTER OF SPACE — When we describe a thing from a particular point, it is a clear proof of the existence of Space. Space is a substance like Air, and eternal (or non-eternal) like it. It is real because it exists, and has certain definite characteristics, and produces certain effects. We form an idea

of the East because of its permanent connection with the Sun; and it is with reference to that that we have the South, West, and North, and the intermediate spaces between them. There is, however, a possibility of doubt in this (10-20).

SOUND — Sound is that which "catches" the ears. There are different kinds of sounds to express different ideas of things. Sound is not a substance, though associated with one; nor is it action, though it has the character of one. It is only a perfect attribute. There is no mark of its permanence, for it is subject to constant change; and it is a mistake to suppose that it can be found in a manifest object (21-30).

Sound is produced by means of the meeting and separation of things, and by other sound. The first sound arises from soundlessness. There can be confusion or doubt in a multiplicity of sounds; but generally speaking, it is possible to separate and distinguish between them (31-37).

CHAPTER III

PART I

RELATION OF OBJECTS THROUGH SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

The last and sixth subject of knowledge is the intimate relation of objects through their similarities and differences. These relations are different in different cases.

For instance, the objects of the senses are different from the result attained by means of them (1-8). An object may be united with one thing for one purpose, and with another for another; and an effect may be the effect of something different from what we believe it to be (9-14). Similar considerations arise in respect of what constitutes a valid argument (15-19).

THE OBJECTS OF THE SENSES—The objects of the senses are well known; but when a person attains to them, the

result achieved is different from the objects themselves (1-8).

An object which is closely connected or united with another, may be associated with it for one purpose, and opposed to it in another; and even so an effect may be the effect of something other than we believe it to be. That is due to the fact that the result is different from the object that produces it (9-14).

CONDITIONS OF A VALID ARGUMENT—That which is not proved, cannot be advanced as a valid argument; nor that which does not exist, or is doubtful (15-17).

An argument bearing on what relates to the connection of the objects of the senses with the soul, is not invalid; but it can have its limitations (18-19).

PART II

RELATION OF OBJECTS THROUGH SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

(Continued)

We can understand the character and function of the mind in the same manner, for it acts in association with the senses and the soul (1-3).

Similarly, we can know that the soul exists, because of the functions of the body, senses, and the mind, and the experience of pleasure and pain (4-5), and also the character of the "I" within us (6-18).

All souls are alike so far as the experience of pleasure and pain, and the acquisition of knowledge are concerned; but otherwise the souls are really many, and different from one another (19-21).

MIND—We know that there is a mind when the soul comes into contact with the senses, and when there is knowledge or the absence of it. Mind is a substance like Air, and

eternal (or non-eternal) like it. A creature has only one mind; and we say so because there is no simultaneity of knowledge or action (1-3).

SOUL—Breathing in, breathing out, closing and opening the eyes, the manner of living, the course of the mind, the changes within the senses,—pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and efforts,—all these show that there is a soul. It is a substance, and eternal (or non-eternal) like Air (4-5).

PROOF OF THE SOUL'S EXISTENCE—When we are in physical contact with a person, we can say that he is so and so; and it is for this reason that *pratyaksha* or sense-perception is necessary for the purpose of acquiring scientific knowledge. But so far as the "I" within us is concerned,—since it is different from everything else that we see—sense-perception cannot be a proper means of acquiring its knowledge (6-10).

But we find that when we say "I", it refers to the soul and soul alone; and that is as good a proof of the existence of the soul as *pratyaksha* or sense-perception can provide; and so this knowledge of the soul may be said to be derived by means of a *pratyaksha* of a different kind. When, however, we say from the peculiar manner of his going, that it is a particular person, what is perceptible is his *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, so far as his body is concerned (11-18).

SIMILARITY AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOULS—We find that the experience of pleasure, pain, and knowledge is common to all; and so we might say that, to this extent, the souls of all creatures are the same. But the souls are really many, and each is different according to the state in which it is born (19-21).

CHAPTER IV

PART I

THE ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCES

Let us now consider the idea of attributes of substances.

Certain things are said to be eternal, while others non-eternal; and we need to understand that the eternal is that which exists; and that it is an effect, but an effect without a cause (1-5).

An attribute is something that is abstract, and we can understand its idea from what is concrete. For instance, we can understand the idea of largeness from a large number of substances and forms; and we can get the idea of form from a number of things having a form. It is in this manner that we can understand the idea of attributes and character of things (6-13).

THE ETERNAL—The eternal is that which exists, but has no cause. Its proof is that it is an effect, but an effect without a cause. This is an exception to the common rule that there can be no effect without a cause, for the rule applies to things that are non-eternal, and not eternal (1-5).

FROM CONCRETE TO ABSTRACT—We can understand the idea of largeness when we have a large number of substances and forms. Similarly, we can have an idea of form, when we collect together a large number of substances with different forms; and we can form an idea of taste, smell, and touch in the same manner. It is in this way that we have a perception of names, measures, individual existence of objects, union and separation, priority and posteriority, and action,—indeed all knowledge relating to the attributes and character of things (6-13).

PART II

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBSTANCES

· All substances have three characteristics,—body, sense-organs, and sphere of activity. All of them do not consist of the five "elements"; but they are composed of atoms, which combine in them in different ways (1-4).

We may classify the bodies of creatures in two ways,—those born of the womb, and those not born of the womb (5-11).

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBSTANCES—All substances made of the Earth and other "elements" have three characteristics, —body, sense-organs, and sphere of activity. There is no ocular evidence of the combinations of all substances; and all of them do not consist of the five "elements",—for some consist of only three. This, however, does not mean that we deny that the atoms of which they are composed can combine in different ways (1-4).

TWO KINDS OF CREATURES—The bodies of creatures may be said to be of two kinds,—those born of the womb, and those not born of the womb. This is a universal rule of division, and is not restricted by country or place (5-11).

CHAPTER V

PART I

THE FACTORS OF ACTION

Let us now consider the problem of action.

The principal factors of action are the soul, the hand and its instruments (1-6); but it is necessary to have impulse and effort

too (7-10); and we can explain all kinds of human actions in this manner (11-13). But there is also an Unseen Power which has its share in some actions (14-15); and there is also an element of deliberate intention in action (16-18).

THE SOUL, THE HAND AND ITS INSTRUMENTS—The principal factors of action are the soul, and the hand and its instruments. The hand acts because it is connected with the soul; and the mace, its instrument, acts in the same manner,—because it is connected with the hand. Were there no such connection, the mace would drop down because of its weight (1-6).

ACTION, IMPULSE AND EFFORT—Action requires a special impulse and a special effort. Were there no special impulse, there would neither be upward nor oblique action. Again, there is a special impulse, because there is a special effort (7-10).

AN ILLUSTRATION—We can explain the action of a child in terms of the action of the hand,—that is, as a result of special impulse and special effort; and we can explain the action of one who has been scorched, through the appearance of blisters, in the same manner. If there be no effort, there can be no action,—even as a person who is fast asleep cannot walk (11-13).

OTHER FORMS OF ACTION: AN UNSEEN POWER—When a straw or a blade of grass moves, it does so because of the action of air; but the movement of a magnet and the approach of a needle towards it, is caused by an Unseen Power (14-15).

DELIBERATE INTENTION—There is also an element of deliberate intention in action (16-18).

PART II

THE FACTORS OF ACTION

(*Continued*)

Action on this earth takes place in three ways,—as a result of impulse, as a result of properly connected combination of things, and as a result of the presence of an Unseen Power (1-13). The action of the mind is caused by means of its association with the soul (14); and there is pleasure or pain when the two come into contact with the objects of the senses (15-16).

Attraction and repulsion, desire to eat and drink, and the connection of different results are all caused by an Unseen Power (17-18).

There can be no action without the existence of the soul (19-23); but we can conceive of the action of the *Guṇas* (or the inherent attributes of the objects of Nature) in the case of things which are not inseparably connected with the soul,—e.g. Time (24-26).

THE FACTORS OF ACTION—We see that action on this earth takes place in three ways: as a result of impulse, as a result of properly connected combination of things,—which includes the action of the forces of Nature which we can understand—and an Unseen Power, where it is performed in a special or extraordinary manner. For instance, water falls because of its weight when it is not supported by anything; it flows on because it is fluid; and it rises in a pipe or tube because of its contact with air. All these actions take place, not because of the pressure of impulse, but because of properly connected combination of things, and in accordance with the laws of Nature, which we can understand (1-6).

AN UNSEEN POWER—But we do not know how sap rises in a tree; and so its ascent may be said to be caused by an Unseen Power. On the other hand, we know that waters thicken or break when brought into contact with fire; and we can explain the action of Fire and Air by means of our

knowledge. But there are some extraordinary actions, —like the flaming of fire in the upper regions, or the oblique blowing of the wind, or the first action of the atoms or the mind—which we cannot explain; and so we say that they are caused by an Unseen Power (7-13).

ACTION OF THE MIND—The action of the mind can be explained in the same manner as that of the hand,—that is, as a result of its association with the soul (14).

PLEASURE AND PAIN—Pleasure and pain arise through the contact of the soul with the mind, senses, and the objects of the senses. But they do not arise when the mind abides in the soul, and is not associated with the senses and their objects (15-16).

ATTRACTION, REPULSION, DESIRE, RESULT—Attraction, repulsion, desire to eat and drink, and the connection with different results,—all these are caused by an Unseen Power. Were there no such Power, things would not cohere; nor would there be freedom from the bondage of life (17-18).

IGNORANCE—Ignorance is absence of existence, or a negation of things (19-20).

REGION, TIME, ETHER, GUNAS—Region, Time, Ether are different from the soul, which alone can act; and they are actionless by themselves. The *Guṇas* (or the inherent attributes of the objects of Nature) too cannot act without reference to the soul. It is a law that things that are actionless in themselves cannot come together by means of their own action and produce an effect (21-23).

But it is possible to conceive of the action of the *Guṇas*, —for they are said to be the original cause of things; but

that is said of things which are not inseparably connected with something else (e.g. the soul). We can explain the idea of the creation of the regions and of Time in this manner,—that is, by means of the action of the *Guṇas* (24-26).

CHAPTER VI

PART I

INTELLIGENT ACTION

Let us now consider the character of different kinds of actions. Certain actions are intelligent actions, like the composition of the Vedas and the *Brāhmaṇas*, acts of charity, and actions that incline us to the best of men, and make us shun those who are hostile or dangerous (1-16).

INTELLIGENT ACTION—The language of the Vedas is an instance of intelligent action, for the composition of words in the text follows a deliberate design; and that is true of the *Brāhmaṇas* too, for they give us a clear and correct idea of action in this manner (1-2).

An act of charity is also characterised by intelligence on the part of the giver as well as receiver (3-5). It is an intelligent act, because feeding the wicked is not called an act of charity. Thus we should always be inclined to those who are the best; and this is true of all classes of persons. Similarly, it is an intelligent act to shun those who are hostile or dangerous to us (6-16).

PART II

GOOD ACTION

Certain actions may be classified as good actions, meant for the benefit of all (1-4). Certain actions are said to be pure and certain

others impure. But a pure action must be characterised by restraint which, however, is not mere abstention from action (5-9).

Desire arises from a prospect of pleasure, and also when a person is absorbed in the objects of the senses. But it is also inherent in man (10-13). Desire and aversion are the cause of all things,—just as well as unjust; and real freedom can be obtained not by means of renunciation of action, but by means of action performed in accordance with the highest nature of the soul (14-16).

ACTION AND MOTIVE: GOOD ACTION—There can be no action without a motive; and motive is of two kinds,—seen and unseen. Where we are unable to discover any motive, we should take it that the proposed action is meant to secure the highest end, or is meant for the benefit of all (1).

KINDS OF GOOD ACTIONS—There are a number of actions of this kind (meant for the benefit of all),—such as initiation in good deeds, fast, continence, etc., as well as the observance of the four stages of life (2-4).

PURE AND IMPURE: RESTRAINT—That which has the desired form, taste, smell and touch, and is consecrated and washed, is said to be pure or clean; and the impure is the opposite of what is pure. But this is only a physical test, and is not enough; and we must take into consideration something else too,—and that is restraint. But restraint is different from mere abstention; and we cannot understand the truth without knowing what it really means (5-9).

BIRTH OF DESIRE—Desire arises from a prospect of pleasure, and also when a person is absorbed in the objects of the senses. But it owes its origin to an Unseen Power, because all are born with it, and it is a peculiar characteristic of the whole race (10-13).

CAUSE OF ACTION—Desire and aversion are the cause of all action,—just as well as unjust; and they bring about the union and parting of things (14-15).

ATTAINMENT OF FREEDOM—But freedom from the bondage of life can be attained not by renunciation of action, but by means of action performed in accordance with the highest nature of the soul (16).

CHAPTER VII

PART I

GUNAS OR THE ATTRIBUTES OF THINGS

Let us now consider the character of *Guṇas* or the inherent attributes of the objects of Nature.

The different "elements" have their own attributes; and they are not eternal because the substances themselves are not eternal (1-5).

All things are produced by means of a cause and through a process of development; and each is a separate entity (6-7).

The idea of small and large arises from certain special characteristics of things, and is obtained by means of comparison and contrast; so also that of eternal and non-eternal (8-20). In the same manner we can understand the idea of ignorance, ether, soul, mind, space, and Time (21-25).

THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE "ELEMENTS"—The attributes of form, taste, smell and touch, belonging to the "elements", are non-eternal, because the substances themselves are not eternal. The attributes of eternal things are eternal, and of non-eternal things non-eternal (1-5).

PRODUCTION OF THINGS—Preceded by the attributes of their cause, all things on earth are produced by means of a process of ripening or development; and each is a single substance (6-7).

THE IDEA OF SMALL AND LARGE—We can understand the idea of small and large in the same manner as that of the eternal. When we say that a particular thing is small or large, it is because it has certain special characteristics, and does not have certain other special characteristics (8-13).

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST—The idea of smallness or largeness is obtained by means of comparison and contrast with other things. Similarly, actions can be explained by means of other actions, and attributes by means of other attributes. Even so we can explain the idea of what is non-eternal by means of what is non-eternal, and of eternal by means of what is eternal. The eternal may be described as something round or circular (14-20).

IGNORANCE, ETHER, SOUL, MIND, SPACE, TIME—Ignorance or want of knowledge is itself a mark of knowledge (21). Ether is great because of its omnipresence; and so is the soul (22). The mind does not possess omnipresence, and is minute like an atom (23). Space (regions or the cardinal points of the compass) is explained by means of the idea of *Guṇas* or the inherent attributes of the objects of Nature (24); and Time can be understood by means of the idea of a cause or an action (25).

PART II

GUNAS OR THE ATTRIBUTES OF THINGS

(Continued)

We can get the idea of identity and separateness in the same manner,—that is, by means of comparison and contrast (1-3). But there is no universal identity of actions and the attributes of things (4-8). We can understand the idea of the combination and division

of things in the same manner (9-12). But it is not always possible to understand the combination and division of cause and effect (13-16).

Language is intended to express ideas correctly, and it is necessary to know how to interpret it (17-22). That will enable us to understand that the terms prior and posterior are relative terms; that actions can be understood by means of other actions, and attributes by means of other attributes; and we shall know the meaning of a thing being in a particular place, and the difference between substance and attribute (23-28).

THE IDEA OF IDENTITY AND SEPARATENESS—The idea of identity and separateness can be understood by means of comparison and contrast in the same manner as that of smallness and largeness (1-3).

NO UNIVERSAL IDENTITY—There is no universal identity of actions and attributes, because they are innumerable, and each is different from the other; and the idea of universal identity would only cause confusion (4-8).

COMBINATION OF THINGS—The combination of two things can be brought about in three ways,—by the action of either of the two, of both separately, or of both together; and we can explain the idea of division in the same manner (9-10).

MEANS OF UNDERSTANDING IDEAS—The idea of combination and division, as well as of action and attributes, can be obtained by means of comparison and contrast in the same manner as that of smallness and largeness (11-12).

ATTRIBUTES AND KNOWLEDGE—If there is no proof of the union of things, we cannot see the combination or division of cause and effect; and that is so because *Guṇas* (or the inherent attributes of things) are not the cause of the union

or separation of things. But we can think of *Guṇas* in a state of rest[1] (13-16).

LANGUAGE AS A MEANS OF ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE—Language is intended to express ideas correctly; but a word and its meaning are not always connected together. The idea of things is sometimes expressed by means of the consonants of a word; and the meaning of a consonant in a combination of consonants is what has been put into it by the author; while that of a word used in the common way arises from its own special characteristics. The proof of the meaning of a word is that there should be general agreement about it (17-20).

RELATION BETWEEN WORDS AND IDEAS—When we use a number of words in a sentence, one must come earlier than another, because they lie in the same direction. It is also possible that there is a cause for this,—namely, that one idea precedes another (21-22).

RELATIVE TERMS—The terms prior and posterior are relative terms, and can be understood in the same manner as small and large. Similarly, actions can be understood by means of other actions, and attributes by means of other attributes (23-25).

RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT—When we say that a particular thing is in a particular place, we get an idea of the inseparable relation of cause and effect (26).

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTE—Substance and attribute are not the same thing, and we can understand the difference between them (27-28).

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[1] This is called *Prakṛti* by the *Sāṅkhya*.

CHAPTER VIII

PART I

GUNAS OR THE ATTRIBUTES OF THINGS

(Continued)

We can explain the idea of knowledge by means of substances, which include the soul and the mind, although they are not perceptible to the senses (1-2). But we should remember that the means of acquiring knowledge are part of the idea of knowledge (3). Indeed, attributes and actions are closely connected with substances (4-5); and the idea of what is general and special refers to all the three (6-8). Thus the idea of whiteness is closely connected with a white object; and we can get the idea of an object by means of a regular succession of a number of objects (9-11).

KNOWLEDGE AND SUBSTANCES—We can explain the idea of knowledge primarily by means of substances; and the soul and the mind are included among the substances, although they cannot be perceived by the senses (1-2).

KNOWLEDGE AND THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING IT—The manner of acquiring knowledge is part of the idea of knowledge (3).

ATTRIBUTES, ACTIONS, AND SUBSTANCES—Attributes and actions are closely connected with substances; and we can acquire their knowledge by means of substances (4-5).

The idea of what is general and special refers to substances, attributes, and actions; but the idea of substances, attributes and actions can be understood only by reference to substances (6-8).

Thus whiteness and the idea of whiteness are closely knit together in a white substance; and that gives us the idea of whiteness. As a white substance is the cause of the idea of whiteness, the two are related as cause and effect. But we get the idea of substances by means of a regular succession

of a number of substances; and that is possible because actions do not occur simultaneously, but only in a regular order of succession (9-11).

PART II

GUNAS OR THE ATTRIBUTES OF THINGS

(Continued)

It is our intellect that enables us to understand the ideas and attributes of things (1-4). But certain attributes inhere in substances,—e.g. smell in the "element" Earth. Similarly, Water, Fire and Air have their own attributes; and these "elements" may be said to be like *Prakṛti* in respect of these attributes (5-6).

FUNCTION OF THE INTELLECT—When we say "this, that, done by you, feed him, etc.", we are able to do so because of the function of the intellect; and that is true of all things (1-4).

PRAKRITI AND THE "ELEMENTS"—So far as our knowledge of smell is concerned, the Earth may be said to be *Prakṛti* or its primary substance; and that is so because it is so large and possesses the attribute of smell. The same may be said of Water, Fire, and Air with reference to their respective attributes (5-6).

CHAPTER IX

PART I

GUNAS OR THE ATTRIBUTES OF THINGS

(Continued)

We can understand the idea of existence and non-existence in the same manner (1-10).

Perception arises as a result of the union of the soul and the mind with a substance; and when substances are perceived, there can be a perception of attributes and actions. When there is perception of the soul, there can be a perception of its attributes too (11-15).

EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE—When it is impossible to get any information regarding an action or an attribute, it is sometimes said to be non-existent. The whole universe that exists is also said to be originally non-existent. But it is really existent as well as non-existent even then; and there is no other meaning of *A-sat* or non-existence (1-5).

EXISTENCE AND PERCEPTION—We say that the past does not exist because it is not perceptible to the senses; but as soon as we recollect it, it becomes perceptible at once. Similarly, that which is non-existent becomes existent if it comes to be perceived (6-10).

PERCEPTION—When there is a special union of the soul and the mind in the soul, there is a clear perception of the soul. In the same manner, when there is union of the soul and the mind in connection with other substances, there is perception of those substances. When substances are perceived, there can be a perception of their attributes and actions too; and so when there is a perception of the soul, there can also be a perception of its attributes (11-15).

PART II

GUNAS OR THE ATTRIBUTES OF THINGS

(Continued)

All this requires the use of language; and the purpose of language is to describe the real characteristics of an object in a strictly logical manner (1-4). But that requires the function of the intellect too (5);

and we can understand by its means how memory and dreams arise (6-9), and know the difference between ignorance and knowledge (10-13).

. THE PURPOSE OF LANGUAGE—A true statement, based on the characteristics of an object, should tell us all about its cause and effect, and what is combined with, opposed to, and inherent in it. This is the real purpose of language,—to describe the real characteristics of an object in a strictly logical manner; and cause, statement of reasons, inference, proof, and the instruments of action have no other purpose than to tell us the characteristic marks of an object (1-4).

FUNCTION OF THE INTELLECT—When we say that a particular characteristic belongs to a particular object, it is because the matter has been considered by the intellect (5).

MEMORY AND DREAMS—Memory arises as a result of the union of the mind and the soul with the impressions of acts previously done. Dreams arise in the same manner; but they belong to a state that is near to sleep (6-9).

IGNORANCE AND KNOWLEDGE—Ignorance arises from a defect of the senses, of education, or of training; and it may be said to be defective knowledge. When knowledge ceases to be defective, it is called knowledge (10-12).

KNOWLEDGE OF THE SACRED BOOKS—A proper understanding of the sacred books, composed by the *Rishis*, arises from a knowledge of the laws of life (13).

CHAPTER X

PART I

GUNAS OR THE ATTRIBUTES OF THINGS

(Continued)

We can understand the difference between pleasure and pain, and doubt, certainty, and suspended judgement in the same manner (1-6).

We see that the different parts of the body have a fixed place in the body, but the soul is different from all of them (7).

PLEASURE AND PAIN—Pleasure and pain are the opposite of each other, because of the difference in the motive of desirable and undesirable things: the one is excellent, the other bad (1).

DOUBT, CERTAINTY, AND SUSPENDED JUDGEMENT—The state between doubt and certainty is one of suspended judgement, and it is different from knowledge. Doubt arises because of dependence on sense-perception; while certainty arises because of dependence on evidence. That which relates to the past may also give rise to doubt, specially when we do not perceive its effect. There is doubt also when we see the same object in a number of causes (2-6).

BODY AND THE SOUL—The different parts of the body have a fixed place in it. But there is something different from all these, and it has its own special characteristics: that is the soul (7).

PART II

GUNAS OR THE ATTRIBUTES OF THINGS

(Continued)

We can have knowledge of the cause of a thing in the same manner (1-3); and so also of its form (4-7); and understand the idea of what is meant for the benefit of all (8-9).

KNOWLEDGE OF A CAUSE—The knowledge of a cause arises from its effect. It may also arise from some other combinations of things, which are the result of action (1-3).

KNOWLEDGE OF FORM, TOUCH, ETC.—In the same manner we have knowledge of form, when we see how an object is subjected to action, as a result of which it acquires a certain form. We have perception of touch, etc. in the same manner (4-7).

ACTION MEANT FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL—When in the case of well-known objects we are unable to say for what purpose they are being used, we should take it that they are meant for the benefit of all (8-9).

VIII

THE MIMANSA

THE MIMANSA: ITS BASIS AND SUBJECT-MATTER—The word *Mīmānsā* means "profound thought or reflection", and the whole work is indeed so in the strictest sense of the term. The word is derived from the root "*man*", which means "to think, know, understand", from which we get the word *manas* or mind,—on which, as we have observed, the main idea of the *Vaiśeshika* is based; and this gives us the connection between the two systems. Indeed, the subject-matter of both is said to be Dharma, referred to the opening *Sūtras* of each; but, as the *Vaiśeshika* has told us so little about it, the gap is filled by the *Mīmānsā*; so that the *Vaiśeshika* is followed by it in a strict sequence of ideas.

Again, as we have seen, the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeshika* deal primarily with the problem of knowledge; and though the latter refers to action too, its treatment of the problem is by no means adequate. This is provided by the *Mīmānsā* now, —more specially as it links up the idea of Dharma with that of Action.

Further, as we have seen, there is a broad mention of the correct method of interpretation of the sacred books in *Nyāya*, and the *Vaiśeshika* makes a passing reference to it too. But the whole idea needs to be properly elaborated and explained; and that is done by the *Mīmānsā*.

The four principal questions dealt with by the *Mīmānsā* are accordingly (i) Dharma; (ii) Action and its relation to Dharma; (iii) the subject-matter of the Vedas, with special reference to the idea of Dharma and Action; and (iv) the method of interpretation of the Vedas, with illustrations, by means of which we can understand them aright.

We have observed in an earlier place that the main idea of the *Mīmānsā* is based on the character of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as an-actor; and it is indeed corresponding to this that Action, conceived in its widest significance as Dharma or the Law of Life, is the subject-matter of this system. It may be said to be a "profound reflection" on the problem of Action, with special reference to the character of the mind as well as *ahaṅkāra*; and, as the special attribute of the one is desire, and of the other action,—this gives us the connection between desire and action, and their corresponding systems of thought, —*Vaiśeshika* and the *Mīmānsā*.

We have also seen how *ahaṅkāra* and the soul are closely connected too; and *ahaṅkāra*, in the original sense of the term, is nothing but the soul when it is conceived to be an actor. As we shall presently see, *Vedānta* is based on the pure character of the soul; and this gives us the connection between *Mīmānsā* and that system too; and this will explain why they are called *Pūrva-Mīmānsā* and *Uttara-Mīmānsā* respectively: for the line of thought commenced by the *Mīmānsā* is completed by *Vedānta*, which constitutes the last word on the problem of the soul with reference to both knowledge and action.

THE PLAN OF THE MIMANSA—The plan of the work, though simple like that of the previous systems, is somewhat different. It is the longest of all systems of Hindu Philosophy, and is divided into twelve chapters which, with the exception of three, each of which has eight parts,—consist of four parts each; and each part of a chapter deals with different aspects of the four questions which constitute the subject-matter of this system. Thus, the author begins by proposing to inquire into the nature of Dharma, and tells us what it means. He then goes on to state that the subject-matter

of the Vedas is the same, and that we can understand them in this light if we adopt the correct method of interpreting them; and this concludes all the four parts of the first chapter.

The second chapter deals with the same problem again,—with a fuller account of the Vedas and their contents, and a fuller explanation of the method of interpreting them, by means of which their hymns of praise addressed to the gods can be transformed into statements of the laws of Nature.

This process is followed throughout the work; and so each chapter contains an exposition of the idea of Dharma, conceived in its widest significance as action performed in a spirit of sacrifice,—that is, as good, intelligent and joyful action, meant for the benefit of all—together with a reference to the Vedas as dealing with this question, the method of interpreting them in this light, and a number of examples to illustrate this method. Indeed, as the whole system is based on the character and function of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, it gives us a detailed account of the Law of Action,—its character and scope, origin and effect, the manner in which it takes place, its instruments, and relation to knowledge, and bearing on the final goal of life; and it concludes with a description of the act of creation as being of the essence and end of all that is in the world.

TREATMENT OF THE SYSTEM—As a summary of each part of a chapter of the *Mīmānsā* has been given in the body of the work, it is not necessary to repeat it here. It would perhaps be more convenient to put together its main ideas, spread all over the text,—relating to Dharma, Action, the Vedas, and their method of interpretation, together with illustrative examples—as that will enable the reader not only to have a clear idea of the character and scope of the system,

but also to understand the basic idea of the Vedas as well as of the wonderful "stories" of the Epics and the *Purāṇas*, which have been constructed on the same model as the Vedas, and can be analysed into accounts of the different systems of philosophy and religion in the same manner.

I. DHARMA

DHARMA—Dharma, says the *Mīmānsā*, may be defined as the highest good; but its idea is not limited to sense-perception. It arises from action, which is the law of life. Action may be divided into natural (or spontaneous) action, and deliberate action, which requires an exercise of the intellect; and Dharma refers to the latter kind of action; for action arising from impulse is not Dharma. It may be said to be action conceived as a great sacrifice, and requires knowledge to understand it. So long as there is life, all things must conform to the Dharma of action; and the highest of such action is sacrifice.[1]

II. ACTION

THE CHARACTER OF ACTION — Action[2] is a part of our nature, and cannot be renounced. It is eternal and universal, and involves a material contact between an object and a

[1] References to Dharma are contained in MS. I, i, 1-5, 24-26; I, iii, 1-14; II, i, 9-12; iv, 1-2, 14; and IX, i, 1-4.

Sacrifice means good, intelligent, and joyful action, meant for the benefit of all. Such action can transform the idea of Nature into that of God; that is, if we believe that the action of Nature is good, intelligent, and makes for joy, we believe in God as *Sat-chit-ānanda*.

[2] References to Action are to be found in almost every part of the *Mīmānsā*.

place. It is characterised by purpose, and consists of parts. It means drawing something near to one's self, and requires the use of an organ or limb of the body. It is of many kinds, and includes the process of thinking and acquisition of knowledge; and we may conceive of it as a whole or in parts.

TWO CLASSES OF ACTIONS — There are two main classes of actions,—natural and deliberate action,—and the latter involves the function of the intellect. There can be only one deliberate action at a time, and that is the best action that can be performed by a person at the time.

THE CAUSE OF ACTION — The cause of action is some purpose,—a desire to obtain some satisfaction. It is only the living that can have this purpose, while the inanimate can but serve the purpose of the animate, and impel them to action.

PURPOSE — Purpose implies dependence as well as attachment, and arises because of a connection between the actor and the objects of life. There are many kinds of purposes and actions in life which, however, are mingled together in accordance with a law. The final purpose of all deliberate action is improvement or purification, and so it is linked up with the idea of sacrifice.

Men as well as animals have a purpose in action; and there is reason to believe that there is purpose in the working of the great forces of Nature too; and it expresses itself through conflict. There is purpose even in actionlessness.

Action, purpose, and result are all connected together like the limbs of the body.

DESIRE — Desire is the basis of all action, and it is associated with knowledge. The notion that all desire is evil is a popu-

lar heresy. Desire is connected with action in various ways, and activity arises from association with desire and the *Guṇas* or the attributes of the objects of Nature.

Desire is an attribute of the mind; and once it begins, it goes on without end, expressing itself in newer and newer forms. It is necessary to control desires, and we should not act under their urge. But it is a law of action that if we suspend one action, we must begin another; and the desires of those who make sacrifices should be satisfied. It is not possible to renounce all desires; and we can renounce only those which constitute a dangerous obstacle in our path. But good as well evil desires can be associated with an intelligent action. All desires undergo a change through lapse of time.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF ACTION — Action involves the function of all the faculties of man,—his senses, mind, *ahaṅkāra*, and the intellect. The soul too has its own share in it.

Action involves the use of a limb of the body or an organ of sense. But in all action the mind comes first because of its attribute, desire. At the same time the main factor of action is *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor; and in all deliberate action the decision to act belongs to the intellect. In every case, however, the fruit of action always belongs to the soul.

All these are closely connected together: for instance, when the intellect is associated with desire, it acts like the mind. Again, the function of the intellect involves the idea of Time, which enables us to understand the idea of the soul. On the other hand, *ahaṅkāra* is said to be an aspect of the soul when the latter engages in action; and the function or the mind implies that of *ahaṅkāra*, and is linked up with that of the senses.

ACTION AND THE FORCES OF NATURE — The forces of Nature are characterised by action; and there can be no great human action without their association.

NECESSITY OF KNOWLEDGE — It is necessary to have knowledge to be able to understand the law of action. For instance, we need to understand how it is related to Time, and how the latter enables us to have knowledge of the soul. The consecration of knowledge means intelligent action. But the principle of action should not be deduced from the manner of performing it or from the place where it occurs.

EFFORT—Action implies effort, which is of three kinds,—primary, secondary, and neutral,—the last signifying effort without any desire for the fruit of action.

All are entitled to act, but the manner of the action of each is different; nor are they entitled to the fruit of action. But the fruit always belongs to the soul.

Success in life is due to action. But if we do our best and yet fail, we may ascribe the failure to Time.

ENERGY—Action and effort imply energy, which means activity pervading every part of an organism. We can divide energy into parts, but not a unit of action characterised by a single purpose. All actions, however, are inter-dependent.

CHANGE: IMPROVEMENT: TIME—Action implies improvement as well as change, but not the creation of a new substance. Progress is the result of various kinds of actions, and it is possible to trace it to its source. There is also an element of Time in action, but there is no fixed time or place for it.

All action begins with desire, and the idea of perfection

arises later. Perfection, purification and sacrifice are synonymous terms, and imply the function of the intellect, whose chief role is to decide. Intellect accordingly plays a most important part in action; and it is progressive,—for in a series of intelligent actions, performed in a particular place, the last is likely to be the best.

OPTION—There is always an option before a deliberate action is undertaken. An option is determined by singleness of aim, and the decision to exercise it rests with the intellect.

HABIT—Habit arises from a deliberate repetition of an action for some considerable length of time; and the innate disposition of a person is an important factor in its formation.

ACTION OF THE WHOLE BODY—When a person acts, he does so as a whole entity, and all his faculties take part in action in greater or less degree. The body is accordingly compared to a chariot, which moves but as a single unit.

SATISFACTION, PLEASURE, JOY—All action gives some kind of satisfaction to the mind and the soul. Indeed, all other instruments of action,—the senses as well as the intellect—have their share of satisfaction in it too.

Pleasure arises because of the action of the mind and the intellect; but an interval of time is necessary for its recurrence. Pleasure or enjoyment has power to impel a person to action; and the motive of pleasure is strong enough to lead to the attainment of an object; but it should not cause any pain.

Those who believe that Nature is the supreme creator of life maintain that there is no joy in action; but such persons really deviate from the norm.

SACRIFICE—The highest kind of action is sacrifice, and it arises from an inner urge. An act of charity, and dying in the defence of some one are acts of sacrifice.

ANIMALS AND MEN—Animals too, like men, have a purpose in action, and they are all governed by a common law. They also have a mind, but have only natural desires; and they lack the idea of perfection or purification, which belongs only to men.

OFFSPRING—The instinct to have offspring is obvious. It is often stronger than reason, and implies action, and not its renunciation.

None but the living have a desire to procreate, and it serves the purpose of Nature; and, in its highest form, it is an act of sacrifice. It is a creative act, and there is always harm in indulgence.

RENUNCIATION OF ACTION—There can be no total extinction of action, for some part of it will always remain. We can refrain from action only at the end of our life, when all our tasks are done. Indeed, actions meant for the sake of Dharma should always be performed.

FREEDOM OF THE SOUL—We can escape from the evil effects of action or the bondage of life only by discriminating between different kinds of actions; and so one form of activity is changed into another and a higher one in this way. Indeed, the union of goodness with intelligence makes for the best kind of action as well as freedom from the bondage of life.

III. THE VEDAS AND THEIR SUBJECT-MATTER

NUMBER OF VEDAS—The Vedas[1] are three in number,—*Rik*, *Sāma*, and *Yajur*. A fourth, called *Nigada*, is sometimes added; but it should really be included in the *Yajur*.

RIG VEDA AND SAMA VEDA—Apart from certain improvements, the text of the *Rig Veda* is the same as that of *Sāma Veda*; and the repetition of certain parts is meant to complete the chain of reflection. The name *Sāma* refers to active life; and so we have an account of all that relates to living creatures in the *Sāma Veda*. However, in its absence, we may refer to the *Rig Veda*.

MANTRAS AND BRAHMANAS—The Vedas consist of *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*,—hymns of praise addressed to the gods, and laws of life together with their explanation, respectively.

SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE VEDAS—There are some who believe that the *Mantras* are nothing but hymns of praise addressed to the gods, and should be understood to refer to the offering of sacrifices made with material objects,—for that is the simple meaning of words used in the text. But we are unable to accept this view, because we find that the text, construed even as hymns of praise, makes little sense; and, in certain cases, casts reflections on those who are otherwise highly esteemed. On the other hand, if we construe it in a different manner, and associate it with the idea of action, we find that it gives us complete satis-

[1] References to the Vedas are to be found throughout the *Mīmānsā*. References to their contents are contained particularly in I, i, 27-33; ii, 1-53; iii, I, 15-16, 26-35; II, i, 13-49; III, viii, 15-18; IV, iii, 17-27; VI, i, 33-43; ii, 17-30; iii, 13-17, 31; VII, 1-2, 11-12; iii, 12-15; X, v, 26-58.

faction throughout; and the idea of hymns of praise is transformed into one of laws of life. Where, however, a *Mantra* does not refer to action, it would be found to refer to the soul.

THE PROBLEM OF THE SOUL AND ACTION—According to some, the Vedas deal with the problem of the soul as their principal subject-matter. But this is not correct, for we find that they deal with the whole world of Nature, and the problem of action, and tell us what actions to perform and how to perform them.

ACTION AND DHARMA—The real subject-matter of the Vedas is action, and Dharma is founded on their word; and it would be meaningless to interpret them in any other light. They are an exposition of the *Guṇas* or the inherent attributes of the objects of Nature, and refer to the laws of knowledge as well as action, which constitute the fundamental problem of life; and we can understand them in this light if we interpret their text correctly.

The *Aṅgas* of the *Mantras* of the Vedas are called "limbs", because purpose, action and result are connected together like the limbs of the body; and that is their real subject-matter.

ACTION AND PROHIBITION AGAINST ACTION—The Vedas enjoin action, but do not promise their fruit. They contain prohibition against action too; but that does not mean inaction. It only means prohibition against such actions as ought not to be performed by a good man.

THE TEXT OF THE VEDAS—All prescribed texts are an integral part of the Vedas, and the difference between

them is due to the difference in the manner in which their ideas have been expressed. Their text is authoritative, and no unauthorised additions should be made. Their language is perfect, and we should not venture to alter it. It is difficult to understand, but it is possible to grasp it by means of devotion and proper study. All these things were taught long ago, and we have forgotten them; but we can understand them again: only we should use the proper method of interpretation, and consider them in the light of action; and then we shall find that they make good sense, and are consistent throughout.

IV. THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

NEED OF A NEW INTERPRETATION[1] — We cannot have a single method of interpretation of the Vedas; but whatever method we adopt, it should have a regular plan, and be governed by definite rules. Indeed, if the Vedas have any real value, they cannot have the meaning commonly assigned to them; and so it is necessary to have a different method of interpretation. We are led to the same conclusion by the use of certain special terms in the text, such as those in connection with the god *Indra*. But it is necessary to have a regular method of interpretation, and we find that it exists, —only it requires skill to use it—for different words have to be handled in different ways.

THREE WAYS OF EXPLANATION — There are three ways of explaining the meaning of words used in the Vedas. We may take their common meaning if it is suitable; but, if the

[1] References to the method of interpretation are to be found in almost every part of the *Mīmānsā*, and only a brief summary is attempted here.

THE USE OF LANGUAGE: VERBS AND NOUNS — Life means action, and it has two parts,—its performance, and the doer of the deed; and corresponding to this there are two principal kinds of words in a language,—verbs and nouns; and the rest are all associated with them. Of these, nouns precede verbs, for verbs cannot be used without reference to nouns; and verbs are of two kinds,—transitive and intransitive.

THE BEST FORM OF EXPRESSION — We have to express our ideas by means of language; and the best form of expression would be that in which a single word has a single meaning, and a single idea can be expressed by means of a single word. But if an expression has more than one meaning, it should consist of more than one part. If there are equal ideas to express, there should be separate statements for each; and the close connection of word with word should make for perfection of statement, and there should be no gaps anywhere. Where, however, an idea is intricate, and is likely to cause confusion, it should be described by means of a number of statements,— specially where there are a number of parts of an action. These statements should normally be separate, and it is not necessary that they should be placed in close proximity to one another. Words, the origin of which can be traced, are the best.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE VEDAS — It is in the light of this that we have to understand the language of the Vedas. Different words have been used to express different ideas in different ways; and in a number of cases the text has two meanings,—the apparent and the real—both of which are consistent in themselves throughout. But the real meaning contains a reference to the law of action; and the whole composition is of this kind. But it does not appear to be in

harmony with the objects described; and so it is necessary to reject the apparent meaning of words. But we should do so only if it does not refer to the laws of life.

THE PRINCIPLE OF METHOD OF INTERPRETATION—The new method of interpretation of the Vedas depends primarily on changing the form of words used in the text, by dividing them into parts; and there is a principle underlying this idea. Thus, we know that action implies change as well as improvement; and corresponding to this the form of words has to be changed to make for improvement of the whole idea. Similarly, the idea of Time is obtained by means of an orderly arrangement of things; and so it is necessary to re-arrange the text in an orderly manner to get the idea of Time. Again, action is associated with desire, and is divisible into parts, while desire changes from time to time; and corresponding to this the form of words, expressive of these ideas, has to be changed, and they are divided into parts.

The reason for dividing a word into parts is that the different ingredients of an object can be clearly specified in this manner. Again, each part of a word is separate because it corresponds to each part of an action; and it has a bearing on the idea of the principal word, except in the case of a reference to the great forces of Nature, which are described in a different manner.

AN EXACT DESCRIPTION—The main reason for dividing a word into parts is that the author has himself formed it in this manner, in order to describe in the briefest and the best manner the constituents of an object. When we give a particular name to an object, there is generally a good reason for doing so; that is to say, certain qualities are

intended to be described by the name. This can best be done when each part of a word refers to a quality; and that is what has been done in the words used in the Vedas. This, however, is possible only when words are newly coined for the purpose; and such is indeed the character of a number of words used in the text. When words are arranged in this manner, they can cover the entire range of subject-matter of Dharma or the law of life, and their meanings can be fixed; and that is what we find in the Vedas. There are also certain instructions in connection with these words to enable us to understand them. For instance, when a name is repeated, we should understand that it is for the sake of further explanation.

The purpose of this form of composition is that the properties of objects, which are closely connected with one another, should be properly described; and so, if there are any examples, they too should be in the same form. There is thus no similarity between the original and the new meaning of a word; and, as there is an exact correspondence between an idea and its form of expression,—if a thing is not suitable for teaching, or is deemed to be contrary to Dharma, it is found to be expressed in a form which cannot be understood.

MEANING OF PARTS OF WORDS—Each part of a word accordingly signifies a *dravya* or a substance in the philosophical sense of the term,[1]—for it refers to a separate object, action, result, or the character of the doer of the deed. Thus, we can express the idea of a single action by means of a single note, and that is the best mode of expression.[2] This

[1] The *Nyāya* system mentions nine *dravyas*,—the five great "elements", Time, Space, Mind, and the Soul.

[2] The manner in which each part of a word, or a letter of the alphabet,

is based on the principle that there is only one exercise of the intellect at a time; and it also prevents repetition. Thus, each part of a word is separate because it corresponds to each part of an object or action, and has a bearing on the idea of the principal word.

There is, thus, a theory in connection with the idea of the division of words into parts, and it enables us to understand the text in a new light. The chief merit of this form of composition is that it is based on an intelligent plan formed by the author himself. It is intentional, because we find that it is complete; for when, in accordance with this theory, we put words in their proper place, and nothing is left out, it transforms the idea of *Mantras* or hymns of praise addressed to the gods into that of laws of life.

THE KRAMA METHOD OF RECITATION — When we divide a word into parts in accordance with this method, we are required to see that it remains altogether intact, and the position of its parts is not changed. Corresponding to this we are required to read the text in accordance with *Krama*,[1]

represents an idea or action may be illustrated by words like UNO, UNESCO, etc., current in these days,—where each letter, U, N, E, S, C, and O represents an idea or an object. The ancients, however, went much further than this, for they distributed all the *dravyas* or concepts of philosophy among the letters of the *Sanskṛt* alphabet, so that it was possible to give a fixed meaning to each letter, and coin fresh words without difficulty. The modern word-maker works from the opposite side, and forms a new word from the first letters of the names of certain objects; and the result often is that a letter may have as many meanings as there are words beginning with it. For instance, the letter A occurs in A.I.R. as well as F.A.O.; but it refers to *all* in the one (All-India-Radio), and *agriculture* (Food and Agriculture Organization) in the other case. This is not possible in the ancient system.

[1] *Krama* is a peculiar method of reading the Vedic text, according to which the reading proceeds from the first member,—word, syllable or letter

which enables us to understand its new meaning in terms of action.

It may be argued that this is not possible. But there is a reference to the *Krama* method of recitation in the sacred books; and we find that a *Mantra* or a hymn of praise addressed to the gods is transformed into *Vidhi* or a law of life by its means. The text of the Vedas,—wherever it is found that it does not make sense—should accordingly be interpreted in accordance with the *Krama* method of its reading.

In a number of cases the meaning of the principal word can be understood by means of *Krama*, and that of others by reference to the principal word. When we pronounce a word according to *Krama*, the whole word should remain intact; and if we have to break up its form, it should be done immediately, when it would give us the required meaning.

The *Krama* method of recitation is not intended to regulate time; and the the reason for changing the form of a word is that it does not make sense otherwise. There are certain words which express their own idea completely; but even they need to be divided into parts when read in accordance with *Krama*, though there should be no change in their meaning.

There is good reason for following the *Krama* method of

—to the second; then the second is repeated and connected with the third; and then the third is repeated and connected with the fourth, an so on. This ensures that words are properly divided into parts, and no part is left out. Thus, when we read the word *Prakṛti* according to *Krama*, it has to be *Pra-kṛ*, *kṛ-ti*, so that the whole is clearly divided into *Pra-kṛ-ti*, and its correct meaning is "(*ti*, an older form of *iti*) that is to say (*kṛ*, 'to act') action, (*pra*, 'great' or 'going forth') which is great or is going forth." *Prakṛti* accordingly means "great action about to begin or to go forth"; and this fits into the idea of the *Sāṅkhya*, which tells us that *Prakṛti* is a state of equilibrium of the three *Guṇas*, and is followed by action or evolution into different forms of life (SS. I, 60-66).

recitation, for the design of division into parts is indicated by its means. But the meaning of words is not obtained by adding up their parts. We should read the text properly according to *Krama*, and analyse words according to correct grammatical rules, when we shall be able to get their real meaning. But the same word should have the same meaning throughout.

THE PRINCIPAL WORD — The principal word used in the text has a special significance, and without it the text itself would become meaningless. On the other hand, if the principal cause of action is not clear, or is not expressed by the principal word, the explanation should be contained in the text itself, and it should not be necessary to divide the principal word into parts, although a number of other words may have to be divided.

The method of division of words into parts applies, as a rule, to the principal or the most important words; and if there are a number of such words in a sentence, they should be regarded as synonyms. The meaning of the principal word is obtained by dividing it into parts, while that of its synonyms without it. With regard to the rest, we should change their form if their meaning does not appeal to reason. But it is necessary to have knowledge to be able to understand the meaning of some synonyms; while in certain cases we have to "negotiate" their meaning, though not in the case of the best synonyms.

It is important to understand the meaning of principal words, as that enables us to understand the rest,—and it can be done by means of the *Krama* method of reciting the text, while that of others by reference to the principal word. But we should adhere to the order of words used in the text.

In the case of principal words the parts which have the

same meaning should be in close proximity to one another; and if a single note expresses the idea of an important thing, such notes should all be found together, and the things themselves should have the same maker.

All things are connected together in accordance with a law; and even so the meaning of all expressions is connected with the principal word. This, however, does not apply to the meaning of parts of words where the great forces of Nature are concerned. In other cases it should be possible to have this connection, which should enable us to understand the meaning of the text. On the other hand, if the principal word is removed, we cannot understand the text at all.

A DISGUISE—Thus we see that it is the law of life that has been described in the Vedas in this "veiled" manner. The secret of this method consists in dividing words into parts; and that is the meaning of seeing through their "disguise". The common meaning of a word is its meaning without this "disguise" or division into parts; and so a "disguise" may be said to be a collection of qualities, which can be understood by means of inference; and seeing through this "disguise" consists in our ability to know how things are connected with one another. We know that there is a "disguise", because we can pierce through it, and find out the correct meaning of the text. But it requires knowledge, deep concentration, devotion of a life-time, and a measure of good fortune to succeed.

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE TEXT—We can understand the real meaning of the text of the Vedas in the same manner as we understand the laws of life relating to animals,—that is, by means of inference.

THREE WAYS OF RECITATION—There are instructions in regard to the manner of reading the text, each of which has a bearing on the method of interpreting it. In some cases we are required to sing aloud, in others to recite silently, while yet in others to read in a normal tone. The first implies that we have to change the form of words even as we do in singing; the second that no change should be made, —for no words are uttered; and the third that we may do as circumstances require, and the meaning would, in any case, be the same.

NARRATIVE FORM—It is natural for a person to narrate action,—of some person or past time; and this enables us to understand that there is a description of action in narrative form in the Vedas.

MEANING OF CONTRADICTIONS—We sometimes find that the latter part of a statement contradicts an earlier one; and we should take it that this is intentional, and meant to indicate that we have to divide words into parts to understand their meaning. Similarly, if we find that the text contains something that is incongruous, or casts reflection on some one otherwise held in high esteem, we should conclude that it requires a new interpretation; but the latter should be consistent throughout.

UTILITY AND BEAUTY—Again, if we find that the description of an object is inconsistent, we should attach more importance to the object than to its description; and if there is an inconsistency between an object and its use, we should attach more importance to its use. Indeed, meaning is more important than elegance of expression; but language, like a garment, should have both utility and beauty,—though

utility or meaning comes first. But there should be a method in our work, and we should be able to combine parts with the whole, and select the best meaning, when we shall find that there is both beauty and utility in the contents of the text.

PREDOMINANT THOUGHT—There can be only one predominant thought at a time, and it must produce its own effect or result; and we should bear this in mind in our attempt to understand the text. In certain cases, however, we can understand the meaning without any difficulty from the context or the effect that is produced; and where there is a doubt about an occurrence, it can be understood from its description,—for there is nothing that cannot be described in words.

HOW TO DISCOVER A NEW MEANING—As when we discover an error in a course of action, we adopt some other means to remove the defect, we should do the same in connection with the text,—that is, find out some other means of getting the correct meaning. In some cases we have to repeat the same process, while in others we have to find out where the weakness lies. But we should be satisfied only when we find that the whole thing is both intelligent and good.

THE BEST MEANING—We can accept the meaning of words in their natural form only if it is the very best; but it should not be derived from some detached or casual remark, except in special cases. It should not be obtained by breaking up the unity of idea, or by mixing up words. The best result is obtained by dividing words into parts; but we should take care to see that the whole text is connected together, and has an unbroken unity throughout.

A SUBSTITUTE EXPRESSION—A substitute expression can be used only if it has the same meaning as the original word. But it is not always easy to find an exact substitute; and to that extent the language of the text, which is otherwise perfect, may be said to be imperfect.

TWO MEANINGS: NEED OF SELECTION — When we get two meanings of a word, we must make up our minds as to which of the two we should accept; and we may find that the one we do has little connection with the ordinary meaning of the word. But the new meaning can transform the whole idea of the text, and the words retain their new character throughout.

TWO SERIES — In this method of interpretation there are two series of words,—the original one, and that formed by means of division into parts; and we should see that they correspond each to each in an exact order. It is based on the substitution of one form of a word for another, and is like an exchange,—a strictly equal one. It means a new approach to the Vedas, and throws a new light on their value; but we cannot understand them properly unless we consider them in the light of action, and believe that they regard it as necessary.

NEED OF KNOWLEDGE — In case of difficulty or doubt there are suggestions in the text itself to guide us. But it is necessary to have knowledge to be able to understand the idea in this manner. The design of composition is such that each part is connected with the other, and there is no lack of words to complete the sense.

NEWLY COINED WORDS — We can get only the main idea by changing the form of words, while the subsidiary ones

are obtained by means of words which lie in close proximity. There is, however, no difficulty in understanding the real meaning of the text in this manner. A number of words have been newly coined to fit into this scheme, and each succeeding idea is connected with the preceding one. Indeed, it is possible to have this system because a number of new words have been coined in this way. But all words are not of this kind; and a number of existing words, where suitable, have also been used. A single word can describe a composite action in this manner; and when we change its form, all that is required is that the new meaning should be formed out of the meaning of its parts. But we have to use our intelligence to fix upon the meaning.

MEANING OF PURIFICATION — Indeed, it is necessary to use our intelligence in interpreting the text, specially if there is a conflict of opinion. Certain ideas have been expressed by means of similes; and the "purification" or correct formation of a word really means that it is being expressed more exactly than before,—that is, by means of its division into parts. When the form of a word is changed, there is an implication that it has not been clearly expressed in its original form. This, however, may not always be so; and we may change its form because it has been stated that we should do so.

DIFFICULT EXPRESSIONS — It is not always easy to describe an action in words; and so, if we find that a certain expression is unsuitable, we must not suppose that it is meaningless; and we may have to divide it into parts to understand it.

CONDITION OF A NEW MEANING — We must not make any alteration in the language of the text; and if a word has a

bearing on the idea of action, we should accept its meaning without changing its form. When we change the form of a word, the meaning may appear to be unusual; but we will not err, because certain technical terms have been used to guide us. The real meaning of a word is often very different from its common one, and we can understand it by dividing it into parts, or by referring it to its origin or root. In case of doubt, we may take its common meaning, though it may not be its Vedic sense,—for the latter is usually obtained by dividing it into parts. There is nothing irregular in this method of division, for the whole word remains intact, and at the same time we are able to get the correct meaning of the text. However, roots of words should not be divided into parts; and the roots and parts of the same word should, as far as possible, not be mixed together.

How to Divide a Word into Parts — When we divide a word into parts, we may commence with the first part and go on step by step to the last, or we may begin with the last and go back step by step to the first,—as suits us best; and when the plan of the most important part has been fixed, the rest will be found to fit into the whole scheme. This applies to single words as well as to compounds.

Miscellaneous Rules — This method of interpretation is not governed by any hard and fast rules; but there are certain directions to guide us, and they may be summed up as follows:—

When to Divide a Word into Parts—It is not necessary to divide all words into parts to understand their meaning. We should do so when the text does not make sense otherwise.

EFFECT OF DIVISION INTO PARTS—When the form of a word is changed in this manner, it becomes an entirely new word, with no connection with its original form.

UNIFORMITY OF MEANING—The same word should have the same meaning throughout; and the meaning of a fundamental word cannot be obtained from some other word.

SELECTION OF MEANING—If a word can be interpreted in two ways, which are equally balanced, we should divide it into parts only if it serves some special purpose. We should select the meaning that suits the context best, and has a bearing on the idea of action or a law of life.

WORDS CONNOTING ACTION—The form of words connoting action should, as far as possible, not be changed.

CAUSE AND EFFECT—If there is mention of a result, we should see that we get a reference to its cause as well.

FITNESS OF MEANING—When we get a new meaning of a word by dividing it into parts, it should fit into the whole context, and not stand in isolation by itself.

AUTHORITY OF THE SRUTI—The meaning of the entire text should be in accordance with the teachings of the *śruti*, and that will convince us of its correctness. We shall find that the description of ideas and objects is so accurate, that they appear to be like living creatures.

NO ARBITRARY MEANING—We cannot give any meaning we like to a word, for there is often a good reason for the meaning that is assigned to it. We should bear in mind

that each action is meant to secure an object, and requires that necessary means should be provided for the purpose. There must also be a sequence of cause and effect. We must bear all this in mind when we attempt to find out the meaning of an obscure word by reducing it to its rudimentary form. Indeed, the meaning can be regarded as properly fixed only when it yields a proper result; and, in any case, it must arise from the word itself, with all its parts intact.

THE IDEA OF A GOD—We can understand the idea of a large number of gods by dividing their names into parts. The planets too are a kind of gods. There are also a large number of other names the real meaning of which can be obtained in the same manner.

CONFIRMATION OF MEANING—When we divide a word into parts, the meaning should be obtained from the parts of the word itself, and there should be a confirmation of it as we proceed with the text.

RULES OF GRAMMAR—We should divide words into parts in strict accordance with the rules of grammar, and follow the best grammarians. We should bear in mind that there is unity of idea underlying the whole text, and we must not omit any part. In case of doubt we should consult competent teachers, though there may be a difference of opinion among them too.

RESULT OF BAD ARRANGEMENT—If words or their parts are badly arranged, we cannot get the correct meaning.

NEW EXPRESSIONS—If an expression has never before been used, its form should not be changed, unless there are directions in the text itself requiring us to do so.

DEFINITION OF MEANINGS—If the meaning of a word has not been defined in the text, we cannot define it ourselves. We may divide it into parts to get its meaning; but it cannot come to possess any new properties by reason of this division.

A SINGLE ACTION—Words which express the idea of a single action should not be divided into parts.

DROPPING OF PARTS—When we divide a word into parts, some parts which have the same meaning may be dropped.

PARTS WITH THE SAME MEANING—The parts of words which have the same meaning should be in close proximity to one another; and this rule applies to all principal words.

VARIATIONS—All words should have the same meaning throughout; and if there are any variations, they should be specified.

INTERPRETATION OF VEDIC HYMNS: RIG VEDA—In the *Rig Veda* we usually get the correct meaning of words by dividing them into parts. In a number of cases, however, there is no conflict between the new and the original meaning of words. But it would, as a rule, be advisable to divide words into parts, and then we can always check up whether the meaning is correct or not.

The *Gāyatrī* verses and certain other hymns have to be interpreted by means of division of words into parts. There are, however, a number of words which have to be interpreted in a different way. But we must not mix up words, or omit any part of the text, and need to use our intelligence to interpret it.

In the hymns of the *Rig Veda*, beginning with the word

Manotā, the form of words should not be changed. We can understand their meaning in different ways; and, in certain cases, from the effect they produce.

In the *Pavamāna* hymns, sung at the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice, it is necessary to change the form of words. We are also permitted to make a change in the text at our discretion. The words used are quite new, and the method of interpretation depends on the nature of the text; and the only test is that we should be able to understand it properly.

SAMA VEDA—The different *Sāman* hymns constitute a single whole, and can be understood by dividing words into parts. But this need not be done in all cases,—specially in connection with words which refer to action. In the *Bṛhat-sāman* and *Rathantara-sāman* hymns it is necessary to divide words into parts.

SPECIAL CASES—There are also some special cases which need to be dealt with in a special manner.

NUMBERS—For instance, there are certain special ideas attaching to numbers, and we have to use our intelligence to understand them. We may take these numbers as a whole or in parts, and they may also be compared to certain things. But we should accept what the sacred books say about them; and the idea of their totals is important.

PHENOMENA OF NATURE—The idea of the great phenomena of Nature has been dealt with in a special manner. The new and the full moon belong to this class, for they are governed by their own laws.

DESIRES OF ANIMALS—The idea of the attributes of animals cannot be obtained by means of division of words into

parts, for they have their own characteristics; and the theory of the division of words into parts does not apply to them, because the nature of their impelling force is different. But we can represent the function of their mind and its relation to desire by means of division of words into parts; though even this is not possible in all cases. The desires of animals are accordingly described in a special manner, which may appear to be new, but is significant, and would be found to be appropriate too. The language of the text in connection with matters of sex is sometimes plain, and sometimes ornate, as occasion requires; but we can understand the idea by piercing through the "disguise" of words.

THE TEST OF CORRECTNESS—The test of correctness is the result that is achieved. But if we divide a word into parts and find that the meaning of one part fits into that of the following two, we may take it that it is correct; and then we can arrange our ideas of action by means of inference. This method of interpretation involves a complete substitution of one meaning for another,—with a new natural order of connection between words—which would itself be a test of its correctness; and, according to *Jaimini*,[1] it would be stupid to ask for more.

THE VALUE OF THIS METHOD—This method of interpretation means a new approach to the Vedas, and throws a new light on their value. The special character of this explanation is that it enables us to understand the working of the laws of Nature and the great forces associated with them, which are otherwise unintelligible. In this manner we can understand the nature of desire and its relation to action, and several other things. Indeed, the very idea of the *Mantras* or hymns

[1] The celebrated author of the *Mīmānsā Sūtras*.

of praise addressed to the gods is transformed into that of an account of the great laws of Nature,—thus making for the glory and greatness of the Vedas.

ILLUSTRATIONS

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE VEDAS—The Vedas, as the *Mīmānsā* has explained, deal with the many problems of Nature and Man in a number of ways, and with great precision, beauty and wealth of description. Nature consists of an infinite variety of objects, and is governed by a number of laws; but, in spite of apparent conflict, it is characterised by a fundamental unity. Man consists of his body and soul; and the body is said to consist of intellect, *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor (where the soul is conceived to be a non-actor), mind, and the senses of knowledge and action. We cannot conceive of the soul by itself, and so can think of it only in terms of these faculties of man; and man is associated with the objects of Nature through desire, purpose or aim; and seeks, by their means, some satisfaction, pleasure, or good,—with perfection or purification as his final goal. All life is characterised by action; and action,—deliberate action—conceived as Dharma or sacrifice, is the subject-matter of the Vedas; and all that is included in it has been described in a variety of forms, and can be understood by means of the method of interpretation explained by the *Mīmānsā*.

THREE WAYS OF EXPLANATION—The *Mīmānsā* then goes on to give us a number of illustrations to explain its idea.[1]

[1] These illustrations are to be found scattered throughout the *Mīmānsā*, and the reader may consult the Glossary and Index to the *Mīmānsā*.

It tells us that there are three ways of understanding the text of the Vedas: by means of (i) the common meaning of words, (ii) special definitions given in the text itself, and (iii) division of words into parts. It also tells us that, though all these are different from one another and there is often little in common between them, the common meaning of words is not, sometimes, without a connection with their meaning obtained by means of division into parts; and this has been rendered possible because a number of words used in the text have been newly coined for the purpose,—though old existing words have also been used. It then gives us a number of illustrations to explain the different methods of interpreting the text,—with special reference to the problems dealt with by the sacred books.

THE COMMON MEANING—The first method, based on the common meaning of words, does not require any special illustration; but the *Mīmānsā* tells us that certain words,—specially those bearing on the idea of action, should not be divided into parts. Indeed, it has been laid down as a fundamental principle of this method of interpretation, that we should at first take the common, current meaning of words; and it is only when they do not make sense, or are otherwise unsatisfactory, that we should divide them into parts to understand their real meaning.

SPECIAL DEFINITIONS—The *Mīmānsā* contains a number of names the meaning of which has been specially defined,—and they relate to both Nature and Man; and we are required to accept this meaning in preference to any other.

DIVISION OF WORDS INTO PARTS—The largest number of names, however, are those the meaning of which can be

obtained by means of their division into parts. But, as special definitions and meanings obtained in this manner are often connected together, we have combined illustrations for both.

NATURE AND THE GODS—There are a number of expressions of this kind that refer specially to Nature. The gods, for instance, are said to represent the great forms and forces of Nature, which, as the *Sāṅkhya* tells us, include the Intellect, *Ahaṅkāra*, Mind, the ten senses, the five great "elements" and their respective properties; and so the principal gods of the Vedas refer to all of these. Some of them refer also to the soul; and so the *Mīmānsā* refers to a number of them,—*Agni*, *Indra*, and *Soma*,—*Vāyu* and *Vishṇu*, *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*, *Heaven and Earth* and *Viśve-devas* (All-gods), and explains the meaning of many of them, and tells us how to understand the rest by dividing their names into parts. The planets too are said to be a kind of gods, and we are told how to understand their idea.

NATURE AND SACRIFICE: THE VEDI—Nature is also represented in a number of other ways,—by means of its objects as well as other forms,—grass, herbs, and trees—curd, milk, and water—animals, *śūdra*, or a "woman"; while "sweet" water means Nature "sweetened" into the idea of God by means of sacrifice or good, intelligent and joyful action. Indeed, the whole world of Nature has been conceived in terms of action or a great sacrifice, in which Man too has an important place; and so we have a picture of this great Sacrifice, with its *Vedi* or great platform, in the midst of measured ground,—made of bricks of different kinds, each in its proper place,—sprinkled with holy water and covered with grass. Then there are the materials of

sacrifice,—fragrance and flowers, fruits and medicinal plants, and grains of all kinds, with rice above the rest; and all these refer to the world of Nature in the midst of which we live. Then there is the "sacrificer", and the "priests" who help him to make the sacrifice; and they refer respectively to the soul and the faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind and the senses—by means of which he acts.

SACRIFICIAL POSTS AND ANIMALS — Then there are a number of sacrificial posts, and animals tied to them with ropes; and these are meant to illustrate the inborn tendencies of man, and the different kinds of actions he performs.

FIRE AND CLARIFIED BUTTER — The fire is then kindled, the gods invoked in due form, and clarified butter and a number of things mixed with it poured into the flames; and all this is meant to illustrate the idea and character and scope of intelligent action, and its association with goodness in the life of man.

EXPLANATION OF TERMS — All these terms have been explained at considerable length and with great wealth of detail in the *Mīmānsā*. Thus "measuring the sacrificial ground" means "using the mind" in an intelligent action in the world; *Vedi* or the raised platform refers to Nature; the "bricks" used in constructing it are desires of different kinds,—and those placed in the middle are neutral or disinterested desires. Similarly, water, grass, flowers, fruits, grains, and medicinal plants symbolise the life-sustaining, gracious, and healing powers of Nature. Fire, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, refers to the intellect; and so all that is done in connection with it signifies action and its purification, in which the gods or the great forces of Nature play a most important part.

The "sacrificer" is the soul; and the four *Ritvij* priests are the four faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, and the senses respectively. The sacrificial posts, *yūpa* and *svaru*, refer to disinterested action and action with a purpose respectively; while the rope tied round an animal refers to the innate characteristics and tendencies with which a creature is born.

OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS — There are a large number of other expressions with a similar explanation. For instance, the hand represents the idea of action; so does the term *pṛshṭha*; while "conquest of everything" signifies intelligent action. Early morning work means the best work; *Sāman* is "active life"; *kapāla* (the alms-bowl) and life in the forest refer to renunciation of action; while *japa* (silent repetition of a sacred name) and an oblation offered to deceased ancestors signify action that is free from desire for fruit.

THE SUN AND MOON — The *Mīmānsā* tells us that *Agni* or fire refers to the intellect; and the idea of the Sun is the same. The Moon, on the other hand, refers to the mind, which has desire for its special attribute; and so all that relates to *Soma* or the Moon,—for the idea of the two is the same—refers to the mind or to desire. Thus no-moon signifies the merger of the mind in the intellect,—for the Moon is said to dwell with the Sun on the no-moon night; the new-moon refers to the birth of the mind in the form of desire; the changes of the moon to the changes of the mind and its desires; while the full-moon signifies the fulfilment of desire through action, or the union of the mind with the intellect, —for the full-moon is said to be like the Sun.

DESIRE AND ITS SATISFACTION — The idea of desire and its satisfaction is also expressed in many other ways. The

"bricks" used in the construction of *Vedi* or the sacrificial platform, refer to desire,—signifying that Nature (*Vedi*) consists of innumerable objects of desire. The idea of different kinds of desire is expressed in the same manner: for instance, the idea of desire with a purpose, and neutral desires, without any particular object,—and so meant for the benefit of all—is expressed by means of certain specified "bricks" used in the construction of the *Vedi*. Similarly, the word *chhanda* (which has a number of meanings, including 'pleasure') signifies desire regarded as an obstacle in our path. Sweetmeats and cakes as well as other articles of food and drink and dress refer to desires and their satisfaction. The mass of people refers to different kinds of desires, —some good, some bad—like the people themselves; and there are similar ideas associated with common things, like acts of buying and selling, eating cooked and uncooked food, wearing clothes, giving in charity, and offering sacrifices. Indeed, the whole world is conceived to be full of objects of desire,—for the very basis of life, specially family-life, is desire,—and so the birth of a son symbolises the satisfaction of desire.

MAN AND WOMAN — These illustrations have a great bearing on the ancient idea of human life and its relations. For instance, Man refers to the whole human race, and includes Woman too. But Woman, conceived as a special instrument of creation, is said to symbolise the idea of Nature or *Prakṛti*; and so, as the latter is said to be characterised by unconsciousness, "woman", we are told, can neither have knowledge nor property. But we have to understand the sense in which the term is used,—for all the disabilities associated with a "woman" refer to her idea as a symbol of the creative power of *Prakṛti*. But woman, conceived as a living creature, is a

co-partner of man in everything,—knowledge, property, and deeds of sacrifice—even as the *Mīmānsā* tells us.

THE FOUR CASTES — We have to understand the idea of the four castes in the same manner. They are said to be *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kshatriya*, *Vaiśya*, and *Sūdra*; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that the *Brāhmaṇa* refers to the intellect, while the *śūdra* to the objects of Nature; and then, if we obtain the meaning of the remaining two names in accordance with the method explained in the *Mīmānsā*, we find that the *Kshatriya* refers to *ahaṅkāra* and the mind, while the *Vaiśya* to the senses of knowledge and action. Thus it is only the first three "castes" that can be included in the idea of a living creature or Man, and all the characteristics of a human being can be applied to them; while the *śūdra*, referring as he does to the objects of Nature, can only be described in terms of the character of *Prakṛti*,—that is, unconscious, and incapable of acquiring knowledge or property. Indeed, the *śūdra* is like a "woman" in the sense in which the latter is symbolic of the idea of *Prakṛti*; and, as the latter,—even as the *Sāṅkhya* tells us—exists for the sake of *purusha* or the soul, so is a "woman" said to live for her *purusha* or "man." There is, however, a small difference between the idea of a "woman" and a *śūdra*. A woman is, indeed, an instrument of creation; but she can also be conceived as a supporter of life, for she gives milk to her young; and both are characteristic of *Prakṛti*, conceived as the original source of life. But the primary emphasis is on the creative power of a woman when she is conceived to be symbolic of the idea of Nature or *Prakṛti*. But we can conceive of the objects of Nature as supporting the life of creatures too; and so it is possible to conceive of them independently of the idea of a "woman", when she is regarded as a supporter of life. As the *śūdra*

refers to the objects of Nature, he is accordingly the supporter or "servant" of the living or the first three "castes". It is in this manner that the character of the *śūdra* and a "woman" has been described in the sacred books; and we need to understand the exact meaning of these terms and the sense in which they are used to be able to grasp their original idea.

THE FOUR STAGES OF LIFE—The *Mīmānsā* also contains a reference to the four stages of human life,—that of a student, a householder, a dweller in the forest, and a renouncer of all actions. It tells us that the first is not meant for pleasure, but for acquiring knowledge. We have an experience of desire and its satisfaction at the next stage, and it also enables us to understand the idea of action performed as a sacrifice, —for the head of the family thinks of the family in preference to himself, and all his actions are meant for the benefit of all its members. The third stage is one where the idea of family is extended to the whole world, and a person acts for the benefit of all creatures; and the last stage is that when he must pass away, and so renounce everything.

SACRIFICE—The idea of sacrifice has a special significance in the *Mīmānsā*, for it deals with the problem of Dharma, which is nothing but action performed as a sacrifice. It tells us that sacrifice means good as well as intelligent action, which purifies both the doer of the deed and the materials used in connection with action; and then we have a number of references to *homa*, *rājasūya*, *jyotishṭoma*, a preliminary sacrifice, supplementary sacrifice, bone-sacrifice, renewal of sacrifice, consecration of animals, offering of five cups, and dying in the midst of a sacrifice,—together with the names of a number of ceremonies and articles used in connection with them. All this is meant to explain the idea of action, conceived in

the widest sense of the term,—including all that is in Nature and Man, working in accordance with a law that is both intelligent and good, and preserves and sustains the universe.

Animals and Men—We have observed that an animal refers to the objects of Nature, and man to living creatures, —specially the human race. But certain special ideas have also been associated with certain animals: for instance, the cow refers to the senses of knowledge, the horse to the senses of action, and the goat to action.

Figures of Speech—There are also a number of figures of speech in the text. For instance, certain objects have been personified: *Sarasvatī* is the name of a woman as well as a river; and a "woman" and "water" both refer to Nature or *Prakṛti*. Hence *Sarasvatī* refers to Nature or *Prakṛti*, and is represented as a goddess. Similarly, desire is personified as a god; but not so Time, for it is an unfailing cause of decay. The human body is described as a chariot, for the latter moves as a single unit, and the body acts in the same manner too; while words once uttered are compared to the action of a sword, because they are beyond recall.

Significance of Numbers—There is a special significance attaching to certain numbers: for instance, the numbers three, six, eleven, and sixteen all refer to the mind in its different aspects: three, where the mind may, for practical purposes, be identified with the intellect; six, when it is associated with only the senses of knowledge; eleven where it is associated with both the senses of knowledge and action; and sixteen where it is associated with the ten senses of knowledge and action, and the five properties of the five great "elements".

There is no reference to the number twenty-one in the *Mīmānsā*; but it occurs in later literature, where it refers to the mind in association with the ten senses and their ten objects,—the great "elements" and their properties.

Similarly, the number five refers to the five senses of knowledge or of action; and ten to the ten senses of knowledge and action combined. The number ten also refers to the idea of multiplication, and one-tenth to that of division.

There are also a number of other ideas associated with numbers: for instance, the numbers 8, 12, 33, 34, 112, and 1200 all refer to Nature or *Prakṛti*,—its divisions, variety, or vastness, as the case may be. The number twelve refers also to Time and the intellect; thirteen and four signifiy completeness, and thirteen may also refer to the soul; fifteen implies a sudden retirement from active life; seventeen refers to the "subtle body" as well as the intellect or the soul, as should suit the context; twenty-six refers to God; while a thousand signifies something indefinitely large, or a long duration of time during which the laws of Nature operate.

THE ORIGINAL IDEA OF THE VEDAS—These and several other illustrations are scattered throughout the *Mīmānsā*, and they give us a new idea of the Vedas as dealing with the great laws of Nature, with special reference to the life of Man. They have been described in a new form,—clear, concise, exact, and accurate—and yet full of life, colour and variety, which can be understood by means of the method of interpretation it has explained. It tells us that the same principle has also been applied to later works, called *smṛti*,—for they too deal with the same problems of life,—only they lay special emphasis on the character of the soul and the place of God in the scheme of the universe.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MIMANSA—The *Mīmānsā* accordingly occupies a most important place, not only among the six systems of Hindu Philosophy, but all ancient and sacred literature. It covers the principal range of the subject-matter of the Vedas; and, as the same ideas have been repeated in later literature in different forms,—by enabling us to understand the Vedas, it enables us to understand the central idea of all sacred books,—the *śruti* as well as the *smṛti*—for they are all governed by the same method of interpretation, and have the same forms of expression,—the difference between them being one of degree rather than kind. Indeed, it contains the substance of some of the most important ideas of ancient science, philosophy, and religion, and gives us a picture of the customs, manners, and ways of life of the people of the times; and so it is possible to re-construct the ancient edifice of thought and life by its means. A number of ancient ideas,—specially those relating to the "caste-system" and the *śūdra*, the four stages of life, the status of "woman", the conception of sacrifice and the renunciation of action—may not be the same as those of later times or our own; but that would only show how many changes have taken place during the intervening years.

IX

THE YOGA SYSTEM

FROM MIMANSA TO YOGA: MEANING OF YOGA — After the *Mīmānsā* comes *Yoga*, based on the character of the intellect.

The word *Yoga* has a number of meanings in *Sanskṛt*; but it has been specially defined by the author of this system as consisting in the control of the activities of the mind; and its

object is said to be to produce wholeness or harmony of life, and to reduce pain to a minimum.

The reference to the control of the activities of the mind is significant, for it can be exercised only by what is higher than the mind,—namely, the intellect, which is the basis of this system. We have observed that the *Mīmānsā* is based on the character of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor; but its last chapter deals with the problem of sex life, as a part of creative action; and that is specially associated with desire or the activity of the mind, and needs to be properly regulated and controlled. As the intellect is higher than both mind and *ahaṅkāra*, we are thus able to make an easy transition from *Mīmānsā* to *Yoga*.

THE PROBLEM OF YOGA — We have seen that *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeshika* deal chiefly with the problem of knowledge, while the *Mīmānsā* is concerned with that of action. *Yoga* attempts to integrate both knowledge and action, and to give us an idea of wholeness or harmony of life, by means of which all pain can be reduced to a minimum.

SANKHYA AND YOGA — The removal of pain is the chief problem of the *Sāṅkhya* too, and it examines the relation of knowledge to action at considerable length,—for it too partakes of the character of the intellect, and lays special emphasis on discrimination, an attribute of the intellect, as a means of securing freedom from pain. But its object is more to amplify than to integrate the different points of view of knowledge and action; and so it comes to the conclusion that there is no joy in life, and a man can attain his end only by means of renunciation of all actions. It admits, however, that a person must act so long as he lives; but he should do so sparingly, till gradually all action comes to an end, and he is

made free. Action, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, is thus a necessary evil, and not a necessary good.

The point of view of *Yoga* is not exactly the same. As it attempts to integrate knowledge with action, it lays equal emphasis on both, and stresses the importance of knowledge as well as action. It points out that there is a measure of joy in life, and explains how great and good things can be achieved in the world by means of this integration. But it also believes that a time must come at last when all action comes to an end; and so a total cessation of action must still be regarded as the ultimate end of life.

THE IDEA OF GOD —*Yoga* also takes us a step further towards the idea of God. The *Sāṅkhya*, as we have seen, dispenses with His necessity; but it has no objection to the existence of a God who is like a liberated soul, having nothing whatever to do with the world: only such a God can be of little use to man.

The *Nyāya* makes a passing reference to *Iśvara* or God, but regards Him more as a spectator of things,—unable to provide or to prevent the result of actions.

The *Vaiśeshika* refers, not to God, but to an Unseen Power, which plays an important part in the manifestation of extraordinary things; while the *Mīmānsā* tells us of gods or the great forms and forces of Nature, which are both seen and unseen, and without which no great action can ever take place.

Yoga takes up the *Sāṅkhya* idea of God, as corresponding to that of a liberated soul, but points out that He has an important place in our life, and we can attain our goal by devotion to Him. Thus we have in *Yoga* what may be called a personal God; but it does not say that He is a creator in any real sense of the term.

EVOLUTION OF IDEAS —*Yoga* is thus a further stage in this scheme of thought, but has a great deal in common with the *Sāṅkhya*. Indeed, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us, there is little difference between the two systems; but their conclusions are not identical, for their points of view are not the same. *Yoga* recognises the importance of action, though it gives an equal or perhaps even a higher place to knowledge; and so paves the way for the final conclusion of *Vedānta*. That system, as we shall see, attempts to evolve a perfect harmony between knowledge and action; and includes all ideas of creation,—by *Prakṛti* or an Unseen Power or the great forces of Nature—as well as a personal God—in its conception of *Brahma*, who is both personal and impersonal, and combines *Purusha* and *Prakṛti* into one. Indeed, as we have observed, *Prakṛti* itself is transformed into God by being associated with the idea of Sacrifice, and so becomes *Sat-chit-ānanda*—goodness, intelligence, and joy.

THE PLAN OF THE WORK—The *Yoga* system is divided into four chapters; and the whole work follows an integrated plan, being of the nature of a discussion.

In the first chapter the author gives us the meaning of *Yoga* and its implications, and goes on to discuss each of them separately. This is continued in the second chapter, where we are also told of the eight means of attaining to *Yoga*, five of which are examined in this chapter. The remaining three are examined in the third chapter, which also tells us of the many powers that can be acquired by means of *Yoga*. In the last and fourth chapter the author explains how the soul can attain to freedom from the bondage of life.

The text may now be summarised as follows:—

CHAPTER I

YOGA AND THE PROBLEMS OF LIFE

Yoga consists in the control of the activities of the mind (1-3). There are five such activities, some of which cause pain and some do not (4-6); and it is necessary to understand them (7-11).

It is also necessary to understand the idea of restraint (12-14), freedom from desires (15-16), soul (17-18), life and its purpose (19-23), and God (24-29); and that will enable us to remove the obstacles that distract the intellect (30-32), and attain to calmness of mind (33-34), by understanding the behaviour of the mind itself (35-40). That will make for wisdom and a state of *samādhi*, where knowledge leads to righteous action (41-50),—and even beyond this, where there is no action at all (51).

THE MEANING OF YOGA—*Yoga* consists in the control of the activities of the mind; and it is only when a person is able to see things in their proper light, that he may be said to have been established in his real nature, and to understand himself (1-3).

DIFFERENT KINDS OF ACTIVITIES—Activities are of five kinds, which cause pain as well as do not cause pain. They are (i) means of acquiring knowledge; (ii) misapprehension; (iii) doubt; (iv) slumber; and (v) memory (4-6).

The means of acquiring knowledge are sense-perception, inference, and the sacred books; misapprehension is false knowledge; doubt arises from following the meaning of words without understanding their real idea; slumber is a state of unconsciousness, when there is no sensation of any kind; and memory is the power of retaining a thing that has been perceived (7-11).

RESTRAINT—A person can restrain his activities by means of repeated practice and freedom from worldly desires. Repeated practice is secured by means of effort; and when it

is put forth assiduously, gently, without interruption, and for a long time, a person becomes firm in his restraint (12-14).

FREEDOM FROM WORLDLY DESIRES—A person becomes free from worldly desires, when he becomes conscious of his power to control all kinds of desires. But higher than the freedom from desires for objects is the freedom from desires for their attributes; and that is attained when a person perceives his own soul (15-16).

THE SOUL—The nature of the soul can be understood by means of reasoning, reflection, joy, and the idea of consciousness. One means of the knowledge of the soul is the cessation of all kinds of effort; and another is the residue of impressions of previous actions (17-18).

LIFE AND ITS PURPOSE—Those who believe in *Prakṛti* maintain that all things will be dead in the end. But there are others who believe that, before that happens, there are many things to achieve,—faith, heroism, memory, harmony of things, and wisdom; and all these can be attained by all kinds of persons,—only if they desire to be free from the violence of passion; and all can do so by means of devotion to God (19-23).

GOD—God is a special kind of *Purusha* or Soul who is untouched by thought of pain, action, and its result. He is omniscient, and there is no one like Him. He is not limited by Time. His idea is expressed by means of the sacred syllable *Om*, and can be understood by means of its silent repetition. After that a person can understand his own soul, and all obstacle in his path disappear (24-29).

OBSTACLES AND THEIR REMOVAL — The obstacles which distract the intellect are disease, idleness, doubt, negligence, want of energy, incontinence, perception of false ideas, instability, and looseness of conduct. Pain, despair, trembling of the body, and breathing in and out are linked up with these distractions; and the remedy against them is the constant practice of Truth (30-32).

Calmness or joy of mind is obtained by means of universal friendliness, compassion, sympathy in joy, and indifference to the objects of pleasure and pain, good as well as evil; and also by means of regulating the in-coming and out-going breath (33-34).

The manner in which the mind behaves depends on the nature of its activity as directed towards the objects of the senses; but the pure activity of the mind is without any sorrow; and the mind that is free from desire for its objects is free from sorrow too. Or this state may be attained by means of the knowledge of dreams and sound sleep; or it may arise from meditation; and the power of such a person extends to the infinitesimally small and the infinitely great (35-40).

WISDOM AND THE VISION OF REALITY — When a wise man is established in this state, and his worldly desires come to an end, his mind shines like a jewel, and is unaffected by anything. But when a man is perplexed by doubt, he falls into a state of confusion and uncertainty. But all uncertainty disappears when the memory is purified, when the form of a thing drops, as it were, and only the reality is seen (41-43).

It is in this manner that we can understand the real nature of all things. But this state of *samādhi* or intense contemplation contains the seed of future actions. The soul

attains to a state of serenity when it has experience of that which lies beyond the range of thought; and in such a state knowledge leads to righteous action; and its impressions can blot out all other impressions (44-50).

But when even this is destroyed, there arises,—because everything has been destroyed—a state of contemplation which is without the seed of any future action (51).

CHAPTER II

YOGA AND THE MEANS OF ATTAINING IT

The first state of *Yoga* is one of action,—action performed as a sacrifice. It is of three kinds, and makes for wholeness or harmony of life (1-2).

There are a number of causes of pain (3), and it is necessary to understand all of them (4-11). That will enable us to understand that the root of pain lies in action (12-15); and it is possible to prevent it by not allowing impulses, which have not yet arisen, to arise (16-17), and by understanding the character of the soul and the objects with which it associates itself (18-20).

This association is caused by want of knowledge; and when the latter disappears, so does the bond between the soul and its objects, and it becomes free. This knowledge is acquired by different means of attaining to *Yoga* (21-28).

There are eight means of attaining to *Yoga* (29), and it is necessary to understand them. Of these the first five are (i) self-control (30-31), (ii) restraint (32-34),—and we should understand the result of self-control (35-39) as well as restraint (40-45),—(iii) posture of meditation (46-48), (iv) breath-control (49-53), and (v) the withdrawal of the senses from their objects (54-55).

YOGA OF ACTION — The *Yoga* of action performed as a sacrifice consists in austerity or severe meditation (*tapas*), study of the Vedas, and devotion to God; and its object is to produce wholeness or harmony of life, and to reduce pain to a minimum (1-2).

CAUSES OF PAIN — The causes of pain are absence of knowledge, egoism, desire, aversion, and intentness on securing an object (3).

Absence of knowledge can be in respect of things that are dormant or asleep, are minute, incoherent, or very large; and it consists in regarding that which is transient, impure, painful and not concerned with the soul as the very opposite of all this. Egoism consists in identifying the powers of the senses with those of contemplation; desire in thinking that pleasure will follow as a result of action; aversion in believing that there will be pain as a result of action; while intentness on securing an object is a natural characteristic of even a a wise man. All these should be avoided at their very inception; and that is always possible by means of meditation (4-11).

THE ROOT OF PAIN — The root of pain lies in action; and so long as this root lasts, there will always be pain. Actions have pleasure and pain for their result because of good and evil cause. But life is full of pain even to a wise man, because of the troubles of change, sorrow, impressions made on the mind, as well as opposition of the objects of Nature (12-15).

PREVENTION OF PAIN — But it is possible to prevent pain, for an impulse that has not yet arisen can be avoided; and the association of the seer with the objects seen is the cause of impulse (16-17).

OBJECTS: ATTRIBUTES: THE SEER — A visible object is characterised by form, activity, and location in a place. It consists of the "elements", it can be referred to the senses, and can be enjoyed or given away as a gift. The attributes of objects may be special, general, possessed of characteristic marks, and not possessed of characteristic marks. The seer is one who can see; and when pure, has perception of consciousness; and the seer is the soul, because it has perception of consciousness (18-20).

BONDAGE AND FREEDOM OF THE SOUL—The union of the soul with the objects of Nature enables it to understand the real nature of its own powers and theirs. But the cause of this union is *a-vidyā* or absence of knowledge; and when that disappears, the union also comes to an end. When the soul ceases to look at the objects of Nature,—that is its freedom from birth; and the means of this cessation are the faculty of discrimination and freedom from confusion; and the wisdom of such a person becomes sevenfold at the last stage. That is secured by means of acting in conformity with the means of attaining to *Yoga*; and when all impurity is destroyed, the light of knowledge enables a man to attain to discrimination (21-28).

EIGHT MEANS OF ATTAINING TO YOGA—There are eight means of attaining to *Yoga*,—self-control, restraint, posture for meditation, breath-control, withdrawal of the senses from their objects, concentration of mind, meditation, and *samādhi* or intense contemplation, when the contemplator and the object contemplated become identified (29).

Self-control consists in non-injury, truth, non-stealing, continence, and renunciation. These are universal and required of all in all circumstances (30-31).

Restraint is not so universal, and consists in cleanliness or purity of mind, contentment, austerity, study of the Vedas, and contemplation of God. In this connection if one has a doubt, he should think of the opposite side of the question, and that will resolve his doubt (32-34).

RESULT OF SELF-CONTROL—Non-injury means abandonment of all enmity. When a person is established in truth, he understands the interdependence of cause and effect,—of action and its fruit. Non-stealing means contentment and

absence of covetousness of anything; and he who is established in it is wealthier than the wealthiest man in the world. When a man is established in continence, he gains manly power or energy. When a person renounces what he should renounce, he knows how to live in the world and be happy (35-39).

RESULT OF RESTRAINT—When a man becomes clean or pure in mind, he feels disinclined towards the organs of his own body, and does not associate with others. When the nature of his mind is purified, he is filled with gladness, becomes one-pointed, has control over his senses, and understands his soul. When he is contented, he becomes exceedingly happy. *Tapas* or austerity destroys his impurities, and makes for perfection of the body and the senses. The study of the Vedas makes for a proper understanding of the great forms and forces of Nature. A person can attain to *samādhi*, when he can identify himself with the object of his contemplation, —by means of devotion to God (40-45).

POSTURE—The posture for meditation should be steady with ease. It should be followed by relaxation of effort, when there will be communion with the Infinite, and all differences between things will disappear (46-48).

BREATH-CONTROL—When a person is in that posture, and controls the motion of his in-coming and out-going breath, that is called breath-control. It is of three kinds,—external, internal, and relating to the suspension of breath. There is also a fourth kind of breath-control, which goes beyond the external and internal; and it is at this stage that the veil drops, and a person sees the Light of Life. These acts of holding the breath make a man fit for *Yoga* (49-53).

WITHDRAWAL OF THE SENSES FROM THEIR OBJECTS—The senses are said to be withdrawn from their objects when there is no contact between them and their objects, and they are centred, as it were, in the mind (54-55).

CHAPTER III

THE MEANS OF ATTAINING TO YOGA: THE POWERS OF YOGA

We can understand the idea of the remaining three means of attaining to *Yoga*,—concentration (*dhāraṇā*), meditation (*dhyāna*), and *samādhi*, when the contemplator and the object contemplated become identified—in the same manner (1-3). These three can be taken together, and are called *saṁyama* or deep concentration (4-6); and, as compared with the preceding three, refer to the inner organ of man,—beyond which there is a state called *nirbīja*, where there is no action and no result (7-8).

Restraint can achieve many things, and makes for one-pointedness (9-13); but a really pious man follows the law of life, and is not affected by the changing conditions of things (14-15). But *saṁyama* can achieve even more,—leading ultimately to perfect knowledge, born of discrimination, which makes a person free (16-54).

DHARANA OR CONCENTRATION —*Dhāraṇā* or concentration consists in the fixation of the mind in one place (1).

DHYANA OR MEDITATION —*Dhyāna* or meditation arises when, in a state of concentration, a person fixes his attention on one and one object only (2).

SAMADHI — *Samādhi* is said to be a state when the object of contemplation alone appears to exist, and one's own self, as it were, ceases to be (3).

SAMYAMA — These three,—*dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna*, and *samādhi* —constitute what is called *saṁyama* or deep concentration of the mind; and when that is attained, a person becomes

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supremely wise; and this *saṁyama* can be made use of in various ways (4-6).

These three, as compared with the five preceding means of attaining to *Yoga*, refer to the interior of the body; but even these belong to a state which is outside the range of what is called *nirbīja*, or that which is not followed by any result or action (7-8).

POWERS OF RESTRAINT — A person is said to have developed his powers of restraint when, though his consciousness has been fully awakened, he is able to control himself; when he permits his powers to express themselves and even to prevail, but knows the suitable time for exercising restraint and can control his mind, which, having been purified, functions with calmness. When he attains to this state, all search after objects of the senses comes to an end, and he becomes one-pointed; and that is called oneness of the mind and the objects it seeks (9-13).

A pious person is he who follows the law of life irrespective of whether an object is calm or full of excitement; but the development of different persons is different, and that is the cause of the different methods they adopt (14-15).

POWERS OF SAṀYAMA — The powers of *saṁyama* or the combination of *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna*, and *samādhi* are of various kinds. It enables a person to have knowledge of the past and future, the proper meaning of words, his own previous state of birth, and the approach of death,—as well as of what is minute, concealed, or remote—and of his body, and the whole world. A person can, by its means, put an end to hunger and thirst, become steady, have knowledge of the mind and soul, and attain to perfection. He can penetrate into the minds of others, make his body light, hear wonder-

ful sounds, pass through space, and remove the veil and see the light. He can have knowledge of the "elements", and control his senses,—leading to perfect knowledge and freedom from the bondage of life. It is this knowledge born of the faculty of discrimination that can make him free (16-54).

CHAPTER IV

FREEDOM FROM BONDAGE

The different objects of life can be attained by means of various kinds of actions (1-3); but all actions, consciously performed by the mind, are characterised by a purpose (4-6). These actions produce their own results which, in their turn, are the cause of future actions, which again produce their own results; and so the chain of action goes on from birth to birth (7-11).

We know that Time exists (12-13); and need to distinguish between mind and matter (14-17), and the mind and the soul (18-21).

It is also necessary to understand the character of the functions of the intellect (22), and the mind (23-24); and that will enable us to attain to discrimination and put an end to all attachment (25-28). That will be the end of all affliction (29-33), and the soul will be for ever free (34).

ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTS — Objects can be attained in various ways,—conditions of birth, medicines, application of the mind, exercise of the intellect, and *samādhi*. But when the original stage of a substance is completely developed, it changes into another in its natural course. Nevertheless, we cannot know the purpose of the first action in the first substance in Nature (1-3).

THE MIND — But the human mind acts with a purpose, which arises from a state of consciousness when it acts. A person has only one mind, though it prompts a number of senses to action; but when it is associated with the intellect, it becomes free from all vice (4-6).

ACTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS — The actions of a *Yogī* are neither good nor bad; while those of others are of three kinds,—good, bad, and a mixture of the two. As a result of these actions, a number of impressions are made on the minds of those who are susceptible to them, so that there is an immediate store of future actions and their results,—even though this may be in different births, places, and times; and that is so because memory and these impressions mean one and the same thing. But we cannot know the beginning of these actions, because desire, which is their cause, is eternal, and has no beginning. But, as all actions are governed by motive, result, attachment, and the interdependence of things,—they come to an end when the latter disappear (7-11).

TIME — The past and future exist as real because their course has different characteristics. The difference between them is subtle, but clear; and it is of the nature of the *Guṇas* or the attributes of *Prakṛti* itself (12-13).

MIND AND MATTER — We can understand the real state of a substance from the unity of its development. But its idea is also affected by the mind; for even if the substance be the same, if it is associated with different minds, the idea of any two of them may be different (14-17).

MIND AND THE SOUL — The actions of the mind are always known to its "master" or the soul, because it is always subject to change, while the soul is not. The mind is not self-illuminated, because it cannot see itself (18-21).

INTELLECT — We can form an idea of the function of our intellect when we see how thought-impressions are formed,

and try to grasp the disposition of the mind from the expression of the face (22).

MIND AS A SUITABLE INSTRUMENT — As the mind is coloured by both the seer (soul) and the object seen, it is suitable for all purposes. But even that mind, with its innumerable desires, acts for the sake of the soul (23-24).

DISCRIMINATION — So far as the soul or the seer is concerned, there comes a time when all thought of attachment must come to an end; and then the mind is inclined towards discrimination, and is not far from freedom from the bondage of life. So long as it is weak, it has desires arising from the impressions of previous actions; but all affliction ends with the end of these impressions (25-28).

END OF AFFLICTION — When a person has no interest even in reflection or meditation, he attains to a state of discrimination, and rises to a state of *samādhi*; and after that pain and action both come to an end. Then the perfectly pure one knows how infinite is knowledge, and how small the objects of Nature in the world. Then, as the *Guṇas* or the attributes of Nature have done their work, and displayed all that they had to display,—the succession of changes, —connected with the moments of Time and lasting till the extreme end of change is grasped,—comes to an end (29-33).

FREEDOM OF THE SOUL — This is the state of freedom of the soul. It means a return of the *Guṇas* or the attributes of the objects of Nature,—which have no further concern with the soul—to their original state of association with *Prakṛti*, dissociated from the soul. Or we might say that the Mental Power is established in its own true nature (34).

X

THE VEDANTA SYSTEM

THE PLACE OF VEDANTA — After *Yoga* comes *Vedānta*, the last of the six systems of Hindu Philosophy, based on the character of the soul.

We have seen how we begin with the *Sāṅkhya*, with its idea of *Prakṛti* as the supreme creator of things,—all except the soul—and rise by clear gradations of thought to the idea of the importance of God in *Yoga*. But all that has been stated so far is implied in the *Sāṅkhya* itself, and all that the other systems have done is to explain or amplify its ideas; and, even as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us, there is no essential difference between *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*.[1] The *Sāṅkhya* is frankly dualistic in its conception of *Prakṛti* and *purusha* (or the individual soul) as two separate entities; and, while it has no objection to the existence of God in terms of a liberated soul who has nothing whatever to do with anything in the world, and can neither create nor cause anything to be done,—it points out that such a God can be of little use to man; and maintains that the freedom of the soul from the bondage of life can be achieved only by means of self-knowledge and renunciation of action. It believes that there is no joy in life,—for what is called joy is, according to it, but a form of pain; and this pain is caused by action, which is a characteristic of all things in the world. It tries to explain how we can put an end to action,—stating that when a person does not engage in any new actions, the impressions of previous actions,—which are the cause of further action—become fainter and fainter, till at last they totally disappear, and the soul becomes for ever free. But it does not succeed in estab-

[1] BhG. V, 4-5

lishing its theory, because, even as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, there can be no total extinction of action, and something of it will always remain.

In addition to this there are a number of other gaps of thought in the *Sāṅkhya*, and so the other systems do not hesitate to take a somewhat different point of view: for instance, the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeshika* refer to the soul as an actor, while the *Mīmānsā* explains that it is both an actor and a non-actor,—acting so long as it dwells in the body, and ceasing to act when it departs; and so their answer to the question of freedom from the bondage of life is not the same as that of the *Sāṅkhya*. *Yoga*, however, while differing from the *Sāṅkhya* in holding that there is joy in life, and many great things can be achieved by means of concentration of thought and effort, is at one with that system in maintaining that our ultimate goal,—however far off—is a total renunciation of action. Also, like the *Sāṅkhya*, it makes an attempt to explain how there can be an absolute cessation of action. It, however, gives an important place to God, whom it conceives to be a special kind of *purusha* (or the individual soul),—in the same manner as is suggested by the *Sāṅkhya* itself—for it does not conceive of Him as a creator in any real sense of the term; but it believes that devotion to this God makes for concentration of thought and effort and success in everything. *Yoga* accordingly gives us the idea of a personal God, but does not essentially take us any further in our quest.

There are thus a number of gaps of thought in these systems; and though a number of points have been amplified or explained, the essential problem still remains, and needs to be tackled from an entirely new point of view; and the solution,—so far as it is humanly possible to solve such a problem—is provided by *Vedānta*.

THE MEANING OF VEDANTA — It is commonly believed that the word *Vedānta* (*Veda-anta*) means "complete knowledge of the Veda"; but the opening *Sūtra* of this system which, as in the case of the other systems, describes its principal subject-matter,—tells us that it is an inquiry into the nature of *Brahma* or God; and that, as the *Mīmānsā* has told us, is not the subject-matter of the Vedas. The Vedas, we are told, deal not with the problem of God or even the soul,— though there may be stray references to them too—but chiefly with the great laws of Nature and their application to the life of man. This is what the *Bhagavad Gītā* says too; for it tells us that the Vedas deal with the three *Guṇas* or attributes of the objects of Nature, and so it is necessary to go beyond them, and to understand the soul.[1] Hence, as the idea of God corresponds to that of the human soul,—for there appears to be no other equally satisfactory way of understanding it—*Vedānta*, dealing as it does with the nature of *Brahma* or God, cannot be restricted even to a complete knowledge of the Vedas, the subject-matter of which is so different.

It would accordingly be more correct to interpret the word (*Veda-anta*) as "(*anta*, 'end, out-skirt') that which is the end (or is at the end) of the Vedas"; and so would correspond to the idea of the *smṛti*, which refers to post-Vedic literature, and is distinguished from the *śruti*, which refers to the Vedas and all that relates directly to them. Indeed, the subject-matter of the *smṛti*, as distinguished from the *śrūti*, is the nature of God and the soul; and, as it is said to follow the latter, so may *Vedānta* be said to come at the end

[1] BhG. II, 45. This would explain why the references to the Vedas in the *Bhagavad Gītā* are not very eulogistic. The discourse of the *Gītā* takes us beyond the Vedas to the idea of God and the soul.

of the Vedas; and it may be of interest to observe that there are a number of references to the *smṛtis* in the *Sūtras*. Thus, as *Vedānta* is based on the character of the soul, it comes after *Yoga*, based on the character of the intellect.

A NEW ASPECT OF YOGA — We have observed that it is not possible to conceive of the soul as pure soul, and so it is necessary to understand its idea in terms of the different faculties of man; and, as the highest of these is the intellect, it is often considered in its light, and the two are, for practical purposes, identified. Now, as *Vedānta* is based on the character of the soul, and *Yoga* on that of the intellect, it means that there should be a great deal in common between them, and the two may even be identified. But we find that their essential conclusions are very different. Hence, if what has been stated here be correct, there should be another way of looking at *Yoga*, different from what has been given in the *Sūtras*.

THE CHARACTER OF THE BHAGAVAD GITA — The colophon or inscription at the end of each chapter of the *Bhagavad Gītā* describes it as a "knowledge of *Brahma* in the *śāstra* (or sacred book) of *Yoga*"; and we find that it really deals with *Brahma*, and at the same time each of its chapters is said to have a bearing on *Yoga*. Indeed, *Kṛishṇa* has been described as Supreme *Brahma*[1] as well as the God of *Yoga*[2] (*Yogeśvara*), and yet his idea is not the same as that of *Iśvara* or God as given in the *Yoga-Sūtras*; for though the latter conceives of a personal God, He is not spoken of as a creator anywhere, whereas *Kṛshṇa* is referred to as such again and again.[3] He

1 BhG. X, 12.
2 BhG. XI, 9; XVIII, 78.
3 BhG. VII, 6; VIII, 18-21; IX, 4, 7-8; X, 8, 39-42; etc., etc.

is a personal as well as an impersonal deity,—the knowable and the unknowable united together into one.[1] He is the Supreme Intelligence identified with the Supreme Soul, and can be understood only by the soul of man when it realises the highest Truth;[2] and it is for this reason that he is spoken of as the author of *Vedānta*, the knower of the Vedas,[3]—greater than *Brahma* himself,[4]—nay, his very abode,[5]—for it is by means of the intellect alone that we can understand the idea of the soul and of God in his manifest form,—that is, as characterised by certain attributes. There is thus another way of looking at *Yoga*, different from the system described in the *Sūtras*; and there are a number of references to it in the *Mahābhārata*. It gives us a personal idea of God, as distinguished from his impersonal conception as *Brahma* in the *Vedānta Sūtras*; and, as the whole idea is based essentially on the intellect, it is called by the name of *Yoga*: only we should remember that the intellect in this case is for practical purposes identified with the soul, whereas in the case of the *Yoga-Sūtras* it is intellect conceived in its own character as such. There are undoubted points of contact between the two conceptions, and to that extent the idea of the *Yoga-Sūtras* would coincide with that of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, or the idea of *Yoga* in the *Mahābhārata*: otherwise they would be different. On the other hand, the *Kṛshṇa*-idea of God would include the personal idea of God in the *Yoga-Sūtras* as well as the idea of *Brahma* in *Vedānta*.

This is indeed, the idea of *Kṛshṇa* in the *Bhagavad Gītā*; but, as the whole work is a synthesis of all the great systems

[1] BhG. XII, 3-7.
[2] BhG. XI, 52-55.
[3] BhG. XV, 15.
[4] BhG. XI, 37.
[5] BhG. XIV, 27.

of philosophy, it contains certain apparent points of conflict too, which can be resolved only when we look at the problem in the light of these systems.

VEDANTA AND THE MIMANSA — We have observed that the *Mīmānsā* is based on the character of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor; but that can be conceived to be a separate entity only when the soul is regarded as a non-actor. When, however, we think of the soul as an actor itself, the idea of *ahaṅkāra* can only be merged into it; and it can retain its separate character only in its secondary sense as *abhimāna* or egoism, which must disappear before the soul can understand its true character as soul.[1] The idea of *ahaṅkāra* in this secondary sense still continues to be used in literature.

Thus *ahaṅkāra*, in its original sense as the I-as-an-actor, is only an aspect of the soul; and, as the *Mīmānsā* is based on the character of the former, and *Vedānta* on that of the latter, the former is also called *Pūrva-Mīmānsā*, and the latter *Uttara-Mīmānsā*, or the first and latter part of philosophy. We also find that the *Mīmānsā* deals with the subject-matter of the Vedas and the method of their interpretation, while *Vedānta* deals with the problem of God and the soul, or what comes "at the end of the Vedas"; and it is for this reason that the one refers widely to the *śruti*, and the other to the *smṛti*. Again, the *Mīmānsā* tells us that the gods of the Vedas are nothing but the great forms and forces of Nature; and it is the idea of these powers, working in accordance with a law that is conceived to be good,

[1] This is the idea of *Abhimanyu*, the son of *Arjuna*, in the story of the *Mahābhārata*. He personifies *abhimāna*, while *Arjuna* is the human soul; and the whole story of the life and character of each centres round these ideas. This has already been explained (MM. III-V).

intelligent, as well as conducive to joy of life, that has been evolved into that of *Brahma* or the God of *Vedānta*.

VEDANTA AND THE OTHER SYSTEMS: AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION — We have seen how the chief ideas of the *Sāṅkhya* have been explained or expanded by the other systems, so that the *Yoga* solution of the eternal problem of life,—namely, freedom from the bondage of the world—is practically the same as that of the *Sāṅkhya*. We have also seen the main idea of this system in regard to the character of the soul and the manner of its obtaining freedom; and the reason why it fails to carry conviction is that it is impossible to agree that there can be a total annihilation of action, so that the soul cannot at any time divest itself of its "subtle body", made up of the constituents of *Prakṛti*, and become its own self as pure soul again.

It is at this points that *Vedānta* directs its chief criticism. It maintains that if, as it is generally agreed, the soul cannot, at any stage, be separated from its "subtle body", it cannot be regarded as altogether different from all that is in *Prakṛti* or Nature,—for the "subtle body" is said to be composed of seventeen parts,—the essence of the intellect, mind, the ten senses, and the five properties of the five "elements". It is there when the soul abides in a body on earth and is said to live, and it accompanies it also after death; and the only difference between the two states of life, on earth and after death, is that the "subtle body" comes to be associated with the five great "elements" of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether in the one case, and is without them in the other. In the latter case it is also without *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, for no action, in the sense in which we understand the term, takes place.

The conclusion of *Vedānta* accordingly is that the soul

and Nature belong essentially to the same class; and, if it is possible to hold,—as the *Sāṅkhya* and the other systems do—that matter (the senses and the "elements" and their properties) is formed out of the mind, we can conceive of *Prakṛti* itself as emanating from *Brahma*. Indeed, *Vedānta* conceives of *Brahma* as *Prakṛti* and soul taken together as one, for the two are for ever inseparable both in a state of rest and action; and when life evolves or there is action emerging out of a state of rest,—the great forces of Nature, from the intellect down to the "elements", issue forth; but each of them contains within itself an essence of the energy of the soul as well. The latter has power to permeate everything, but is associated with them in various degrees: for instance, we cannot associate it so clearly with the "elements" as with the mind and the intellect. It cannot be separated from its "subtle body", and is said to live when it comes to abide in the midst of the "elements" which constitute the basis of its physical body; and it passes away when it leaves these behind, and goes to dwell in some other world beyond; and is finally merged in *Brahma*,—the fountain source from which all things arise, and into which they enter at the end.

BRAHMA — This *Brahma* too is of the same character as the soul,—the highest *Purusha* (soul) and *Prakṛti* (Nature) united together into one; and so *Vedānta*, unlike the *Sāṅkhya* and its allied systems, gives us a purely monistic conception of life. Thus we see that we begin with Nature as the supreme creator of things and think of the soul as different from all of them, and end with *Brahma*, where Nature and the soul are united together into one; and that is the ultimate Reality, which is both personal and impersonal, manifest as well as unmanifest. This is the final conclusion of *Vedānta*,

and this the "knowledge of *Brahma*" in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, as expressed in the conception of *Kṛshṇa*.

It is by no means difficult to understand this idea. Indeed, as we have seen, the very idea of Nature can be transformed into that of God by means of the idea of Sacrifice. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that sacrifice or good and intelligent action, performed in accordance with its law, and meant for the benefit of all, transforms and purifies not only the doer of the deed, but also sanctifies the materials of the sacrifice. It is this idea that is amplified by *Vedānta*, for the idea of *Prakṛti* itself is transformed into that of *Brahma* or God by means of the idea of Sacrifice. This really means that if we believe that the whole universe is governed by a law which is essentially intelligent and good, and makes for the preservation and continuance of life; and that despite all changes, including sorrow and death, there is joy in life when we take it as a whole,—we believe that there is God in the universe, who creates, supports, and continues life without end, and that death itself is but a door to another life. It is in this manner that we can transform Nature itself into *Brahma* by means of the idea of Sacrifice, and believe that the universe is full of life and joy without end; and this is the essential truth of *Vedānta*. It does not deny the reality of pain, but maintains that we are for ever acting to change it into pleasure or joy, so that freedom from the bondage of life consists not in the renunciation of action, but a state of equanimity in the midst of action and the experience of pleasure and pain.

THE CONCLUSION OF VEDANTA—Thus we see that the conclusion of *Vedānta* is altogether different from that of the *Sāṅkhya*; but, while maintaining that life is synonymous with action, and action as a sacrifice is of the essence of the idea of God,

it believes that knowledge and action are but counterparts of the same energy of the soul, and that with every breath we draw, we know and act at the same time; and so it includes all that the other systems have to say on the subject of freedom from the bondage of life.

THE PLAN OF THE WORK — The work is divided into four chapters, and each chapter consists of four parts. As in the case of the other systems, the opening *Sūtra* tells us that its subject-matter is inquiry into the nature of *Brahma*; and, as the idea of *Brahma* is associated with that of the soul, and the latter is conceived to be characterised by desire as well as joy, and is regarded as a creator, we have a discussion of all these questions with reference to both *Brahma* and the soul in the four parts of the first chapter.

In the second chapter the author examines the consequence of regarding *Prakṛti* as the supreme creator of things, and then goes on to consider the character of the soul as an actor, and of *Brahma* with reference to *Prakṛti*.

In the third chapter we are told of the relation of the soul to the body, how a new birth takes place, and how the soul, after death, is said to live is the world beyond. The author also deals with the problems of knowledge, action, and pain; explains the process of creation in this world, and points out that creation by the Infinite must be of the same kind. He also tells us how we can understand the idea of God, and explains his idea of *Brahma*, with special reference to the character of the soul.

In the last chapter the author considers the question of re-birth and transmigration of the soul, and explains the limitations of the idea of freedom of the soul from the bondage of life, as it is understood by the *Sāṅkhya* and the other systems; and points out that real freedom can consist only in

a state of equilibrium in the midst of action and the experience of pleasure and pain. He who attains to this may be said to be free from the revolutions of birth.

The *Sūtras* may now be summarised as follows:—

CHAPTER I

PART I

BRAHMA AND THE SOUL

Let us now inquire into the nature of *Brahma*, who may be described as the origin of the universe (1-11).

Freedom means joy, and joy is not opposed to desire (12-20). The soul is different from a number of things, like Ether or light, but is still characterised by joy (21-31).

BRAHMA — Let us now inquire into the nature of *Brahma*. *Brahma* is that which is the origin of the universe; but He has also been described as a spectator of things in the sacred books (1-5).

When we say that *Brahma* is the origin of the universe, it does not mean that He should be associated with *Guṇas* or the attributes of the objects of Nature. We can conceive of Him independently of the *Guṇas* in the same manner as we are able to do of the soul (6-11).

THE CHARACTER OF THE SOUL — The state of freedom is one of joy; and we say so because the soul itself is full of joy 12-17).

There is no real contradiction between desire and joy, for desire can be in consonance with Dharma (18-20).

The soul is different from a number of things,—for

instance, Ether, vital breath, and light (21-24). It is possible to argue that if it is characterised by desire, it cannot be very different from them. But this is not a valid objection, for desires can be controlled; and we say that the soul is different from the "elements" because they are divisible into parts, while the soul is not (25-26). Indeed, we cannot deny that the soul is different from these things (27-31).

PART II

THE CHARACTER OF THE SOUL

We can prove that the soul exists, and is an actor and a propagator of the species; and, as there is joy in the act of creation, joy is a characteristic of the soul (1-18).

We cannot think of the soul as it is, and the best way is to think of it in terms of the intellect (19-32).

THE CHARACTER OF THE SOUL — We can prove the existence of the soul; and it is generally agreed that it is different from *Guṇas* or the attributes of the objects of Nature; and, in any case, is conceived to be without a body. But it is an actor and, though small in size, can fill the whole body in the same manner as Ether (1-8).

The soul is an eater of food, and a propagator of the species. The act of creation is a secret act, corresponding to the nature of the soul. There is also joy in a proper act of creation, and joy is a characteristic of the soul (9-18).

This may appear to be a new conception of the soul, but is none the less true. The soul is an actor, because it is the original thinker; but, as it is unmanifest, we cannot conceive of it as it is, and have to clothe it in some form to grasp its idea. That form is the intellect, which is said to be a common characteristic of all men. We cannot deny that the intellect

is the only form in which we can think of the soul; and there is general agreement of learned men on the subject (19-32).

PART III

BRAHMA AND THE SOUL

We can understand the idea of *Brahma* from the character of the soul (1-3). The soul is associated with the vital breath, but is different from it: so is *Brahma* (4-9). The soul has other characteristics too, and the idea of *Brahma* corresponds to them as well (10-43).

THE IDEA OF BRAHMA — *Brahma* is the resting place of Heaven and Earth and all other things, and we can understand His idea from the character of the soul (1-3).

THE CHARACTER OF THE SOUL — The soul is the supporter of *prāṇa* or vital breath,—but the two are different. It is associated with the vital breath in accordance with a law, so that it may live in the world and act and create (4-9).

It is imperishable because it abides in Ether, and that too is so in accordance with a law (10-12).

It is small in size but great in action, and can make itself manifest only through the body in which it abides, and by means of which it acts. But we cannot define it by means of words (13-24).

So far as the body is concerned, it fills the whole of it, but abides more specially in the heart (25-26).

We cannot deny that the soul is an actor, or that it has a form,—for it is always known by its "subtle body", which is its form, and by means of which it acts. It is eternal, because this "subtle body" of its is eternal too. The actions of the soul are of various kinds; and they arise from its own natural activity (27-43).

PART IV

THE CHARACTER OF THE SOUL

The soul is an actor, and the body is its form (1-3); but no language can describe it truly as it is. It is sometimes described in terms of *prāṇa* or vital breath (4-12); but the two cannot be identified (13-28).

THE CHARACTER OF THE SOUL — The soul is an actor, and the body is its form. It is minute but all-pervading, because of its special characteristics; and it is because it depends on the body for its manifestation, that it desires to have different objects of Nature (1-3).

No language can describe the soul as it is, but its best description is that it is like the intellect. At the same time we cannot deny that it is an actor; and the original idea of the science of Astrology is based on its conception as such. It is for this reason that it is also described in terms of *prāṇa* or the vital breath, which is its chief instrument of action (4-12).

There are some who would identify the soul with the vital breath; but the logical consequence of this would be that we should regard *Prakṛti* or Nature as the sole supreme creator of the universe, including the soul (13-28).

CHAPTER II

PART I

THE LOGIC OF IDEAS

If we identify the soul with the vital breath, we must regard *Prakṛti* as the sole supreme creator of everything, and accept the logic of this idea (1-3); and it must mean that the soul cannot make itself free from the bondage of life. But if we believe that the very

goal of its life is this freedom, we must come to a very different conclusion (4-37).

Logic of Ideas—We cannot deny that, if we identify the soul with the vital breath, the logical consequence is that we must regard *Prakṛti* as the sole supreme creator of all things; and this has the advantage of giving us a simple monistic conception of life (1-3).

The Issue—But the real point at issue is not this,—but rather that the soul is not an actor, and only imagines that it is so, whereas the real actor is *ahaṅkāra*. It is said that the soul is able to imagine itself to be an actor because it imitates *ahaṅkāra*, and has the power of doing so. But this argument involves an inherent contradiction; for we cannot explain why, if the soul is really not an actor, it should imagine that it is so. Again, it would be impossible to show how, if it imitates *ahaṅkāra*, it can cease to do so; and in such a case there can be no possibility of its freedom from the bondage of life (4-25).

A Different View—But the very conception of the soul as a non-actor arises from this desire for freedom; and if that is not possible on this assumption, the assumption itself must break down. Hence we must agree that the soul is an actor. But this does not mean that it is subject to change: it only means that our idea of freedom has been changed, and life itself becomes like sport. It eliminates the idea of harshness or evil from things; for, if we look at the beginning of life, we find that there can be no harshness or evil in the first action of a creature; and it is this first action that makes for the continuance of action without end (26-37).

PART II

THE SOUL AS AN ACTOR

We cannot know the origin of creation or action; but we know that each action is distinct from the other, and has a purpose to serve (1-7).

We cannot deny that the soul is an actor, and *ahaṅkāra* is only its form when it engages in action (8-21). The real actor is the soul, and it is the soul that perceives all things (22-33): but it cannot function without the assistance of the body (34-45).

THE NATURE OF ACTION—We cannot know the origin of creation or action, and can only say that it is of the nature of life itself (1-3). But each action is distinct from the other, and has a purpose to serve (4-7).

THE SOUL IS AN ACTOR—We cannot deny the importance of the soul; nor can we divest it of its intellectual powers, or say that it is not an actor (8-12).

THE SOUL AND AHANKARA—The real actor is the soul; but, as it is without a form, it is necessary to give it a form to understand it; and *ahaṅkāra* is its form when it engages in action. This is proved by the fact that the two are not separate entities and cannot exist side by side; for we find from experience that when the higher one or the soul appears, the other disappears (13-21).

HOW THE SOUL ACTS—The real actor is the soul, because there is continuity in action; and that is possible because there is a permanent factor of action,—namely, the soul. We can understand this if we exercise our memory,—and memory is an attribute of the soul (22-29).

There can be no existence without perception; and the real perceiver is the soul (30-33).

It is in this manner that the soul acts. But it is not the whole actor, for it cannot act without the assistance of the body. Thus we might say that there is no fundamental difference between the soul and the body because of their eternal co-existence. Indeed, we cannot even say which of the two is master or lord, and they are best described as friends (34-39).

At the same time we cannot say that the soul is like an organ of sense; but from a purely scientific point of view, there is no real contradiction between the soul and the body (40-45).

PART III

GOD, NATURE, AND THE SOUL

Ether can be regarded as a creator only when it is identified with *Prakṛti* (1-8).

Prakṛti is said to be without origin, and we can understand the idea of God only by meditating on it (9-20).

The soul is minute like an atom; and it is an actor and experiencer of joy (21-36).

The idea of evil arises from absence of order, or impropriety of conduct (37-39). The actions of the soul can be said to be both good and bad; but at the moment when it acts, they are the best it can perform (40-42).

The soul is minute, and is like the light; it cannot be destroyed; but we cannot explain its real idea as it is (43-53).

Ether—Ether is not the original creator of things; but it may be said to be so in a secondary sense, when it is identified with *Prakṛti* or Nature, as it sometimes is in the sacred books (1-8).

Prakrti and God—But *Prakṛti* is without any origin; and all vital energy is said to arise out of it. Indeed, we can understand the idea of God only by meditating on it and

its characteristic marks, and not by means of our intellect or mind, as is sometimes imagined (9-15).

God is said to be the refuge of all that move and do not move. But this does not prove His existence. Nor can His existence be proved from the existence of the soul. It can only be proved by meditating on the character of Nature or *Prakṛti* (16-20).

THE SOUL—The soul is minute like an atom, and abides in the heart of man. In common parlance we might say that we get this idea from its association with the *Guṇas*,—for the statement that it is minute like an atom is its *Guṇa*, attribute, or distinctive mark. Indeed, it is because it constitutes the core of the *Guṇas*, that it is said to be characterised by intelligence. But so long as we understand it as soul, there can be no defect in its idea merely because of looking at it in a particular way (21-32).

The soul is an actor, because it is admitted by all that it is an experiencer of joy, because it clings to life, and because we are required to perform certain actions as obligatory. Were the soul not an actor, there should be none of these (33-36).

GOOD AND EVIL — The idea of evil arises from absence of order, or impropriety of conduct, and it is based on our own perception of things. Impropriety of conduct arises from a perverse exercise of power, or a lack of proper adjustment of things (37-39).

The soul is really like a carpenter, who acts in both ways, —that is, good and ill. But at the moment when it acts, it acts from the best motives, so far as its own self is concerned (40-42).

THE CHARACTER OF THE SOUL — The soul is minute, but can fill the body in which it abides. It is like light, and there is nothing higher than the soul (43-47).

The soul acts or refrains from action because of its bond with the body. As it is without mass, it cannot be destroyed. Indeed, it is beyond the grasp of the mind, and is superior to the intellect. We cannot explain its real nature by referring it to something else, for it is what it is by means of its own inner nature (48-53).

PART IV

THE SOUL AND THE VITAL ORGANS

The *prāṇas* or vital organs exist like the soul (1-7); but the soul is the best among them all (8-16). Nevertheless, the two are different (17-19); and the soul is characterised by both knowledge and action (20-22).

THE PRANAS — The *prāṇas* or vital organs exist like the soul, and they are possessed of *Guṇas* or the attributes of Nature from their very birth (1-7).

THE SOUL — But the soul is the best among all of them. It is said to have five functions like the mind, and is said to be seated in the intellect, and functions by means of the vital breath (8-16).

But the sense-organs are different from the soul, and the soul is superior to all of them (17-19).

Although the soul is said to be a personification of consciousness or knowledge, it is really a threefold actor. Nevertheless it is different from flesh and other constituents of the body (20-22).

CHAPTER III

PART I

THE PROBLEM OF THE SOUL

The soul dwells in the body in order to act and attain to perfection (1-3); and it does so by means of the function of the intellect (4-7).

The departed soul is re-born because of its previous actions (8-16); and its real problem is one of knowledge or action as its end (17-20). It is also concerned with the problem of pain (21-27).

THE OBJECT OF LIFE — The soul is united with a body in order to engage in action and attain to perfection (1-3). It does so by means of the intellect, which has an important place in action, and comes next after the soul itself (4-7).

RE-BIRTH — The departed soul is born again as a result of its previous actions,—both good and bad—and this takes place in accordance with a law (8-12).

The souls of creatures ascend and descend after dwelling for some time in the city of the god of Death; and we say so from the observation of their course of life (13-16).

THE PROBLEM OF THE SOUL — The real problem of the soul relates to knowledge or action as the goal of life,—for that is the problem under discussion here (17-20). There is a third problem too,—that of pain; and we say so because the occurrence of calamity is so common. But there are other things too besides pain, which are a source of joy in life (21-27).

PART II

THE SOUL AND GOD

The act of procreation is an act of the soul (1-25), and it gives us an idea of creation by the Infinite (26-30), which may be called the Supreme Soul (31-32). We can understand the idea of God in a number of ways (33-41).

PROCREATION AND THE SOUL — The act of procreation is an act of the soul, for after it the soul becomes self-conscious in a very special way (1-13).

The sex-instinct is indeed most powerful, and serves the purpose of Nature. But it is necessary to exercise restraint, and that too is done by the soul (14-25).

CREATION AND THE SUPREME SOUL — This creation of the soul gives us an idea of creation by the Infinite,—provided we agree that the Infinite creates (26-30); and so we may conclude that there is a Supreme Soul, for the idea of the individual and the Supreme Soul is identical (31-32).

AN INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTION OF GOD — We can have an intellectual conception of God by regarding the universe in a special way,—that is, in terms of the idea of Sacrifice. There is also another idea of God,—in terms of negatives ("not this, not that"); and both these enable us to understand His vastness and omnipresence; and then we realise that it is He who bestows the fruit of actions. Indeed, it is this that gives us the idea of Dharma too (33-41).

PART III

THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF VEDANTA

It is this that gives us the fundamental idea of *Vedānta* (1-10),

—for we cannot deny that there is joy in Nature (11-13). This also enables us to understand that all souls are alike (14-34).
The soul abides in the body, and does not sin through action (35-44); and it is an error to believe that it is *ahaṅkāra* and not the soul that acts (45-49). We can understand how this error arises and how it can be removed; and then we can realise that all souls are the same (50-66).

THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF VEDANTA — This is the fundamental idea of *Vedānta*, based on the existence of a universal impelling force of life. There is complete agreement on the point among thinkers, and all works on the subject say so (1-10).

Indeed, we cannot deny that there is joy in Nature, and all sacred books are agreed that there is (11-13).

IDENTITY OF SOULS — When there is absence of motive in action, it leads to meditation, which is the voice of our own soul. But the perception (or meditation) of each soul is different, as we see from subsequent results. We could regard all acts of perception as alike, if there were no difference between souls (14-19).

We can regard souls as alike when there is some other relation between them too,—a relationship that is not due to some special cause; and we find that such a relationship exists. For instance, all of us can understand certain common ideas,—like the fullness and omnipresence of light; and that is so because of this relationship between souls (20-24).

The sacred books say so too; but we do not know it because we do not understand them. There are many ways of understanding the text of the sacred books; but it requires knowledge to be able to succeed. If we do so, we shall find that there is no real contradiction among them (25-34).

THE NATURE OF THE SOUL—The soul abides in the body, and there is a reciprocity between the two. At the same time

we can distinguish between them. The soul is verily Truth; but while it abides in the body, it has its own desires too (35-39).

But the soul does not sin through action, though there is a separate result of each action (40-44).

It is an error to believe that it is *ahaṅkāra* and not the soul that acts; for when we get knowledge, we find that it is the soul that does so (45-49).

This error arises from the fact that attachment exists, and we believe that it cannot come to an end even when the soul comes to regard all things as equal or the same (50-51).

But it is possible for the soul to attain to this state, and it is honoured as supreme because it can act without attachment. This also enables us to understand that all souls are the same; because if the soul can regard all things as alike, it can make no difference to it whether it abides in a body or not; and we believe that the souls are different because the bodies in which they abide are different (52-54).

Indeed, we might say that the limbs of the body are attached to the soul, but the soul is not attached to them; and the superiority of the soul consists in the fact that its actions are a sacrifice (55-57).

The souls appear to be different because of the difference in the use of words. But it is an error to suppose that they are different, because we find that the result of an action is not different in the case of different souls (58-60).

It is the nature of the soul to be united with the limbs of the body, and that is so because of the assistance it receives from them in performing its actions. Indeed, the connection of the soul with the body has never been regarded as contrary to reason (61-66).

PART IV

THE SOUL AND THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF LIFE

This is the correct idea of the soul; but there are other ways of understanding it too (1-8).

Each system of philosophy has its own conception of the soul; but they are all parts of one great whole, and need to be understood in that light (9-27)

There are different actions for different stages of life, and they are the result of the characteristics of both body and soul (28-40)

Fitness is not a necessary condition of success in life (41-43); and the fruit of action belongs not only to the soul, but to all the organs that take part in it (44-47). Indeed, there are different actions suited to different states and stages of life (48-52).

IDEA OF THE SOUL—This is the correct idea of the soul; but there are some who believe that the soul is that which remains after everything else in the body has undergone a change or disappeared. But this is an indirect way of getting at the idea of the soul, though there is no error in it (1-8).

THE SOUL AND THE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY—Each system of philosophy has its own idea of the soul. But all systems are alike in their own way, and each is part of a great whole. There is a division of thought among them, just as we may divide a large number like a hundred. But it is not difficult to understand these systems, because we can know their meaning from the language of their text, and there are no symbolic expressions like "kindling the fire" in them. Their whole idea of action as a sacrifice is based on reason; but even so it is necessary to have calmness and self-control to be able to understand their text (9-27).

ACTIONS AND STAGES OF LIFE—There are different actions for different stages of life: for instance, when a person is at the point of death, he is permitted to eat anything, but is

unable to do so. Thus, a person can perform only certain actions at a certain stage of life, and that is so because he needs the assistance of different organs of the body at different times. In any case, these actions are the result of the characteristics of both body and soul; and we know that it is not always possible to overcome obstacles that lie in the way, and succeed (28-40).

CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS — But fitness is not a necessary condition of success in action,—for it may be destroyed, or a person may not be able to make use of it. This statement may appear to be an extraordinary one, but is none the less true and easy to understand. At the same time we must not deprecate fitness as a means of success in action (41-43).

THE FRUIT OF ACTION — The fruit of action belongs not only to the soul, but to all the organs that take part in it. Indeed, there are three factors of action,—the actor, the instruments or organs that take part in action, and the object of action; and the fruit or result belongs to all of them (44-47).

ACTIONS AND STAGES OF LIFE — There are different actions for different states and stages of life; but the most comprehensive idea of it is to be found in that of the householder. The life of a *Muni* gives us another equally comprehensive, —but that relates to a conception of a world that is believed to be full of obstacles. This leads us to believe that there can be no fixed rule in regard to the attainment of freedom from the bondage of life (48-52).

CHAPTER IV

PART I

RE-BIRTH AND REMOVAL OF SIN

The same soul is born again and again, and it alone can comprehend *Brahma* (1-5).

We can understand the idea of the soul in several ways; and when a person attains to knowledge of the soul, all his sins are removed (6-16).

According to some the highest action is that which is characterised by knowledge; and they believe that the highest goal can be attained by means of renunciation of all actions (17-19).

RE-BIRTH — The revolution of birth takes place again and again; and we say so because of the characteristics of creatures; and it is the same soul that is born again and again (1-3).

ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE SOUL — The soul does not consist in its outward form or the body; and it may be described as the faculty of seeing or understanding *Brahma* (4-5).

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE SOUL — We can understand the idea of the soul in several ways. A person is said to exist because of the existence of the soul. We can grasp its idea by means of contemplation too. It is the one thing within the body that does not change; and we can grasp its idea in a state of one-pointedness,—for then there is no difference between the seer (the soul) and the object seen. We also see that it abides in the body up to the time of death (6-12).

REMOVAL OF SIN — When a person attains to knowledge of the soul, all his sins are removed. Death also puts an end to

sin; but that applies to actions not yet begun; and so far as previous actions are concerned, their sin is removed only when their effect comes to an end (13-16).

THE HIGHEST ACTION AND THE HIGHEST END — According to some there is also another class of actions besides those that are good or bad,—and they are actions characterised by knowledge. They also believe that it is only when a person destroys both good and evil actions by means of *Yoga*, that he can attain to the highest goal (17-19).

PART II

THE SOUL AND ITS GOAL

It is a law that the lower abides in the higher; and so all things abide in the soul (1-5).

Real immortality consists in doing heroic deeds without injury to any one; but there are some who believe that it consists in being merged in the Supreme (6-16); and that the soul follows the path of light in the world beyond (17-21).

ALL THINGS ABIDE IN THE SOUL — It is a law that the lower abides in the higher; and so speech and the other sense-organs abide in the mind, the mind in *prāṇa* or vital breath, and that again in the soul (1-5).

REAL IMMORTALITY — The soul cannot be seen; but all souls are essentially alike. Real immortality consists in doing heroic deeds without injury to any one; but there are some who have another idea of immortality,—that is, when the soul, after passing through a number of births, is merged in the Supreme (6-8).

The soul is minute, but, at the same time, full of ardour and glow, which arise not from self-denial or prohibition, but rather from its association with the body (9-14).

We are told that all souls are at last merged in the Highest; and the Highest is without any division, as the sacred books declare (15-16).

It is said that when the soul attains to perfection, it is filled with light, realises its own self, and becomes full of joy. All its sense-organs are illuminated because of the strength of knowledge; and the remainder of its course on earth becomes sweet; and it values its own purity more than anything else. And when it passes away from this earth, it follows the path of light into the world beyond (17-21).

PART III

THE HIGHEST END OF THE SOUL

Those who believe in this idea of immortality of the soul maintain that the soul passes through light, and comes into the presence of the Deity; and, as all its actions have come to an end, it is merged in the Highest, and thereafter has no desire for further action (1-16)

THE END OF THE SOUL—Those who believe in this idea of immortality of the soul tell us that it goes on and on through light,—from cloud to air, and then into lightning that is above the sky,—accompanied by its "subtle body"; and then it is led by something that is of the nature of lightning itself, and comes into the presence of the Deity. All its actions having come to an end, the soul, together with the "subtle body", is merged in the Highest; and after this it can have no intention of gaining anything through further actions (1-14).

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This is what we are told, and the excellence of the idea is obvious (15-16).

PART IV

REAL FREEDOM

It is said that when the soul arrives there, it becomes free for ever afterwards (1-5).

But we are unable to think of the soul except in terms of the intellect; and so we must think of the problem of freedom too in its light. If we do so, we find that real freedom consists in a state of equilibrium in the midst of all actions, or the experience of pleasure and pain (6-22).

INTO THE HIGHEST—It is said that when the soul arrives there, it becomes free, and lives on for evermore in the Highest; and this, we are told, is due to the fact that its own nature is like that of the Highest (1-5).

A RATIONAL VIEW—But we are unable to think of the soul except in terms of the intellect; for even when we try to think of it as soul, it appears to be full of reflection (6-15).

We have accordingly to think of the problem of freedom of the soul in terms of the intellect. There are some who believe that this can be achieved by means of renunciation of all actions in the world. But we find that there can be absence of action only if things were not connected with one another. But we find that they are all connected with the soul, though the soul itself is not subject to change. Hence the soul cannot refrain from all kinds of actions. On the other hand, it can be proved that it can attain to a state of evenness or equilibrium in the midst of all actions, or the experience of pleasure and pain. And this, according to the Scriptures, is the state of one who is said to be free from all revolutions of birth (16-22).

XI

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION

FROM SANKHYA TO VEDANTA—This substance of the great systems of Hindu Philosophy is enough to show that, even as *Vedānta* tells us, they are but parts of a magnificent whole, and deal with the many problems of life from different points of view. We begin with certain assumptions, and then, by a gradual process of thought, criticise, correct, or confirm them. For instance, we begin with the idea that *Prakṛti* or Nature is the supreme creator of life, and there is no place for God in the scheme of things; that the soul is altogether different from all that is in the world or the body in which it abides; that there is no joy in life, and pleasure itself is but a form of pain; that all desire is essentially evil; that there is an inherent opposition between knowledge and action; and that we can attain to freedom from the bondage of life only by means of a total renunciation of action and withdrawal from the world. Then, slowly and gradually, we understand the implications of the ideas of Nature and God, the real character of the soul and its relation to the body and the world, the nature of knowledge and action, good and evil, pleasure and pain, desire and its result,—and come to the conclusion that there is no inherent opposition between the idea of Nature and of God, and that if we believe, as we must, that the working of the great forces of Nature is characterised by both goodness and intelligence, we transform the idea of Nature itself into that of God; that the soul, though different from many things in the world, cannot be dissociated from them, nor can its idea be separated from that of the intellect, which is said to be an expression of Nature itself; that there is joy in each

true act of creation, and it is this joy that sustains the world; that the motive of each action is positive,—the attainment of some satisfaction, pleasure, or good, besides the avoidance of their opposites; that there is an element of goodness in each desire, so far at least as the person who possesses it is concerned, and it can be in conformtiy with Dharma too; that the difference between pleasure and pain, and good and evil is one of degree, not kind; that there is no essential opposition between knowledge and action, and there can be no action without knowledge and no knowledge without action; and that freedom from the bondage of life is attained by living in the world, doing heroic deeds without injury to any one, attaining the highest that is in it, understanding the true nature of the soul and all that is called life, and living in a state of equilibrium in the midst of all actions and the experience of pleasure and pain. The whole process is rational or intellectual, and is illuminated by a wealth of ideas and imagery, and embodied in a form which, when we understand it, is as clear as it is coherent and concise, and is without a parallel in the history of human thought. At the same time there is an attempt to transcend the limitations of human reason too, and we are led into the realms of the Unknowable,—the city of the god of Death, as well as the kingdom of eternal life and light,—the abode of the Supreme. Thus, physical science and logic and ethics,—the laws of life and the theories of knowledge and action—together with psychology and metaphysics, the origin and essence of things, the nature of the soul, and the idea of God—are all integrated together to make a great whole which, when perceived from different points of view, gives us a number of *Darśanas* or clear visions of life, and constitutes the end of all our quest of Truth.

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that to understand these systems of philosophy is to understand the foundations of ancient thought and the essence of what is described in the sacred books. They all claim to derive their origin from the Vedas and the *Upanishads*; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that the subject-matter of the Vedas is nothing less than the laws of Nature and the life of man,—or Dharma that sustains the universe. It also explains the method by means of which we can understand them in this light.

The *Upanishads* are said to be an exposition of the secret doctrine of the Vedas, and we can now understand that they are really so. A great deal of what they contain is pure thought; and the same ideas have been expressed in the Vedas in a different form. But a considerable portion of the *Upanishads* too has been composed in symbolic form, and would need to be interpreted in the same manner as the Vedas, and in accordance with the method described in the *Mīmānsā*. The great Epic of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is said to be a Veda; while the *Mahābhārata*, the greatest of all, has been described as the fifth and last of the Vedas; and we are told that what "is in it is elsewhere too; and what does not occur in it, occurs nowhere else;"—for it includes the entire range of human thought from *Sāṅkhya* to *Vedānta*, when interpreted in accordance with the method explained in the *Mīmānsā*. The same is true of the *Purāṇas* too; and it is for this reason that the *Mahābhārata* is spoken of as "*itihāsa* or history of the *Purāṇās*"; but we need to understand them also in the same manner.

FROM SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY—An examination of the different systems of philosophy will show that the whole process is purely rational or scientific; and the ancients must have known a great deal of physical sciences, in a strictly

modern sense of the term, to be able to describe them in this form. Their conception of the "elements" was indeed different from our own,—for they conceived of them as great elemental forms and forces of Nature,—Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether—out of which all material objects are formed. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the Vedas deal with the great laws of Nature and their bearing on the life of man; and what great truths a proper study of their text will disclose would be difficult to say. But the *Sāṅkhya* tells us that all matter is formed out of the mind; and the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeshika* discuss the nature of the atom, refer to its division, and tell us how, though invisible, it can yet be perceived. They also define Ether and sound, describe the character of mass and action, and examine the properties of the "elements". The *Mīmānsā* deals with the conception of Time as something purely intellectual, speaks of its connection with action, and tells us how it can be described. It also gives us a scientific division of animals into vertebrate and invertebrate, and refers to *Jyotishṭoma* or the rays of light. There is also a reference to the many great things that can be achieved by means of *Yoga*; but if we understand the text correctly, we find that the principal idea is purely sceintific, for we are told that a body can be made to become light as cotton by means of its adjustment to motion; and we can hear wonderful sounds by concentrating on the essential character of sound.

Indeed, the great attempt of the ancients was not only to understand the laws of Nature, but also to integrate them into the life of man; and when they conceived of man as a microcosm, they fused science into psychology, and conceived of the six systems of philosophy: the *Sāṅkhya* based on a broad survey of Nature, and the rest on the five faculties of man,—his senses, mind, *ahaṅkāra*, intellect, and

the soul. Thus they transformed science into philosophy through the medium of psychology.

FROM PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION — The same process of thought enabled them to transform philosophy into religion; for we find that it is these systems of philosophy which constitute the bases of the different systems of Hindu religion, and exhibit the same unity of thought as the systems of philosophy themselves. It is sometimes believed that philosophy and religion are two different things,—the one based on reason, and the other on faith—and the two have little in common with each other. While this is true of some great systems of religion, like Christianity and Islam, the essential idea of what are called the Hindu systems of religion is purely philosophical, even as the basis of their philosophy is a knowledge of the laws of Nature and their application to the life of man. Indeed, the ancients conceived of religion as the highest art of life,—an attempt to live in the light of the highest Truth as we understand it. Dharma, —the term commonly used for religion—was, accordingly, conceived to be action performed as a sacrifice, even as the *Mīmānsā* tells us; and that means nothing but good, intelligent, and joyous action, meant for the benefit of all; and it is this that sustains all life, both of the individual and the world, even as the word literally signifies. Religion is thus but a realization of the highest Truth, an experience of an ideal conception of life,—necessitating a harmony of both knowledge and action, reason and emotion—when the head and the heart act in unison, and meet in the awakening of the soul and the presence of God,—the eternal principle of Goodness, Intelligence, and Joy (*Sat-chit-ānanda*) that fills the universe. The ancients believed that, as the ultimate object of all action is perfection, all life ministers to this end:

and so all the fine arts,—architecture, sculpture, painting, music and poetry—the most magnificent temples, the finest carving and statues, the most delicate painting and effects of light and shade, the deepest notes of music, and the most beautiful poetry—were pressed into the service of this idea of Dharma or religion. It has, indeed, drifted far away from its original conception; but its basic ideas still remain, and it is yet possible to trace them to their source.

XII

THE SYSTEMS OF RELIGION

THE SYSTEMS OF RELIGION — As the different systems of philosophy constitute the bases of the different systems of religion, it would be of interest to correlate their fundamental ideas and theories.

FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS OF SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY — As we have seen, the fundamental ideas of the different systems of philosophy may be resolved into the conception of knowledge or action as the final goal of human life; and we can understand their essential idea of the soul as well as God in their terms. For instance, the *Sāṅkhya* believes that action is the cause of all our sorrow and pain; that Nature is self-created and there is no place for God in the scheme of life; that the soul is different from all that is in Nature; and that it can make itself happy and free only by means of perfect knowledge and renunciation of all action. The other systems deal with the same problem from different points of view, and the conclusion of *Vedānta* is the very opposite of that of the *Sāṅkhya*.

THE IDEA OF GOD AND SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY — Now, if we conceive of God as *Sat-chit-ānanda* or the principle of good, intelligent and joyous action made manifest in the universe, the opposition between soul, Nature, and God disappears, and we can harmonise them into one great Whole. We can, therefore, examine the different systems of philosophy in the light of the measure of their belief in God as the supreme creator of the universe. We have seen that the *Sāṅkhya* has no place for Him in its scheme, while *Vedānta* conceives of Nature itself but as a form of God; and, between these extremes, the remaining systems have their own ideas of God.

THREE GROUPS OF IDEAS — These may be divided into three groups. We may believe that Nature is the supreme creator of the universe, or that God is the supreme creator, or that the two together jointly create the world.

Now, if we believe that Nature is the supreme creator of life, it is possible to have three points of views: that Nature is the *sole* supreme creator; or, if there is God, He is but a spectator of Nature's work; or has, at best, but a small share in it. We cannot, in any case, agree that God is equal or superior to Nature, or the sole creator of the universe.

If, again, we believe that God and Nature are joint creators of life, we can have three points of view: that the share of Nature is more than that of God; that the two are equal; or that the share of God is more than that of Nature.

If, on the other hand, we believe that God is the supreme creator of the universe, there are again three points of view: that God is the *sole* supreme creator; or, if there is Nature, it is but a spectator of His work; or has, at best, a small share in it. This is the exact opposite of the first group of ideas based on the conception of Nature as the supreme creator

of the universe, and the two exclude each other. Between them lies the second group, which has a point of view in common with each, and so may be said to be their connecting link. Thus, if, starting with the idea that there is no place for God in the scheme of things, we come to believe that He is a spectator of the work of Nature, and then that He is a small creator too,—we not only rise to the top of the first group of ideas in this system of thought, but also find ourselves at the bottom of the second; and similarly, when we rise to the top of our second group, we are at the bottom of the third; and in this manner can ascend from the lowest to the highest point of thought in this scale.

THE TRIMURTI — It is this that gives us the *Trimūrti* or the threefold form of the Deity,—*Brahmā*,[1] *Siva*, and *Vishṇu*, to which there are innumerable references in the sacred books. When we desire to live in accordance with the scheme of thought based on the first group of ideas, we get the system of religion called after the name of *Brahmā*; the second gives us the system of *Siva* or *Mahādeva*; while the third that of *Vishṇu*.

JAINISM AND BUDDHISM — We notice, however, that the system of *Brahmā*, based on the idea that Nature is the supreme creator of the universe, leads to the conclusion of the *Sāṅkhya* and its allied systems,—namely, that the ultimate goal of human life is knowledge and renunciation of action. Action is a necessary evil so long as we have to

[1] The word *Brahmā* is not the same as *Brahma*, although they are closely allied, and both are derived from *Brahman*. *Brahmā* is the nominative masculine, while *Brahma* the nominative neuter form of this word; and the former refers to a personal, and the latter to an impersonal form of the Supreme Spirit,—the sense in which it is used in the *Vedānta-Sūtras*.

live; but happiness or freedom from sorrow can be attained only by means of knowledge and the renunciation of action. But a total renunciation of action, as the *Mīmānsā* has taught us, belongs only to the last stage of human life, when the spirit departs. The course of life based on the system of *Brahmā* may, accordingly, be divided into two parts,—the beginnings of life, when we learn to live, and so must have more of knowledge than action,—and, the end, when we are about to die, when all action, however important, must come to an end; and corresponding to this the system of *Brahmā* was divided into two parts,—*Jainism* and *Buddhism*—the one emphasising the role of knowledge at the beginning, and the other at the end, of life.

SAIVISM AND VAISHNAVISM — Between these extremes lies the great work of life, which sustains and preserves the race, and demands the application of knowledge to action designed to that end. But here again we can have two points of view: we may believe that action is indeed necessary, but knowledge, coupled with renunciation, is still our final goal; or we may hold that knowledge and action are but two aspects of the same thing,—life; and that there is an essential harmony between the two, and that life goes on for ever; and corresponding to this we have the two systems of religion associated with the names of *Siva* and *Vishṇu*. The latter believes that not only is life not evil or characterised by constant sorrow and pain, but that it is based essentially on the principle of goodness, intelligence and joy; and so God himself is born from age to age in the world. It is this that gives us the idea of the "incarnations" of *Vishṇu*; and the systems of *Siva* and *Vishṇu* constitute the bulk of what is known by the name of Hinduism. They embrace the whole range of human life from the time a child grows into a boy

and is able to think for himself and act; and so we go on through experience of family-life to a bond with the whole race and the world, and to the attainment of perfection through harmony of knowledge and action, when we realise that happiness or freedom from sorrow consists not in running away from life, but in its fulfilment, and the attainment of a state of equilibrium in the midst of all that may happen in the world. And so, if a person live in this manner,— all his life becomes a sacrifice,—full of goodness, intelligence, and joy,—and death may come when it will, and he is not disturbed.

JAINISM, SAIVISM, AND VAISHNAVISM — We have observed that *Jainism* corresponds to the beginnings of human life, when there is an emphasis on knowledge more than on action; while *Saivism* and *Vaishnavism* refer to the rest, with a new conception of what belongs to active life and to its end; and, as this covers the entire range of human existence, these three systems still survive in India.

BUDDHISM — The system of *Buddha*, which too had its origin in this country, has, however, disappeared; and that, in spite of the fact that *Buddha* is said to be an *avatār* or "incarnation" of *Vishṇu*. In this connection we have observed that *Buddhism*, as a system of religion or a scheme of life, corresponds to the end of a man's existence on earth, when all action must come to an end; and so it may be said to be a perfect plan of life in the path of death. But this is included also in the system of *Siva*, according to which knowledge, together with renunciation of action, is said to be the ultimate goal of life; and so all that is of real value in *Buddhism* is included in the system of *Siva*, and the existence of the two side by side can only cause confusion. Indeed, the

existence of *Buddhism* as a separate system of religion would imply that it is in harmony with the main course of human life, whereas its principles apply largely to its end in death, when a man has completed his tasks and fulfilled his mission in life;[1] and an active practice of its philosophy of negation of action, by men in their youth and nations in their prime, can only lead to decadence; and this would appear to be the reason why it was "driven out" of India as a separate system, and the best in it included in *Saivism*.[2]

SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION — We have observed that these systems of religion are founded on the different systems of philosophy; and it is now possible to bring out their connection more clearly.

As we have seen, the *Sāṅkhya* has no place for God in its scheme of life; and it comes to the conclusion that the highest end can be attained only by means of knowledge and a total renunciation of action. Corresponding to this we have the first form of the system of *Brahmā* or the *Digambara* school of *Jainism*, which holds identical views.

Nyāya tells us that God does not grant the fruit or result

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[1] The founder of *Buddhism* is called *Siddhārtha* (*Siddha-artha*), which means "he all whose objects have been attained"; and so it is only when a person has fulfilled his mission in life and attained to all he seeks, that he can awaken into the final truth (or become a *Buddha*,—for that is the meaning of the word), that all action must ultimately be renounced. This is also the point of view of *Saivism* or *Yoga*, but not of *Vaishnavism* or *Vedānta*; for according to the latter, there is no end to life or action, and God himself is born from age to age.

[2] The essential idea of the different systems of religion and their relation to the corresponding systems of philosophy has been dealt with elsewhere (MM. II); and it would be examined again in connection with the "story" of the *avatāras* or "incarnations" of *Vishṇu*. We shall then understand why *Buddha*, though an "incarnation" of the Deity, is said to have been silent when questioned about the existence of God.

of action, which accrues largely through our own effort. This may be taken to imply that God exists, but only as a spectator of the work of Nature or *Prakṛti*, which alone creates; or, if He may be regarded as a creator in any sense of the term,—His creation is limited to the first act, after which all things work out in accordance with a universal law, without any direction or interference on His part. *Nyāya* accordingly believes in a limited scope of action, emphasises the role of knowledge, and explains the different means of acquiring it. As this attitude to life belongs to the stage of its beginning or the end,when we do not know how to act, or, being at the point of death, cannot do so,—corresponding to this we have the *Svetāmbara* school of *Jainism* and the *Hīnayāna* school of *Buddhism* respectively; and the latter also corresponds to the first form of the school of *Saivism*.

After this we have the *Vaiśeshika*, which refers not to God, but to an Unseen or Unknown Power, which has its own share in creation and shaping results; but we are not told exactly what it is. We are accordingly free to conclude that, if this Unknown Power may be identified with God, He would be deemed to act in conjunction with Nature or *Prakṛti*, and His share may be less than, equal to, or greater than that of the latter; and corresponding to this we have the whole range of the system of *Siva*, which would also include the *Mahāyāna* school of *Buddhism*, and the first or dualistic form of the system of *Vishṇu*.

The *Vaiśeshika* is followed by the *Mīmānsā*, which, like the former, contains no reference to God, but tells us instead of a large number of gods, who represent the great forms and forces of Nature. We may, therefore, assume that its idea of God would be similar to that of the *Vaiśeshika*, though wider in range. We have also explained that the *Mīmānsā* is but a first step to the philosophy of *Vedānta*; and so, in so

far as the systems of religion are concerned, has little contribution of its own to make. This is due primarily to the fact that it is based on the character of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor; for, if we regard the soul itself to be an actor, as a number of systems,—and more specially *Vedānta*—believe, there can be no separate place for *ahaṅkāra* as an actor; and, as the great systems of religion regard the soul as such, there is no separate place for the *Mīmānsā* in their construction.

Yoga, as we have seen, assigns a special place to God for the attainment of perfection. We have also explained that there is another aspect of *Yoga*, where it is, for practical purposes, identified with *Vedānta*; and that is the point of view of the *Bhagavad Gītā* which, while giving a separate place to *Prakṛti*, tells us that the real creator is only *Kṛshṇa* or God. There are thus two ways of looking at *Yoga*, so far as the relation of *Purusha* and *Prakṛti* or God and Nature is concerned: God is the chief creator of the universe, and so far as *Prakṛti* is concerned, it is either a spectator of His work, or is at best but a small co-sharer with Him. *Yoga* may, accordingly, be said to be the opposite of *Nyāya*; and, corresponding to its two aspects, we have the highest point of the system of *Siva* or *Mahādeva*, and the qualified monistic school of the system of *Vishṇu*. *Vedānta*, the culmination of all ancient thought, tells us that God is the *sole* supreme creator of the universe, and Nature itself is but His form. It is thus the exact opposite of the *Sāṅkhya*; and corresponding to it we have the pure monistic school of the system of *Vishṇu*.

INTEGRATION OF ANCIENT THOUGHT—We thus see that the nine points of view of the three groups of ideas, which give us the three great systems of religion,—of *Brahmā*,

Siva, and *Vishṇu*—with three forms of each—are all distributed among the five systems of philosophy; for the sixth, the *Mīmānsā*, as we have explained, has no place in the construction of the systems of religion. Of these the *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta*, at the two extreme ends of thought, have but a single point of view,—the one holding that it is *Prakṛti*, and the other that it is *Brahma*, who is the supreme creator of life. The *Sāṅkhya*, indeed, gives a separate place to the soul, but does not explain its origin.

Similarly, *Nyāya* and *Yoga* have two points of view each, and are opposed to each other. The one holds that the chief creator is *Prakṛti*; and God, if He exists, is either a spectator of its work, or has, at best, but a small share in it. *Yoga*, on the other hand, maintains that the chief creator is God, and *Prakṛti* is either a spectator of His work, or has, at best, but a small share in it.

Between these two groups of opposites lies the *Vaiśeshika*, which serves as a connecting link between them. It is based on the character of the mind, which, as we have explained, is characterised by electric energy and has its positive and negative charges. As these may be said to correspond to the idea of *Purusha* and *Prakṛti*, the *Vaiśeshika* may be said to be based on the idea that God and Nature are joint creators of life, but we cannot say who is the greater of the two. We may, therefore, consider their relation from three points of view,—the share of God being more than that of Nature, or the share of Nature being more than that of God, or the two being equal. These are the three aspects of the *Vaiśeshika*, corresponding to the three forms of electric energy that we know,—one static, and two dynamic—with their direct and alternating currents of electricity.

SPECIAL CHARACTER OF THE VAISESHIKA—The *Vaiśeshika*

accordingly serves as a connecting link between the great systems of religion. We find that the two great systems of *Brahmā* and *Vishṇu* exclude each other,—the one holding that *Prakṛti*, and the other that *Purusha*, is the sole, chief, or major creator of life; and there is no point of contact between them. Between them lies the system of *Śiva* or *Mahādeva*, which maintains that *Purusha* and *Prakṛti* are joint and equal or almost equal creators of the universe; and this is the point of view of the *Vaiśeshika* too; and it is this that gives it its special position,—signified by its own name—in the ancient scheme of thought.

SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION—We can now correlate the main ideas of the great systems of religion with those of the corresponding systems of philosophy.

There are three aspects of the system of *Brahmā*, based on the character of Nature as the supreme, chief, or major creator of things; and these correspond to the basic conception of the *Sāṅkhya*, the first aspect of *Nyāya*, and the first aspect of the *Vaiśeshika* respectively,—the first aspect of *Nyāya* being that God is but a spectator of the work of *Prakṛti*, and that of the *Vaiśeshika* that He creates, but has a smaller role to play.

Similarly, there are three aspects of the system of *Mahādeva*, based on the idea of God and Nature being joint creators of life,—and the share of the God may be more than that of Nature, or the two may be equal, or the share of Nature may be more than that of God; and these correspond to the second point of view of *Nyāya*, the second point of view of the *Vaiśeshika*, and the first point of view of *Yoga*.

In the same manner there are three aspects of the system of *Vishṇu*,—the opposite of the system of *Brahmā*—based on the idea of God as the supreme, chief, or major creator of the universe,—the monistic, qualified monistic, and dualistic

schools of this system; and corresponding to these we have the basic conception of *Vedānta*, the second point of view of *Yoga*, and the third point of view of the *Vaiśeshika*.

Thus we see how the points of view of the *Vaiśeshika* extend to *Nyāya* on the one hand and to *Yoga* on the other, and connect together the two opposing groups of ideas and their corresponding systems of religion,—those of *Brahmā* and *Vishṇu*. The position of the system of *Mahādeva* is identical, for it is based essentially on the idea of *Purusha* and *Prakṛti* as joint creators of life, and that is also the basic conception of the *Vaiśeshika* in its relation to the character of the mind.

ASCENDING SCALE OF THOUGHT—This enables us to understand how all the great systems of philosophy and religion are connected together and are but parts of one great whole. We have already explained how that is true of the systems of philosophy; and it is not difficult to see that there is the same attempt at integration in the systems of religion too.

We have seen how we can rise from the *Sāṅkhya* to *Vedānta* by means of a gradual process of thought and the idea of sacrifice, or action characterised by goodness, intelligence and and joy, and meant for the benefit of all. But, even as we find in the concluding portions of *Vedānta*,—we can conceive of the soul and its problem of freedom only in the light of our intellect; and, as it is *Yoga* that is based on the character of the intellect, *Vedānta* and *Yoga*, conceived in this special light,—may, like the soul and the intellect, be, for practical purposes, identified. We find that the same line of thought applies to the systems of religion too.

We have to begin with the system of *Brahmā*, extending from the *Sāṅkhya* to *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeshika*. We begin with the *Sāṅkhya*, and find that its theory of a total renuncia-

tion of action is an impossible one, for it means that we cannot live; and so we pass on to the next system, *Nyāya*. But even that does not satisfy us,—for it lays special stress on the necessity of controlling all desires, and permits us only just to exist. We, on the other hand, wish not only to exist, but also to propagate the species; and so we pass on to the next system, the *Vaiśeshika*; and this concludes the range of this system of religion. It is in this manner that we pass from the *Sāṅkhya* to *Nyāya* and thence to the *Vaiśeshika*, and rise correspondingly to their respective ideas of God,—as one who has no place in the scheme of existence, as one who is a mere spectator of life, and as one who has a minor part in the creation of things.

But when we reach the topmost point in the system of *Brahmā*, we find that we are at the bottom of the system of *Mahādeva*, with its range extending from *Nyāya* to *Vaiśeshika* and thence to *Yoga*. We begin with the idea that God has but a small part to play in the world; and, as the idea of God is co-extensive with that of sacrifice,—it means that there is but a small measure of goodness, intelligence and joy in life. But this does not satisfy us, and so we pass on to the next system, *Vaiśeshika*, which tells us that the share of God and Nature can be equal too; that is to say, there is an equal measure of good and evil, or joy and sorrow in the world. But even this does not satisfy us, and so we pass on to the next system, *Yoga*, which tells us that the share of God is more than that of Nature, or that there is more of goodness and joy than evil and sorrow in life; and this completes the whole range of this system of religion.

When again we reach the topmost point in the system of *Mahādeva*, we find that we are at the bottom of the system of *Vishṇu*, with its range extending from the *Vaiśeshika* to *Yoga* and *Vedānta*. We begin with the idea that there is

more of goodness and joy than evil and sorrow in life,—for that is the point of view of the *Vaiśeshika* in this system. But we find, on further reflection, that it gives us more satisfaction to believe that good and evil, joy and sorrow are relative terms, and evil itself can be changed to good, and sorrow to joy; and so we pass on to the next system, *Yoga*. After this the next stage in our evolution is that there is nothing but goodness, intelligence and joy in the world, —and that is the real meaning of God as the sole supreme creator of the universe in *Vedānta*. And so we rise to the topmost point of human thought in *Vedānta* in the system of *Vishṇu*. But we find that it is difficult to understand the idea of universal goodness, intelligence and joy in life; and so are content to drop down to the earlier point of view of *Yoga*,—namely, that good and evil, joy and sorrow are relative terms, and that evil can be changed to good, and sorrow to joy.

Thus we see that, as intellect and soul and *Yoga* and *Vedānta* may, for practical purposes, be identified, the pure monistic conception of the system of *Vishṇu* may, in the same manner, be identified with its qualified monistic view; and this is as far as it is possible for the human mind to go.

DESCENDING SCALE OF THOUGHT — This is how man can rise from the lowest to the highest conception of life in the ascending scale of thought; and when he does so, he may be said to have attained to perfection. This is what is possible for him to achieve in life; but there is also the fact of death, for there is no one who can live for ever. And so, after achieving the height of perfection in the world of life, man must also prepare for death; and so he comes down from his *Yoga* conception of life to that of the *Vaiśeshika*, and then to *Nyāya*,—believes that it is *Prakṛti* that rules

below, and, leaving his body behind to be reduced to its elemental form, lets his soul depart, to live in some unknown world, till its time comes again to renew its course of existence on earth.

The *Sāṅkhya*, as we have seen, is based on its own conception of Nature; and the real quest of man, having a bearing on the actual facts of his life, begins with *Nyāya*; but, having attained to perfection through *Yoga* or *Vedānta*, he comes down to *Nyāya* again. He begins with an attempt to control the activities of his senses; and, having completed the whole cycle of human thought and experience, finds that he is unable to use them,—and so ends where he begins. This is the story of human life on earth; but there are other worlds too, and they have also their own stories to tell.

ORIGINAL AND EXISTING IDEAS — This, in brief, is the main idea of the great systems of Hindu religion, as they are to be found in the sacred books, and they have the same relation to one another as the corresponding systems of philosophy. Their modern forms and practices, however, appear to be very different; but it is not difficult to understand how their original idea, along with that of the corresponding systems of philosophy, has been lost through the passage of Time. But the sacred books still remain; and their text, when properly interpreted, tells us what their ancient conception really was. Indeed, even in the midst of this great wreckage of Time, it is still possible,—through the many forms, observances, laws, customs, and traditions that yet survive, —to discover traces of their original idea, and re-construct the ancient fabric again. But this demands a separate treatment, and is outside the scope of the present work.[1]

[1] A fuller examination of the systems of Hindu Philosophy and Religion is contained in the Author's work, *The Mystery of the Mahābhārata*, Vol. II.

XIII

THE ESSENTIAL IDEA OF THE SACRED BOOKS

THE SACRED BOOKS—We are now in a position to understand the essential idea of the sacred books of the Hindus.

THE VEDAS—The Vedas, as the *Mīmānsā* has told us, deal with the laws of Nature and the problem of action, with special reference to the life of man; and we can understand them in this light if we interpret them in accordance with the method it has explained. The *Mīmānsā* mentions three Vedas,—*Rik*, *Sāma* and *Yajur*; and refers to a fourth, *Nigada*, but observes that it should be included in the *Yajur*. The real fourth Veda, which would appear to be of later origin, is *Atharva*; and it too should belong to the same class as the previous three.

MANTRAS AND BRAHMANAS—The Vedas consist of two principal parts,—*Mantras*, believed to be hymns of praise addressed to the gods, and *Brāhmaṇas*, consisting of *Vidhi* and *Artha-vāda*,—believed to be directions in regard to the ceremonies at which the *Mantras* are to be recited, and explanation of legends etc. connected with the *Mantras*. But the *Mīmānsā* tells us that, if we interpret the *Mantras* properly, we shall find that they deal with the laws of Nature and the problem of action, while the gods will be transformed into personifications of the great forms and forces of Nature. Similarly, as the word *Vidhi* also means a law, the *Brāhmaṇas* deal really with the same laws of Nature, and *Artha-vāda* is but an explanation of these laws, even as the word literally signifies. But they too would need to be interpreted in accordance with the method explained in the *Mīmānsā*, to be understood in this light.

RIG VEDA—The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the *Rig-Veda* deals with the problem of action, conceived in its widest significance, —that is, with reference to all that the ancients knew of the world of Nature, including man.

SAMA VEDA—The *Sāma-Veda*, we are told, deals with the problem of all living creatures; and so a considerable portion of the text of the *Rig-Veda* is repeated in the *Sāma-Veda*.

YAJUR-VEDA—The *Yajur-Veda*, even as is signified by the name, would accordingly deal with the law of sacrifice or good, intelligent and joyous action, with reference to both Nature and man.

ATHARVA VEDA — The *Atharva-Veda* is said to have been composed by *Atharvan*, and is believed to consist chiefly of spells, incantations and formulas intended to prevent or cast out disease and counteract calamities. *Atharvan*, however, is said to be a priest who is associated with *Agni* and *Soma*; and we have seen that the one refers to the intellect, and the other to the mind. Hence, as the Veda is called after his name, it means that it deals with the problem of intellect and the mind,—with special reference to the life of man; and if we understand their laws, we can avoid evil and disease. We can, however, understand all this only in accordance with the method of interpretation explained in the *Mīmānsā*.

THE UPANISHADS — It is said that out of the *Brāhmaṇa* part of the Vedas arose the *Upanishads* and the *Sūtras*; and the *Upanishads* are said to describe the secret doctrine of the Vedas. As we can now understand the "secret" form of the Vedic text, and know that they deal with the laws of life, we can understand that the *Upanishads* are really an exposition

of the secret doctrine of the Vedas, for a great body of their text is composed in a form which is easy to understand, and it is not necessary to divide words into parts to get their meaning. But a considerable portion of even their text is symbolic and written in the form of stories, which need to be understood in the manner explained in the *Mīmānsā*.

THE SUTRAS — The *Sūtras* are said to be short, pithy sentences, or aphoristic rules, believed to hang loosely together like threads; and the *Vedāṅgas* and the sytems of philosophy are composed in this form. These *Sūtras* have commonly been regarded as unintelligible in themselves, and our present-day knowledge of what they contain is based on certain commentaries of learned men, which are taken to be authoritative. But we have seen that the *Sūtras* of the six systems of philosophy are not only not unintelligible, but describe the different problems of life in a brief, direct, connected, and coherent manner. If the *Sūtras* of the *Vedāṅgas* are of the same kind,—and they appear to be so indeed—they too should yield similar results.

SRUTI AND SMRITI—The Vedas and Vedic literature are called *śruti*, which means literally "what is heard"; and they are believed to contain sacred knowledge orally transmitted from generation to generation. This is followed by what is called *smṛti*, meaning "memory"; for it is believed to have been remembered by heart; and, in its widest application, it includes the *Sūtras*, the law-books of *Manu*, the Epics of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, and the *Purāṇas*. But the terms *śruti* and *smṛti* can also refer to what is objective and subjective respectively,—for what is heard is largely objective; while memory, being a special characteristic of

THE FATHER OF KUNTI—But the idea of *Kuntī* as our planet Earth cannot stand alone. If it is a proper clue to the understanding of the real idea of the story, it must be supported by all the other statements regarding her. If she is the "daughter" of *Sūra* of the *Yadu* race, and the "sister" of *Vasudeva*, the "father" of *Kṛshṇa*,—and if she also represents the Earth,—the latter cannot be men, as we believe, but only symbols of great forms of life, like her.

We have observed that the relationship of father and son may be made to represent the connection between origin and end, or cause and effect; and similarly, brother and sister may represent ideas or objects arising from a common cause or source.

YADU—We have to begin with *Yadu*, for the "father" of *Kuntī* is said to belong to this "race".

As we are unable to understand what exactly it signifies, we may divide the word into parts; and, if we do so, we find that the meaning it conveys is that "the exercise of our intelligence makes for a proper function of the senses of knowledge".[1]

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then be "(*Kum*, a form of *Ku*) the Earth, (*ti*, an older form of *iti*) that is to say". We have *Kunti* or "that is to say, the Earth."

The idea of *Kuntī* as Earth with reference to the senses and the mind, can be extended further still. We have observed that, according to the ancients, the energy of the mind was electric, and that of the senses magnetic,—the senses of knowledge referring to the one, and the senses of action to the other, magnetic pole. The energy of the mind and senses functioning together may, accordingly, be said to be electro-magnetic; and so the word *Kuntī* would signify that the ancients believed that there is a permanent electro-magnetic current of energy flowing through the Earth.

The idea of *Kunti* as Earth, and all that is connected with her, has already been explained (MM. IV-V).

[1] The word *Yadu* may be divided into *ya*, *d*, *u*, when its meaning would be "(*ya*) intellect associated with (*d*) sacrifice connected with (*u*) the

SURA—This idea, however, appears to be incomplete, for a proper exercise of our intelligence makes for a proper function of the senses of action too; and so we are told of *Sūra* as "a chief of the *Yadus*", who refers to the association of the intellect with the senses of action, or action.[1]

THE DESCENDANTS OF SURA—Now we have seen that, if we understand the idea of intelligence in its completeness, as making for both knowledge and action, we can, by a gradual evolution of thought and by associating the idea of "sacrifice" with Nature, eliminate the difference between it and God, and so understand the most perfect idea of the Deity that is possible for man to know. As these ideas

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senses of knowledge". It means that if we exercise our intellect, we understand the nature of the sacrifice of the senses of knowledge; and, as "sacrifice" means good, intelligent and joyous action, the idea is that the exercise of our intelligence enables us to understand all this with reference to our senses of knowledge. As there is no reference to the senses of action in the word, the idea is that the highest conception of life, in the light of our intellect, is that it is knowledge that makes for joy in the end.

As a proper understanding of the function of the intellect leads to the idea of action too, the latter is expressed in the idea of *Sūra*, who is said to belong to this race (or the body of those who hold this view).

[1] The word *śūra* may be divided into *ś,ū,ra*, and its meaning would be "(*ś*) the intellect (*ū*) woven with (*ra*) the senses of action."

It accordingly means that the intellect is associated with the function of the senses of action.

The word *yadu* limits the intellect to the senses of knowledge, or to knowledge only; and it is necessary to conceive of it separately, because there are some who believe that, if we look at life in an intelligent manner, we can come to the conclusion that its end is knowledge and not action.

But this idea is really incomplete, for we cannot separate knowledge from action; and the acquisition or attainment of knowledge itself is a form of action, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us. Hence the idea of *yadu* is followed by that of *śūra*, who refers to the intimate connection of intelligence (or an intelligent way of looking at things) with action.

are derived from the original conception of *Yadu* and *śūra*, they may be said to be the "descendants" of the latter.

VASUDEVA AND KUNTI—When we examine the problem of knowledge and action in the light of our intelligence, our attention is directed to Nature and all that is in it; and we find that it consists of a number of great and good objects; and one of them is our planet Earth. The idea of the great and good objects of Nature is expressed by *Vasudeva*,[1] and of the Earth by *Kuntī*;[2] and, as they are both derived from the same source, they are spoken of as brother and sister.

KRISHNA—*Vasudeva* is said to be the "father" of *Kṛshṇa*; and that would require some explanation too.

We are engaged in an examination of what Nature can create; and the sacred books tell us that it consists of eight divisions,—the five great "elements" (Earth, Water, Fire,

[1] The word *Vasudeva* may be divided into *Va, su, deva,* when its meaning would be "*(deva)* god or a great good object or force of Nature, *(su)* born of *(va,* 'water', symbolic of Nature, as the *Mīmāṅsā* tells us) Nature".

Vasudeva accordingly refers to all that arises from Nature in terms of a god or the great good objects or forces of life. We have already seen that a god refers to these objects and forces.

Vasudeva in the story is said to have been married to *Devakī*, and they had eight children, the last of whom was *Kṛshṇa*.

We have observed that "marriage" implies an intimate union or relationship; and so we might say that the idea expressed by *Vasudeva* is now closely united with that expressed by *Devakī*; and the union of the two gives rise to eight objects.

Now *Devakī*, as a woman, refers to Nature; and if we divide the word into *Deva,kī*, the meaning would be "*(kī)* what is *(deva)* a god or a great good force or object of Nature?" Her union with *Vasudeva* signifies an intense desire to know what things arise from Nature; and they are its eight divisions, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us (VII, 4). Hence *Vasudeva* and *Devakī* have eight "children".

[2] The idea of *Kuntī* as Earth has already been explained.

Air, and Ether), Mind, *Ahaṅkāra*, and the Intellect.[1] As the idea of the latter is derived from the former, it may be said to be "descended" from it; and, as the former is *Vasudeva* (associated with *Devakī*), he should have eight children; and the last of them, *Kṛshṇa* should refer to the intellect. We find, on an examination of his name and what is associated with him, that it is so.[2]

THE FAMILY OF KUNTI—The whole idea may now be summed up as follows: There are a number of persons who believe that the exercise of intellect means the attainment of knowledge; and so the pursuit of pure knowl-

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[1] We have a reference to this in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (VII, 4).

[2] We can divide the word *Kṛshna* into *K*, *ṛ*, *sh*, *ṇa*, when its meaning would be "(*na*) intellect associated with (*sh*) mind, (*ṛ*) the senses of action, and (*k*) Nature or *Prakṛti*."

Kṛshṇa accordingly refers to intelligence in its most perfect conception, as associated with the mind, action (or the senses of action) and the objects of Nature. That is to say, when we look at Nature, and see how it is associated with our intellect, mind, and the senses, and makes for action,—we can get a complete idea of life; and if then we associate all this with the idea of "sacrifice" or goodness, intelligence, and joy in action, we can transform Nature itself into *Brahma* or God.

It is this that *Kṛshṇa* represents; and the idea of sacrifice is expressed by means of his *Sudarśana Chakra*, which really means "(*Sudarśana*) good or beautiful (*chakra*, derived from '*kṛ*', meaning 'to act') action." This *Chakra* or action can never leave him, for he is always characterised by sacrifice.

The idea of *Kṛshṇa*, as given in the *Mahābhārata*, has already been explained; and that, as given in the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*, would be explained in due course. As we shall see, he represents the idea of God as Supreme Intelligence, immanent in the universe, and making itself manifest in acts of sacrifice. We might say that he represents the idea of God as it can be transformed out of that of Nature by means of the latter's association with sacrifice. It is for this reason that he is represented as being of dark colour, for that is said to be the colour of Nature or *Prakṛti*, as distinguished from that of God, which is said to be white. *Kṛshṇa* is thus Nature transformed into God by means of sacrifice.

edge, to the exclusion of everything else, is in accordance with an intelligent scheme of life (race of *Yadus*). But, if we pursue the idea to its logical end, we find that the intellect makes for action too; and so an intelligent scheme of life requires that knowledge should result in action (*śūra*).

The idea of intelligent action takes us to the source of all action,—Nature or *Prakṛti*; and, if we understand the character of its different manifestations, we see that what arises from it is a number of great forms and forces of life, which are essentially good and governed by an intelligent plan (*Vasudeva*), and among them is our planet Earth (*Kuntī*). If now we wish to know what are the great objects of life that arise from Nature or *Prakṛti* (*Vasudeva and Devakī*), we find that they consist of eight things (eight children of *Vasudeva and Devakī*),—the five great "elements" and all that belongs to them, Mind, *Ahaṅkāra* and Intellect. The idea of intellect is most important, for it is in its light that we can understand all things, including soul and God; and intellect and soul, and Supreme Intelligence and God may, for practical purposes, even be identified. Indeed, it is by means of intellect that we can, by associating the idea of sacrifice with Nature, transform it into God (*Kṛshṇa*).

It follows from this that, if we understand the essential character of our planet Earth, we shall find that it is connected with the idea of God (*Kuntī* as the paternal aunt of *Kṛshṇa*). And corresponding to this we are told that it is in this family that *Kuntī* or *Pṛthā* is born.

KUNTIBHOJA—But this is not a generally accepted view of Earth, for the people do not commonly believe that it belongs to the great family of God, and that we can understand the nature of His existence through it. They are rather content to think that it is a bountiful bestower of good things.

But even this is allied to the process that leads to the idea of God, which is essentially based on the goodness of things that support life,—though it does not by itself make for a proper conception of God.

Corresponding to this we are told that there was a childless cousin of *Sūra* named *Kuntibhoja*,[1] and *Pṛthā* was given to him to be brought up as his own daughter.

THE BRAHMANA'S BOON—We have to begin with the position that the Earth is a bountiful bestower of good things, without any direct reference to the idea of God (*Kuntī* is brought up by *Kuntibhoja*); and now we have to see what are those good things that it can bestow.

When we examine the character of Earth, we find that it is not possible for it to create anything by itself. But our intellect tells us that there are a number of great forces of Nature, and the Earth can create a number of things with their assistance.

This is the *Mantra* of the *Brāhmaṇa*, according to which *Kuntī* could call up any celestial to have children by,—for a *Brāhmaṇa*, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, refers to the intellect, and a god or a celestial to a great form or force of Nature.

KUNTI AND THE SUN—If we make an intelligent use of our means of acquiring knowledge, we find that the creative

[1] The word *Kunti-bhoja* means "*(Kunti)* the Earth as *(bhoja)* bountiful". *Kuntibhoja* may accordingly be said to be one who believes that the Earth is bountiful, or is a bestower of good things.

He is said to be childless, because this conception of the Earth does not, by itself, produce any important result.

He is the cousin of *Sūra* because even the idea of Earth as bountiful partakes of some intelligence. We have already explained that *śūra* refers to intelligence which is associated with action.

power of the Earth is quickened by means of that of the Sun; and so the Sun may be said to be the great source of what the Earth creates.

Corresponding to this we are told that *Kuntī* made use of the *Brāhmaṇa's Mantra*[1] and invoked the Sun.[2]

THE BIRTH OF KARṆA—What is it that the Earth creates in association with the energy of the Sun? We find that the first form of creation on our planet Earth is the Vegetable Kingdom, the essence of which is seed or grain; and the ancients believed that all kinds of seed or grain arise in the bosom of the Earth as a result of the action of the rays of the Sun.[3]

Corresponding to this we are told that out of the union of *Kuntī* with the Sun was born a hero, called *Karṇa*; and he expresses the idea of seed or grain.[4]

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[1] A *Mantra* means literally "an instrument of thought"; and so a *Brāhmaṇa's Mantra* would mean "an instrument of thought based on an exercise of the intellect", for a *Brāhmaṇa* signifies intellect, as we have seen. Hence it may be interpreted as "an intelligent use of the means of thought or of acquiring knowledge".

[2] Modern science tells us that the Earth derives a great deal of its energy from the Sun.

[3] The Vegetable Kingdom is created on our planet Earth before the Animal Kingdom,—for it constitutes the food of the latter, which could not exist without it. All creatures live by food, which consists ultimately of the Vegetable Kingdom, for even the carnivorous live on the herbivorous. The *Upanishads* also tell us that the great Creator created first of all food, and then the eater of that food (SBE. I, 240; XV, 28).

The story of the birth of *Karṇa* shows that the ancients believed that seed or grain is created in the Earth by means of the action of the rays of the Sun. It may be of interest to point out that plants cannot grow properly, or at least yield fruit, without the action of sunlight.

[4] The word *Karṇa* has a number of meanings in the dictionary, one of which is "grain furnished with chaff",—that is, grain fit for food as well as cultivation; and this is the appropriate meaning of the word through-

NATURAL ARMOUR AND EAR-RINGS OF KARNA—If we examine the form of seed or grain (or fruit), we find that it is encased in a comparatively hard outer skin or rind. Similarly, there is bark on a tree; and they serve to protect the grain or plant.

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out the *Mahābhārata*. The [illegible] tells us that it is not always necessary to divide words into parts to understand their meaning, and the dictionary meaning of a word may be quite suitable. It may also happen that the dictionary meaning of a word as well as that obtained by means of its division into parts, is the same. The word *Karṇa* belongs to this class; but, as its ordinary meaning is satisfactory, it is not necessary to divide it into parts here.

As *Karṇa* represents seed or grain, the story of the growth of the latter and the uses to which it may be put has been described in the Epic in terms of the growth of the hero and the use of his arms.

His "half-brothers", the *Pāṇḍava* brothers, and the remaining "sons" of *Kunti*, represent the Animal Kingdom, the highest form of which is Man; and the five "brothers" represent the five parts of a man,—his intellect, mind, breath or *prāna* as the vehicle of the soul, and arms and legs respectively. As the formation of arms and legs is different from that of the rest of the body, the last two "brothers", *Nakula* and *Sahadeva*, are said to have a different "mother", though they too are created at the instance of *Kuntī*; and, as arms and legs have a similar form, they are said to be "twins". As the five "brothers" represent Man or the eater of food, and *Karṇa* is food or grain,—and there is an apparent "hostility" between food and the eater of food,—*Karṇa* and his "half-brothers" are "enemies". *Arjuna* is the arch-enemy of *Karṇa* for he represents breath that swallows food; and the "combat" between the two is the process by means of which the eater of food eats food. The whole story of the Epic is like that.

As *Karṇa* represents food, the basis of all physical creative energy associated with Nature or *Prakṛti* in the *Sāṅkhya*,—he also represents that system in the Epic. Man, on the other hand, rises from *Sāṅkhya* to *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeshika*, and thence to *Yoga* and *Vedānta*. His opponents, the *Kauravas*, believe in *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeshika*; and so the "battle of *Kurukshetra*" is a contest between *Sāṅkhya*, *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeshika* on the one hand, and *Yoga* and *Vedānta* on the other,—the former represented by the *Kauravas* and their allies, and the latter by the *Pāṇḍavas* and their associates. It is in this manner that we have a conflict of systems of thought in the Epic. All this has already been explained.

We also see that seed, grain, or fruit grows on the branch of a tree, and makes it look beautiful.

Corresponding to this *Karṇa* is said to have been born with a natural armour and ear-rings.[1]

KUNTI THROWS KARNA INTO WATER—Seed or grain has an element of moisture in it, and it cannot grow without it. That is so in accordance with a law of Nature.

Corresponding to this we are told that *Kuntī* threw her son into water as soon as he was born.[2]

KUNTI REGAINS HER VIRGINITY—The essence of seed and the Earth is the same, and the two may even be identified.[3] The

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[1] The word for *armour* in the text is *kavacha*, which also means "bark or rind", which is a natural "armour" for all trees or seeds.

The word for an *ear-ring* in the text is *kuṇḍala*, which may be divided into two parts, *kuṇ*, *ḍala*. But, according to the practice of grammarians in framing compounds, *kun* can be a substitutute for *kuṇa*, and *ḍala* for *ḍāla*; and so the meaning would now be "(*ḍāla*) a branch (*kuṇa*) bearing fruit." The idea of "ear-rings" would thus be that of grain or seed on a branch which bears fruit. The point of this is that seed grows into seed again.

[2] The real idea of this action of *Kuntī* would appear to be that there is an element of moisture in grain, and it makes its appearance as soon as it is formed by the action of the rays of the Sun on the Earth. This may be said to correspond to the existence of the nucleus of the cell, which is said to be a fluid substance.

The seed may thus be said to be composed of three "elements",—Earth, Water, and Fire,—the last corresponding to the heat or rays of the Sun. Or we might say that it partakes of the three attributes of these "elements",—and has a colour or form, the property of Fire; taste, the property of Water; and smell, the property of Earth.

There is a reference to these three "elements" in the systems of philosophy. (Cf. MM. I, 137).

[3] Earth and food, the basis of which is seed or grain, are identified in the *Upanishads* (SBE. I, 96-97).

birth of seed or grain does not, accordingly, affect the structure of the Earth or its fecundity. It does indeed absorb the rays of the Sun, as a result of which grain or seed is born; but it can reflect back or radiate them again, and regain its original state.[1]

Corresponding to this we are told that the Sun restored her virginity to *Kuntī*, and went away.

KARNA IS BROUGHT UP BY ADHIRATHA AND RADHA—It is food that supports the body, and makes all creatures live. Indeed, we might say that a person seeks to preserve grain because he is anxious for the preservation of his body; and this "anxiety for the body" is *Adhiratha*,[2] who is said to have picked up *Karṇa*, and brought him home to his "wife".

We have "anxiety for the body" (*Adhiratha*), because we have a desire to live, and desire is a special attribute of the mind. This is *Rādhā*, the "wife" of *Adhiratha*. She refers to the mind and its attribute, desire,—the desire to live;[3] and she is the "wife" of *Adhiratha*, because this desire is intimately associated with "anxiety for the body".

[1] The story of the restoration of her virginity to *Kuntī* and the departure of the Sun implies that this is what the ancients believed,—namely, that the birth of seed in the Earth does not affect its structure, and that it can radiate the rays of the Sun it has absorbed, and regain its original state.

[2] The word *Adhiratha* may be divided into *Adhi-ratha*, when its meaning would be " (*adhi*) anxiety regarding (*ratha*, 'a chariot' which, as the *Mimānsā* tells us, is symbolic of the action of the body) action of the body". *Adhiratha* accordingly signifies "anxiety in regard to the action of the body", which depends for its existence on food. He personifies this idea, and so picks up *Karṇa* (grain), and brings him home.

[3] The word *Rādhā* has a number of meanings, one of which is "lightning", which is the same as electric energy, and is identified with the energy of the mind. The mind, as we have seen, has desire for its attribute; and desire is at the root of all action,—the most important of which

THE ARMS OF KARNA—Seed or grain has a number of uses, and can be very effective. Corresponding to this we are told that *Karṇa* became an expert in the use of arms.[1]

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is action for the preservation of the body. The idea of *Rādhā* is thus closely connected with that of *Adhiratha*: and so they are spoken of as "husband" and "wife".

There is a reference to *Rādhā* in connection with *Kṛshṇa* in the story of the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*; and there too her idea is the same. This will be explained in due course.

[1] The arm is an instrument of action; and "arms" or "weapons" used by it would accordingly refer to the manner in which instruments of action can be used. The "arms" or "weapons" of *Karṇa* would, accordingly, refer to the different ways in which grain can act,—that is, the manner in which it can grow, and the uses to which it can be put. These are indeed many and wonderful; and so *Karṇa* is said to be an expert in the use of arms.

The story in the Epic tells us that *Karṇa* showed his skill in the use of arms at the *Svayamvara* ceremony of *Draupadī*, when she selected her husband, and he was equal to *Arjuna*, the chief of the *Pāṇḍavas* in every way. But she rejected him because of his "birth", and selected *Arjuna* instead. She afterwards became the "wife" of all the five *Pāṇḍava* brothers.

We can understand the real idea of all this if we know what these characters signify. *Draupadī* is also called *Yajña-senī* or "mistress of sacrifice"; and so she represents the idea of sacrifice or good, intelligent and joyous action, as has already been explained.

The five *Pāṇḍava* brothers,—*Yudhishṭhira*, *Bhīma*, *Arjuna*, *Nakula* and *Sahadeva*—represent five parts of a man,—his intellect, mind, vital breath as the vehicle of the soul, and arms and legs respectively.

Karṇa is seed or grain, as has already been explained.

Karṇa is able to show the same skill as *Arjuna*, because there is little difference between the evolution and growth of the Vegetable and Animal Kingdoms, and their "kinship" in this respect is now universally recognised. *Karṇa* represents the Vegetable Kingdom, and *Arjuna*, as the soul of Man, the essence of the Animal Kingdom or Man. There is, however, one difference between them, while they are both alike so far as their natural actions are concerned: the Vegetable Kingdom is not capable of performing any deliberate action,—whereas Man is.

Draupadī represents sacrifice which, like Dharma,—as the *Mīmānsā* tells us—refers to deliberate and not natural action. Hence she cannot have *Karṇa* for her "husband" or one who can be intimately associated

KARNA WORSHIPS THE SUN—All seed or grain is ripened by the Sun, and the *Upanishads* say so too. Its energy may, therefore, be said to be due to the quiet manner in which it can submit to the action of the Sun. Corresponding to this *Karṇa* is said to worship the Sun.

KARNA SATISFIES THE BRAHMANAS—If we use our intelligence, we shall find that all our essential needs can be satisfied by the Vegetable Kingdom, when, under the action of the rays of the Sun, it becomes fully mature or ripe.[1]

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with the idea she represents. She selects *Arjuna*, because he represents the soul which, as all systems of philosophy, other than the *Sāṅkhya*, tell us, can engage in acts of sacrifice.

She becomes the "wife" of all the five *Pāṇḍava* brothers, because it is possible to conceive of all the five parts of a man,—his intellect, mind, soul having the vital breath for its vehicle, and arms and legs—as engaging in acts of sacrifice.

The story does indeed tell us later on that *Kṛshṇa* himself made an offer to *Karṇa*, whereby he could "share" *Draupadī* like the *Pāṇḍava* brothers, if he agreed to change sides and join them. This too is easily explained.

Karṇa represents food, and it is possible, as the *Upanishads* tell us, to conceive of food as a sacrifice offered to the soul; that is to say, it is good to eat food, and the soul partakes of it to be able to perform good and intelligent deeds. If we accept this idea, it follows that food can be intimately associated with the idea of sacrifice, and so *Karṇa* can "share" *Draupadī* in the same manner as the five parts of a man.

But *Karṇa* also represents the *Sāṇkhya* system, as we have pointed out; and this system maintains that the soul is really not an actor at all. Hence, it cannot engage in any act of sacrifice. Indeed, the goal of life is said to be the renunciation of all action. Hence *Karṇa* cannot associate himself with the idea of sacrifice (or *Draupadī*), and so rejects the offer of *Kṛshṇa*, as the story tells us.

[1] The essential needs of an intelligent man are his food, shelter, and clothing; and all of them can be supplied by the Vegetable Kingdom.

The action of the Sun on grain and its effect would appear to bear out the idea behind the modern theory of vitamins in different kinds of organic matter,—for they are all believed to be connected with the Sun.

Corresponding to this *Karṇa* is said to worship the Sun, and when his back was heated with its rays, there was nothing that he did not give to the *Brāhmaṇas*.

TWO MEANINGS—This is the story of *Kuntī and Karṇa*, as given in the Epic, and we can see how it can be transformed into an account of laws of Nature, which, in their turn, constitute the bases of the different systems of philosophy and religion. It will have been noticed that the method of interpretation follows strictly the rules laid down in the *Mīmānsā*; and the two meanings, which are entirely different from each other, are equally complete, and no important idea or expression has been left out. This, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, is necessary, if the new meaning is to substitute the old; and that is one of the excellences of the ancient art of composition. It is true of the Vedas, as the *Mīmānsā* says; it is true of the *Mahābhārata*, as has already been explained; and it is equally true of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*, as will be explained in due course. It would follow from this that it would be true of other sacred books as well.

It would perhaps be of interest to place the two versions of the story of *Kuntī and Karṇa* side by side.

STORY	EXPLANATION
There was a chief among the *Yadus*, named *Sūra*.	If we exercise our intelligence, we find that it leads to the idea of knowledge as an attribute of the intellect (*Yadu*). But if we make a further use of our intelligence, we find that the intellect is associated with action too (*śūra*). This leads us to the conclusion that the end of life is not only knowledge, but action too.

STORY	EXPLANATION
Sūra was the father of *Vasudeva*, and grandfather of *Kṛshṇa*.	When we understand this law of life, and observe the universe in its light, we find that Nature consists of a great number of forms and forces, which work intelligently and for a good end (*Vasudeva*). Then, if we pursue the point further still, we find that Nature may be divided into eight parts, the last of which is intelligence, which, when associated with the idea of sacrifice, gives us the idea of God as Supreme Intelligence immanent in the universe (*Kṛshṇa*).
He had a daughter, named *Pṛthā*.	When we understand this law of life (*śūra*), we find that the Earth (*Pṛthā* or *Kuntī*) is a great form and force of Nature too, and that it belongs to this "family of God".
He had a childless cousin, *Kuntibhoja*, and he gave his daughter to him to adopt; and she came to be called *Kuntī*.	But all people do not believe that the Earth belongs to the great "family of God". They are satisfied with the view that it is a bountiful bestower of good things (*Kuntibhoja*), although this view is not, by itself, fruitful of any great results (childless). But if we pursue even this idea to its logical end, we find that it takes us to the idea of good action or action as a sacrifice, and so is allied to the idea of God,—itself derived from that of sacrifice.

STORY	EXPLANATION
While residing in her adoptive father's house, *Kuntī* had been taught a *Mantra* by a *Brāhmaṇa*, by reciting which she could call any one of the celestials to have children by him.	But even if we agree that the Earth is a bountiful bestower of good things (*Kuntī* lives in her adoptive father's house), we cannot admit that it can create anything solely by itself. But if we exercise our intelligence (*Brāhmaṇa's Mantra*), we shall find that the Earth can create with the assistance of the great forces of Nature. There are a number of such forces, and it can create a number of things by means of them (*Kuntī* can call up any celestial for purposes of creation).
Kuntī used the *Brāhmaṇa's Mantra*, and invoked the Sun; and, as a result of their union, was born a hero named *Karṇa*, encased in a natural armour, and a face brightened by ear-rings.	If we exercise our intelligence (*Brāhmaṇa's Mantra*), we find that the Earth is closely associated with the Sun, and has power to attract and absorb its rays; and, as a result of this, there is formed within it the essence of seed or grain, the origin of the Vegetable Kingdom (*Karṇa*). The latter is encased in an outer cover of hard skin, rind or bark, and has a beautiful form, such as may be seen in fruit hanging on the branch of a tree.
The Sun, after restoring her virginity to *Kuntī*, went to	The seed is of the same essence as the Earth itself, and its birth, at this stage, does not affect its constitution or powers; for it is not affected by the rays of the

Story	Explanation
heaven; and she threw her son into water.	Sun that it absorbs, as it can radiate or reflect them back again (the Sun restores *Kuntī's* virginity, and goes away). But the grain, even at this stage, contains an essence of moisture or water, like the nucleus of the cell (*Kuntī* threw her son into water).
Karṇa was picked up by *Adhiratha*, the husband of *Rādhā*, and brought up by them.	All creatures live by food, the origin of which is seed or grain. A creature accordingly picks up and preserves it, because of his anxiety to support his body in proper action (*Adhiratha*), and the desire to live (*Rādhā*).
Karṇa grew up and became an expert in the use of arms. He used to worship the Sun; and when his back was scorched with its rays, there was nothing on earth that he did not give to the *Brāhmaṇas*.	Seed or grain can grow into a tree, and the process of its development, and the uses to which it can be put, are wonderful (*Karṇa* becomes an expert in the use of arms). It absorbs the essence of the power of the Sun itself (*Karṇa* worships the Sun); and when it is fully mature or ripe (his back was heated with the rays of the Sun), there is no essential want of an intelligent person (*Brāhmaṇa*) that it cannot satisfy.

It is in this manner that the whole story can be transformed into a statement of facts and laws of Nature, each part cohering with the other, and making a new and complete whole. But it is necessary that the same "character" should retain its own idea throughout the narrative; that is, *Kuntī* should always mean our "mother" Earth, and *Karṇa* grain or seed, and the systems of thought associated with their ideas. Similarly, all other "characters" in the Epic,—for there must be uniformity of conception throughout—must represent different ideas and objects of life, and retain their own form everywhere. It is only then that, even as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, we can regard these works as sacred, as they are believed to be.

All this, so far as it relates to the *Mahābhārata*, has already been explained and need not be repeated here; and it would be found that the Epic is really an account of the clash and conflict of all the great systems of philosophy and religion, and shows how they can be reconciled in the end.

The idea of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa* is similar too: only they deal with the problem in terms of the actions of gods and demons rather than of human beings, as the *Mahābhārata* does.[1] We may conclude from this that the idea of all other sacred books is also the same, and that they can be re-interpreted in the same manner.

CONCLUSION—This is the ancient, original idea of the sacred books of the Hindus, and of Hinduism,—a rational system of thought and life, and a synthesis of science, philosophy, and religion. It has its share of emotion too,—devotion, love, and faith—with all that the art of man can embellish,

[1] All this has been worked out, and will be published in due course.

—for there is no essential difference between the working of the head and the heart; and the two, like intellect and the soul, may even be identified.

But the ancient systems are not the same as we find them today. They are separated from us by three thousand years, during which many changes have taken place; but the traces of ancient thought yet survive in what remains, and can take us back to the past to re-construct it again.

At the same time, while this method of interpretation helps to solve a number of problems of the sacred books, and places the ancients and their thought in a new perspective,—giving us a new idea of their standards of culture and civilization, their achievements in science and psychology, and the understanding of moral and spiritual values of life,—it involves a re-orientation of a number of ideas bearing on science and psychology, ethics, history, metaphysics, and religion. But it is not possible, within the limits of the present work, to deal with even a fraction of these, and they must await consideration elsewhere.

THE MIMANSA SUTRAS

OF

JAIMINI

(English Translation)

CHAPTER I

PART I

THE LAW OF DHARMA: THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE VEDAS

Dharma may be defined as the highest good (1-3). Its idea is not limited to sense-perception, and requires a proper teacher to explain it (4-5). It arises from action (6-7), which is the law of life (8-10). Success arises from action; and action cannot be renounced (11-15). There is action even when we do not see it (16-17); and action is eternal and universal (18-23). There is a difference between natural and deliberate action (24-26). The subject-matter of the Vedas is action (27-32).

DHARMA—Let us now understand what is Dharma. It may be defined as the highest good; and so let us inquire into its cause (1-3). 1* 2 3

HOW TO UNDERSTAND DHARMA—The idea of Dharma does not arise from sense-perception, because the latter is limited to what is present, while the idea of Dharma goes beyond the present. As it is conceived to be the highest good, its idea can best be imparted by a competent teacher, which is a valid means of acquiring knowledge, and does not require the authority of a *Bādarāyaṇa* to prove it[1] (4-5). 4 5

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*The figures against punctuation marks refer to the serial numbers of *Sūtras* in the text.

[1] *Bādarāyaṇa* is the name of the celebrated author of the *Vedānta Sūtras*.

The authority of a competent teacher is described as *śabda*, which means oral testimony, and is admitted to be a valid means of acquiring knowledge by all systems of philosophy.

DHARMA AND ACTION—Some people say that Dharma arises
from action, and prove their point by referring to the actual
facts of life; and so they believe that the idea of Dharma 6
is not permanent (6-7). 7

DHARMA AND THE LAW OF LIFE—Dharma is indeed linked
up with action, for we often say that a person does his
Dharma, and that implies action. Action is part of our 8
nature, for we see that all of us are engaged in some kind
of action at the same time; and we see it in *Prakṛti* or 9
Nature in all its modifications. We also see that success in 10
action is often the result of a number of persons acting
together. At the same time we find that there are some 11
who believe that we should be indifferent to all that is in
the world. But even he who is said to be indifferent, acts. 12
He might appear to be inactive, but is not really so; and we
believe that he has not acted, because he has not succeeded
in achieving his object. Indeed, we have to go beyond 13
the commencement of an action to understand all this; 14
for the sun may appear to be inactive, but it is acting all
the time; and so are all creatures too (8-15). 15

LAW OF ACTION—There is an immutable law of action at
work within all forms of life, according to which all must
act. For instance, we see things growing in size, but 16
without apparent action; yet there is sound, motion, or
vibration within them unperceived (16-17). 17

ACTION IS ETERNAL AND UNIVERSAL—Action is eternal,
because it is meant to be performed for the sake of
something else; and also because we see it all the time 18
everywhere. The number of creatures engaged in action is 19
so large, that it cannot be counted; and it is not necessary 20

to refer to the same creature again, because all are acting at the same time. We say so because we know the manner in which action takes place; and if we take necessary evidence or observe the working of *Prakṛti* or Nature,[1] we shall find that it is so (18-23). 21 22 23

NATURAL AND DELIBERATE ACTION—But it may be argued that action, performed in the ordinary course of nature, is of little importance, because it does not serve any special purpose; and those who believe that all action should be of this kind, naturally argue in this way. But we see that when people have a purpose or aim in action, it is the result of deliberate intention or precise thinking (24-26). 24 25 26

VEDAS AND ACTION—According to some, the Vedas deal with the problem of the soul as their principal subject-matter; but this is not correct, because we find that they deal with the world of Nature, which is not permanent. This has been stated to be their subject-matter; and that is how they are taught and explained; and all Vedic literature is of the same kind. As they deal with the problem of action, they tell us what actions to perform and how to perform them[2] (27-32). 27 28 29 30 31 32

[1] The word in the text is *Liñga*, which has a number of meanings, one of which is *Prakṛti* or Nature.

[2] The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that the subject-matter of the Vedas is the three *Guṇas* or the attributes of Nature,—*Sattva, Rajas*, and *Tamas*,—which are said to be the cause of all action in the world. We are accordingly advised to go beyond all this, and to be "full of the soul" (BhG. II, 45; III, 5, 27-29).

It may be of interest to point out that, while the principal subject-matter of the Vedas is Nature and its laws, that of the Epics and the *Purāṇas* is the soul or its highest expression,—God; and that is the principal difference between the *śruti* (Vedas and Vedic literature) and *smṛti* (post-Vedic literature, including the Epics and the *Purāṇas*).

PART II

THE VEDAS AND THE METHOD OF THEIR INTERPRETATION

The subject-matter of the Vedas is action (1-9). They are an exposition of *Guṇas* or the attributes of Nature (10-14); and refer to the laws of knowledge as well as action, which it is necessary to discover (15-22); and we can do so if we interpret the text correctly by means of the application of the rules of grammar (23-41). There is authority for this method of interpretation (42-47); but it has not been followed because of ignorance and want of application (48-49). The Vedas refer really to the laws of Nature (50-53).

SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE VEDAS—The subject-matter of the Vedas is action; and they would be meaningless if we interpret them in any other light: hence they are said to be non-eternal. They are not eternal also because they give 1 expression to conflicting opinions; because they do not yield 2 the desired results; because no other meaning is possible; 3-4 because they are the joint composition of a number of authors; and deal with things that are not eternal. Indeed, 5-6 we find that they have the meaning of laws of Nature, and are meant to be a praise of these laws. This is also the 7 traditional view; and there is no contradiction in it; and if 8 a person is unable to understand them in this light, he should seek the assistance of a competent teacher (1-9). 9

AN EXPOSITION OF THE GUNAS—The Vedas are really an exposition of the *Guṇas* or the attributes of Nature;[1] and 10 that is so because the *Guṇas* are the most important part of Nature,—for it is chiefly in this form that Nature appears 11 to us, when we look at it from a distance (or in a broad perspective) (10-12). 12

[1] Cf. BhG. II, 45.

GUNAS AND NATURE—The *Guṇas* are said to be born of Nature or *Prakṛti* in the same sense in which a child is born; for there is a natural desire to have something that will last for some time[1] (and that is why *Prakṛti* creates *Guṇas* and lives through them) (13-14). 13 14

KNOWLEDGE—It is for the same reason that we praise knowledge (for it lasts); and the more complete the knowledge, the longer it lasts; and so the most perfect knowledge belongs to the Supreme (15-16). 15 16

AND ACTION—(We find, however, that knowledge is connected with action, for) we see that certain results follow from certain causes; and so we might say, broadly speaking, that certain special results will follow from certain special causes. But the idea of knowledge and action is the same as has been explained in the previous systems.[2] Nevertheless, there must be a law governing the two; but such a law has not yet been discovered, and a mere statement of their relation would be useless[3] (17-19). 17 18 19

[1] The *Bhagavad Gītā* also tells us that the *Guṇas* are born of Nature or *Prakṛti*, and are the cause of all action. Indeed, all Nature appears to us in the form of these *Guṇas*, for there is nothing in the world (except, of course, the soul) that is without them (BhG. III, 5, 27-29; IV, 13; XIV, 5-20; XVII, 1-22; XVIII, 7-10, 19-44).

[2] The previous systems are *Sāṅkhya*, *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeshika*; and they all deal with the problem of knowledge and action. But, according to the *Mīmānsā*, they have not succeeded in discovering the law connecting them together.

[3] The *Mīmānsā* sets out to discover this law, and to prove it too; and so it says that it would be useless merely to state it. It holds that we can find this law in the Vedas themselves, if we understand them aright.

As we shall see, the connecting link between knowledge and action is desire.

AN OBJECTION—We cannot deal with the question in a popular way, because that is already known (and it has no bearing on the idea of a law). It may, however, be 20–21 argued that all that can be said in the matter has already been said, and nothing more is possible now. Further, 22 it may be contended that it is impossible, in a number of places, to construe the text of the Vedas in the light of action; and so it is best to regard these books as consisting of hymns of praise addressed to the gods. Moreover, 23 if there is consistency of this kind of meaning throughout, we must not drag in some other meaning; specially, as against it, a reference to a law would be inappropriate. 24 Again, if it had been the intention of the authors of the Vedas to expound a law, the language of the text should have been different (20-25). 25

AN ANSWER—But there is good reason for coming to conclusion that the Vedas deal with the laws of Nature, because the same can be proved, and we can get it from the text itself. The text of the Vedas does indeed support 26 the view that it refers to the praise of the gods; but that is its first or direct meaning, without being pressed into some other sense. But even as praise it appears to be 27 meaningless; and we might ask if it is not improper to have praise that is meaningless. While we cannot deny that 28 the text does refer to the praise of the gods, we hold that, in the way it is commonly understood, it is so only in a secondary sense,—the primary idea being that of a law. 29 We are, however, prepared to agree that, if the text does really refer to the laws of Nature, this conclusion should be based on well-established facts, and not on some special statements or analogies,—for that would nullify the very idea of a law. But, as a matter of fact, we get the idea 30

of law from the text of the sacred books themselves; for we get this meaning from the very language of the text, when we apply correct grammatical rules. But he alone will understand who is learned or wise, for the language needs to be properly understood (26-33). 31 32 33

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE TEXT— We cannot get the correct meaning of words from their common form; but we can do so by referring them to Nature, which is described as "*a-chetana*" or inanimate. That, however, should be done when the common meaning is contradictory; and a student of the Vedas can easily find out the real meaning of the text in this way. The reference to the laws of Nature should be made when we are unable to understand the correct meaning of the text and are confused; and (we should understand that) it would be meaningless for the Vedas to refer to something that is ephemeral (34-39). 34 35 36 37 38 39

It may, however, be argued that the meaning of words cannot be a special one; but in this connection we might repeat that the text has a secondary meaning (which refers to the praise of the gods) (40-41). 40 41

SPECIAL MENTION OF THIS METHOD—Indeed, there is a special mention of this method of interpreting the text; and there is an explanation of its idea too; and the principal subject-matter of the Vedas is found to be consistent when interpreted in this light. Further, if we make use of this method and understand words in their correct formation, we find that the text does not contain any censure of the actions of any one;[1] and the explanation of the 42 43 44 45

[1] The *Mīmānsā* later on tells us again that one of the reasons why it is necessary to change the form of words, by dividing them into

meaning of words is in accordance with what is found in a dictionary. At the same time, a single thread of thought runs throughout the text, and there is no contradiction in it anywhere (42-47). 46 47

CAUSE OF FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND—We do not know this explanation of the Vedas because of want of application and ignorance on the part of those who read them. But we find that they do refer to Nature, which is said to be non-eternal; and we get this meaning from the text itself; and so our conclusion is that the language of the Vedas refers to the laws of life (48-53). 48-49 50-51 52-53

parts, is that the common meaning involves a censure on the actions of gods who are otherwise esteemed and regarded as good; and it mentions *Indra* specially in this connection. As it is impossible to conceive that they could be guilty of misconduct, it is necessary,—so the *Mīmānsā* tells us—to see if it is possible to get a different and a more suitable meaning out of the same words. And so we hit upon this method of interpretation, by means of which we divide words into the parts which compose them, and find that they bear a very different meaning, which involves no censure on any one, which has a reference to the laws of Nature, and is consistent in this sense throughout. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that this method applies to the text of the *smṛtis* too; and so if we apply it, we shall find that the real meaning of the great Epics and *Purāṇas* is very different from what it is commonly believed to be. For instance, we find that if we accept the common meaning of the text, a number of actions of the gods and heroes who figure in these works,—*Kṛshṇa* in particular, and even *Rāma*—are not free from censure. But if we adopt this method of interpretation, we find that the whole idea is very different; and the entire "story" is transformed into a narrative of different systems of philosophy and religion. This has been explained in the case of the *Mahābhārata* (M M. III-V), and a similar explanation of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*, which includes an account of all the principal incarnations of *Vishṇu*, will follow in due course. As these constitute the subject-matter of a large number of *Purāṇas*, it would be found that this method of interpretation applies to the entire range of the sacred books of the Hindus; and this is what the *Mīmānsā* tells us.

PART III

THE LAW OF DHARMA AND THE VEDAS

Dharma is founded on the word of the Vedas (1). It is linked up with action (2-4); but every action is not Dharma (5-9). For instance, action arising from impulse is not Dharma (10-14).
Action is universal (15-18). It may be defined as a case of material contact between an object and a place; but it is universal and not local, and is without end (19-25).
All this is described in the Vedas; and we can understand it if we change the form of words used in the text (26-35).

DHARMA AND THE VEDAS—Dharma is founded on the word of the Vedas, which is the highest word (1). 1

DHARMA AND ACTION—(Dharma is linked up with action, and) we find that a man is always engaged in action; and this should enable us to acquire definite knowledge in regard to the law of action. Any contradiction of the 2 fact that there is action everywhere should be disregarded; 3 for we know that it is impossible (2-4). 4

EVERY ACTION IS NOT DHARMA—(But every action is not Dharma; for instance,) we cannot say that an action of the body, performed by a healthy man in the ordinary course of Nature, is Dharma; for the sacred books have 5 their own idea of Dharma, and it is based on certain prin- 6 ciples admitted by all to be true. There is no inconsis- 7 tency or contradiction in the sacred books; and if there is any inconsistency anywhere, we should take it to be in our own ideas rather than in them. We should, therefore, 8 accept what is contained in these books (5-9). 9

ACTION DUE TO IMPULSE IS NOT DHARMA—The action of a healthy body, performed spontaneously or in the ordinary

course of nature, is obviously the result of impulse; and [10] that is not the idea of Dharma as given in the sacred books; [11] and it would be an incorrect application of the rules laid down by them to think that it is so. Their statement [12] regarding Dharma is definite and complete, and leaves no gaps to be filled; and we can verify this for ourselves by [13] making an experiment and a careful study of the sacred books (10-14). [14]

If we do so, we shall find that there is only one inescapable conclusion,—that there is action everywhere, and all things are subject to it. It should, therefore, be deemed to have been proved, and regarded as a universal law of [15] life,—for such is the nature of things, as we can see for [16] ourselves. This is proved by the fact that we can find [17] nothing in the world that is eternal (15-18). [18]

Definition of Action—Action means that there is a material contact of an object with a place. This, however, [19] does not limit the idea of action and make it local, for the [20] same object can be in different places at different times, —just as when we say that a person belongs to *Mathurā*, we do not confine him to that place. The law of action [21] or of the doer of the deed,—for both are the same—may be illustrated by the action of a person who is devoted to something for a while; and this is not inconsistent [22-23] with the law of universal action described in the sacred books. Since, however, they speak of continuous action, [24] we have to understand the sense in which the term is used, for otherwise we might commit a mistake (19-25). [25]

How Described in the Vedas—(All this has been briefly expressed, and) it would be improper to demand that it should have been described in many words. We can, [26]

however, understand the real meaning if we make a special effort; and our inability to do so arises from the fact that we take only the form of words, and neglect their real meaning (26-28). 27 28

How to Understand the Text—The entire meaning of the text would be changed by changing the form of a word in a particular place; and this can be done because there are no fixed rules regarding the combination of words or their parts. But if we adopt but a single meaning, we cannot distinguish between things; and that will render the whole idea worthless. It is possible to look at the text in different ways; but the best meaning is that which refers to action. There are some, however, who believe that there is no reference to action; that there is no possibility of any other meaning than the common one; and that the words refer to one particular object only. All that we can say is that the meaning does refer to action, and there is no break in the continuity of its idea (29-35). 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

PART IV

THE VEDAS AND THE METHOD OF THEIR INTERPRETATION

The sacred books, when properly interpreted, refer to action of all kinds; but more specially in connection with the *Guṇas*, which are associated with *Prakṛti* (1-5). But a name may not always express the idea of *Guṇas* (6-8).

It is not difficult to give a rational explanation of why a word should be divided into parts to give its correct meaning; but there are cases where words do not need to be altered in this way, and their common meaning remains (9-16).

We cannot lay down any hard and fast rules to get the real meaning of words; and the only test is that it should fit into the

context (17-19). That is the proof of its correctness, and of the glory and greatness of the Vedas (20-28). But it must fill all gaps and be taken as a whole (29-30).

ACTION IN THE VEDAS—It has been explained that the text of the sacred books, when properly interpreted, refers to action; and it follows from this that everything should have a bearing on that meaning. It may be that this 1 action consists in giving a new name to an object,—something that has not been done before; but so far as the main idea 2 of action is concerned, it should refer to the *Guṇas*, which are closely connected with *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna*.[1] This 3 is contained in a number of sacred books; and there is a 4 definite statement to this effect too (1-5). 5

CHARACTER OF A NAME—There are some who believe that, in such a case, when a name is given to an object, the rule should be that there should be a clear mention of the *Guṇas*. But this is not possible, for a name may 6 refer to two equal actions; and in such a case a single 7 word would need to have another meaning too (6-8). 8

There are others who maintain that a word and its attributes should go together; that we should not divide it into parts to get the idea of action; and that there should not be different rules in connection with different words. But this is not always possible; for if a word and 9 its attributes should always go together, so should a word and the object to which it refers. Again, suppose there is mention of the word *Barhis* (meaning sacrificial grass) and *ājya* (meaning clarified butter poured over the sacrificial fire) in the text, but no consecrating ceremony,—should we say that these words have no meaning? 10

[1] *Pradhāna* refers to *Prakṛti* or Nature.

We should, of course, agree that they have their ordinary meanings if they were used in connection with vessels of holy water required for a sacrifice. The same would be true in connection with another word,—*Nirmanthya* (meaning, being stirred or churned).[1] It is true that there is no variation in the meaning of the word *Vaiśva-deva* (meaning, relating to all-gods); and that is so because of the nature of what it signifies,—something that is perceptible to the senses, and requires no discussion of the thing itself;[2] and if we were to give a different meaning to the word, it would make no sense at all. The idea of the *Guṇas*, however, is different[3] (9-16). 11 12 13 14 15 16

No FIXED RULES—As has already been observed, we cannot lay down any hard and fast rules to get the correct

[1] As these words,—*Barhis*, *ājya*, and *Nirmanthya*—appear to make little sense in their existing form and with their ordinary meanings, it is necessary to see if they can admit of some other more satisfactory meaning in some other way; and the *Mīmānsā* implies that we can get this by dividing them into parts or in some other manner. As we shall see later on, grass or the vegetable kingdom refers to Nature or *Prakṛti; ājya* signifies goodness; and *Nirmanthya* refers to the function of the mind.

[2] *Vaiśva-deva* means "relating to all-gods"; and a god, as we shall see, refers to the great forces of Nature. Thus all-gods would refer to the entire world of Nature, the idea of which is clear and constant. Hence the word *Vaiśva-deva* retains its ordinary meaning throughout, and it is not necessary to change its form by dividing it into parts, to get its meaning, as we must do in the case of other words.

[3] *Guṇas* are the attributes of Nature; and so they do not refer to Nature in its entirety, but to its different forms, possessing different attributes. Although there is nothing in Nature that is free from *Guṇas,* the entire world of Nature must be regarded as different from them, for they are said to be born out of it. Hence the *Mīmānsā* tells us that the idea of *Guṇas* is not identical with that of Nature conceived in its entirety.

meaning of words; and their only test is their suitability in connection with the context. [17] We must, however, remember that an attribute is meant to describe the characteristics of an object; and this requires that the attributes should be in their proper place, and that nothing should be meaningless; [18] for the whole significance of the text depends on their use. This means that nothing should be left out (17-19). [19]

REQUIREMENTS OF INTERPRETATION—Now, in order to interpret a Vedic text in the light of action or the law of creation, we have to show that the whole of it,—with all its names—remains unbroken when understood in this manner; whereas it makes little sense when understood in terms of the praise of gods. [20] It is not necessary that there should be any authority in support of this; [21] for the authority is the manner in which we have to fix a meaning, when we are unable to find a cause, and the text makes little sense. For instance, when there is a reference to an actor, there may be a number of causes for his action, and we have to find them out; and we fix the meaning of a word in the same manner. [22] That is the proof of the correctness of our meaning,—namely, that it fits into the text; [23-25] and testifies to the glory of the Vedas, and their wealth, [26-27] and shows that the matters of which they speak are eternal [28] (20- 28).

VALUE OF THIS INTERPRETATION—The value of this interpretation lies in its ability to fill all gaps of thought in case of confused, doubtful, or ambiguous expressions; [29] but we have to understand it in the light of the meaning it yields, and conceive of it as part of a great whole [30] (29-30).

CHAPTER II

PART I

THE LAW OF ACTION: THE VEDAS AND THEIR FORM

The idea of an action is described by means of verbs, and of an actor by means of nouns. Verbs are associated with nouns; and there are two kinds of verbs, transitive and intransitive (1-8).

Dharma requires the function of the intellect (9-12); and it is described in the Vedas in various ways (13-21).

The text of the Vedas does not consist of hymns of praise addressed to the gods, but is an examination of the laws of Dharma (22-31).

The Vedas are said to consist of *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*,—hymns of praise, and laws of life and their explanation; but the essential idea of both is the same (32-34).

The Vedas are three in number,—*Rik*, *Sāma*, and *Yajus*. A fourth, *Nigada*, is sometimes added; but it should be included in the *Yajus* (35-45).

The text of the Vedas is composed in the most perfect form of language (46-49).

VERBS AND NOUNS—Verbs are words which refer to action; and they have a meaning which relates to a way of thinking, feeling or conduct,—all of which are associated with action. All words are not of this kind: for instance, [1] there are nouns, which describe the form of an object; and other words depend on them, because, as soon as we use them, they give us the idea of something that is real. [2-3] Verbs do not express any plan or purpose in themselves, if we utter them without reference to something else; and they can be properly understood only in association with nouns, because they depend on them. When we [4] utter a verb, it conveys no meaning in itself; for we are

compelled to direct our attention to something else, and inquire about it (1-5). 5

Verbs are of two kinds,—primary and secondary (or intransitive and transitive). Primary verbs are those 6 which do not require an object for their action, because the object is unessential; while secondary verbs are those 7 which require an object for their action, because an object is essential in their case (6-8). 8

IDEA OF DHARMA—So far as Dharma is concerned, it is associated with action,—action without end, like a great sacrifice. There should be general agreement about the 9 idea of Dharma; and the idea of the Vedas and other works should be the same. But it is not easy to define it, 10 because there are no fixed rules to lay down what constitutes a fit and proper object. But the difficulty itself 11 serves a useful purpose of its own, for it calls upon us to decide what is so[1] (9-12). 12

TEXT OF THE VEDAS—There are some who believe that there are certain texts, like *Stotra* and *śastra* hymns,[2] which have been properly composed and about which there can be no difference of opinion,—for they are part of sacrificial texts and closely connected with the gods. But were it so, those texts which do not 13 refer to the gods, would be deemed to be of a secondary importance; and their meaning, which is not 14

[1] This means that Dharma requires that we should use our judgement or intelligence to decide what is fit and proper according to occasion and circumstances.

[2] *Stotra* is a hymn of praise which is sung; while *śastra* is one that is recited audibly or otherwise, as distinguished from the *Stotra* that is sung.

secondary, would be rendered secondary. But this cannot 15
be, because these texts too are an integral part of the Vedas. 16
The difference between the two kinds of texts is due to the
difference of manner in which their ideas are expressed; 17
and there can be no question of the subsidiary
character of any. It is in this light that we should under- 18
stand the idea of the sacrificial texts and other formulæ
recited at sacrifices; and we shall find that they make a 19
consistent whole throughout, and yield good sense in 20
that way (13-21). 21

AN OBJECTION—But there are some who believe that
this is not true of all that is taught in the sacred books, and 22
maintain that we can see for ourselves that it is so. They 23
also contend that there is general agreement regarding
the *śruti*,[1]—namely, that it contains hymns of praise, which
should be understood to refer to the offering of sacrifices; 24
because the words used in the text (can have only that
meaning, and) are quite different from anything that can
be construed in any other way (22-25). 25

AN ANSWER—But it is impossible to accept this, because
we find that the text, construed even as hymns of praise,
makes little sense; and it is admitted that there is a differ- 26

[1] *Sruti* is said to refer to sacred knowledge, which has been heard by certain holy sages, and believed to have been orally transmitted from generation to generation. The term is applied to the Vedas, as well as the Upanishads and other Vedic works. It is distinguished from *Smṛti*, which is said to refer to the whole body of sacred tradition or what is remembered by human teachers; and, in its widest acceptance, includes the six *Vedāṅgas*, the Laws of *Manu*, the Epics of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, and the *Purāṇas*,—all of which are believed to be sacred.

ent meaning too,—which can properly be associated with 27
the idea of action, and gives us complete satisfaction as to 28
the result. With regard to the question whether hymns 29
of praise can be the same as a law of Nature, they can have
that meaning because the words are the same. Moreover, 30
if a hymn of praise is suitable for reciting sacred formulæ,
it can be full of meaning too. Again, the word *Mantra* is 31
used in giving directions (implying that it means something more than mere praise); and in the rest of the work 32
the word *Brāhmaṇa* is used. There can be no doubt that 33
the *Mantra*-part belongs to the sacred books, and this division (between the *Mantra*-part and the *Brāhmaṇa*-part)
is to be found in the Vedas themselves (26-34).[1] 34

NUMBER OF VEDAS—The *Mantras* of the *Rig Veda* are
always divided into certain fixed parts, for that is how we
get their meaning: while the name *Sāma* is applied to 35
verses that are meant to be sung; and *Yajus* to the rest. 36-37
The *Nigada* may be regarded as the fourth, because of
its special character;[2] and that is so because there is a 38

[1] The Vedas are said to consist of two distinct parts,— (1) *Mantra*, believed to consist of hymns of praise and prayer addressed to the gods, and (2) *Brāhmaṇa*, consisting of (i) *Vidhi* or Law, and (ii) *Artha-vāda*, or explanation of these laws.

According to the *Mīmānsā* the real idea of the *Mantra* is the same as that of *Vidhi* or the laws of Nature or life; and it tells us that we can find out that it is so if we understand the text in the light of the method of interpretation it has described. We are told that a *Mantra* can have this meaning (as laws of Nature), because the words of the text are the same; and all that we have to do is to interpret them in a different way.

[2] The *Mīmānsā* mentions only three Vedas,—*Rik*, *Sāma*, and *Yajus*,—and so belongs to the period when the fourth, the *Atharva*, had not been composed. It may be of interest to point out that the

statement to that effect. Nevertheless, the *Nigada* should be included in the *Yajus*, because it has the same form as the latter; and the peculiar character of its hymns is due to the manner of reciting them, as well as the purpose they serve. We have been told that this purpose is of a secondary character; but we cannot say the same of all,—at least of *Rig Veda* (35-45). 39 40 41 42 43 44–45

THE BEST FORM OF EXPRESSION—In the best form of expression,—if there is a single meaning, there should be a single statement to convey its idea; but if it is related to something else, it should be divided into parts; while in case of equal ideas, there should be separate statements. The close connection of word with word makes for perfection of statement, because all are connected together alike: only we should see that there are no gaps anywhere (46-49). 46 47 48 49

PART II

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

Different words express different ideas, and their meaning can be understood in the light of their context (1-8).

The meaning of certain words has been specially defined; while in the case of others it can be obtained by dividing them into parts. But no fixed rules can be laid down (9-19). Certain conditions must, however, be satisfied (20-27). In certain cases we can do as we like (28-29).

Bhagavad Gītā too mentions only three Vedas,—the same as the *Mīmānsā* (BhG. IX, 17).

The *Mīmānsā* mentions *Nigada* as the fourth, but would include it in the *Yajus*. The word means "a prayer or sacrificial formula recited aloud". As it is not sung, it cannot be included in the *Sāma*; and, as it does not partake of the special characteristics of the *Rik*, it cannot be included in that Veda; and so only the *Yajus* remains.

WORDS AND THEIR MEANING—Different words express different ideas of action, because we have to do different things; but if we repeat the same word without a different cause, it would be useless. (But we should be able to get the meaning from the context: for instance,) if there is a reference to the full moon, the subject-matter should indicate it even though there is no mention of its form. But if words convey different meanings in different contexts, we cannot use them in the same sense everywhere (1-4).

SPECIAL MEANINGS—The special meaning of a word arises from its connection with the text of the *śruti*; and so too the idea of its attributes; and when we know the purpose for which it is used, we can settle its meaning. There is a definite statement in support of this in the sacred books; and we can see the proof of it ourselves (5-8).

DEFINED MEANINGS—(There are certain words the meaning of which has been defined: for instance,) the word *Upāñśu-yāja* refers to the full moon.[1] This is necessary in cases where the subject is not under discussion in the text. But we can get this meaning from the connection of the parts of the word itself;[1] and that is how we get the meaning in a majority of cases. (We resort to this because we get certain expressions which make little sense: for instance,) there is nothing special in the sprinkling of clarified butter

[1] The word *Upāñśuyāja* consists of two parts,—*Upāñśu* and *yāja;* and of these *Upāñśu* is said to be a particular *Soma* oblation, while *Yāja* means "a sacrifice". Again, *Soma* refers to the Moon; and so the combined expression *Upāñśu-yāja* means "the action of the Moon"; for a sacrifice signifies action, even as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us (BhG. III, 14). Hence it refers to the full moon, and that is also its meaning as defined.

over *Agni*;[1] but when we do this, we understand the whole idea clearly; and find that any other meaning would be irrelevant to the context (9-15). 13 14 15

METHOD OF DIVISION INTO PARTS—The rule in regard to the meaning of a word through its parts arises from the fact that this division is made in conformity with a common practice, and there is plenty of sacred authority in support of it. There is the same direction in connection with the combined word *Paśu-Soma*, where we get a combination of two substances (*Paśu* and *Soma*); and this combination is not useless because we get its meaning by means of this division[2] (16-17). 16 17

RULES CANNOT BE LAID DOWN—But we cannot lay down rules in connection with such formations: only we should remember that when we sub-divide a word-formation into parts, we should be very near its correct meaning; for the substance itself is made up of parts, (corresponding to which we have the parts of a word); otherwise no purpose would be served by this sub-division (18-19). 18 19

[1] As we shall see later on, *Agni*, which commonly means the god of Fire, refers to the Intellect, for that is how the word is said to be defined. We shall then see that "clarified butter" refers to the idea of goodness; and so "pouring clarified butter over the fire" really means associating goodness with the function of the intellect. This is necessary, because intellect, like fire, can be both creative and destructive; and it becomes creative only when it is associated with the idea of goodness. Hence in an act of sacrifice it is necessary to "pour clarified butter over the fire".

[2] *Paśu* means an animal, while *Soma* means not only the moon, but also the mind; and so *Paśu-Soma* means "(*Soma*) the mind of (*Paśu*) an animal"; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that animals have a mind. The sacred books tell us of five kinds of *Paśus* or animals,—men, horses, cows, goats, and sheep. (AV. XI. 2, 9 etc.)

CERTAIN CONDITIONS SHOULD BE SATISFIED—But if the current meaning of a word correctly conveys the idea of the attributes associated with an object, it should not be divided into parts to serve some other purpose. When we divide a word into parts, we should preserve their position as it is in the word; and if we wish to divide into parts a word connoting action, we should do so after due reflection. The clear idea of the text, obtained in this way, should be such as meets with general approval. In case we can interpret a word in two ways, which are equally balanced, we should go in for a new combination only if there is some special merit in it. If no special purpose is served by analysing a word connoting action, its meaning in its place in the text should be accepted. Again, if there is mention of a result, we should see that there is a reference also to its cause or action—for a result is always connected with action. If there are two ways of interpreting a word, and they appear to be of equal value,—we should select the meaning which fits in with the peculiar character of the context; and in normal cases it should be associated with action (20-27).

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

SPECIAL CASES—(However, there are some special cases). In the hymns composed by Saubhari, in the hymn addressed to *Purusha*, and in the concluding passage of a *Sāman* hymn which is sung in chorus, we can do as we like.[1] In all these cases, as the author has said what he has

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[1] *Saubhara* means "of Sobhari"; and the latter is the name of the author of the hymns of the *Rig Veda*, VIII, 19-22, etc. The hymn addressed to *Purusha* is RV. X, xc.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us later on that it is necessary to divide into parts words used in the *Sāma Veda*. Here we are told that in certain hymns, which are sung in chorus, we may or may not do so, for the result is the same.

desired, all that is necessary is that they should be pleasant to hear. The meaning of the concluding portion of a *Sāman* hymn, sung in chorus, depends on the repetition of certain notes (28-29). 29

PART III

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION: THE LAW OF ACTION

This method of interpretation implies a deliberate plan on the part of the author (1-4). There are, however, certain works where the common meaning of words is satisfactory, and this method should not be adopted (5-13).

The popular idea of sacrifice is based on a misconception; and if we pierce through the "disguised" form of words, we shall understand what it means, and the whole idea would be found to be consistent throughout (14-20)

If we understand the text in this light, we shall find that *Agni* refers to intellect; and that will enable us to understand the whole text in terms of Dharma or the law of life (21-23).

There are some treatises which maintain that we can achieve our goal without action (24-25). But that is not the idea of the Vedas: only they have to be understood in a different light,—in the same manner as we understand the meaning of *Agni* as intellect (26-29).

EXISTENCE OF A PLAN—The merit of this method of interpretation is due to its connection with an intelligent plan; and because this connection is perfect, it leads to a result very different from the apparent meaning of words. It is in 1 this manner that we can pierce through the "disguise" of words; and so we might say that the meaning obtained by means of this method has been given to it by the author himself according to design or plan; and its unique character is due to the excellence of this mode of expression. (1-2) 2

IMPORTANCE OF INTENTION—(The idea of intention is importatant; for) in making expiation by means of sacrifice, the most important thing is intention, because it is closely

connected with sacrifice.[1] (The words in text give us the idea of sacrifice), because we find that they fit into it completely, and nothing is left out when we put them in their proper place according to this plan (3-4). 3 4

A DIFFERENT MEANING—In certain parts of the text, however, there is a different method of interpretation, because the current meaning of words is satisfactory, and there is a general agreement about them. In such cases the rule regarding the division of words into part does not apply; and the language of the text is complete in itself, because its result is satisfactory; and it would be a change for the worse to have a different explanation, or to believe that there is a "disguised" form of expression which needs to be seen through. We can have a proper knowledge of the text because of the excellence of its composition; and this proper knowledge is not limited to a particular object, but is of a general or universal character; and we can get it by means of the correct use of words, because no technical terms are used. In such cases we can understand the idea of an action or the meaning of a word in the same manner as we hear it (that is, in its current, common form) (5-13).[2] 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

[1] It is necessary to have a proper idea of Sacrifice. It is, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us, born out of action (BhG. III, 14). It is, therefore, a kind of action which alone does not make for bondage (BhG. III, 9). It may accordingly be described as a good, intelligent, and selfless action,—meant for the benefit of all. It is in this sense that an act of Nature, like rain, is said to be a sacrifice (BhG. III, 14).

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the Vedas deal with sacrifice in this sense of the term.

[2] A great deal of the language used in the *Bhagavad Gītā* is of this kind, and the common meaning of most words is satisfactory. It is only in the case of certain names of persons or things, that we need to apply a different method of interpretation to understand them.

POPULAR IDEA OF SACRIFICE—There are some who believe that the injunction in the sacred books in regard to the performance of sacrifices refers to actual sacrifices, which are to be performed with material objects, and which yield certain results, which are actually experienced. All these sacrifices are associated with certain actions, which have to be performed (14). 14

BASED ON A MISCONCEPTION—But this idea arises from seeing only the "disguised" form of words used in the text;[1] and if any one should doubt this statement, he 15 should examine the principal part of the text in this light; 16 and then he can satisfy himself if the meaning is correct. 17 He will find that the new meaning is all connected together through the meaning of words, and fits into the text to make a complete whole. Indeed, it may be com- 18 pared to the possession of a new wife, and its difference from the old, to her being separated from her former state. 19 If the new meaning stood in isolation, unconnected with the text, it would indeed be worthless; for then there would be some action or result which would apparently have been omitted and would need to be supplied (15-20). 20

MEANING OF AGNI—When we see through this "disguise" we find that *Agni* (the god of fire) means "intelligence"[2]; 21 and if we interpret the word according to this rule, we find

[1] The real idea of Sacrifice has already been explained. The common idea of Sacrifice, says the *Mīmānsā*, is based on a misconception, for we see only the "disguised" from of words, without understanding their meaning.

[2] The *Mīmānsā* explains later on that seeing through the "disguise" of a word means dividing it into parts (MS. VII, iv, 16-20; IX, iii, 7-14). This *Sūtra* therefore tells us that if we do so in the case of the word *Agni*, we shall get the idea of "intelligence". In a subsequent chapter we are again told that this is the definition of the word *Agni*.

that it refers to a fundamental concept of philosophy.[1] 22
It is in this manner that we assign the meaning "intelligence" to *Agni*, as a result of which we get the idea of Dharma or the law of life[2] (21-23). 23

The word *Agni* may be divided into A,g,n,i; and of these A refers to the intellect, g and n to the senses of knowledge, and i to the mind. The meaning of the word accordingly is "(A) the intellect associated with (g,n) the senses and (i) the mind". As we shall see in the course of this work, the senses of knowledge can refer also to those of action and *vice versa*,—for one of them, the *Tongue*, is both a sense of knowledge and of action. Thus the two letters g and n,—although they refer to the senses of knowledge, would include those of action too. Hence the word *Agni* gives us a complete idea of the function of the intellect in association with the mind as well as the senses.

There are innumerable references to *Agni* in the sacred books, from the Vedas downwards; and all of them can be interpreted in this light. For instance, we are told that there are three kinds of *Agni* or sacrificial fire: *Gārhapatya*, *āhavanīya*, and *Dakshiṇa*; and they are commonly interpreted to mean "the householder's fire, received from his father and transmitted to his descendants"; "consecrated fire taken from the householder's perpetual fire and prepared for receiving oblations"; and "the southern fire" respectively. But if we understand their idea correctly, we shall find that the *Gārhapatya* refers to the function of the intellect in association with the soul ("master of the house"); *āhavanīya* refers to its function in the world abroad; while *Dakshiṇa* refers to skill in action, by means of which one can act and yet be free from the bondage of action. (Compare also MM. I, 312-338).

[1] The word in the text is *dravya*, one of the meanings of which is "an elementary substance in philosophy". The *Vaiśeshika* mentions nine such substances,—the five great elements, Time, Space, Mind, and the Soul. The Intellect too is a *dravya* in the same sense, as, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, it is the first "substance" to arise from Nature or *Prakṛti*. The *Bhagavad Gītā* gives it the highest place among the eight divisions of *Prakṛti* (BhG. VII, 4).

[2] If we understand *Agni* to mean "intellect", the whole idea of the text would be transformed, and what we shall get is Dharma or the law of life. It is in this manner that the *Mantras* of the Vedas can be changed from the idea of praise of gods to that of Dharma; and so they may be said to deal with the problems of life conceived in its widest significance; and this is what the *Mīmānsā* says too.

A DIFFERENT VIEW—But different books follow different plans; and we are told that we can achieve the highest end by refraining from action[1] (24-25). 24 25

THE VIEW OF THE VEDAS—But the *Vedas* repeatedly tell us that it is only by means of action that we can succeed in achieving results;[2] and in order to understand this properly, what has been stated in respect of *Agni*, should be extended to the other gods as well.[3] The text has two meanings, which are consistent in themselves throughout, and the reference to action in this manner is intentional. The *śruti* too repeatedly tells us that there is another or a different meaning besides the apparent one (26-29). 26 27 28 29

PART IV

THE LAW OF ACTION: NEED OF KNOWLEDGE: ACTION AND TIME

So long as there is life, there must be action (1-2).
We can understand this if we fix the meaning of words according to the *Krama* method of reciting the text (3).
The sacred books also tell us that action must cease; and

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[1] Certain books appear to hold the view that we can achieve the highest end by refraining from action; but this is an erroneous view. The *Mīmānsā* tells us later on that this view appears to find a place in the Vedas too; but the prohibition against action should be understood not in an absolute, but a relative, sense,—as a prohibition against evil or dangerous actions.

[2] The *Bhagavad Gītā* too says the same thing (BhG. IV, 12; XVIII, 2-7).

[3] This means that in order to understand what the gods of the Vedas really signify, we should divide their names into parts, as in the case of *Agni*. This is repeated in a subsequent chapter too, and we are told that the gods refer to the great forms and forces of Nature. (Cf. MM. I, Chapter IX).

we must understand what this really means (4-7). There are a variety of actions (8), but there can be only one action at a time (9). Action does not consist in a name; the law of one action at a time applies to all kinds of action; but it is the best action that can be performed at the time (10-13).

It is necessary to have knowledge to understand the law of Dharma (14); and we can understand it if we interpret the text correctly (15).

In certain cases, however, it is easy to understand the whole idea (16-19).

Certain actions are more important than others (20); but the most important thing in this connection is *Chitta* or intellect (21), because it is its special function to decide (22).

All knowledge is relative (23), and its idea is illustrated by that of a ceremony lasting twelve days (24).

There is an impulse to action, and a discussion within us as to its *pros* and *cons* (25); and when we decide to act in in a certain manner, it means that the balance of judgement is on that side (26).

There is an element of time in action (27); and the impulse in connection with certain religious and virtuous actions is irresistible (28-30).

While each action has its own cause and a separate method of performance, a combination of a number of actions shows how all kinds of actions are mixed together in life (31-32).

THE LAW OF ACTION—We find from this discussion that so long as there is life, all things must conform to the Dharma (law) of action; and the *Vedic* texts all agree that this is the law of the actor[1] (1-2). 1 2

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THIS—When we wish to see through the "disguise" of words relating to the Dharma or law of action, we should settle their meaning by means of the *Krama* method of reading the text;[2] and if we do anything else, the whole thing would become meaningless (3). 3

[1] The *Bhagavad Gītā* also tells us that no one can remain, even for a moment, without performing actions; and even the barest needs of the body cannot be supplied without some kind of action (BhG. III, 5, 8).

[2] The word in the text is *Pra-krama*, which means "*Krama-pāṭha* or reading of *Krama*"; and *Krama* is a peculiar method of reading the Vedic text, according to which the reading proceeds from the first

MEANING OF CESSATION OF ACTION—We are taught that action must cease, and also that if there is time, there should be variety or different kinds of actions. But because 4 life is transient, it is not possible to have it so for ever. 5 There is, accordingly, an apparent contradiction between these statements; but so far as the actor is concerned, it 6 is necessary for him to act in accordance with the law of Dharma; and the direction in regard to time can only be a reason for his action[1] (4-7). 7

VARIETY OF ACTIONS—What is called variety of actions includes a number of things,—name, form, good actions, statement of differences, repetition of a word or sentence, censure, effort, acquisition of knowledge, command, and thought of death; and these give us an inexhaustible store of reasons for action in many different ways. Nevertheless, 8 there can be only one action at a time (8-9). 9

member,—word, syllable or letter—to the second; then the second is repeated and connected with the third; the third repeated and connected with the fourth; and so on. This ensures that no part of a word can possibly be omitted.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we should regard the common form of a word as a "disguise" which hides its real meaning; and the latter can be found by reading the text according to *Krama*; and this would have the effect of dividing a word into its component syllables and letters. We can then assign suitable meanings to these and understand the real meaning of a word. The *Mīmānsā* contains a number of references to this method of division of words into parts, and also to *Krama*; and the idea of the two is the same.

[1] The real meaning of cessation of action is that an action must come to an end at some time, and not that we must refrain from all actions; for when one action ends, another begins. It is, however, true that all action on earth ends with death,—for all life must come to an end one day. There is thus an apparent contradiction between the two statements; but the idea is clear. The *Gītā* too tells us that a person must continue to act so long as he lives (BhG. III, 5, 27-28, 33 etc.)

CHARACTER OF ACTION—We cannot have action merely by calling it so or giving it a name. It requires direction or impelling force, without which there can be no action. The [10] law of one action at a time applies to all kinds of action; [11] and so far as giving it a name is concerned, it can easily be coined. Although we can perform only one action at a [12] time, it is, at the time, the best action we can perform [13] (10-13).

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE TEXT—It is only when a person has knowledge that he can understand what is taught about Dharma or the law of life; and the idea of it can be [14] obtained by dealing with the text in the same manner as we deal with what relates to *Agni*[1]. There are no two [15] opinions in the matter, for all authorities are agreed; and [16] the whole idea is expressed so briefly, that nothing can be gained by having it otherwise. It is meant to be [17] understood not by one person, but by all; and we can [18] have a clear and complete idea of the whole in this way [19] (14-19).

IMPORTANCE OF CERTAIN ACTIONS AND OF CHITTA—Even though we can perform only one action at a time, certain actions, such as censure, effort, complete acquisition of knowledge, and speech are more important than others; [20] and the most important place is given to *Chitta* (intellect), because it is the effective cause of action. That is so [21]

[1] The *Mīmānsā* has told us that the real meaning of the word *Agni* is "intellect", and so all that relates to *Agni* has to be understood as referring to the intellect. We can get this meaning by dividing the word into parts. If we do the same with regard to other words used in the sacred text, we shall be able to get a new meaning, which will have a bearing on the idea of Dharma or the law of life.

because (it is the function of the intellect to decide, and) we can proceed to action only when there is an order or decision to that effect[1] (20-22). 22

PERFECTION IS A RELATIVE TERM—When we speak of perfection, we should understand that the term is used in a relative sense,—with reference to something preceding it; and so we should understand it to mean "the best according to our knowledge." No special argument is required 23 to prove this, because if we take a thing out of its whole, we find that we get no desire or impulse to action. (All things are, therefore, connected together,) and that is illustrated by the idea of a ceremony lasting for twelve days, to which there is a reference in the sacred books (23-24). 24

PROCESS OF ACTION—If there were no impulse to action, a person would not be able to act at all, with the result that the laws of action would be proved to be untrue. But we find that there is an order from within, calling upon us to act; and, as this order is constantly repeated, there is a corresponding repetition in the text to express the idea of this law. Before we act, however, we find 25 that there is an order to act on the one hand, and a prohibition against it on the other;[2] and when in the end we act or do not act, it means that there is a balance of judgement on that side (25-26). 26

[1] It is the principal function of the intellect, *Buddhi* or reason, to discriminate between different things, and arrive at a conclusion or decide.

[2] This refers to a certain discussion that always goes on within us before we act. We have to consider the *pros* and *cons* of an action, and, with it, arguments for and against it; and have to decide whether to act or not to act. All this involves an exercise of our judgement or the function of the intellect; and it is for this reason that the highest place in action is given to *Chitta* or the intellect.

Action and Time—(Action involves a reference to Time). When there is a conflict of statements about the time of an action, we ask, in a manner of speech,—When did it take place? (27). 27

An irresistible Impulse—In certain actions,—specially those which we regard as religious, or of a virtuous character, the impulse to action, as we have often heard, is of an irresistible character; and the explanation of it can 28-29 easily be understood (28-30). 30

Difference and Harmony in Action—Each action has a separate cause, and requires a separate method of performance; but, though there is lack of unity because a 31 number of opposite forces are at work,—the connection between the laws of action gives us an idea of how all kinds of actions are linked together (31-32). 32

CHAPTER III

PART I

THE LAW OF ACTION: HOW DESCRIBED IN THE VEDAS

There can be no action without a purpose or cause; and its result is for the sake of *purusha* or the soul (1-12).
There can only be one action at a time (13-15); and actions may be divided into main and subsidiary ones (16-19).
We have to express all this in language, and it can be done in various ways (20-27).

RESULT OF ACTION—Let us consider the characteristic marks of effect or the result of action. This effect or 1 result is meant for the sake of something else; and Badari 2 says that it is for the purpose of acquiring some object, or wealth, or attribute, or purifying one's self. Jaimini 3 says that it consists in action too, for that may be the result of our aim (1-4). 4

FOR THE SAKE OF THE SOUL—The result, however, is for the sake of *purusha* or the individual soul; and the soul 5 too is for the sake of action[1]; and all these are connected 6

[1] The soul is said to be the enjoyer or experiencer of the result of action, and so it is the soul that is said to feel pleasure and pain (BhG. XIII, 21-22). In that case the soul must be deemed to be an actor too.

The point of view of the *Sāṅkhya* is somewhat different. While it agrees that all result is meant for the sake of *purusha* or the soul,— the highest result is that which makes for the purification of the soul, and so makes it free. The *Bhagavad Gītā* also tells us that all action is meant for the purification of the soul (BhG. V, 11). The *Sāṅkhya*, however, believes that it can be attained by means of knowledge,

together by means of purpose. This is a universal law, 7
applicable to all cases and in all circumstances; for if there 8
be no purpose, there can be no action. The result of an 9
action follows action: were it otherwise, we should be
able to get the result without action; and a person is 10
moved to action because of the effect or result he expects
to produce. The purpose and qualities of a person become 11
one in action, for that is the law of action (5-12). 12

ONE ACTION AT A TIME—A person can engage in only one
action at a time, and there is good reason for saying so. 13
This is a characteristic of all, for it is a universal law. But 14
all action is performed for the sake of something else, and
this should be accepted, even as the sacred books tell us 15
(13-15).

NOT APPLICABLE TO SUBSIDIARY ACTIONS—But, while this
is the prescribed order of things, it does not mean that
there is a fixed relation of time and place so far as subsi-
diary actions are concerned.[1] But there is such a relation 16
in respect of deliberate action or action characterised
by the function of the intellect; and we have the testimony
of wise and trustworthy persons to prove that it is so.[2] 17
This is proved by the fact that subordinate (or reflex)

[1] The *Mīmānsā* has divided actions into two kinds,—main and subsidiary, or deliberate and reflex. The law of one action at a time applies only to deliberate actions, because subsidiary or reflex actions can go on at the same time. There is a fixed relation of time and place in respect of deliberate, and not subsidiary, actions.

[2] The word in the text is *śabda*, which means oral testimony of wise and trustworthy persons. We know from their statement that there is a fixed relation of time and place in respect of deliberate actions. We have no other means of finding this, and have no reason to doubt their statement.

actions are without deliberate purpose or aim. But where the subordinate actions of a person cannot be integrated, there should be a separate statement about it (16-19). 18 19

USE OF LANGUAGE—(This leads to a consideration of how ideas should be expressed in language). When an idea is not covered by a statement already made, and it is necessary properly to describe it,—it should be possible to do so by means of a single expression. But where the matter is intricate or causes confusion, and there are other obstacles in the way, a separate statement may be necessary (20-21). 20 21

Where the subordinate parts of an action are performed for the sake of something else, they should normally be taken separately, and not closely connected with one another. Where, however, they are put together, they should be deemed to be there not because of any inherent connection with one another, but for some other purpose. Indeed, it is not a rule that they should be placed in close proximity to one another; and that is so because we desire to have as perfect a statement as possible. If, however, any part of the statement relating to the subordinate parts of an action is in excess of the requirements of the case, we should accept it in a general sense, and without any close connection with the main action. The difference between the statement and the object to be described arises from the difference in the purpose of each, because each symbol has a meaning of its own. The purpose of the text regarding the subordinate parts of an action is that the character of the idea should be properly expressed (22-27). 22 23 24 25 26 27

PART II

THE LANGUAGE OF THE VEDAS AND HOW TO UNDERSTAND IT

The language of the *Mantras* of the Vedas does not appear to be in harmony with the objects described (1-4); but every word is not like that (5-8). It is only when the original meaning does not refer to the laws of life that we should reject it (9-10); and we shall find that the language of the Vedas, when properly understood, does refer to the laws of life (11).

If that be so, how do we get the common meaning bearing on the idea of sacrifice? (12). On the other hand, if this be the real meaning of the text, and we are also able to get another meaning, should not the latter too refer to the idea of sacrifice, for both of them are obtained from the same undivided text? (13-18).

There is a reference to the *Krama* method of reading the text, which enables us to transform a *Mantra* or a hymn of praise into *Vidhi* or the law of life (19-20). Indeed, if the Vedas have any real value, they should have a different interpretation (21-26). We are led to this conclusion by the use of certain special terms in the text (27-29). But it is necessary to have a regular system of interpretation, which indeed exists, but requires skill to use it (30-33). For instance, we can easily understand the meaning of the word *Tvashṭṛ*, but not so of the number thirty (34-36). Again, there are certain words the meaning of which has been defined, and they have to be understood in that light (37-40). There is personification too: for instance, Desire is personified as a god, and associated with the *Soma* juice (41-43).

THE LANGUAGE OF THE VEDAS—The *Mantras* (believed to be hymns of praise, addressed to the gods) refer to a number of objects closely connected with one another; but certain words appear to be missing, which need to be supplied, in order to understand the text. But if there are no real gaps, the original connection of words must have been based on some other meaning, about which there must have been a consensus of opinion. But if the common meaning be the real one, it should not contain anything contrary to rules of morality or what is enjoined. For instance, there is such an incongruity in the de-

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scription of *Indra*;[1] and when a person breaks rules of morality, his description should correspond to his actions; (but it is not so in this case) (1-4). 3 4

NEED OF A NEW MEANING—It may be argued that (if the text of the *Mantras* has a different meaning from the apparent one,) it should be so in the case of *āhvāṇa* or invocation of the deity too. But this is not necessary, for it only lays down the proper time for the invocation of the deity; and there is no reference to any attributes or auxiliary acts, as can easily be proved. It is only where the meaning of a word, in its original form, appears to be incompatible with our conception of the laws of life, that we should reject it. Indeed, if we recite the hymns correctly, we shall find that they refer to the laws of Time or life (5-11). 5 6 7-8 9 10 11

AN OBJECTION AND AN ANSWER—It may, however, be argued that the original meaning, bearing on the idea of sacrifice, could not have come out of no-where; and so that is the real meaning of the deities. But if that be their real meaning,—and yet there is another way of interpreting the text as well,—the latter should also convey the idea of offering a proper sacrifice; and in both cases all that is taught should remain continuous and whole, like a garland of flowers. We are justified in saying this, because both the meanings refer to the same language,—taken in its entirety and without any division (12-18). 12 13 14 15 16-17 18

[1] We have already been told that there are certain descriptions in the text of the Vedas which appear to reflect on persons otherwise held in high esteem; and that leads us to believe that there is likely to be some other meaning of the text (Cf. I, ii, 45).

KRAMA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE—There is mention of the *Krama* method of reading the Vedas; and we find that it is like a "disguise" in which the narrative contains all that we seek; and the governing rule is that a *Mantra* or 19 a hymn of praise should, in the light of these names and what has been taught, be the same as *Vidhi* or the law of life (19-20).[1] 20

NEED OF A NEW MEANING—But we can say this only when we get both the meanings from the same text. But the 21 meaning in its original form is valueless, because it does not yield any result, nor does worship or going to the sanctuary of a god give the promised fruit. This applies 22 to the teaching of all the *Mantras*; and if this is the real 23 meaning of the Vedas, their only purpose would appear to be to minister to eating and drinking; and so both 24 their form and teaching would drag us down, because that is what is said to be enjoined. If, however, the Vedas 25 have any merit of composition, the hymns,—charming as they are—should serve as a single instrument of thought, and both the meanings converge to but a single sense 26 (21-26).

SPECIAL TERMS—There is a special mention of certain symbols or terms which convey the same idea in all circumstances. They have been used in connection with *Indra*; but, as they do not retain their special meaning, they should not have been used. A god represents an 27 aspect of Nature or *Prakṛti*; but if the word has two 28 meanings, there is an implication that there is something in respect of the whole text which has not been properly

[1] The idea of *Krama* has already been explained (Cf. II, iv. 3, n.).

expressed, and something needs to be taken from the one to the other side (27-29). 29

NEED OF A SYSTEM—At the same time it would not be possible to get the correct meaning without a system; 30 (and the system is there, only it requires skill to use it); and if we try to "seize" the text or grab at its meaning, we shall not succeed. As has already been observed, the 31 real meaning is like possessing a wife;[1] and if we grab at it, 32 the whole work would be badly done and suffer from 33 contradictions (30-33).

INSTANCES—We can get the meaning of the word *Tvashṭṛ* (as Mind) from the reference to drinking *Soma*[2] (which means the same thing); but if the two ideas are not 34 equal, we cannot always succeed in this way. For 35 instance, the number thirty has a very different meaning[3] 36 (34-36).

[1] Cf. II, iii, 19.

[2] *Tvashṭṛ* is said to be a god,—"the heavenly builder and creator of living beings". He is also said to be a maker of divine implements—specially of *Indra's* thunderbolt.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that he refers to the mind, because of the reference to his drinking *Soma*, which also means the mind. This means that *Tvashṭṛ* is conceived to be the supreme Mind which creates all things. The special attribute of the Mind is Desire; and the Upanishads tell us that creation takes place through the desire of the Supreme (RV. X, cxxix, 3-4; Chh. Up. VI, ii, 3; Tait. Up. II, vi). *Indra's* thunderbolt would accordingly refer to the function of the mind.

[3] The number thirty is a multiple of 3 and 10; and the one refers to the mind and the other to the senses of knowledge and action, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us later on. Hence it refers to the function of the mind in association with the senses. We cannot get the meaning of this number in the same simple way as that of *Tvashṭṛ*, for it requires a different approach.

WORDS WITH DEFINED MEANINGS—(There are certain words, the meanings of which have been defined): for instance, *Vashaṭ* signifies performance of action;[1] and *Chhanda* means desire, regarded as an obstacle in our path.[2] Similarly, when there is a joint reference to *Indra* and *Agni*, we should be able to distinguish between them from the character of the conclusions that are drawn; and though close to each other, we should be able to get at the idea of each one separately[3] (37-40). 37 38 39 40

DESIRE AS A GOD: ITS CHARACTER—Desire may also be personified as a god.[4] There is desire in all creatures, but 41

[1] *Vashaṭ* is an exclamation uttered by the *Hotṛ* priest at the end of the sacrificial verse, on hearing which the *Adhvaryu* priest casts the oblation offered to the deity into the fire.

As we shall see, the *Hotṛ* priest refers to the mind, and the *Adhvaryu* to the senses; while fire, as the *Mīmānsā* has told us, refers to the function of the intellect. We are now told that *Vashaṭ* signifies the performance of action: that is to say, it is an indication by the mind (*Hotṛ*) to the senses (*Adhvaryu*) that a particular action may be done in accordance with the direction of the intellect.

[2] The word *Chhanda* has a number of meanings, one of which is desire, which, as the *Gītā* tells us, may be an obstacle in our path (BhG. III, 37-43).

[3] *Agni*, as we have been told, refers to the intellect; while *Indra*, the Upanishads tell us, refers to the self-conscious soul; and the two may, for practical purposes, be identified. But we can also distinguish between them, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us.

[4] This means that there are certain desires which are both intelligent and good, and so are personified as gods; for all desires are not an obstacle in the path of our progress. The *Bhagavad Gītā* also tells us that *Kṛshṇa* or God himself is Desire, unopposed to Dharma, in all creatures (BhG. VII, 11); that is to say, whenever a person has a desire which is characterised by Dharma (good and intelligent desire, meant for the benefit of all), he should regard it as the voice of God within him.

Desire is personified as a god in the sacred books in the form of *Kāma-deva*,—"the god of Desire" or "Desire regarded as a god";

one and the same desire does not exist among all. According to *Aitiśāyana*[1] the common characteristic of all desires is that they arise from attachment,—attachment to drinking;[2] and claim that they are entitled to have the *Soma* juice[3] (41-43). 42 43

PART III

THE LAW OF ACTION

The claim of Desire to its fulfilment is based on reason (1-5) Desire is associated with both knowledge and action (6-8). There are primary and subsidiary causes of Desire, which can be understood by means of knowledge (9-10).

Action consists of a number of parts, each of which is associated with desire (11); but, as these parts progress without a break, it appears to be one (12-13).

Action is of many kinds, and all deliberate action is characterised by purpose (14-17); and in its final form it is associated with some object of Nature (18-19).

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and he is also spoken of as the god of love, because that is the highest and purest form of desire; and so *Kāma-deva* is said to be the name of *Vishṇu*, the supreme Creator, himself.

[1] *Aitiśāyana* means a descendant of *Itiṣa*, about whom very little is known. But his opinion is cited in the *Mīmānsā* in more than one place.

[2] Drinking means drinking wine, which refers to the mind, for *Soma* means wine as well as the moon or the mind. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that Desire is a characteristic of the Mind, for it arises from attachment to the function of the mind (drinking wine).

[3] *Soma* or the *Soma* plant refers to the mind, and its "juice" to desire, which is "pressed" out of it. Desire also refers to a desirable object, or the object of desire; and it is in this sense that it is used here in the text.

According to *Aitiśāyana* it is a common characteristic of desire that all those who have it believe that they are entitled to have it fulfilled, —that is, to possess the object of their desire.

Action consists of a number of parts, and there is no action which consists of only one part (20-25); and there is always a cause or purpose for a deliberate action (26-31).

All deliberate action is characterised by reason, and is an expression of the creative power of Nature itself (32-35).

Animals alone are characterised by purpose in action (36-40); but there is reason to believe that there is purpose in the actions of the gods or the working of the great forces of Nature (41-42).

There is also a law of conflict in Nature; but in every case there is only one action at a time (43-46).

DESIRE AND ITS FULFILMENT—This claim on the part of Desire (that it is entitled to the object it seeks) must be based on reason. It may arise from knowledge,—chiefly [1] from something that has been seen; or from inference; [2-3] or from reference to Dharma or a law, without any connection with a particular object;[1] and the sum total of the [4] knowledge of the three Vedas consists in understanding this[2] (1-5). [5]

[1] It is not possible to have a real desire unless we also believe, however erroneously, that it can be satisfied, and we can achieve the object we seek. That is how desire is followed by action, which would be impossible otherwise.

[2] The Vedas, as the *Mīmānsā* has told us, deal with the three *Guṇas* or attributes of Nature, which are said to embrace all forms of life in the universe, including Man,—all except his soul. But, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us later on, we cannot understand the nature of the soul except with reference to the other faculties of man,—his intellect, mind, and the senses; and, as all these are subject to the *Guṇas*, we might say that all that we can imagine, including the character and functions of the soul,—in so far as we can understand them—comes under the purview of the *Guṇas*, and so constitutes the subject-matter of the Vedas.

But, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, the Vedas deal with the problem in the light of Dharma or a moral law of life, which is also its own subject-matter; and Dharma is based on action characterised by knowledge or discrimination. The *Mīmānsā* has told us that the other systems have dealt with the problem of knowledge and action, but not discovered its law; and its own problem is to discover it. Now what integrates the two is Desire which, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, begins as knowledge and ends as action, and is re-born as knowledge again. Thus, if we wish

DESIRE, KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION—We cannot say that Desire only begins with knowledge, for it enters into everything, and its association continues to the end; but because it is associated with knowledge, it cannot be driven out by any amount of action (6-8). 6-7 8

KNOWLEDGE AND PRIMARY AND SUBSIDIARY CAUSE OF DESIRE—There are primary and subsidiary causes of desire; and knowledge refers to its primary cause,—for that is the very purpose of knowledge (namely, to awaken desire). Indeed, it is by means of knowledge that we can understand both its primary and subsidiary causes (9-10). 9 10

ACTION AND ITS PARTS—(Action consists of a number of parts, and) as there is a desire that each part should be properly performed, its different parts cannot be performed at the same time. There is, however, an uninterrupted progress of action, because all its parts are connected with one another by means of common properties; and it is for this reason that the whole action appears to be one (11-13). 11 12 13

MANY KINDS OF ACTION—Action is of many kinds,—of the senses of knowledge (e.g. hearing), of the senses of action (e.g. speech), the mind and the intellect (e.g. inference, discussion, name);[1] and it is associated with some place. But its great weakness consists in being

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to understand the law of knowledge and action, we should understand the law of Desire; and if we do so, we can understand the essence of what is contained in the three Vedas.

[1] The function of the mind is twofold,—*Nāma* and *Rūpa*—giving a name and calling up an image; while the function of the intellect is discussion, decision, or drawing an inference.

dragged down by a purpose or aim.[1] Nevertheless, a virtuous person is not weakened by action, however much it be.[2] Indeed, were there no purpose, we could not perform any principal or deliberate action at all; while, with a purpose, we can perform two or many more (14-17).

NATURE OF PURPOSE IN ACTION—Purpose in action does not consist in the advancement of a particular theory or opinion alone; for it must, in any case, be associated with some object of Nature (18-19).

AN ACTION CONSISTS OF PARTS—When we say that a thing is part of a whole, it means that there must at least be two things,—one coming after the other; and the impelling force of action is new (or different) in each case. It would be contrary to the laws of Nature to say that an action may consist of only one part; for all things in Nature are connected with one another, and a violation of this law would render everything meaningless, even as we cannot buy anything with only one party to the transaction. Buying a thing means at least an attraction for an object: similarly, when a person performs an action, there is always some cause for it. This rule, however, applies only to deliberate actions, characterised by a plan;

[1] The highest form of action is said to be that which is disinterested or devoid of any special purpose or aim; and so having a purpose is sometimes regarded as a weakness or defect in action.

[2] At the same time we cannot act without purpose; and so the *Mīmānsā* makes it clear that good actions or the actions of virtuous men do not involve any taint. These actions are a sacrifice,—good, intelligent, and meant for the benefit of all; and so, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us, we can perform such actions and yet be free from any taint (BhG. III, 9, 13; IV, 19-23, 32; V, 7-12, etc.).

but it is true of all creatures who act, because they have all, without exception, a purpose in action. It is only those things 28 which have some useful purpose to serve that are praised; 29 but, as it is possible to say that all things serve some useful purpose, it would be meaningless to single out any for special praise, specially when there is nothing permanent 30 in the world (20-31). 31

CHARACTER OF DELIBERATE ACTION—All deliberate action is characterised by reason or reflection, because it is preceded by some discussion within us; and this is an expression of the 32 creative power of Nature working in the doer of the deed; for 33 we must admit that it is a law of Nature that there should be growth as well obstacles in the development of things; 34 and it applies to all cases without distinction (32-35). 35

ANIMALS HAVE THIS PURPOSE—This purpose exists in an animal; but because it does not exist in a mass of ground rice, we should not suppose that it does not exist in an animal. We cannot say that an animal too is devoid of 36 purpose; for it cannot exist without it, because it must 37 eat and digest food, and bear the consequence of things. 38 But each animal is a separate entity, for such is the re- 39 striction imposed by its nature (36-40). 40

PURPOSE IN THE ACTIONS OF GODS OR THE FORCES OF NATURE —It is possible to say that there is purpose in another entity too,—a god or a great force of Nature, because it is regarded as a cause of action; and there is reason for 41 thinking so (41-42). 42

LAW OF CONFLICT—It follows from this that there is a clash among things, and it is so in accordance with a law.

But since there is no purpose in a pot or a saucepan, there is, of course, no conflict in it (43). 43

Law of Purpose—According to the law of purpose it is only one object that can act at a time. If there be two together, both cannot act at the same time, as it would be contrary to law; and this applies to *Indra* and *Agni* too[1]. 44 This can be illustrated by the action of a toothless person, 45 and is an absolute truth[2] (44-46). 46

PART IV

THE LAW OF LIFE IN THE VEDAS: PURPOSE IN ACTION AND ACTIONLESSNESS

This is the law of the life of Man, described in the Vedas in a veiled manner, and we can understand it if we pierce through the "disguise" of words (1-14). But it requires deep concentration to do so (15-16); and it is in this manner that we can understand the meaning of certain words (17).

There is purpose in both action and actionlessness, and their idea is expressed in the text in this manner (18-20). This enables us to understand that there is a perfect law of life described in the Vedas; but it requires experience, intelligence, self-surrender, and a measure of good luck to succeed (21-23).

The ordinary meaning of the text is like a woman wearing dirty clothes (24-25); but we should try to get a new meaning only when the ordinary one does not refer to a law of life (26-29). We can accept the new meaning only if the result is

[1] There are a number of hymns in the Vedas addressed jointly to *Indra* and *Agni*; but that does not mean that they can act jointly.

[2] Toothlessness can illustrate the idea of one action at a time; for when a toothless person puts food into his mouth, he can only swallow it. We cannot say in his case that the teeth act on the food or the food on the teeth; and as it is he himself that is acting on it, we see clearly that there can be only one action at a time.

satisfactory, and refers to the law of Action or action performed as a Sacrifice (30-33).
The idea that desire arises from some evil or sin is a popular heresy, for it can also be part of Sacrifice; and its idea may be illustrated by the act of dying in the defence of some one (34-38).
But desire can be evil too: only the person who has it does not regard it so,—for that is the very nature of desire, and that is the reason why he seeks means to attain his object (39-45).
Desire is connected with action in various ways, and success arises out of action (46-52).
We can understand the ideas of certain expressions used in the text in a special way (53-57).

LAW OF MAN'S LIFE, DESCRIBED IN THE VEDAS IN A VEILED FORM—This is the law of the life of Man, described in the Vedas in a "veiled" manner, because it is very important to use the correct expression or the right word. 1 We know that there is this "disguise", because we can find out the correct meaning. But the new meaning 2 should be of the nature of a law; and the largest portion of 3 the text should refer to the law of action. We should get 4 this result when the words required to complete the sense are supplied; and the new meaning should fit into 5 the whole body of the text without contradiction, and 6 remain unchanged throughout the principal part of the work,—because it is based on proper thought, after we have considered the other meaning and rejected it; and so 7 we should be able to explain the meaning of any precept in its light. This is possible because it does refer to a 8 law; and when we see through the "disguise", we find 9 that all our ideas of a law are held together and purified in this way. But by reading the book as it is, we do not 10 see anything relating to the idea of a law; whereas the 11 new meaning should be of the nature of such a law, and 12 it should be such as can uplift us. This is what is meant 13 by "seeing through the disguise" (1-14). 14

IT REQUIRES CONCENTRATION—But the new meaning can be grasped only by means of deep concentration of thought. 15 But because there is a reason for it, there is always something in the text to suggest what it really is; and it is in 16 this manner that words like *Parushī*, *Dita*, *Pūrṇa*, *Ghṛta*, and *Vidagdha* are used in the text.[1] (15-17). 17

ACTIONLESSNESS—(It is in the same manner that we have an explanation of the idea of actionlessness); for even actionlessness has a purpose, and it is in this light that we should understand its idea[2]; and when we grasp the 18 inner meaning of the text, we see that it gives the idea of a law; and there is no error in following this meaning 19 (18-20). 20

CHARACTER OF THE TEXT—When a person gains experience in this special treatment of the text, he will find that it contains a perfect expression of the idea of a law. Indeed, 21 the text is so composed that an experienced person can anticipate that certain words would follow to give the required sense. But it is a fortunate one who can succeed 22 in getting the correct meaning; and it requires complete self-surrender to do so (21-23). 23

[1] It would be diffcult to explain the meaning of these words without reference to the context.

[2] The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that he is a wise man who sees inaction (actionlessness) in action, and action in actionlessness; and so performs all kinds of actions (BhG. IV, 18). Thus there is no essential difference between the two; and so, if there is purpose in action, there must be one in actionlessness too. The *Mīmānsā* explains later on that the idea of actionlessness must be understood in a relative and not an absolute sense,—and with reference to time. That is, that there comes a time when a person cannot act; and that is the time of death,—for it is only then that he can really give up action.

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO MEANINGS—The ordinary meaning of the text may be compared to a woman wearing dirty clothes, and it is only when they are removed that we can see her purer form. This is necessary, because we refuse to accept the grosser form of what is pure and undefiled. But this idea of a law cannot be found in the principal topic of discussion, and so we have to find it in some special way. But it is only when the ordinary meaning does not refer to a concept of philosophy, that we should think of a new meaning that does so; and we can get it if we have the necessary knowledge; and we shall find that it is closely connected with these ideas of philosophy (24-29).

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TEST OF CORRECTNESS—We should agree about the correctness of the new meaning only if the result achieved is satisfactory,—for that is the measure of its success; and, according to *Aitiśāyana*, it should refer to action. Indeed, there is no difference of opinion in the matter that the entire text should refer to all kinds of actions[1]. At the same time we should be able to show that the *Homa* oblation is connected with the sacred fire, *āhavanīya*[2]; and

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[1] The *Mīmānsā* tells us that this is the subject-matter of the *Rig Veda:* it deals with the problem of action conceived in the widest sense of the term, and without any limitations.

[2] *Homa* is an act of making an oblation to the gods by pouring clarified butter into the fire. We have seen that fire refers to intelligence; and, as we shall see, clarified butter refers to the idea of goodness (p. 52, n.). *Homa* is, therefore, an act of adding goodness to intelligence in an action; and it is this that makes it an act of sacrifice.

We have explained that of the three kinds of sacrificial fires, *āhavanīya* refers to intelligent action performed in the world; and as such action must be for the benefit of others too, *āhavanīya* is closely associated with *Homa*.

the rest of the explanation should follow from the narrative itself (30-33). 33

DESIRE AND EVIL—The idea that desire always arises from some evil or sin should be regarded as a popular heresy. The sacred books tell us that there can be no sinfulness in desire so far as it refers to knowledge. If 34 there is no unfortunate occurrence in connection with desire, we should regard it as part of the idea of sacrifice. 35 Such a desire does not make any distinction between action and action; and it has its own characteristics to distinguish 36 it from other forms of desire, and is always associated with action performed as a sacrifice and at the proper time. 37 To die in the defence of some one is an action of this kind[1] 38 (34-38).

EXTENT OF EVIL IN DESIRE—Desire should be deemed to arise from evil only when we are satisfied in a scientific manner that it is so, and not merely because it is said to be so in a popular form of speech; and this should be 39 regarded as true for all times and without exception. We 40 find that a person who has desire thinks of it in the same manner (that is, he does not regard it as an evil, so far as he himself is concerned); and that is due to the very 41 nature of desire.[2] All gifts and oblations are made 42 in this way; and we shall arrive at the same conclusion 43 if we divide desires into parts and distribute them (when we shall find that the possessor of desire will have that

[1] This is the idea of desire that is not opposed to Dharma, referred to in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (BhG. VII, 11).

[2] It is the nature of desire that the possessor of it does not regard it as evil,—at least so far as he himself is concerned.

which he regards as good for himself). That is the reason 44
why a man seeks means to achieve his object (39-45). 45

DESIRE AND ACTION—If the object of desire is unessential or secondary, we find that it is desired only once; for 46
we see that it is so from the actual result. Even when a 47
person does not desire to act, he must still do so, because he depends for his very existence on the result of actions; and 48
we see that it is so from what he actually does. Thus we 49
see that it is because of this that all creatures engage in action,—for they have the same identical motive (namely, to live); and this may be seen from their characteristics.[1] 50-51
Again, if a number of persons act as a result of a common desire, their actions will be in accordance with their desire (46-52). 52

SPECIAL FORMS OF EXPRESSION—(Certain ideas have been expressed in a special manner; for instance,) priority of time gives us the idea of what is first or most important. 53
If we do not hear that a person has anything for food or drink, we should take it that the word *dāna* (giving) means distribution of food; and we are familiar with 54
that meaning of the word. Again, food is identical with 55
a material substance, and that is how we can get its meaning. It is for this reason that the act of giving is 56
praised, and there is a special injunction to that effect 57
(53-57).

[1] We have the same idea in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (BhG. III, 8).

PART V

CHARITY, DESIRE AND SATISFACTION

Acts of charity or *dāna* are good deeds (1-4). It is only when something is left over or saved that it can be given away as charity or gift, and it is an act of sacrifice (5-9).

A whole means the whole of what exists at a particular time, and it is divisible into parts (10-12). The same is true of all kinds of actions (13-15). Actions are different from one another; and in order to understand them, we should divide them into parts (16-17). There are some who believe that action gives satisfaction to the soul and not the mind; but we should examine this opinion carefully before accepting it (18-21).

The origin of desire is knowledge (22-26), and animate and not inanimate objects derive satisfaction from it (27-28). This idea of satisfaction is described in the sacred books in various ways (29-35).

The mind and the senses too have their share in satisfaction (36-39); and we can understand this from certain terms used in the text (40-45). But satisfaction is obtained only when a thing is transformed into something else (46-53).

NATURE OF DANA—Acts of *dāna* or charity are good deeds in all respects; and there is good reason for thinking 1 so. In this case the meaning is obtained by dividing the 2 word (used for goodness) into parts;[1] and we also find 3

[1] The word used in the text is *ājya* which, as has already been observed, signifies goodness. This *Sūtra* tells us that we can get this meaning by dividing the word into parts; and we are told later on that we should divide it into two parts.

The word *ājya* would accordingly have to be reduced to *aja*, for it means "relating to *aja*"; and *aja* may be divided into *a*, *ja*; and we have to understand its idea by giving suitable meanings to these letters.

The letter "*a*" has a number of meanings; but the most suitable here would be "not" and "like"; and, similarly, the most suitable meanings of "*ja*" would be "poison" and "enjoyment". *Aja* would, accordingly, mean "not poison" or "like enjoyment"; and, with reference to desire, imply that desire is not evil, and may be deemed to be even enjoyable. Hence it signifies goodness as an essential element of desire.

that the explanation of the meaning of the expression "properly done"[1] takes us to the idea of goodness (1-4). 4

CONDITIONS OF DANA—It is only when something is left over or saved that it can be given away as gift or charity; 5 and the idea of universal gift or *dāna* cannot last (or is self-contradictory). A gift can be divided into parts like 6 speech, and it is an intelligent act like a *Homa* sacrifice.[2] 7 But it is not like a cake or sweetmeat;[3] for were it so, 8 it would be incompatible with the idea of sacrifice, which requires imagination, ascertainment, selection and arrangement of things[4] (5-9). 9

WHOLE AND ITS PARTS—When we use the word "whole", it means in every case the whole of what is produced; 10 and it is greater than the different things of which it is made. When we divide the whole into its parts, the last 11 in the series can have but one purpose to serve; and the 12

Ajya also means "clarified butter" poured over the sacrificial fire: and, as the *Mīmānsā* has told us that fire or *Agni* means intelligence, "the pouring of *ājya* (clarified butter) over *Agni*" would mean adding goodness to intelligence in an act of sacrifice.

[1] The word in the text is *Svishṭa-kṛt*, which means "properly done"; and it is also a name of *Agni*. As the latter refers to the intellect, the idea is that an action intelligently done alone can be properly done; and it leads to the idea of goodness too.

[2] The idea of *Homa* as a good and intelligent action has already been explained.

[3] Giving *dāna* or making a real offering of charity is not like giving away sweetmeat or a cake. It is an act of sacrifice. The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us of the different ways in which *dāna* can be made; and the best gift is that which is made to a proper man, in a proper place, and at the proper time, and is given because it is the right thing to do (BhG. XVII, 20-22).

[4] The word in the text is *Kalpana*, which means "imagining, ascertaining, selecting, putting in proper place".

same is the case with a sacrifice or an offering properly and intelligently made. The same is true of actions asso- 13 ciated with *Indra* too,[1] and also of all actions referred to 14 in the sacred books[2] (10-15). 15

DIFFERENT KINDS OF ACTIONS—Actions differ although the material substances associated with them may be the same; 16 and so all actions should be performed. In order to understand an action, we should divide it into parts till nothing is left; then, beginning with the last, go back to the first[3] (16-17). 17

ACTION AND SATISFACTION—According to some teachers, there should, in every action associated with *Indra* and *Vāyu*[4], be a measure of satisfaction; but not so in the case 18 of action associated with *Soma*[5],—although in certain 19 circumstances it may be so, if we see a different meaning

Indra, as the Upanishads tell us, refers to *Prājñātman* or the self-conscious soul.

[2] All actions may be divided into parts, and the last in the series can serve but one purpose.

[3] As the idea of the division of a word into its parts corresponds to that of an action, we have, in a number of cases, to put together the meanings of the parts of a word in the manner explained in this *Sūtra*: that is, begin with the last letter, and go back, step by step, to the first. There are a number of such cases in the MM. I-V.

[4] *Indra* refers to the soul, and *Vāyu*, commonly believed to be Air, to its vital breath; and the two are closely allied.

[5] *Soma* refers to the Mind, as has already been explained.

The point of these two *Sūtras* is that there are some who believe that, while action gives satisfaction to the soul and its vital breath, it does not give satisfaction to the mind. The author of the *Mīmānsā*, however, does not agree with this view; for he tells us later on that not only the mind, but the senses too get their share of satisfaction.

in what they say[1]. But these teachings are new, and we should see that they do not conflict with the rules (18-21). 20 21

THE ORIGIN OF DESIRE IS KNOWLEDGE—When we hear the name of sweetmeats or cakes, a desire arises within us, and the cause of the desire is the name itself. We may hear only one man sing the praise of the cake; or it may be all, because all are associated with it; or only the singers of its praise may desire to have it,—having been drawn to it from what they have heard. All these desires are associated with knowledge, and so should be grouped together[2] (22-26). 22 23 24 25 26

SATISFACTION—(There can be no satisfaction in the case of inanimate objects; and so) the sacred books do not tell us that the *Soma-stones* get any satisfaction when the *Soma-juice* is pressed out.[3] This satisfaction arises when one secures an attractive object; and so it may be said to arise from association with all objects (27-28). 27 28

[1] But he is careful to add that, although these teachers hold certain views, it is possible to read some other meaning too in what they say; and, in that case, we may find that the mind has its share of satisfaction in action too.

[2] The origin of desire is knowledge, which arises when the senses (ears) come into contact with an object (or when we hear the praise of a cake). The *Bhagavad Gītā* also tells us that when a man thinks of the objects of the senses, he forms attachment for them, and that gives rise to desire (BhG. II, 62); and again we are told that the senses are drawn towards their objects (BhG. III, 34), which gives rise to the function of the mind and its attribute,—desire.

[3] *Soma* refers to the mind; and *Soma-stones* would refer to the objects of nature, by means of which desire is generated or "pressed out". Desire is, accordingly, expressed in terms of *Soma-juice*.

HOW DESCRIBED—The idea of satisfaction is expressed in terms of a cake, because we get it when we have it. The 29 meaning of all other words, like the mention of a cake, is also in accordance with the same rules. Similarly, we 30 should understand that the exclamation *Vashaṭ* refers to satisfaction in the performance of action;[1] and the same 31 idea is expressed by *Homa* and *Soma* sacrifices.[2] The 32 difference between cakes and other expressions is that the idea of satisfaction is obvious in the one case,—not so in the rest. But even in the case of other expressions we 33 should understand that there is a reference to satisfaction through action, because there is good reason for doing so; and even where there is no special mention of cakes, we should understand, from a general statement of the text, that there is a reference to the doer of the deed. In the 34 case of a cake, we can understand the idea of satisfaction from a different point of view[3] (29-35). 35

[1] The idea of *Vashaṭ* has already been explained. It refers to the performance of action; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that the fact that we are directed to perform an action implies that there is satisfaction in it.

The expression for "satisfaction" in the text means literally "eating and drinking".

[2] *Homa* refers to a good and intelligent act; and both goodness and intelligence are of the essence of the idea of sacrifice.

Soma refers to the mind; and so *Soma-sacrifice* refers to the proper function of the mind.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that there is satsifaction in doing a good and intelligent act (*Homa*), and also in a proper function of the mind (*Soma-sacrifice*).

[3] The idea of satisfaction in a cake is obvious, for we get it when we eat it. It is not quite so obvious in the other instances, and we have to make an effort to understand it. There can be no action without satisfaction of some kind; nor can there be any without a doer of the deed: and this is what the *Mīmānsā* tells us.

SATISFACTION OF THE SENSES AND THE MIND—If we interpret the text in accordance with *Krama*, we shall find that it is the *Adhvaryu* priests[1] (the ten senses of knowledge and action) who get satisfaction through action first; or it may be the *Hotṛ* priest[2] (the mind), as we may find from the form of the *Mantras*. We get this from the meaning of the text, and for a good reason too (36-39). 36 37 38-39

IDEA OF SATISFACTION: HOW EXPRESSED—This satisfaction is permitted in accordance with the teachings of the sacred books. The text contains words like "invite", "invited in that place"; and if we understand the character of its language, we shall see that it is in this manner that a request is made; and it is in accordance with this meaning that 40 41

[1] It is said that there are four *Ritvij* priests who take part in a sacrifice instituted by a *Yajamāna* or a sacrificer, who pays for it. They are *Brāhmaṇa*, *Udgātṛ*, *Hotṛ*, and *Adhvaryu* Of these the *Mīmānsā* defines *Brāhmaṇa* to mean the intellect, and tells us that the *Adhvaryus* are ten in number, and so would refer to the ten senses of knowledge and action. Of the remaining two, the *Mīmānsā* tells us that we can get their meaning by dividing the words into parts; and then we shall see that they refer to *ahañkāra* (or the I-as-an-actor) and the mind respectively. Thus the four *Ritvij* priests refer to the four faculties of man,—his intellect, the I-as-an-actor, mind, and the senses; and this will enable us to understand that the *Yajamāna* or the sacrificer, for whose sake these "priests" engage in action, is really the soul.

It is said that each of these *Ritvij* priests is assisted by three more; and if we understand the meaning of their names, we shall find that they refer to the same faculties of man. For instance, a *Brāhmaṇa* or intellect is assisted by three others, who refer to *ahañkāra* (the I-as-an-actor), mind, and the senses respectively; *Udgātṛ* is assisted by those who refer to the intellect, mind, and the senses; and so on. The idea obviously is that, in any intelligent action, all the four faculties of man have their part to play: only the principal role, at a particular time, may belong to any one of them (See Appendix I).

[2] As *Adhvaryu* refers to the senses, the *Hotṛ* refers to the mind. The idea of satisfaction is described in the *Sūtras* in terms of eating food.

these words are repeated in the text.[1] Thus there is only one meaning of the text for those who have mastered it, for they understand the intimate relation of things. But even if we commit a mistake in grasping the idea of satisfaction, it does not mean that it is not there. Nor is it denied to the worshipper,[2] merely because there appears to be some cause (40-45). 42 43 44 45

SATISFACTION IMPLIES TRANSFORMATION—We can attain to perfection by means of devotion to our task, and the errors or defects of the whole family can be removed thereby. The effect of enjoyment in a cake is produced in a special manner,—namely, that its whole form is changed; and that is what the sacred books say.[3] It is in the same manner that an act of sacrifice is transformed to yield satisfaction; and this is illustrated by a *Homa* sacrifice'[4] (a good and intelligent deed). The same idea is expressed 46 47 48 49

[1] The terms "invited", "invite" mean an invitation to eat or to share in the performance of an action and derive satisfaction from it.

[2] The worshipper, as has been pointed out, refers to the soul, for whose sake all the faculties of man take part in action. Were there no soul, there would be no action. But the soul is not "actionless" as some would believe; for it has its place in action, and "pays" for it,—even as the *Yajamāna* bears the cost of the sacrifice. As the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us, the soul is an enjoyer or experiencer of action; and so it has a principal share in satisfaction.

[3] A cake gives pleasure when it is eaten; but, when it is eaten, its entire form is changed. This may be said to be a law of joy or satisfaction. In order to give pleasure, satisfaction or joy, a thing must transform itself, and cease to be what it is.

[4] To do this is an act of sacrifice; and so sacrifice implies a transformation of a person or thing that engages in, or is offered as, a sacrifice. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that this is illustrated by a *Homa* sacrifice, in which an offering is made by casting clarified butter into the fire. But the latter is totally changed when cast into the fire; and this would illustrate the point.

by means of cakes, but in a more obvious manner,—for this satisfaction arises as soon as we eat them. We can 50 verify this for ourselves; and it is a matter of common 51 observation to see people moving towards cakes; and the 52 *Brāhmaṇas*'[1] too,—for the same language is used in connection with them (46-53). 53

PART VI

SELF-INTEREST AND NATURAL DESIRE: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE VEDAS

Self-interest is inherent in man (1-3). It cannot be seen; it can only be understood (4-7).

Self-interest has two forms, which may be described as natural motive and deliberate motive (8); and the conflict between them may be seen in the discussion that goes on within us (9). But discussion has its purpose too; and it can modify natural motive as well as desire (10-13). Natural motive precedes discussion; and it is not only an intelligent, but also a good, desire that can be associated with the idea of sacrifice (14-17).

There is a common law of life applicable to all animals, because there is no essential difference between them at any time (18-22); and their similarity of behaviour is due not to similarity of motive, but of nature (23-24).

Natural desire comes first, and the idea of its purification afterwards (25-26). Lower animals are characterised by an urge in respect of primary and not secondary actions and objects (27); and there is little difference in their milk, which is easily affected by time (28-29).

The idea of Sacrifice, as a means of this transformation, is exemplified in the story of *Sikhaṇḍin* in the *Mahābhārata*, where we are told that a person, born as a woman, was transformed into a man by its means. The real idea, however, is that the form of Nature or *Prakṛti* (represented as a woman) can be transformed into that of *Purusha* or God (represented as a man) by means of the idea of Sacrifice (MM. IV, 153-155).

[1] The *Mīmānsā* defines a *Brāhmaṇa* as one characterised by intelligence,—or a particularly intelligent person. Even intelligent persons like to take eat sweetmeats or cakes; and so the latter can easily symbolise the idea of pleasure or satisfaction obtained through action.

We can understand the text of the Vedas in the same manner as we understand the laws of life relating to animals (30-31); and it should be judged in the light of the meaning it yields (32-34). For instance, if we find that there is something incongruous in a certain portion of the text, we should take it that it needs a new meaning (35-37). But certain conditions need to be satisfied before one meaning can be substituted for another (38-47).

SELF-INTEREST IS INHERENT IN MAN—Self-interest is not aroused by discussion. It is in the very nature of man, and does not need to be re-stated to be understood, —though we often speak of it (1-3). 1 2 3

IT CANNOT BE SEEN—We cannot say that it can be seen, —for it is a rule that we can do only one thing at a time; nor can we say that we can see it arise, because it is not possible to do so, unless we mean that seeing is the same thing as understanding, because they are so similar in this case (4-7). 4-5 6-7

NATURAL AND DELIBERATE INTEREST—(There are two forms of self-interest,—which may be described as natural motive and deliberate motive). There is an impelling force or cause in all action; but there can be a conflict between this force and the chief purpose that a man may have in view when he acts. Hence this impelling force may be called natural motive. But because of the special importance of discussion that takes place within us, this natural motive may be an obstacle in the development of action. But discussion has its own purpose too, because it is produced by some cause, and may be said to be a modification of natural motive itself, for it is closely connected with it. Again, desire improves through discussion; and the purpose of desire, when it is associated with discussion, may be compared to putting fire in a sacrificial fire- 8 9 10

place[1]. But discussion does not produce desire, because it is meant to serve the purpose of desire; and we can see the proof of it ourselves (8-13). 11 12 13

NATURAL MOTIVE—(Natural motive precedes discussion) and may be compared to a discussion that has not yet begun. But all motive, in respect of any action, arises at its own proper time. However, of all desires, the desire to perform an intelligent action alone should, by its very nature, be regarded as preceding an act of sacrifice; but this is not true of all such desires, because of the meaning of sacrifice[2] (14-17) 14 15 16 17

A LAW OF LIFE—The law of life that is true of the five classes of animals[3] is true of all, for the explanation in all cases is the same; and they continue to remain in their original state without change. Indeed, so far as we can understand, their attributes and objects are the same, and will be so in future too. We cannot say that they are what they are because of the effect of Time, because they are so made,—as part of a great whole. Nor can we say that their similarity of behaviour is due to similarity 18 19 20 21–22

[1] When desire is associated with discussion,—that is, when our motive of action is under discussion within us, the object is that the desire should be purified or rendered fit for action performed as a sacrifice.

[2] Sacrifice requires that an action should not only be intelligent but also good. Intelligence, however, is a necessary pre-requisite of action performed as a sacrifice; and so an intelligent desire precedes such action. But, as it is only a desire that is also good that can make an act of sacrifice, it is not all intelligent desires that can be associated with sacrifice.

[3] The word used in the text is *Paśu,* which refers to five classes of animals,—men, cows, horses, goats and sheep (p. 21. n.). But the law of life that is true of these animals, is true of all, says the *Mīmānsā*

of motive, because it would be contrary to reason (to suppose that their motives can always be the same) (18-24). 23-24

NATURAL DESIRE OF AN ANIMAL—The first desire (of an animal is its natural desire) arising from its original state; the idea of its purification comes later,—from the object it seeks; and this can easily be proved. 25-26 There is also an absence of urge in respect of subordinate objects. 27 But there is little difference between any two kinds of milk; and that which has not been mixed with anything should be boiled, because it is affected by time. 28 But that which is mixed with something is also affected by time, and for the same reason (25-29). 29

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE SACRED BOOKS—As we are able to understand the laws of life relating to animals, we can, in the same manner, understand the meaning of the sacred books; 30 and when we do so, the whole thing appears like a new ray of light. 31 (But we must understand them from their own point of view; because) what has been taught long ago cannot be connected together by means of present-day objects[1]. 32 But if we are able to connect things together, we should understand them in the light of the result they yield; 33 and that should be proved to be true by means of definite knowledge (30-34). 34

(Indeed, there are suggestions to guide us in the text itself: for instance,) if in a portion of a hymn addressed

[1] The Vedas were composed long ago, and they need to be interpreted in the light of the ideas of their own times. This is as true today as it was in the days of *Jaimini* when he wrote the *Mīmānsā*. But even in his days the original idea of the Vedas appears to have been almost lost.

to *Agni*, there is something which appears to be irrelevant to the main idea, we should take it to be of this kind (that is, that it needs to be interpreted in another way). Again, if a thing is known to be produced by a certain cause, but is not described as such, we should understand that the difference lies in its mode of expression; and that is how one meaning is substituted for another (35-37). 35 36 37

CONDITIONS TO BE SATISFIED—But the substitute should not have the same meaning as the original word on the ground that its purpose is the same,—because that would be contrary to rules; and this restriction makes for excellence of composition of the *śruti*. But similar statements should stand together and should not be interpreted differently, because there is no difference in their explanation; and in such cases the names should be of the same kind. Indeed, the apparently different expressions are but modifications of the same thing; and have been introduced to relieve monotony, which is otherwise inevitable, because the laws of Nature, sought to be described, are eternal, and therefore the same. Even so when the same idea is differently expressed, the form of expression should be natural, not forced; and the entire statement should make a coherent whole. This is necessary, because the symbols, understood in their traditional sense, are contradictory; but the name of each principal object has been formed in the light of its special characteristics (and so it is possible to know its exact idea) (38-47). 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

PART VII

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION: NATURE, SACRIFICE AND THE SOUL

Certain names, which appear to be unconnected with the rest of the text, refer to Nature; but we should be careful in arriving at this conclusion (1-5).

Nature is associated with the soul, without which we cannot understand the idea of action (6-9).

Certain terms used in connection with the performance of a sacrifice, refer to Nature (10-13); others refer to the function of the mind, and so on (14-17).

The result of a sacrifice accrues to the sacrificer, and so he should engage in it himself,—at least so far as its principal part is concerned; and he may employ others to do the rest (18-21). All this is described in the sacred books under different names (22-26). For instance, the ten *Adhvaryu* priests refer to the ten senses (27); and we have also the idea of detachment or disinterestedness in action (28-29). There are also other terms used in the text; and all the constituents of action are called *Ritvij* priests (30-37). They are sixteen in number, and the "master of the sacrifice" or the soul is the seventeenth; and all these perform all kinds of actions referred to in the sacred books (38-42).

Similarly the function of *Mitra* and *Varuṇa* is to ordain action; but we should come to this conclusion when certain other words are also used in the text (43-45). We can get the meaning of *Adhvaryu* and other words by means of this method of interpretation (46-49).

This is the method of interpretation of the Vedas, and it should be applied to other sacred books as well (50). This will enable us to understand the idea of Dharma. All this is given explicitly in the *Aṅgas* of the Vedas: in the remaining works not so explicitly (51).

CERTAIN WORDS REFER TO NATURE—Where certain names appear to be unconnected with the text, they should be deemed to refer to Nature (*Pradhāna*),[1] because of the special manner in which they have been explained. But 1 all unconnected expressions are not of this kind. Nor can 2

[1] The word used in the text is *Pradhāna*, which refers to Nature or *Prakṛti*.

we apply this rule to all expressions, however removed from the context, because this mode of expression is intended to serve a special object, which can easily be proved[1] (1-5). 3–4 5

NATURE AND THE SOUL—(This reference to Nature is due to the fact that) Nature is always associated with its "master" or the soul, because all action has a result, which would be meaningless otherwise.[2] This result is achieved by means of the desire to act; and that is possible only through the union of the soul with Nature,—for desire arises when they are brought into close contact with each other;[3] and the result is also achieved by means of the union of the two,—for that is the purpose of desire (6-9). 6 7 8 9

OTHER REFERENCES TO NATURE—By putting together the attributes of an object we put together its idea or meaning; and we find that the consecration for a religious sacrifice and the fee paid to the priest also refer to Nature;[4] because, 10 11

[1] The special object is to explain the character of action, which is so closely connected with Nature; and this is made clear in the following *Sūtras*.

[2] We cannot understand the character of action, so closely associated with Nature, without reference to the soul. We can grasp its idea only in the light of our own actions, or the experience of those who live; and, as we cannot have an idea of life without that of the soul, we cannot understand the character of action without it. Hence the necessity of associating Nature with the soul.

The word for the soul in the text is *Svāmin*, which means "master, lord", and is also the name of *Vishṇu* or *Shiva*. The "master" of Nature is the soul or God.

[3] The *Bhagavad Gītā* says the same (BhG. II, 62; III, 34, etc.).

[4] This means that the forces of Nature can be associated with the idea of Sacrifice; that is to say, we can believe that they act in

like all other things in Nature, these too must come to an end. In the same manner the *Vedi* (raised piece of ground for the sacrificial altar) of *Yūpa* (a sacrificial post) also refers to Nature[1] (10-13). 12 13

REFERENCE TO THE MIND—Some one, incapable of being taught in connection with what has been stated above, might ask, 'What is the idea of measuring the sacrificial ground, the recitation of *Sāmidhenī* verses, and the two vessels in which the *Soma* plants are conveyed to be pressed, which, according to instruction, are associated with these verses?'[2] Measuring the ground refers to the function and purpose of the mind;[3] and the whole narrative is like that (14-17). 14 15 16 17

SACRIFICER AND HIS SERVANTS—The result of sacrifice, referred to in the sacred books, is obtained by the per-

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accordance with a law, which is characterised by both goodness and intelligence, and is applicable to all alike. It is this that gives us the idea of God; and we might say that Nature itself is transformed into God by means of the idea of sacrifice. This is exemplified in the story of *Sikhaṇḍin* in the *Mahābhārata*, to which reference has already been made.

[1] All this is meant to illustrate the idea of sacrifice in Nature; that is to say, the raised ground, altar, sacrificial post, etc., etc., are all intended to represent the working of the great forces of Nature in accordance with a moral and intelligent law.

[2] *Sāmidhenī* verses are recited while the sacrificial fire is kindled, and so would refer to the function of the intellect, for that is the idea of fire in the sacred books.

As the *Soma* plant refers to the objects of Nature, the two "vessels" which convey it to be pressed, would obviously refer to the two kinds of senses,—of knowledge and action,—which come into contact with these objects.

[3] The word used in the text is *Soma*, which refers to the mind, as has already been explained.

former of the sacrifice, because he is the cause of sacrifice; and he should engage in it himself. In any case, the 18 principal part of the sacrifice, being the most important, should be performed by him; and, as for the rest, he may do it himself, or get it done by some one else. Another 19 person may be engaged to do the less important part of it; and the hiring out of such a person is permitted by the sacred books, specially when the sacrificer is prevented from doing it himself. Thus, the measure of the part of the 20 sacrificer depends on the circumstances of each case; and no fixed rule can be laid down, because no special distinction can be made (18-21). 21

DIFFERENT KINDS OF ACTIONS—However, the sacred books make a distinction in regard to different kinds of actions, and different names have been given to their actors. We 22 cannot say that these different names refer to the same actor who performs these different actions, because the results are clearly different (22-24). 23–24

ADHVARYU PRIESTS—The names of *Adhvaryu* priests have been given to them in accordance with this statement; and 25 that has been stated in a number of sacred books. Their 26 number should be ten, because we can verify it for ourselves[1] (25-27). 27

DETACHMENT—There should also be a *śamitṛ* (detachment, which keeps the mind calm), because there is

[1] *Adhvaryu* priests refer to the senses of knowledge and action, which are ten in number.

[2] *Samitṛ* means "one who keeps his mind calm"; and it refers therefore to detachment or disinterestedness in action. There are a number of references to this in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (BhG. II, 56-58 etc.).

a special mention of that name. This is clear from the subject under discussion, because we are told that we should not think of results[1] (28-29). 28 29

OTHER FACTORS OF ACTION—There is also a reference to other constituents of action,—those factors that are inclined towards their objects, as we can see for ourselves. For instance, the "seller" represents the slow movement of action, for he is the person who makes it move slowly (30-31). 30 31

RITVIJ PRIESTS—All the constituents of action are called *Ritvij* priests, because they cannot be distinguished, and are not exclusive of one another.[2] This is not a mere theory or hypothesis, because all of them have the right to engage in an act of sacrifice; and there is a rule, about which there is general agreement, that all these "priests" should be given "gifts" when a sacrifice is performed.[3] 32 33 34-35 36

[1] The *Bhagavad Gītā* also tells us that we are entitled to act, but not to claim the fruit or result of action (BhG. II, 47).

[2] The *Ritvij* priests, as has already been pointed out, refer to the four faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, mind, and the senses. As the *Mīmānsā* explains later on, all these are closely connected with one another, and it is not always easy to distinguish between them. For instance, the intellect and the mind may, in certain circumstances, be identified. On the other hand, the mind is sometimes regarded as an organ of sense.

[3] Although these faculties are connected with one another, they yet have their special functions to perform; and the "gift" or "fee" paid to them indicates that their work has been properly done. The *Mīmānsā* has explained that a "gift" signifies satisfaction in the performance of action.

Indeed, their different functions have been laid down, for they alone are initiated in the work[1] (32—37). 37

MASTER OF SACRIFICE—The "master" is the seventeenth to share it with them[2] (38). 38

THEIR ACTIONS—All these perform all kinds of actions,—according as they are suited to them; and the idea of the "fires" is the same, because they have their proper time.[3] 39 It is because of their combination that there is constancy in action; and that is why their combination is so important.[4] There is a reference to all this in the sacred books, 40 and a detailed description of it in the form of a narrative; 41 and we can see it for ourselves in that form (39-42). 42

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[1] All these faculties have their special functions, and the work of the senses cannot be done by the mind, and so on; nor can the function of one sense organ be performed by another. Thus each is specially initiated to do its own work.

[2] There are four principal *Ritvij* priests, and each of them is assisted by three more,—making a total of sixteen; and their idea has already been explained. The "master" or *Svāmin* is the soul; and he is the institutor of the sacrifice; and all these "priests" work for him, and are paid their "fee".

[3] As has already been explained, "fire" refers to intellect or intelligent action; and the three fires,—*Gārhapatya*, *Ahavanīya*, and *Dakshiṇa*—refer to the three ways in which an intelligent action can be performed: to preserve one's self or the family; to work for others in the world; and so to act that one is not tainted by the evil effects of action (See II. iii. 21. n.).

[4] The importance of the combination of all these faculties is described in terms of the three assistants of each one of the principal *Ritvij* priests. The idea is that, even if we assign the principal role to the intellect, *ahañkāra*, mind, or an organ of sense,—the remaining three must also be there before an action can take place. That is why each of the *Ritvij* priests has three assistants to help him.

MITRA AND VARUNA—According to the teachings of the sacred books, the function of the two gods, *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*,[1] is to ordain action, and to lay down instructions in connection with its performance. But this conclusion can be drawn only when certain words are repeated in the text, and the word *Praisha* (meaning "direction") occurs in close proximity; and there is also a reference to the *Hotṛ* (the mind) in the hymns to be recited in the morning[2] (43-45).

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[1] The original form of the word *Mitra* is *Mıt-tra*; and *Mıt* is is derived from *Mi*, meaning "to measure, to judge", which is a function of the intellect; while *Tra* is the same as *Tri*, meaning "three", which, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, refers to the mind. *Mitra* or *Mit-tra*, accordingly, signifies the function of the intellect and the mind; and the two, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, may even be identified.

Varuṇa is described as the lord of waters which, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, refer to Nature. He represents, therefore, the idea of Nature or *Prakṛti* as the supreme creator of life (Cf. MM. I, 392-397).

Now, if we believe in Nature as the chief creator of life, the logical conclusion is that we must renounce all actions if we wish to be happy and free. The idea of renunciation of action is accordingly associated with *Varuṇa*; and this is said to be his "noose", from which it is difficult to escape.

But *Varuṇa* and *Mitra* are often invoked together; and when that is done, they ordain action, for so the *Mīmānsā* tells us. As *Mıtra* refers to the function of the intellect and the mind, it means that if we look at Nature in an intelligent manner, we realise that we cannot refrain from all actions; for to do so would be to put an end to one's life.

Varuṇa accordingly does not represent an uncompromising attitude towards action, and so is friendly to other gods, who represent different points of view. The attitude of total renunciation of action s represented by *Vṛtra*, the Serpent-deity, who stops all flow of waters or the working of the great forces of Nature, and so must be "slain" (Cf. MM. I, 304-310).

But even *Varuṇa and Mitra* do not represent the idea of action without end: they do so under certain conditions, which are repre-

MEANING OF ADHVARYU—The *Adhvaryu* priests get their share of sweetmeats (satisfaction), because it is so stated in the text; and the meaning of the word can be obtained by applying the method of interpretation.[1] We can do so when we understand the other meaning of the word *Chamasa*[2], and also grasp the idea (*of Adhvaryu*) in a state weakness[3] (46-49).

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sented in a particular manner in the Vedas. Accordmg to their idea, we can act only when all life is before us (or we are in the morning of our life), and our mind is fresh and vigorous; and so there should be a reference to the *Hotṛ* priest, who refers to the mind, in the hymns recited in the morning. When, however, the evening of life approaches (or we are at the point of death), all actions must cease; and so the idea of the renunciation of action has its point too.

The idea of *Vedānta*, on the other hand, is that after death there is life again, and even God himself is born from age to age; and so there is no end whatever to action.

[1] We are told that there are ten *Adhvaryu* priests; and, as the number ten refers to the ten senses of knowledge and action, this enables us to understand that the *Adhvaryu* priests refer to these senses.

Again the word *Adhvaryu* means "one who institutes an *Adhvara*", which is said to be the name of a *Soma* sacrifice. The word *Adhvara* is *A-dhvara*; and the latter is derived from the root *Dhvṛ*; and we have to get its meaning from "*a*" and "*Dhvṛ*"; and the latter is composed of *Dh*, *u*, *ṛ*; so that the whole word depends on the meaning of these four letters. Of these "*a*" is a particle of negation; "*dh*" refers to the mind; "*u*" to the senses of knowledge; and "*ṛ*" to the senses of action; and so the whole meaning is "(*a*) not (*dh*) the mind; but (*u*) the senses of knowledge and (*ṛ*) the senses of action".

As the senses, however, cannot be dissociated from the mind, *Adhvara* is said to be a name of a *Soma* sacrifice or a function of the mind.

[2] *Chamasa* is said to be a vessel used for drinking *Soma*. It also means sweetmeat, which symbolises satisfaction. We are required to take the latter meaning.

[3] When we are in a state of weakness, our senses refuse to function, and we get no satisfaction in action. This enables us to understand the part of the senses in satisfaction; and this corresponds to the *Adhvaryu* priests getting their share of sweetmeats.

RESULT OF INTERPRETATION—This is the method of interpreting the Vedas, and it should be applied to other sacred books as well.[1] This will enable us to get a proper idea of Dharma.[2] The authority for this is given explicitly in the *Añgas* of the Vedas, because the meaning there is clear; while it is not so explicit in the remaining works[3] (50-51).

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PART VIII

THE PROBLEM OF ACTION: THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

The task of the "master" or the soul is to acquire something (1-2). The impressions of previous actions impel the soul to act; and the other faculties engage in action because of the the soul (3-6). The urge to action depends on the nature of the soul; and, as all souls are not equal, their actions are different; *Tapas* or meditation too is a cause of this difference (7-9); but

[1] The word Veda is mentioned in the text twice; and, as it refers to Vedas as well as a book of sacred knoweldge, it has been taken in both these senses. It is in this sense that both the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* are spoken of as Vedas. The *Mīmānsā* tells us later on that this method of interpretation is applicable to *śruti* as well as the *smṛti*. Indeed, it applies to the great Epics and the *Purāṇas* as well as the Upanishads and other sacred works.

[2] This method of interpretation enables us to understand that the Vedas deal with the problem of Dharma or the law of action in the world, conceived in its widest significance, and characterised by both goodness and intelligence.

[3] There are six *Vedāñgas* (*Añgas* or sub-divisions of the Vedas). They are regarded as auxiliary to, and a part of, the Vedas, and are composed in *Sūtra* form. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we can understand their idea directly and explicitly from their text; while in the case of other works we have to resort to this method of interpretation.

all other faculties depend for their action on the soul (10-12). Desire too is associated with the soul (13-14).

The *Mantras* also refer to the soul (15-16); and we should understand them in their proper light (17-18).

Actions may be referred to the different organs of the body in which the soul abides (19-20). We should interpret the text in the light of action, the idea of which is described in different ways (21-25); but the fruit of action always belongs to the soul (26-29).

Action implies improvement as well as change, but not the creation of a new substance; and this is stated in the Vedas (30-33).

As action implies change, the form of words in the text has to be changed in order to get their real meaning; but this change should be made only when we are unable ot get a suitable meaning otherwise (34-41).

There is an element of Time in action, and it too implies change; but its idea is dealt with elsewhere (42).

We should not divide into parts words which are not in close proximity to one another (43-44).

TASK OF THE SOUL—The task of the "master of action"[1] (the soul) is to acquire something,—for that is the object of his action. The acquisition of something can be the task of others (other faculties of man) only if it is so expressly mentioned in the text (1-2). 1 2

IMPRESSIONS OF PREVIOUS ACTIONS—There are impressions of acts, done in a previous state of existence, on the powers or faculties of *purusha* or the individual soul, which, so far as we are aware, compel it to engage in action.[2] But all the faculties, associated with the "master of the sacrifice"[3] (the soul), engage in action, because of the importance 3

[1] The word in the text is *Svāmin* which, as has already been explained, refers to the soul.

[2] All this is clearly described in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (VI, 37-45); and there are references to it in the Upanishads too. It is a cardinal point of Hindu belief, and explains the law of human action in terms of continuity of life without end.

[3] The word in the text is *Yajamāna*, which means "master or institutor of the sacrifice"; and that, as has already been observed, refers to the soul.

of the soul. All this is quite well known; and we know 4-5
it from the fact that they all depend on the soul[1] (3-6). 6

Action and Nature of the Soul—The impelling urge
to action depends on the nature of the soul; and, as all 7
souls are not equal,[2] their methods of performing actions
are different. *Tapas* or meditation is also a cause of this 8
difference, as we find from the achievement of results in
ordinary life. But the general idea in regard to the other 9
faculties has already been explained; and because they 10-11
all depend on the soul, the latter cannot be restricted to
any one of them[3] (7-12). 12

[1] The dependence of the other faculties on the soul is rendered in the Upanishads in terms of the story of the "quarrel" of the *Prāṇas* or the organs of man,—each striving for supremacy. In the end they are satisfied that they all depend on the vital breath, the vehicle of the soul (*Ait-Ar. Up.* II, i, 4,5; *Kaush. Up.* II, 14).

[2] As all souls do not begin their journey of life at the same time, they may be said to be at different stages, and so are not equal. The *Mīmānsā* has told us that the impressions of previous actions impel the soul to action; and if we assume that the soul begins its journey through life at some time, we will also assume that the story of its actions begins at that time; and then the chain of action can go on without end. This gives us a rational explanation of inequalities between man and man; and that is the idea of inequality between souls. But this theory postulates that we must agree to begin the story of life somewhere.

[3] This means that all the faculties of man have their fixed abode in the body,—all except the soul. It is obvious that the senses have their fixed place; and the ancients fixed the mind in the lower, and the intellect in the upper, part of the head. But the soul was conceived to be free to move among all these faculties; and they function when it is associated with them. Thus, when the soul associates itself with the eye, the latter sees; when it associates itself with the ear, the latter hears; when it associates itself with the lower part of the head, corresponding to the brow, there is thought; and when it associates itself with the upper part of the head, there is judgement or decision.

DESIRE AND THE SOUL—Desire too is associated with the soul,[1] because of its connection with the object to be achieved. It can be associated with the other faculties 13 only when so expressly mentioned[2] (13-14). 14

MANTRAS AND THE SOUL—The *Mantras* too, when they do not refer to the performance of action, are like that (that is, they refer to the soul). They are associated with 15 the inspired and wise ones in this way, as we may see for ourselves (15-16). 16

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THEM—A *Mantra*, occurring in two places in two different sacred books, is true in respect of both, because it is full of meaning; and we should recite 17 *Mantras* in such a manner that we understand them. An unlearned person is verily not intended for the task 18 (17-18).

ACTIONS AND ADHVARYU PRIESTS—We find from an account of the text, that actions are referred to what belongs to the sacrificer;[3] and they should indeed be referred to 19 that. That is the idea of the *Adhvaryu* priests (the senses),

[1] As the soul is conceived to be an actor, desire must necessarily be associated with it. It may be of interest to observe that both *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeshika* associate desire with the soul (NS. III, ii, 39; VS. I, i, 5-6).

[2] Desire is said to be a special attribute of the mind. But that only means that when the soul associates itself with the mind-centre, a man has desire; even as when the soul associates itself with the eye, a man sees.

[3] The "sacrificer" is the soul; and what belongs to him are the different organs of the body in which the soul abides. This is made clear in the following *Sūtra*, where we are told that the reference is to the *Adhvaryu* priests or the organs of the senses.

and the whole statement of the text follows an organised
plan (19-20). 20

How to interpret the Text—In case of conflict of
statements, we should interpret the text in terms of action,
because that is how the principal ideas have been put
together. With regard to the rest, such meaning as is
suitable, may be assigned. The idea of action is expressed 21
in terms of orders issued by some one in authority. The 22
Adhvaryu priests also refer to action, as may be seen; but 23
they are subordinate to some one else because action is
shared by others (other faculties) too[1] (21-24). 24

Fruit of Action, and meant for Whom—When we
understand the significance of this, we shall see that the
action of the *Ritvij* priests (faculties of man other than
his soul) makes for the fruit or result of action. But the 25
fruit really belongs to the "master" or the soul, because
it is meant for it. This can easily be proved, because the 26-27
object of all action is its result or fruit, which, in every
case, belongs to the "master" or the soul; and we know 28
that it is so (25-29). 29

Action and Improvement—All action, without exception,
is meant for improvement or a better order of things. 30
But while action implies change, it does not mean the
creation of a new substance. This is expressly stated in 31
certain special texts of the Vedas; while with regard to the
rest, the idea is not so explicit. If, however, there is an 32

[1] It is not the senses alone that take part in action. The other faculties,—the mind, *ahañkāra*, and the intellect have a share in it too; and the senses are subordinate to them.

error of interpretation in regard to a portion of the text, it can easily be discovered by means of close study (30-33). 33

CHANGE OF FORM OF WORDS—All things are subject to change, and so they are like Nature or *Prakṛti* in this respect; (and that is one of the reasons why the form of certain words referring to these objects is changed). But 34 in interpreting the text we should first of all get the principal meaning of a word, without reference to its parts; 35 and it is only when there is a special cause,—that is, when we get an inconsistent or impossible meaning—that we should resort to its division into parts (34-36). 36

When we divide a word into parts, its whole sense is altered; for the parts have no connection with the text, 37 and the reason for having them is that they alter the sense. We can see the proof of this at once, for this is true 38-39 of all cases without exception; and we can verify it if we 40 but pronounce the words correctly (37-41). 41

ACTION AND TIME—There is an element of Time in connection with the performance of all action; but there is a special rule in connection with it[1] (42). 42

RESTRICTIONS—It is, however, possible to say that it would not be correct to divide into parts words which are not in close proximity to one another; for instance, if 43 we wish to know the real meaning of the word *Virāj* in its rudimentary form, we should know the context in which it is used[2] (43-44). 44

[1] This has been explained in Chapter IV, iii.

[2] *Virāj* is sometimes described as a male and sometimes as a female power; and we can understand its true character only if we know the context in which it is used.

CHAPTER IV

PART I

ACTION, MOTIVE AND THE SOUL: THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

Let us inquire into the laws of action with reference to the soul, and understand the nature of motive in action(1).

The cause of action is the desire to obtain some satisfaction (2); and, as this desire serves the purpose of the soul, the soul is concerned in each action (3); for the result belongs to the soul, and without it there can be no action (4-5). But this applies to animate and not inanimate objects, which serve the purpose of living creatures and impel them to action (6-10); for it is a self-evident truth that the soul cannot engage in action by itself (11-17).

It is necessary to understand the nature of purpose in action (18). A person who is in a state of uncertainty or divided opinion, cannot act; and so there must be a definite purpose before he can act (19). Desire means that there is such purpose; and it implies dependence as well as attachment (20).

There is diversity of purpose and action: nevertheless, all things meet and mingle in the world; and this is symbolised by the formation of curd out of milk as well as by Nature or *Prakṛti* (21-23).

A principal word in the text has a special significance (24-25).

Action and purpose as well as all things are dependent on one another (26); but we can see the working of this law more clearly in animals than in inanimate objects (27).

If a substance is produced in a particular place, it means that there is a certain connection between the two (28-32).

The difference in the performance of the same action is due to the skill of the doer of the deed (33-34). But certain courses of action have a special cause, and require special direction (35-37). This, however, does not apply to cases where the principal cause of action is well known (38-40).

If the principal cause of action is not clear, the explanation should be contained in the language of the text itself, without the division of words into parts (41-42). But the common meaning of certain words like *Jauhava* and *Anuyāja* makes little sense, and they need to be understood in a different way (43-48).

ACTION AND THE SOUL—Let us inquire into the law of action with reference to *purusha* or the individual soul,

and understand the nature of motive or the cause of action (1). 1

CAUSE OF ACTION—A man always desires to obtain some satisfaction or pleasure: that is the object of his life; and the motive or cause of action is the same (that is, to obtain some satisfaction or pleasure) (2). 2

DESIRE—Desire is the root of action, for an action can be performed only when there is some desire to urge it on; and it is performed for the sake of the soul: the sacred books say so too. That an action is meant to serve the purpose of the soul is evident from the fact that an inanimate object can have no desire of its own. Hence purpose or desire is the basis of all action, and that is how it is connected with it; and the sacred books tell us that the *purusha* or the individual soul is concerned in each action. 3 Thus, as there is no difference of opinion in the matter, the result of action should belong to the soul, as has been stated in the *śruti*. But even if we do not understand the 4 exact cause of action, we cannot deny that it is meant to serve the purpose of the soul,—for the purpose is always there; for otherwise there can be no connection between purpose and action, and so no action at all (3-5). 5

THIS IS TRUE OF ALL LIVING CREATURES—This is true of all living creatures in the world, but it does not apply to 6 inanimate objects, which can only be given away, because they cannot act by themselves. Inanimate objects are 7 associated with living creatures because they serve their purpose; and so their use is different from that of the latter; and we should accept what the sacred books tell us in this connection. They impel the living to different

kinds of actions, which are characterised by purpose; and all this can easily be proved, for the soul cannot engage in any action by itself, and must be associated with something else as an auxiliary, to be able to do so. That something is desire, which is like a string, connecting the soul with its object; and all the sacred books are agreed that it is so (6-12).

This does not require any further proof, for it is a self-evident truth, and requires no words to establish it. Indeed, we understand it as soon as we read and grasp the language of the Vedas,—the knowledge of which can be acquired in the same way as that of other things. It is in this manner that the whole thing can be proved, and indeed is proved (13-17).

THE NATURE OF PURPOSE—It is necessary to understand the nature of purpose of all objects, without exception, that are connected with one's self. We find that when a person is directed to act, but does not do so, it is because he is in a state of uncertainty or divided opinion, and does not know what to do; (and this means that there must be a definite purpose before a man can act). Desire means that there is such a purpose, which is associated with some object, and implies dependence arising from attachment.[1] It is for this reason that there is diversity of purpose in connection with the actions of a person; and what is true of one, is true of all. But it is also a law that all things must meet and mingle in the world, and this is symbolised by the formation of curd out of milk, as well as by Nature or *Prakṛti*[2] (18-23).

[1] Cf. BhG. II, 62.

[2] We see the working of this law in the world of Nature itself, where all things meet and mingle with one another.

All actions are inter-dependent, and cannot be separated from one another or the language that describes them. Hence there is an intimate connection between an object and its name (11-12).

This is the basis of the language of the Vedas. Their text is authoritative, and no unauthorised additions should be made (13-17).

We can understand its meaning from the words themselves. The meaning of some has specially been explained; while of others we must understand from the context or the effect they produce (18-27). Where there is a doubt about an occurrence, we can understand it from its description, for there is nothing that cannot be described in words (28-30).

There is no error or impropriety in the language of the Vedas; and so a substitute expression can be used only if it has the same meaning as the original one. But it is not easy to find an exact substitute; and so it is possible that, in such cases, the language is not perfect (31-35).

The chief difficulty in connection with the text is that it is not easy to understand (36-37). But if we find that the description of an object is inconsistent, we should attach more importance to the object than the description (38); and if there is an inconsistency between an object and its use, we should attach more importance to its use (39). But there should be a method in our work, and we should be able to connect the parts with the whole. When, however, there are a number of meanings, we should take those which are apposite (40-41).

ENERGY IS ACTIVITY—In all forms of energy there should be activity; and this is true of all things that exist. This activity is to be found in every single part of the whole organism, though its purpose is fulfilled by the principal part,—the remaining parts being subsidiary to the latter and ministering to its ends. If the principal part does not function, the whole organism suffers from its evil effects; while, on the other hand, if it functions properly, the whole attains to a degree of excellence, because of its close connection with the principal part (1-3).

ACTION, PURPOSE AND RESULT—*Jaimini* says that while we may divide energy into a number of parts, we cannot divide action in the same manner; and a single statement in connection with the commencement of an action should

serve to explain the character of the whole. But, as the purpose of each action is different, there must be a mention of at least one purpose at the commencement of such action, just as we find in the case of other plans. (This would enable us to have a proper idea of action;) and this is proved by the fact that we find that we are able to accomplish our purpose even though we might have committed mistakes in regard to the manner of performing an action. This is due to the power of predominant thought (that prompts us); and its effect can specially be seen in actions which are to our liking,—because of the state of our desire. (But this success is also due to close application,) and if we do not apply ourselves closely to our task, we cannot succeed in this way; and there is oral authority[1] to that effect in connection with the manner of doing things. (This is borne out by the fact that) we find that when we deliberately abstain from an action, we do not feel any disappointment (4-10). 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Action and Language—All actions are inter-dependent, and one action has share in another. Actions cannot be separated from one another, nor from the form of words which express their idea. Hence there should be unity between the idea of an action and the name given to it, just as in the case of the character of the cow (and its name);[2] for the name should be full of life (or expressive of the object described) (11-12). 11 12

[1] The word in the text is *śabda*,—the testimony of wise and trustworthy persons in acquiring definite knowledge. Its chief basis is said to be personal experience of such persons.

[2] The point of this is that when we utter the word *go*, meaning a cow, we understand that it means a cow, and it gives us also an idea of the character of the cow.

LANGUAGE OF THE VEDAS—(This is the character of the language of the Vedas). The text of the *śruti* is authoritative; and unless we are specially instructed to do so, we should not make any additions of our own to it, because it would be contrary to the laws of learning. 13 Indeed, there is no need to make any additions, because the statement of all the required particulars is found in the same place in the text. But an addition may be made 14 if its meaning is uniform with the rest of the text. The 15 rule in regard to making an addition is based on the meaning we obtain,—in whatever it is done; for it is neces- 16 sary that we should get a proper meaning, and that indeed is also our desire (13-17). 17

HOW TO OBTAIN A MEANING—(The meaning of a word is contained in the word itself: for instance,) the meaning of the word *Agni* as a god[1] (or a great natural power) is not derived from the meaning of some other word; and it 18 means a god because that is its own meaning. But there 19

The word *go* may be divided into *ga*, *u*,—the meaning being "(*ga*) the senses of knowledge, associated with (*u*) the senses of knowledge"; and, as this name is said to have been given with a special design, we may conclude that the ancients believed that the cow was endowed with specially keen sense-organs. Further, as the idea of the senses corresponds to that of magnetic energy or special properties of attraction, it also means that they believed that the cow or its milk had such properties. It is in this way that a name expresses the character of an object.

[1] *Agni* means intellect, as has already been explained; and intellect is the highest "division" or form of Nature. Hence, as a god represents a great power of Nature, and intellect is such a power, *Agni* is described as a god. Again, the *Mīmānsā* tells us that the meaning of the word is contained in the word itself,—that is, we can obtain it from the context in which it is used or its division into parts (Cf. p. 26, n.).

are some who deny this on the ground that the text does
not define the meaning of the word. Even so the text 20
does not define the meaning of the word *svāmin*; but
we understand its meaning (as soul, master or lord) from
the result arising from its use, and the result arises from
its connection with action.[1] If a word has a number of 21
meanings, we have to take that which is the least imper-
fect; and it is in this manner that we get the meaning of 22
the word *svāmin* from the context. The same is the case 23
with the word *karma-kāra* (a workman, servant), because
of the reference to his being hired or paid a wage. Thus 24
we get the meaning of a word from the result of its use; and 25
so the character of a person is connected with his actions, 26
and even the desire to do a certain deed indicates the
same (18-27). 27

POWER OF LANGUAGE—If there is a doubt about what has
happened, we can find it out from its description. We 28
cannot say that there are things that cannot be described
in words, because it is all within the power of the mind
to describe them;[2] and it is the mind that enables us to 29-30
make a correct use of words (28-30a)[3]. 30a

LANGUAGE OF THE VEDAS—We are told on authority that
there is no error or impropriety in the use of words in

[1] Thus we can understand the meaning of the word *svāmin*, as referring to the soul, from its use in the text and the result that is obtained.

[2] The mind has two characteristics,—*nāma* and *rūpa*—name and form: that is, when we give a name to an object or cast up its image, it is the mind that is functioning. Hence there can be no description beyond the powers of the mind, or of language, for the mind expresses itself in its form.

[3] This *Sūtra* does not occur in certain texts. The word for the mind is *khādira*, which refers to the moon,—a symbol of the mind.

the text of the Vedas; and so a substitute or alternate expression should be used only if it has the same meaning as the original word, because anything else would convey a very different sense. It may not, however, be possible [31] to find an exact substitute, with an identical meaning, [32] specially where the text deals with fundamental ideas or the eternal character of things. It is possible that in [33] such cases even the original language is not perfect, because perfection can never be achieved, and we are always wanting to achieve it; and that is the reason why the [34] more we study the text, the greater is the knowledge we acquire (31-35). [35]

THE CHIEF DIFFICULTY AND HOW TO OVERCOME IT—It is not correct to say that this would be so in any case, however great our devotion to the task; (for the chief difficulty is not that the language is not perfect, but that) the text does not make any sense at all. (But there is a way out,) [36–37] and if we find that the description of an object is inconsistent, we should attach more importance to the object than to its description, because the object is the primary thing, and the description is for the sake of the object. [38] Again, if we find that there is an inconsistency between an object and its use, we should attach more importance to its use. In case there is no reference to an object, we should see what arises out of it as a result, because what remains of objects is their use. There should thus be a [39] method of doing things in connection with each part of the entire text; and, as it is possible to get a rational mean- [40] ing in this way, we should be able to explain each part of the whole. When, however, there are a number of meanings, we should take those which are most apposite,—for that is the measure of their excellence; and the rest

of the text is intended to contribute to that excellence (36-41). 41

PART IV

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

It is necessary to make a selection of our meaning; but if there is a special mention of a particular meaning or a particular cause, we should accept that in preference to anything else, even if some other meaning also makes sense (1-9). But there can be only one predominant thought, which must produce its own effect or result (10-12). The main and subordinate parts of the text are closely connected together, for otherwise the whole thing would become meaningless (13-16).

There are, however, certain terms or expressions which have a special meaning: for instance, "burning to ashes" means "burning everything" (17-18); "inexhaustibleness" refers to this world (19); *tad* means sacrifice of all kinds (20-25); the idea of renewing the sacrificial fire and "cooked rice" is the same (26-27); the "offering of five cups" is a substitute for something else (28); there is an idea behind the invocation of the deity of a substance without the worshipper (29-31); "conquest of the world" means harmony of thought, feeling and action (32-33); the austerities of a father mean that he wants to benefit his son (34); the idea of Time arises from something that makes its appearance, or the word "immeasurable", or the birth of a son (35-39).

The meaning of the word *sva* or soul cannot be expressed in words (40); we can understand the idea of Time because of its connection with some characteristic of the soul (41); and we can understand the idea of both Time and the soul because of the purposefulness of Time (42).

It is necessary to arrange things in an orderly manner; and it is this that gives us the idea of Time (43-47).

IMPORTANCE OF SPECIAL MEANINGS—When in our interpretation of the text we come to two meanings which are equally significant, we should select that which has a bearing on the result, because that is the purpose it has to serve. But if there is a special reference to some other 1 meaning, it should be preferred; because, if there is men- 2 tion of a special cause, result is but a poor support to

uphold a different one. When there is special mention of a particular cause, it should be regarded as most important, and the result should be "absorbed" or explained away in some other way. But whatever the explanation, the meaning of the whole should be closely knitted together, with an intimate relation of each part to the other. However, the cause that has been specially mentioned, has an excellence of its own; and it is only in matters of great importance that there is a detailed description of things in the *śruti* (1-7). 3 4 5 6 7

No other explanation can make as good sense as the special meaning given in the text, because there can be no conflict with it anywhere. At the same time, as the whole meaning is closely inter-connected, the predominant thought of the text can be found only in one place (and two explanations cannot be equally satisfactory). But the prominent thought cannot exist without result,—for, were it so, it would be an unskilful way of handling it. Indeed, it is there for the purpose of producing a result. This should be so, and this is actually found to be the case; and anything else would be unthinkable. As all parts of the text are closely connected together, the meaning based on result cannot be regarded as subsidiary; and it would be a very unusual thing to think that it is (8-12). 8–9 10 11 12

MAIN AND SUBORDINATE PARTS—So far as the subordinate parts of the text are concerned, since they are meant to serve the purpose of some higher object, they need to be supported by some statement in the text. Nor need the statement create a doubt as to the exact idea of these parts, because there is always a reason for them;[1] and 13 13a

[1] This *Sūtra* does not occur in certain texts.

their meaning cannot be different in different places, because it is obtained from the entire body of the text. 14-15 Indeed, if they were to lose their meaning, the whole text would be broken up (13-16). 16

SPECIAL EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN TERMS—(There are certain expressions used in the text which have been explained in a special manner: for instance,) when we speak of "burning to ashes", the meaning is the same as "the burning of everything", because we can put one for the other in the same place; and that is how we should under- 17 stand the meaning of words used in the same place (17-18). 18

When the word *anya* is used, meaning "inexhaustibleness", we should understand that it means *etad* or "this world"; and the reason for this is to be found in the sacred books themselves (19). 19

Similarly, the word *tad* means *havis* or sacrifice, and we cannot say that their meanings are different, for the word *havis* should be deemed to refer to sacrifice because of its connection with the word *tad*.[1] It is not necessary 20-21 that all this should be contained in the *śruti*, for this is the very definition of the word; and so offering sacrifices 22-23 to the god, religious bath, and even acts of eating and drinking are said to be like *tad* (or sacrifice). When a 24 word has been specially defined, its meaning should be obtained in two ways,—the word itself and its definition; and no *Dharma-śāstra* or code of laws is required further to explain it (20-25). 25

[1] The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that there are three names of *Brahma*, —*Om*, *Tad and Sat*; and of these *Tad* is specially associated with the idea of sacrifice (BhG. XVII, 25). The literal meaning of the word (*ta*, *d*) is "(*d*) sacrifice, associated with (*ta*) the senses of action".

Again, the idea of "renewing the sacrificial fire" is the same as that of "cooked rice" (for they both refer to food conceived in terms of sacrifice); and so the meaning of both the expressions arises from the mention of the object associated with them (26-27). 26 27

There is a mention of "an offering of five cups" in the *śruti*; and it should really be a substitute for something else[1] (28). 28

There is also a rule in regard to "the deity of an object"; but there is no express mention of "the worshipper" in every case.[2] But the worshipper would wish to be present at the sacrifice because of the opportunity it would give him. Indeed, we might say that each limb of the body is a worshipper or sacrificer, because it can be the instrumental cause of action (29-31). 29 30 31

If a person desires to conquer the world, he should put himself in such a state of thinking and feeling as would enable him to engage in action; and this idea is expressed in terms of "payment of a wage or price"[3] (32-33). 32 33

When a father is devoted to his son, and wishes to do something for him, there is an impelling urge within

[1] The "five cups" are obviously substitutes for the five organs of sense, by means of which we can act. As we can drink out of a cup, so we may be said to perform a function by means of these organs.

[2] The idea of a "worshipper" is defined in the following *Sūtras* as a limb or member of the body. As it is possible to conceive of the great forces of Nature (and that is the idea of a deity) acting without reference to man, the presence of a "worshipper" is not essential.

[3] There is an alternative reading, which means that "If we do not succeed in the conquest of everything, the failure should be attributed to our manner of action". The idea of "payment of a wage" is that we have to pay for our success,—which can be achieved by means of action (Cf. BhG. IV, 12).

him to submit even to austerities for his sake[1] (34). 34

THE IDEA OF TIME: HOW EXPRESSED—The idea of Time arises from something that makes its appearance; and we can get it from what has already been mentioned.[2] We 35
can also get it from the meaning of the word immeasurable.[3] 36
Again, when there is mention of the birth of a son in the *śruti*, it should be understood to refer to a sub-division of Time. It should be regarded as pointing to Time, 37
without reference to any other direction or rule; for the 38
idea of the birth of a son would be found to be meaningless if we associate it with action instead (35-39). 39

SOUL AND TIME—The meaning of the word *sva* or soul cannot be expressed in words.[4] But if Time enables us 40
to associate ourselves with anything, it is because of its connection with some characteristic of the soul;[5] and 41

[1] A reference to the austerities of a father should be interpreted to mean that he wants to do something for the benefit of his son, because of his love for him.

[2] We get the idea of Time when something new makes its appearance. There is also a reference to Time in an earlier chapter.

[3] When we get the word immeasurable in the text, it generally refers to Time; or we might say that Time cannot be measured, for it is without a beginning or end. But we can understand something of it as it passes, and sub-divide it too; and so the idea of the birth of a son in the text is that it refers to a sub-division of Time.

[4] It is not possible to describe the soul as it is; and we can only understand it in terms of the character of some other faculties, —intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, or the senses. That is to say, we can describe it as supreme intelligence and the essence of rationality in man; or say that it is an actor; or that it is characterised by desire; or that it is an instrument of knowledge as well as action There is no other way of describing the soul; and its special characteristic is that all other faculties function because of it.

[5] These are the characteristics of the soul; and it is by means of them alone that we can get an idea of Time, or associate ourselves with anything in the world.

because Time has some purpose to serve (in the order of the universe), we can understand the idea of both Time and the soul[1] (40-42). 42

THE LAW OF TIME—When ideas and objects are scattered about, their arrangement in some scientific manner is a source of comfort,—like an asylum; and the idea of the 43 law of Time arises from the existence of both (things and their orderly arrangement). We cannot understand 44 the idea of Time from anything else, however perfect it be; and if we pursue any other course to understand 45 what is Time, we shall find that, far from coming anywhere near it, we are farther removed from its idea; for 46 we can succeed only if we look at it from a particular point of view[2] (43-47). 47

[1] It is by means of our intellect that we can get a proper idea of Time; and as the intellect and the soul may, for practical purposes, be identified, it enables us to understand the character of the soul as well.

It may be of interest to point out that the ancient divisions of Time into *Yuga*, *Manvantara*, and *Kalpa* all refer to the exercise of our mental faculties. For instance, the word *Yuga* is derived from *yuj*, one of the meanings of which is "to fix or concentrate the mind". The word, *Manvantara* is derived from *Manu*, which is the same as *manas* or the mind; while one of the meanings of the word *Kalpa* is "research, investigation". Indeed, the word *Kāla* for Time is itself derived from *kal*, which means "to perceive, consider". Hence we might say that the idea of Time involves a process of thought or a function of the intellect or the mind.

[2] It is only an orderly arrangement of things,—events occurrring in proper succession, that can give us an idea of Time. The appearance of a new thing, or the birth of a son, is meant to express this idea of an orderly arrangement of things in the world; and that is why it represents the idea of Time, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us.

PART V

. THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

(*Continued*)

As when we discover an error in a course of action, we adopt some other way to remove the defect, we must do the same in connection with the text of the sacred books. In some cases we may have to repeat the same process, while in others we have to find out where the weakness lies; and we should be satisfied only if a thing is found to be both intelligent and good (1-8).

There are certain directions enabling us to understand the meaning of the text: for instance, we know the idea of boiled milk and of sacrifice offered silently (9-15).

According to *Asmarthya*, we should take the meanings of words as they are, without making any change; and treat as exceptions those which have been defined in a special way (16-20); and this will enable us to understand the meaning of a number of words (21-26). This requires devotion to the task, but is amply rewarded by the results achieved (27-37).

In this manner we can understand the nature of action, its relation to time and desire, and how it can be purified of taint by means of control of the mind (38-45).

We need to understand the text of the Vedas in the light of all this; and should, where necessary, change the form of words to get their real meaning. The two meanings may create difficulties in some cases, but they can be overcome. In some cases they can be reconciled; while in others we must accept the second meaning, obtained by changing the form of words, as being the better of the two: only we must remember that the whole idea must remain consistent throughout (46-56).

AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF ACTION AND INTERPRETATION —If, at the commencement of an action, we find that we have committed a mistake in regard to occasion or time, we wish to invoke the gods and make an offering to them, like the sacrifice of the five cups (or five senses);[1] and this   1

[1] We have already explained that the five "cups" refer to the five organs of sense.

The gods refer to the great forces of Nature; and "invoking" them would mean understanding the character of these forces.

The point of this *Sūtra* is that when we discover a mistake, we wish to take stock of things again, retrace our steps, and begin afresh, so that we might succeed in our next attempt. We have to do the same thing in the case of the sacred text, when we find ourselves at fault.

is done in order to remove the error when it has been discovered. We are able to discover our error in connection with the text in the same manner, because such is the form of words used in it. We can discover our error in making curd by repeating the process, and gaining experience; for this is the manner of discovering error when we are new to our task. In case of deficiency of strength, we may find fault with the function of the five senses (five cups), although they might be faultless. We cannot say that this is possible in all cases,—even of good actions, which require exercise of the intellect,[1] because such actions would be without fault, and their cause would be general, and not a particular one[2] (1-8). 2 3 4 5 6 7–8

SPECIAL MEANINGS—(Certain words have been specially defined: for instance,) the expression "boiled milk" or "cooked rice" is for the sake of accurate description.[3] In the case of prayer uttered silently,—because no words are spoken,—the natural form of words should remain unchanged.[4] In such cases if we follow our own predi- 9 10

[1] The word in the text is *sāmnāyya*, which means "any substance mixed with clarified butter and offered as a burnt offering". We have explained that "clarified butter" refers to goodness; while anything partaking of the character of *Agni* or fire refers to the intellect. Hence the meaning here.

[2] The cause of a good and intelligent action is a general and not a particular one, because it partakes of the character of a law.

[3] Boiled milk or cooked food is but a detailed description of food, which, as the *Mīmānsā* has told us, refers to Nature or *Prakṛti*. There are a number of similar references in the Upanishads.

[4] There are three ways of reading the sacred text: singing aloud, silent repetition, and normal reading. In the case of the first we are told that the form of words should be changed, because that is what we do when we sing; and in the case of the second the *Mīmānsā* tells us that the natural form of words should remain unchanged; while in the case of the third we may do what is necessary in each case.

lections, we are likely to commit mistakes, as it happens in a number of other cases; and we shall fritter away our energy without achieving any result,—which can only be done by understanding the real meaning of things. (This is most important of all;) with regard to the rest, it is all a matter of description or illustration; and we can understand the rest of the meaning of the text in this manner (9-15). 11 12 13 14 15

OPINION OF SCHOLARS—*Asmarthya* says that we should normally take words in their natural or original form before they have been distributed into something else; and that will give us their correct idea. There are, however, certain words which have to be treated as exceptions, such as *taṇḍula*[1] (meaning "rice") (16). 16

Alekhana says that the word *ūrdhava* (meaning "raised above") is the opposite of *bhāj* ("possession") (that is, it means non-possession); and it is because of this that it has been personified into a deity[2] (17). 17

The word *mushṭi* (a fist) may similarly be included in some other idea; but it does not belong to the class of exceptions; and that is due to the quality of the word. Indeed, we can get its correct meaning by taking it away from its own place, and putting it somewhere else; (for this is the best way of dealing with it) and anything else 18 19

[1] Rice, as the *Mīmānsā* has told us, is the best form of grain, and so refers to *Prakṛti* or Nature in a special way. This is a special case even according to *Asmarthya*, where the common meaning of a word is not satisfactory, and a different interpretation is required.

[2] Non-possession of the material objects of life is something that is "raised above": that is, it is a high ideal, and so is personified as a god.

would make the whole thing meaningless[1] (18-20). 20

The real meaning of the word *sāmnāyya* should be obtained from its connection with the word *samnaya*[2] 21 while that of the word *aushadha* ("consisting of medicinal herbs") from its connection with both.[3] We cannot deny 22 this connection on the ground that medicinal herbs are not always effective, because their failure is due to some other cause (21-24). 23–24

CERTAIN OTHER EXPRESSIONS—Rising up to depart too quickly, and making an all-inclusive bargain, express the idea of separation and union respectively (25). 25

If a thing has occurred and we can establish that it has occurred, it means that we know what is called its efficient cause (26). 26

If we understand the *śruti* in any other way, it would give us a substituted form of meaning and not the real one. 27

[1] The word *mushṭi* has a number of meanings, including a fist (the hand closed to grasp something). It accordingly refers to the idea of possession; and, as the hand is an instrument of action, it implies action performed for the sake of possession. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we can get its correct meaning by replacing it by the word possession, to which there is also a reference in a previous *Sūtra*.

[2] As has already been explained, *sāmnāyya* refers to a good and intelligent action; while *sam-naya* means "bringing together". As the meaning of the one is to be derived from the other, it means that the idea of a good and intelligent action (*sāmnāyya*) is obtained from bringing things together (*sam-naya*): that is to say, bringing things together is a good and intelligent act.

[3] *Aushadha* means "consisting of herbs", and is derived from *oshadhi*, "a medicinal plant or herb". It is said that the meaning of *aushadha* or "what relates to medicinal plants",—that is, their healing power—should be obtained from a good and intelligent act as well as puttings things together: that is to say, medicinal herbs get their healing power when things are put together intelligently and for a good cause.

A person can succeed in obtaining the desired result by dedicating himself to the study of the text; and then he would know the difference between the two meanings (27-28). 28

It is in this manner that, by means of inference, we can understand the idea of sacrifice lasting twelve days.[1] But 29 there is an uncertainty in regard to the idea of the full moon, because there is no difference between one full moon and another[2] (and so an explanation becomes necessary) (29-30). 30

If there is only a simple reference to the full moon, and nothing follows immediately after the statement has been made, it should refer to the full moon of the month of *Chaitra*.[3] But the word *ekāshṭakā* in the *śruti* refers to the 31 full moon in the month of *Māgha*.[4] (31-32). 32

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[1] Sacrifice means a great good action performed selflessly, intelligently and in accordance with a law; while a period of twelve days is symbolic of intelligence and length and continuity of time; for the number twelve refers to the intellect, as the ten to the ten senses, and eleven to the mind. This is how we can understand its idea by means of inference: for if the number ten refers to the ten senses, eleven must refer to the mind, and twelve to *Buddhi* or the intellect.

[2] As has already been explained, the moon refers to the mind; and so the new moon signifies its awakening as desire, and the full moon its fulfilment in action. But as there are different kinds and conditions of action, a simple reference to the full moon cannot explain all, because one full moon is so like another, while actions are different.

[3] Hence one kind of reference to the full moon refers to a particular full moon,—of the month of *Chaitra*, the beginning of the Hindu year,—and so points to action at the commencement of our career, an action that must go on for some length of time.

[4] Another reference to the full moon, where the word *ekāshtakā* occurs (and it refers to Nature or *Prakṛti* with its eight divisions)—leads us to conclude that it refers to action at the end of our life, when it is necessary to renounce it,—even as the month of *Māgha* comes at the end of the Hindu year, for it is the last of the winter months.

Ekāshtakā is said to be the eighth day after the full moon, and so it

We cannot say that there is another *ekāshṭakā* too, for there is no other *ekāshṭakā*; and it is only for the sake of convenience of understanding by the people that it has been divided into two.[1] Indeed, we think of another 33-34 *ekāshṭakā*,—and that too by mistake—when we are exclusively occupied with a certain idea, and think of it as something that confers benefits;[2] for we get this idea of it 35 according as it appears to us; but all its characteristics are 36 in this one form (33-37). 37

SACRIFICE PURIFIES—As there is an appointed time for dedication to a task, to neglect it would detract from the idea of duty in regard to what ought to be done at the proper time. On the other hand, the common cause of action is the 38 desire to rise to something higher, when we are prepared for the task. There is in this nothing against the acts of 39 making oblations to the gods, as the ancients used to do; 40

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refers to the number eight. As a woman refers to Nature or *Prakṛti* —and it is a noun in the feminine gender—it may be said to refer to *Prakṛti* too. This is further supported by the reference to night, specially of the dark fortnight of the moon,—for that too refers to *Prakṛti*. We may therefore, conclude that *ekāshtakā* refers to Nature or *Prakṛti*; and this is borne out by what follows. *Prakṛti* is said to have eight divisions, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us (BhG. VII, 4).

[1] *Ekāshtakā* or *Prakṛti* is only one; and it is only for the sake of convenience of understanding its idea that we are told that there are two forms of it,—one making for life and the other making for death. There is a reference to two kinds of *Prakṛti* in the *Bhagavad Gītā* too (BhG. VII, 5); but later on we are told of only one (BhG. XIII, 20-24; XIV, 3-5).

[2] The *Prakṛti* that confers benefits is the same as the higher *Prakṛti*, referred to in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, which is said to be the "life of all creatures, and sustains the universe" (BhG. VII, 5). It is this idea of *Prakṛti* that is closely associated with that of God, for it can easily be transformed into the latter by means of the idea of Sacrifice. This has already been explained.

for actions take place when the time is ripe for them. But by controlling desire, we elevate ourselves, because the desire is removed or purified thereby[1] (38-42). 41 42

FUNCTION OF THE INTELLECT AND THE MIND—If there is anything against *Homa*, *Agni-hotra* offerings should be made every evening;[2] but every morning we should make use of that which consists of sixteen parts;[3] but it should 43 44

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[1]As has already been explained, the gods refer to the great and beneficent forces of Nature; and making oblations to them means that we admit that these forces have a part to play in action. The idea of human action, performed as a duty, or as a sacrifice, is thus in complete harmony with the part that the great forces of Nature play in it; and this is exemplified by the fact that actions take place when the time is ripe for them. At the same time it is necessary to control our desires, for desires are removed or purified in this manner (Cf. BhG. III, 37-43; V, 7-12; etc.).

[2]*Homa* is an act of making an oblation to the gods by casting clarified butter into the fire. As gods refer to the forces of Nature, clarified butter to goodness, and fire to the intellect,—it means a good and intelligent action associated with the great powers of Nature: that is to say, we believe that the latter are characterised by both goodness and intelligence, and regulate our life accordingly.

Agni-hotra is an oblation to *Agni*; and there are two kinds of *Agni-hotra*,—*nitya* or obligatory, and *kāmya* or optional. As *Agni* refers to the intellect, it means an intelligent action, whether it be obligatory or optional.

The point of this *Sūtra* is that even if we do not believe in the forces of Nature as being characterised by goodness and intelligence, our own actions, whether obligatory or optional, should be.

The reference to "evening" is also significant, as it is the end of the day, and so implies that, however we begin such actions, the end at least should be characterised by intelligence.

[3] But the beginning (morning), though characterised by desire (an attribute of the mind, which consists of sixteen parts), should be governed by the highest thought or thought of death, for we should be afraid of evil which is so common.

The morning refers to the beginning; that which consists of 16

always be under the authority of predominant thought (or the intellect) because evil is so common (43-45). 45

THE TEXT AND ITS INTERPRETATION—There is a corresponding "evil" or difficulty in the text, and it arises from the use of words; but it disappears when their form is 46 changed. When, however, a word is substituted by another, 47 it loses its value, like food thrown into water, unfit to be eaten by a wise man.[1] There would, in such a case, be simul- 48 taneous alternative readings, and it would be impossible to grasp the main idea. This is only to be expected, be- 49 cause there can only be one instrumental cause of a thing, and it can be expressed by only one word at a time. But 50 where there is a conflict of statements, there is likely to be a difference of opinion (or doubt) as to the exact idea of the text. In some places, however, the idea may improve 51 with two readings; but that will not be (commonly) so, 52 because things are united together into a single whole (46-53). 53

If two things are related as prior and posterior, the former is the weaker of the two; and such is the case with the natural form of a word.[2] But if, on second thought, we 54

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parts is the mind; and *Prāyas-chitta*, the word used in the text, means "predominant thought, or thought of death."

[1] When one meaning is substituted by another, the original meaning becomes useless. However, when we are dissatisfied with the original meaning, there can be a number of alternative ways of handling the text; and we have to choose the best, for even two cannot be alike, though, in some cases, it may be an advantage to have them.

[2] This means the same thing as saying that second thoughts are best. Similarly, if in the case of words we find it necessary to change their form, it would be found that, as between their original form and the changed one, the latter, being the last, is the better of the two.

find it necessary to change the form of words, the entire Veda should again hold together in the same manner as in the other case:[1] for if a work is continuous,—however extensive it be, there can be no break in it unless it is intended to be so[2] (54-56).

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[1] The *Sūtra* in its original form may be rendered as follows:—

55. "If, at the repeated acts of prayer and praise, the *Udgātṛ* priest comes last, the entire Veda should hold together, as in the other case."

The *Udgātṛ* priest is said to chant or sing aloud the hymns of the *Sāma Veda*; and, according to the *Mīmānsā*, singing aloud is an indication that the form of words should be changed. The idea of *Udgātṛ* priest coming last would accordingly be that we find, on later thought, that it is necessary to change the form of words in order to understand their meaning; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that this is specially necessary in the case of the *Sāma Veda*, which deals with the problem of living creatures; and that is the reason why its hymns are intended to be sung.

The meaning of the *Sūtra* would now be as follows:—

"If we find repeatedly (at the repeated acts of prayer and praise) that, on second thought, the form of words should be changed (the *Udgātṛ* priest comes last), the entire Veda should hold together, as in the other case."

The *Mīmānsā* warns us that if we find it necessary to change the form of words we should take care to see that the meaning of the text remains continuous and consistent in its light throughout, and that this consistency is not less than it is in its original form.

[2] The *Sūtra* in its original form may be rendered as follows:—

"In a particular series of days of sacrifice there can be a break only if there is a break in action."

We have explained that sacrifice refers to a good and intelligent action; and the idea of a series of days would be that it is both continous and extensive. The point is that in the case of such an action there can be no break unless it is so intended; even so there should be no break in the meaning of the Veda when we interpret it in the light of action, conceived as a sacrifice, by changing the form of words.

PART VI

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION: THE PROBLEM OF ACTION

We can accept the meaning of words in their natural form only if it is the very best (1-2); but it should not be derived from some detached or casual remark, except in very special cases (3-6). It should not be obtained by breaking up the unity of idea of the text or by mixing up words; and the best result is obtained by dividing words into parts as in the case of *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara-Sāman* hymns of the Vedas (7-9). But we should be careful to see that the whole text is connected together and has an unbroken unity of thought (10-11).

When we get two meanings of a word, we must make up our minds as to which of the two we should accept; and we may find that the one we do has little connection with the ordinary meaning of the word (12-15).

In this way we shall find that all human faculties are capable of performing action; but it is the special privilege of the intellect to direct it; and so the highest place belongs to the intellect (16-24). It is, however possible to say that all of them all equal with reference to the soul, because they are equally dependent on it (25); nevertheless the function of the one,—say the mind, cannot be performed by the others,—the intellect, the senses, or their objects (26).

Pleasure or enjoyment has power to impel us to action; and so we see that purpose and action are closely intertwined (27-32).

There may be a doubt as to whether an action like speech etc., which may be a natural or reflex action, is impelled by purpose or not (33); and in such cases we should accept the opinion of trustworthy persons (34). The simplest way of finding out the character of action is to observe the behaviour of a person in a state of distress or agitation (35-36).

It is necessary to refer to all kinds of actions in order to understand their connection with purpose or aim; and this would include sacrifice, which is an exalted kind of action, and free from any element of special interest or aim (37-39).

HOW TO INTERPRET THE TEXT—When we get a number of words in the text, we should accept their meaning in their natural form only if it is suitable, because the text is without any defect. Indeed, the meaning we get 1 should be the best; but it should not be obtained from 2

some detached or casual remark, though it may be so in certain cases, just as we may get the idea of sacrifice from a reference to a branch of the sacred Fig-tree.[1] The reference may not be a prominent one; but the idea of sacrifice arises from the pre-eminence of it, as in the case of the word *kapāla*[2] (1-6). 3 4 5 6

We cannot say that it is possible to get the same idea by means of something else, because it is necessary to maintain unity of thought, whereas there would be an absence of proper relation in the case of casual expressions; and so it would not be possible to work the meaning into a harmonious whole. Indeed, if we mix up words, we fail to understand the real idea of the text; and the correct meaning can be obtained by dividing words into regular parts, as in the case of *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara-Sāman* hymns.[3] Even so the whole text should be connected together, 7-8 9

[1] The Fig-tree has always been regarded as sacred, as being symbolic of *Prakṛti* or Nature itself (Cf. BhG. XV, 1-4); and, as Nature is governed by a law which may be conceived in terms of sacrifice, the Fig-tree or a branch of it may be regarded as a symbol of that sacrifice.

[2] *Kapāla* means "the alms-bowl of a beggar", and so symbolises a life of renunciation, which may be regarded as a form of sacrifice. A reference to a single word like *kapāla* can give us this idea; and so also a reference to a branch of the sacred Fig-tree. But these are exceptions to the rule.

[3] The word *Sāman* has a number of meanings in *Sanskṛt*. Here it refers to a particular kind of sacred text or verse called a *Sāman*, which is intended to be chanted or sung. There are four kinds of verses mentioned in the *Rig Veda* (RV. X. xc, 9)—*Rich*, *Yajus*, *Chhandas* and *Sāman*; and *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara* are two *Sāman* verses which are intended to be chanted. This *Sūtra* tells us that the words in these verses need to be divided into parts to enable us to understand their meaning; and the next *Sūtra* says that the principle involved in this method of interpretation can be extended in these verses from one end to the other.

and there should be no impediments in the way,—because that is the test of our mastery of the text. In the two *Sāmans*,—*Bṛhat* and *Rathantara*—the result of this method can be extended from end to end. Each part of the whole is connected with and dependent on the other; but in order to understand this it is necessary to divide words into their parts (7-11). 10 11

NEED OF SELECTION—We get two meanings of a word in this way, and must make up our mind as to which of the two we should have; but this should not be so merely because of the absence of sense in the other meaning.[1] Indeed, when we get our meanings by dividing words into regular parts, we shall find that they have no connection with those that are ordinarily taught or heard. For instance, if we interpret the word *Pāṇi* as mere hand,—as a minor limb of the body—we shall not get any essential idea of the text (12-15).[2] 12 13 14 15

FUNCTION OF HUMAN FACULTIES—All human faculties[3] are capable of performing meritorious deeds, because there is no distinction between them in this respect; and this 16

[1] The principle of interpretation is that when we reject one meaning and accept another, it should not be merely because the first meaning does not make sense. It is equally necessary that the other meaning should make good sense.

[2] The hand is an instrument of action; and it is necessary to understand the word *Pāṇi* to refer to action, when we shall get a proper meaning of the text.

[3] The word in the text is *Varṇa*, which is commonly believed to refer to the "castes". But we have seen that it really refers to the different faculties of man and the objects of Nature. We have also seen in what sense we have to understand the idea when it is said that only the first three "castes" can act: for it refers to the three faculties of man,—his intellect, mind, and the senses.

can be proved. But such deeds are the special privilege of the intellect, because the other two (the mind and the senses) cannot direct action.[1] There is no statement in the sacred books to the effect that they can; and all that has been laid down refers to the character of the soul,[2] which is also described as "a master of the house" without any derogation of the name,[3] or conflict with the manner in which action takes place. Indeed, we can see the proof of the strength of all the rest by reason of the character of the soul;[4] and that will enable us to understand that the intellect is necessarily the best.[5] Or we might say that all of them are equal if we refer them to their original state (or dependence on the soul).[6] (But even this is not possible, for) it is a rule that when the mind performs its

17 18 19–20 21 22 23 24 25

[1]The word for intellect in the text is *Brāhmaṇa* which, as we have seen, refers to the intellect, as the *Kshatriya* to *ahaṅkāra* and the mind, and the *Vaiśya* to the senses.

Another word in this *Sūtra* is *Aṛtvijya*, which means "the office of a *Ritvij* priest"; and as his office is to direct a sacrifice, it has been rendered as "directing action", for that is the idea of sacrifice.

[2] The word in the text is *Svāmin* (lord, master) which, as has already been explained, refers to the soul.

[3] The soul is also described as "a master of the house"; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that there is no real conflict between the two names, which have been distinguished in a later chapter.

[4] All these faculties derive their strength from their association with the soul, for they cannot act without it.

[5] When we understand how all these faculties function in association with the soul, we shall realise that the intellect is the highest of all,—for its special characteristic is decision, without which no action can take place.

The word in the text is *Brāhmaṇa*, which, as has already been explained, refers to the intellect.

[6] Since all the faculties of man depend for their function on the soul, and cannot act without it, it may be argued that they are alike. But even that is not tenable.

own function, the same cannot be done by the intellect or the senses[1] (16-26). 26

[1] The text of this *Sūtra* may be rendered as follows:—

26. "As according to rule, *Viśvāmitra* performs the function of the *Hotṛ* priest, *Bhṛgu*, *Sunaka* and *Vasishṭha* do not lay any claim to it."

We have explained that the *Hotṛ* priest refers to the mind; and so should *Viśvāmitra*, because he is said to perform his functions.

We have explained that *Mitra* refers to the intellect associated with action; and so *Viśvā-mitra* would mean "*(mitra)* intellect *(viśvā)* in its universal or comprehensive form;" and this, as we now gather from this *Sūtra*, is closely allied to the mind. Indeed, the *Mīmānsā* tells us that the mind and the intellect can be identified, and this is represented by the identity between *Soma* and *Agni*, who refer to the mind and intellect respectively. But *Soma* also refers to the full moon, which means the full development of the mind from desire into action. Hence *Viśvā-mitra* gives us a comprehensive idea of the intellect, where the latter is the fully developed mind engaged in action. In other words, when the mind is fully engaged in action it is like the intellect; and this is the same thing as saying that when the intellect is engaged in action, it is the same thing as a fully developed mind. The *Mahābhārata* accordingly tells us that when the intellect desires anything, it is called the mind (*Śānti P.* XII, cxciv, 20).

Thus we might say that *Viśvā-mitra* gives us the idea of the identity between the intellect and the mind, when the two are engaged in action. He figures in a number of places in a large number of sacred books, and it would be found that he refers to this idea throughout.

Vasishṭha literally means *Vasu-ishṭa* (*Va, su, ishṭha*)—"*(ishṭha)* the highest or the best *(su)* born of *(va)* Nature or *Prakṛti*"; and so refers to the intellect, as the first or highest "born" of Nature. He too figures largely in the sacred books, and retains this meaning throughout.

We are told of the rivalry between *Viśvāmitra* and *Vasishṭha*; and the cause lies in their different points of view in connection with the idea of the intellect: for *Viśvāmitra* represents the idea of the intellect in the closest association with mind and action; while *Vasishṭha*, "born of *Prakṛti*", believes that *Prakṛti* is the supreme creator of life, and so the highest goal can be attained only by means of renunciation of action; and this is the conclusion of the intellect as represented by him. Hence, as it is not easy to reconcile their conflicting points of view, their rivalry continues.

Pleasure and Purpose in Action—The power of pleasure is so great that even those who are not intelligent (or those who wish to renounce action)[1] have to engage in action; and we can easily see this in the case of one who seeks pleasure. All this arises from the power of predominant thought (which impels a man to action); and in the case of intelligent persons (or those who do not wish to renounce action), action arises from the innate condition of their desire. This is so because all are impelled to action by means of purpose or aim; and we can see for ourselves that purpose and action are closely intertwined (27-32).

Doubtful Cases—There may, however, be a doubt as to whether an action like speech etc. is impelled by purpose or not; and in such cases we may take it as we like.[2] But, whenever there is a difference of opinion in regard to the idea of the sacred books, we should, even in such

Bhṛgu—Bh, ṛ, g, u—means "(*u, g*) the senses of knowledge and (*ṛ*) the sense of action, associated with (*bh*) Nature."

Sunaka—ś, u, na, ka—means "(*ś, u, na*) the senses of knowledge associated with (*ka*) Nature."

The difference between *Bhṛgu* and *Sunaka* is that, while the one refers to both the senses of knowledge and action, the other refers to the senses of knowledge only.

Again all the three—*Vasishṭha, Bhṛgu,* and *Sunaka*—refer to their association with Nature.

Thus we see that *Viśvāmitra* refers to the mind fully engaged in action; while *Vasishṭha* to the intellect, and *Bhṛgu* and *Sunaka* to the senses.

[1] The word in the text is *Anagni,* meaning "without fire" or without intelligence. There is a reference in the *Bhagavad Gītā* to one "who is without fire and without action" (BhG. VI, 1); and the idea apparently is that it is only a foolish person who thinks of giving up action during his life. Both the renderings have been given here.

[2] Certain actions, like speech, can be deliberate as well natural or reflex; and we can take them as we like according to the circum-

cases, accept the conclusion of trustworthy persons who agree (33-34). 34

A SUGGESTION—(One of the simplest ways of finding out the character of such action is to) observe the dominant thought of a person in a state of danger or distress; for 35 we can understand the real character of a man's actions when he is in a state of agitation. As acts of sacrifice are free from agitation, we have to examine other kinds of actions; for it is necessary to refer to all kinds of actions to understand this (35-36). 36

We have, for instance, the idea of a real (or excellent) sacrifice. It is not correct to say that acts of sacrifice 37 are altogether different from other kinds of actions; nor do they have a different relation to those regarded as subsidiary. But the idea of sacrifice is necessarily an exalted one; and so the impelling force that makes for it is not the same as in other cases. Indeed, we might 38 say that, as sacrifice has this character, the idea of purpose or special interest should altogether be eliminated from it (37-39). 39

PART VII

THE PROBLEM OF ACTION: THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

The idea of giving in charity: giving away one's self means giving away everything; a person can give away only what he has; neither the earth nor the *śūdra* can be given away. It is

stances of each case. But we should follow the opinion of trustworthy persons,—there they agree—whenever there is a conflict of opinion.

only what belongs to a person that should be accepted as a gift by a priest (1-7).

One action follows another, and one aim is succeeded by another (8-10).

We cannot say that what remains after an action is its result, for the result is uncertain, and may be different from what is intended (11-13).

An examination of an action spread over a number of days shows that one action follows another (14); and this is expressed by the number 112 or *Prakṛti* (15-17); and both imply change as well as increase (18-19).

Prakṛti may be described in a number of ways: as something that confers benefits, or as something that is beyond all measure or limitations (20-25).

It is natural for a person to narrate action,—of some other person or of past times (26); and this is what the sacred books contain (27); and we can get this meaning by dividing words into parts (28), when it will be found to have a bearing on the laws of life (29). We can translate the text in this light by this means (30).

For instance, if some one is stated to have lived for a thousand years, it cannot possibly refer to a human being (31). It can refer only to a law of life, which would, of course, include man (32); and so there is no incongruity in the reference to a man living for a thousand years,—for the reference is really to a law of life (33-34). Indeed, the term man refers to the whole human race; and so we might say that the whole includes each individual too (35-36).

According to *Lāvukāyana* if there is a difference of opinion about the meaning of a word, it should be divided into parts (37).

But there are certain terms the meaning of which has been defined: for instance, a full year refers to *Prakṛti*, and so also a large number of days (38-40).

IDEA OF CHARITY OR GIFT—If a person gives away his own self, it means that he gives away everything without exception. A person can give away only what he has, 1 and anything else would be impossible. Nor can the earth 2 be given away, because it belongs to all without distinction. It would be improper to give away the earth; and 3 so, if a person does so, he should retract, and give away something else which is his own in a special way. Again, 4 what is permanent can have no connection with what is impermanent; and the *śūdra* too cannot be given away 5

according to sacred law[1] (*Dharma-śāstra*). Then, when a person makes a gift to a priest, the latter should accept only that which belongs to the person,—for there is agreement of opinion that that is the real meaning of a gift (1-7). 6 7

ONE ACTION FOLLOWS ANOTHER—When nothing is left, it means that there is an end to a thing; and that is how an action is completed by means of certain things.[2] Even so, after one action has been completed, another remains to be done; and that is clearly inherent in the plan or design of action. We can understand in this manner how one aim follows another (8-10). 8 9 10

It may be argued that nothing is left after a deed is done, and what remains is its result or effect, and the manner of our taking it. But this is not correct, because of the uncertainty of our getting the result. It often happens that in a series of undertakings,—because of our determination to achieve our end—we do something which we had not intended or desired; and this too shows that there is no conflict (with the previous statement that one action follows another). Indeed, if we examine action spread over a series of days, we shall find that this is the law of action, applicable to all cases without exception[3] (8-14). 11 12 13 14

The number 112 or 1200 is like *Prakṛti* itself[4] (or it

[1] The *śūdra* cannot be given away as a gift, because he refers to the objects of the senses or Nature itself. This has already been explained.

[2] An action may be said to come to an end when the things that are associated with it come to an end.

[3] This is a universal law of life,—that one action follows another without a break; and it can be proved in a number of ways.

[4] The text has *Dvā-daśa-śatam* which can mean 112 or 1200; and both numbers refer to Nature or *Prakṛti*.

represents the idea of the action of *Prakṛti*); but it would [15]
not be so if the latter had some other characteristics; [16]
and this can easily be proved. Indeed, there is change [17]
implied in both (this number and *Prakṛti*) without any

The following *Sūtras* tell us that these numbers represent the idea of change or evolution of *Prakṛti;* and we have to see how that can be proved.

The word for "change" in the text is *vikāra*, which has a number of meanings, including "a production or derivation from *Prakṛti*"; and it is in this sense that it needs to be understood here: that is to say, it refers to the evolution of life from *Prakṛti*.

This is described in some detail in the *Sāṅkhya*, which tells us that when *Prakṛti* begins its course, the first to arise from it is *Mahat* or the intellect, from which arises *Ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor; and the latter gives rise to the five attributes of the five great "elements"; then we have the Mind, the five great elements, and the ten senses of knowledge and action (SS. I, 61, 71-72).

Thus we see that it is possible to divide this process into two parts,—intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, and the five attributes of the "elements" on the one hand, and the mind together with the great "elements" and the senses on the other; and the former consists of seven parts, and the latter of 16,—the multiple of which is 112, giving us a complete idea of the evolution of *Prakṛti*.

It is possible to deal with number 1200 in a similar way. The *Sāṅkhya* tells us that the action of *Prakṛti* may be compared to the passage of Time (III,60), and the same idea is repeated in the *Mīmānsā*. Now the ancients divided Time into *Yugas*, *Manvantaras*, and *Kalpas*; and the *Yugas* are said to be four in number; while the duration of all the four constitutes a *Manvantara*; and a thousand *Yugas* make a *Kalpa*. The basis of all this is a *Yuga*.

Now the four *Yugas* are *Satya*, *Tretā*, *Dvāpara*, and *Kali*; and their duration is said to be 1,728,000, 1,296,000, 864,000, and 432,000 years of men respectively. It will be found on examination that all these figures are multiples of the number 1200, which may, accordingly be said to refer to Time or to *Prakṛti*. Indeed, the number 1200 is itself based on the idea of the number 12, which is the real number representing the idea of Time or of *Prakṛti*.

Thus we see how the numbers 112 or 1200 refer to the idea of the evolution of Nature or *Prakṛti*.

distinction; and they can be made more numerous by repeated procreation (or multiplication)[1] (15-19).

IDEA OF PRAKRITI: HOW EXPRESSED—(The idea of *Prakṛti* arises) also from that of conferring benefits, like a ray of light from a heavenly body.[2] All that remains (of *Prakṛti*) is so measureless that it is impossible to reckon it,—because the state of our intellect is so limited; and any other expression for it should be of the same kind, so far as enumeration is concerned.[3] Equally so, it is not subject to any limitations; and can be even more than this, by means of the many uses that can be assigned to it,—because of the different ways in which it exists. This is how its meaning is explained (20-25).

NARRATIVE FORM OF THE VEDIC TEXT—It is natural for a man to give an account of another person or of former times. Indeed, the act of narration should serve some useful purpose too; and this purpose is to be found in the sacred books in spite of apparent contradictions. Its character (or nature) can be seen from the details given in the text (if we divide words into parts), just as we may divide a thing into five (or some definite) parts; and, as it is connected with the Vedas, its teaching should refer to

[1] We have seen from the idea of numbers, as explained here, how the idea of multiplication and creation is the same.

[2] This corresponds to what the *Bhagavad Gītā* calls the higher form of *Prakṛti*, which is said to be the life of all creatures and to sustain the universe (BhG. VII, 5).

The idea of *Kāma-dhuk* or the "Cow of Plenty", which is said to confer benefits, would be of this kind.

[3] Any description of *Prakṛti* would refer to it as measureless etc. (Cf. BhG. XV, 1-3, where the "eternal *Aśvattha*" refers to Nature or *Prakṛti*).

the laws of life (*Vidhi*); and the explanation of the mean- 29
ing should be such that the conclusion has a bearing on
these laws; and it should be possible to translate it in
their terms (26-30). 30

AN ILLUSTRATION—When there is mention of a thousand
years as being the duration of the life of some one, it can
refer only to things the life of which can last so long,
because it is impossible to refer it to a man. It is a figu- 31
rative expression, and we can see that it has some other
meaning.[1] Nevertheless, because of the reference to the 31*a*
laws of life, there should also be a reference to the law
of man (as a part of the law of life); and there is no 32
incongruity in this idea, because there is a latent connec- 33
tion between the law of man and the law of life. *Kārshṇājini*[2] 34
says that when we speak of the law of man, we speak of
the law of the human race, because it would be improper
to speak of it as such if it referred only to an individual. 35
But if it refers to the whole race it means that it refers
to each individual too (31-36). 36

METHOD OF INTERPRETATION—According to *Lāvukāyana*,[3]
if there be a conflict of opinion in regard to the meaning
of the text, one way of reading it should be such that we
divide words into parts (37). 37

[1] This *Sūtra* does not occur in cerain texts. It is said that *Rāma* ruled in *Ayodhyā* for ten thousand years; and we have to understand the idea in a similar way; for he too represents a great system of thought which prevailed for a long time. The *Mahābhārata* tells us that the terms hundred, thousand, hundred thousand refer to an infinite or an indefinitely large number (*Adi P.* I, CCXIX, 8).

[2] This is a name of a philosopher.

[3] *Lāvukāyana* or *Lābukāyana* is the name of a philosopher.

If there is mention of a full year, we cannot understand its meaning, because it passes on; and so it should be deemed to refer to *Prakṛti*, because of the special reference (made to it in this connection); and that is also the idea of a large number of days[1] (38-40). 38 39 40

PART VIII

THE CHARACTER OF SACRIFICE: THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

Sacrifice is an intelligent action, but begins initially with desire (1-3); and this is true of all action deliberately performed (4-5). It may be said that *Japa* or silent repetition of a name has no connection with the intellect; yet it is an act of sacrifice (6). *Homa* is an intelligent action, and is also associated with desire (7); but both *Japa* and *Homa* are like an oblation offered to the deceased ancestors (8).

Certain actions are not performed at the bidding of the intellect (9); but an action performed without expectation of result is an act of pure sacrifice (10). The *upanaya* ceremony of initiating a boy into knowledge is also of this kind (11), for action systematically performed gives rise to knowledge (12).

A proper performance of action as a sacrifice requires the co-operation of both husband and wife (13). We can refrain from action only at the end of our life, when all our tasks are done; and this is in accordance with the law of life (14-16).

A sacrifice is action meant for the benefit of all; and in such a case a person should not seek any special benefit even for his son (17). But the birth of a son symbolises the fulfilment of desire, and so one should have a son (18); and a person should pray to his deceased ancestors for the birth of a son (19).

If a person desires to become great, he must exercise his intellect (20), for the desire itself is inseparable from his intelligence (21-22).

Things associated with the gods are described in the sacred books in certain special ways,—e.g., the first half of the year, a day in the bright fortnight of the lunar month, or an auspicious day,—for we can remember them best in that form

[1] We have already explained that the idea of Time is closely connected with that of Nature or *Prakṛti*, as both refer to change, which is action conceived in its widest significance.

(23); but the entire action should be completed on that day (24); and other days should be associated with the deceased ancestors (25).

Certain words have certain specified meanings: for instance, "begging" or "buying" implies some deficiency (26-27). Certain other words like eating, calling, etc. have also a fixed meaning (28-29).

In the case of animals, however, there is no fixity of meaning, because we cannot assign any fixed attributes to them (30); and so the meaning of a word like *chhāga* (goat, etc.) has to be understood from its use in the text (31-32). Nor can the meanings of such words be derived from their roots or basic forms (33-34).

The general rule, however, is that the same word should have the same meaning throughout: the word *chhāga* may accordingly mean "action" (35-39).

A fundamental word cannot be obtained from some other word (40); and when its form is changed, it becomes an entirely different word, with no connection with its original form (41). This change has no connection with the attributes of an animal (42), the idea of which should be obtained by means of its own character and the meaning of the principal word used in the text (43).

NATURE OF SACRIFICE—*Homa*[1] is a pure intelligent action, which begins originally with desire, and becomes free from desire in the end; and even though the act be quite new or incomplete, it is still an intelligent act (or an act of sacrifice). All actions begin with desire; and it is an imperfect action in which the four *Hotṛ* priests are found to take part;[2] and the teaching in regard to an act of sacrifice

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[1] *Homa* is an act of making oblations to the gods by casting clarified butter into the fire. We have explained that fire or *Agni* refers to intelligence, and clarified butter to goodness of desire. *Homa* is accordingly a good and intelligent action, or an act of sacrifice.

The word for "intelligence" in the text is *Agni* which, as the *Mīmānsā* has told us, refers to the intellect.

[2] A sacrifice, as the *Mīmānsā* will tell us presently, is an act meant for the benefit of all, including the doer of the deed himself, but no more than the rest; and no one can derive any special advantage out of it.

But we find in general that human actions are imperfect, because

does not refer to action as it is in its earliest state[1] (1-3). 3

This is true of all action without distinction; and an action 4 without desire cannot be regarded as a deliberate act, performed at the bidding of the intellect. (It can only be a reflex or accidental action,) whereas we are dealing with a description of what is not accidental (4-5). 5

But *Japa* (or silent repetition of a sacred name) is without any connection with the intellect (and yet it is an act of sacrifice[2] (6). 6

So far as *Homa* is concerned, it is an action which is associated with desire; and that which, at its commencement, is not connected with the intellect, refers to something else, and not *Homa*[3] (7). 7

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they are characterised by desire,—aiming to obtain a particular result; and in such actions the mind plays a most important part; and the mind, as has already been explained, is represented by the *Hotṛ* priest.

We have seen that there are four *Ritvij* priests,—one of whom is the *Hotṛ*; and each of them is assisted by three more, who again refer to the three remaining faculties of man: the idea being that, though a particular faculty may have the most important role in an action, the remaining three have also their place. The three assistants of the *Hotṛ* priest are accordingly the intellect, *ahaṅkāra* and the senses; and this *Sūtra* tells us that the action in which they take part is an imperfect one, because it is dominated by desire, the special attribute of the mind.

[1] An intelligent action is not an act of sacrifice at its commencement. It is only when, like *Homa*, it becomes free from desire, that it can be regarded as an act of sacrifice.

[2] No intelligence is required in merely repeating a sacred name; and so *Japa* is not characterised by intelligence: even so it is not characterised by desire, which awakens when the intellect functions and is transformed into the mind by means of desire. Hence *Japa* is a pure act of sacrifice from the very beginning (Cf. BhG. X, 25).

[3] *Japa* is not like *Homa*, which is characterised by desire at the beginning, and becomes free from it in the end; and so it is only at the end that it can be like *Japa*.

But the idea of both *Japa* and *Homa* is like an oblation offered to the deceased ancestors[1] (8). 8

But there is a special mention of certain actions which are not affected by the intellect, because they have not been commenced at its bidding; and so far as acts of oblation 9 made to deceased ancestors are concerned, they are (pure acts of sacrifice) as has already been stated.[2] The *upanaya* 10 ceremony of initiating a boy in spiritual knowledge is of the kind of a *Homa* sacrifice[3], and should be brought about; 11 for knowledge arises systematically from the performance of action[4]; and it builds up life like an architect, to use a popular form of speech. But in order that an act of sacri- 12 fice should be properly performed, it is necessary that the husband should associate himself with his wife (9-13). 13

CESSATION OF ACTION—The cessation of action comes at a later stage, after the family fire has been lighted (and all tasks are done); for the intimate life of the family continues by means of action. Indeed, the cessation of 14 action means the breaking up of all that we do or hold, and

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[1] But both *Japa* and *Homa* are acts of sacrifice,—free from desire; and so they are like an oblation offered to deceased ancestors, from whom we cannot, in reason, expect any return. Hence an offering made to the deceased ancestors is an act of pure sacrifice, free from desire for fruit.

[2] It has already been explained that an offering made to deceased ancestors represents the idea of a pure sacrifice, because we cannot, in reason, expect any result out of it.

[3] *Upanaya* or initiating a boy in spiritual knowledge is like *Homa* in so far that it begins with a particular desire, but becomes free from it in the end. To give knowledge is a form of desire; but when it is given, there is an end to it; and so to give knowledge is an act of sacrifice like *Homa*.

[4] The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that all action is made more complete in knowledge (BhG. IV, 33).

so it should come at a later time[1]. It does not require any degree of faith to believe this, for all this is in accordance with the law of life, and anything else would be contrary to the teaching of the *śruti* (14-16). 14a 15–16

SACRIFICE AND A SON—When a thing is meant to be for the benefit of all,[2] a person should not contrive to secure any special advantage out of it even for his son. But when desire is satisfied,[3] a son is born; and so one should have a son.[4] Hence, if a man understand the law of life, he should pray to his deceased ancestors and make an offering to them[5] before the union of the sexes (17-19). 17 18 19

[1] This *Sūtra* does not occur in certain texts: it only clarifies the idea of the preceding one. A person can renounce all action only at the end of his life, when he has done all his life's work.

It is this that is exemplified in the life of Buddha, whose real name is *Siddhārtha* (*Siddha-artha*) or "one all whose objects have been attained or satisfied". When a person comes to a stage of life when all his desires are satisfied, he can think of renouncing actions. But, as this stage arrives only at the end of one's life, the creed of Buddha, with its emphasis on renunciation, may be said to be one of perfection in the path of death.

[2] A real act of sacrifice is meant to be for the benefit of all (Cf. BhG. V, 25).

[3] The expression in the text is "drinking *Soma*"; and, as *Soma* refers to the mind or its attribute, desire, "drinking *Soma*" means satisfying one's desire,—even as one may do by drinking wine, which is another meaning of the word.

[4] The birth of a son is accordingly symbolic of the satisfaction of desire; and this is how we should understand its idea in the sacred books. Indeed, the desire to have a son can often be very great,—perhaps the greatest of all, as it symbolises the idea of the preservation of the race; and so the birth of a son can appropriately represent the idea of satisfaction of desire.

[5] The offering made to deceased ancestors represents the idea of pure sacrifice; and the desire to have a son should be of the same kind, —a pure sacrifice, and the son born should live and do his work for the benefit of all.

INTELLIGENCE AND DESIRE FOR GREATNESS—If a person desire to become great, he must exercise his intelligence, as is necessary in the case of a great sacrifice,[1] and his desire would be fulfilled because he has that intention.[2] This desire 20 would, in common parlance, be spoken of as part of intelligence, as it cannot be separated from it[3]; and a person who 21 controls his vital energy, because the proper time for union has not arrived, is like that (is intelligent) (20-22). 22

DESCRIPTION OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE GODS—Things belonging to the gods are associated with the first half of the year,—from winter to summer, during the progress of the sun in the northern path,— a day in the bright fortnight of the lunar month, and an auspicious day; and that is so because we can understand and remember them best in this form, and also because it conveys some other meaning.[4] 23 But the entire action should be completed on that day; 24 while on other days action associated with the deceased ancestors should be done[5] (23-25). 25

[1] An act of sacrifice requires intelligence; and the greater the act, the greater the intelligence. It needs intelligence to rise to greatness in life.

[2] A desire can be fulfilled only when a person has the desire or the intention.

[3] When a person has a desire to rise to greatness, the desire itself is a proof of his intelligence. It is only an intelligent man who can desire to become great.

[4] The gods refer to the great powers of Nature which sustain life; and the first half of the year, etc. are symbolic of this idea. That is to say, the gods are associated with bright, beautiful, and beneficent things in Nature.

The *Bhagavad Gītā* contains a reference to something similar (BhG. VIII, 23-26), and the same idea occurs in the *Upanishads* too.

[5] The deceased ones are said to abide in the region of the Moon, from where they are said to return to be reborn on earth after some

Words with Fixed Meanings—When there is a reference to "begging" (an entreaty) and "buying" in the sacred books, they should be understood to imply some deficiency, —something that is not present,—just as we say in common speech[1]; and this should always be so, because that is the meaning of these words. In the same manner there are other words,—eating, calling, covering (or concealing), making an oblation after slaying a sacrificial animal, and enmity,—which have a fixed meaning;[2] for a meaning that is not constant is of little use (26-29).

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Actions of Animals—(All this has a bearing on the actions of men, who are governed by reason). In regard to the impelling force of animals, there can be no fixed rule, because we cannot assign any such fixity to them;[3] and so the meaning of the word *chhāga* has to be obtained from the description of the *Mantra* or the hymn,[4] even though this may appear to be contrary to rules. Nor can we say that words relating to animals should be such as can be derived from their basic or uninflected forms, like the word *ārshya*

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time. They are those who depart from the earth during the progress of the sun in the other half of the year, etc.; and so the latter refers to them, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us (BhG. VIII, 25-26).

[1] When we beg or buy anything, it means that we want something; so that there is some deficiency to be made good.

[2] It is not possible to explain the meanings of these words without reference to the context.

[3] Animals, other than human beings, are not governed by reason; and so the meanings of words referring to them are not fixed. Fixity is a mark of reason or the intellect.

[4] The word *chhāga* may mean a goat or a sign of the Zodiac (Aries), or something else according to the context. It may also have to be divided into parts to be understood.

(from *Rishi*, meaning "a sage"), for that too would be contrary to rules[1] (30-34). 33-34

A General Rule—The general rule, however, is that the same word should have the same meaning throughout; for if a single name is given a number of meanings, it means that its very idea has been modified. 35 But it may be argued that there is no such rule; and that the meaning of a word is different, because the thing itself is different; and so when a word has two different meanings, we have really to distinguish between two different things, the idea of which is best expressed by two different words. 36 But this is not necessary, because we can get the correct meaning of a word from its intimate connection with the context; 37 and this can be proved from the form of the words used in the text. 38 This would tell us that the meaning of the word *chhāga* is "action"; and it can be understood from the form of the word and the evidence at our disposal (35-39). 39

Character of Change of Form of a Word—A fundamental word cannot be obtained from another or a different form of the same word[2]; 40 and the change of form of a word has nothing to do with its original idea. 41 This change is made in accordance with a definite cause, but is not effected by a

[1] It would be contrary to rules to have fixity of ideas in connection with what are called lower animals, because their own behaviour is not fixed or governed by known rules.

[2] When we change the form of a word, what we do is to divide it into parts, which are, as a rule, letters. This cannot give us a fundamental word. This method of interpretation requires that each letter should be treated like a word itself; and so the word in its changed form has nothing in common with the original word.

consideration of the attributes of an animal, the idea of 42
which should be obtained by means of its true character,
described by means of the principal word and its mean-
ing (40-43). 43

CHAPTER VII

PART I

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

The meaning of the entire text should be in accordance with the teachings of the *śruti* (1-2). This will convince us of its correctness (3); and we shall find the description to be so accurate that the ideas and objects appear to be like living beings (4).

If, however, the common meaning be the real meaning of the text, it should make sense, and the actions of persons should be consistent with their character; but it is not so (5-9).

This method of interpretation applies to both the *śruti* and the *smṛti* (10-11).

Where a word has a number of meanings, it is necessary to make a selection; and it is this principle that has been applied in this method of interpretation, as may be seen from the meanings of certain words (12-19). The new meaning transforms the whole idea of the text, and the words retain their meaning throughout (20-22). There are, however, certain words the meanings of which have been specially defined (23).

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION—When the meaning of the principal word has been explained in accordance with the authority of the *śruti*, the meaning of the rest of the text should also be explained in accordance with the same authority. It will then be found that the text, unsepa- 1 rated from its original meaning, comes to possess its true essence, and retains the same character throughout. 2 We shall thus find, from the conclusions arrived at and the truth disclosed, that the direction we have followed is the correct one, as it will partake of the characteristics of the original words. Indeed, the description is so accurate, 3

that the ideas and objects appear in every case to be like living beings[1] (1-4). 4

AN OBJECTION—It may be argued that this is not possible, because the meanings cannot be divided in such a manner as to give us this result; and so it is not possible to agree that 5 there can be two different meanings in this way (5-6). 6

AN ANSWER—But if this contention were correct, and if the meaning of the text has no bearing on the laws of life, it follows that what the text teaches should be true, and all that we are told should take place, so that if we act in conformity with it, our actions should blossom forth and produce the promised results. If the names are real names, 7 and if this is the normal form of the text, we should be able to grasp the essential characteristics of all things. 8 If, however, we must take the meanings as they are, and cannot divide words into parts, it is possible to say that the names are the names of objects; but the text also refers to their actions, which do not appear to be consistent with their character. Hence we cannot apply the same rule to the rest of the text (and say that the names refer to living beings) (7-9). 9

METHOD APPLICABLE TO BOTH SRUTI AND SMRITI—It may be argued that this method may apply to the *smṛti*, but not to the *śruti*. But this is not possible, because the

[1] This would explain why the characters in the Epics and the *Purāṇas*, which are really ideas of philosophy personified, appear to be like living beings. As the *Mīmānsā* tells us, this method of composition, and so of interpretation, is common to both the *śruti* and the *smṛti*, or the Vedas and post-Vedic literature, and the latter includes the Epics and the *Purāṇas*.

smṛti is nothing but conclusions drawn from what precedes it (*śruti*)[1] (10-11). 10–11

Need of Selection—The words used in the text have a number of meanings; and it is only because we restrict ourselves to a particular explanation that (a difficulty arises, and) we get a different meaning. (It is a common rule of 12 interpretation that) if a word has similar meanings, we should accept that which has already been referred to in the text. But this does not apply to the word *śyena*,[2] 13 because it does not make sense. Again, if a word is quite new, and has more than one meaning, the term "similar" 14–15 should apply only to such meanings as have a bearing on a law of Nature,—as, for instance, that which is derived from *Jyotishṭoma*.[3] If, however, there is a reference to 16 "five motions" in the text, it is easy to explain its meaning[4]; and we get it by substituting one expression for another; 17 and this substitution can be made throughout the text, because it is one and the same idea that is expressed, which 18 can be understood when we see through this "disguise" (12-19). 19

[1] This shows that this method of interpretation applies to both Vedic and post-Vedic literature. It has been applied to the *Mahābhārata*, and is found to be equally applicable to the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*; and so it follows that it would apply to all sacred books.

[2] The word *śyena* commonly means a "hawk or falcon" which is said to have brought down the *Soma-juice* to man. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we cannot accept this or any other meaning given in the dictionary, because it does not make sense, and so we have to divide the word into parts (Cf. MM. I, 376).

[3] *Jyotishṭoma*, said to be a *Soma* ceremony, refers really to the rays of light (See Appendix II). The *Mīmānsā* tells us that "similar" meanings, which we are asked to accept, should refer to the laws of life, —for that is the essential idea of the text.

[4] "Five motions" would obviously refer to the function of the five senses,—especially those of action, for motion and action are closely allied.

Oneness of Meaning—There are some who maintain that it is not possible to have the same meaning throughout, because the sense is fixed by the context in each case. 20 But this cannot be accepted; for if we take the meanings as they are, we find that they are unsuitable, and we are compelled to reject them; and it is in this manner that we 21 find that there is but one assemblage of ideas in connection with *Indra* and *Agni*[1] (20-22). 22

Words with Fixed Meanings—There are certain words which have only one meaning: for instance *Viśvedevas* (all-gods) refers to Nature or *Prakṛti*; and the *āgrāyaṇa* sacrifice should be understood to include all sacrifices. There is also a reference to *avabṛtha* sacrifice, and it is only once that the word has to be divided into parts; and that too in accordance with an express direction[2] (23). 23

[1] We have already explained that *Indra* really refers to the self-conscious soul (*Prajñātman*) and *Agni* to the intellect; and this is the meaning they retain throughout the range of sacred books.

[2] As has already been explained, a god refers to the great powers of Nature; and so *Viśve-devas* or all-gods would refer to all the powers of Nature,—that is, the whole of Nature itself.

Agrāyaṇa is said to be the first *Soma-libation* at the *Agnishṭoma* sacrifice. As *Soma* refers to the mind and *Agni* to intellect, while sacrifice is action,—*āgrāyaṇa*, being associated with both, would refer to the functions of both the mind and the intellect. As the attribute of the mind is desire, which is characterised by an element of goodness,—and always so where the doer of the deed himself is concerned—we have here the association of goodness and intelligence, which is of the essence of the idea of sacrifice. Hence *āgrāyaṇa* includes all kinds of sacrifice.

Avabṛtha means "the purification or ablution of the sacrificer and sacrificial vessels after a sacrifice"; it also means "a supplementary sacrifice". The *Mīmānsā* tells us that it generally retains this meaning; and it is only once that its meaning is different, and it has to be divided into parts to be understood.

MIMANSA

PART II

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION
(Continued)

The name *Sāman* refers to active life (1-2). Action is associated with desire, and is divisible into parts, corresponding to which the words used in the text are also divisible into parts (3-10).

We must not make any alteration in the language of the Vedas (11-12); and we should also accept the meanings of words bearing on the idea of action, without change of form (13-14). When we change the form of a word, the meaning may appear to be unusual; but we will not err, because there are certain technical terms to guide us (15-16). Words, the origin of which can be traced, are the best (17-18). If words had but a single meaning, there would be no need to have this multiplicity of forms; but, as we are unable to make any sense of the text, we are obliged to think of some other meaning (19-20). There can be no objection to this, because the language of the text is not altered, and it is only a question of its proper use (21).

MEANING OF SAMAN—The word *Sāman*, correctly understood, means active life[1], as has been taught; and it is only

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[1] The *Mīmānsā* tells us elsewhere (X, v, 58) that we have an account of all that relates to living creatures in the *Sāma Veda*; and here we are told that the meaning of word *Sāman* itself has been defined as "active life" or a life of action, which only living creatures are capable of.

The word *Sāman* is said to refer to a particular kind of hymns, which are intended to be sung by the *Udgātṛ* priest; and we have explained that the latter refers to *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, whose special function is action.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we should understand the text of all *Sāman* hymns in the light of the idea of action; but if we do not do so, we shall not find any reference to the laws of life in the text.

It may be of interest to observe that the Vedas are all characterised by a plan. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the subject-matter of the *Rig Veda* is action, conceived in its widest significance, and embracing all forms of it without exception (IX, ii, 4-5),— so that it would include Nature as well as animal life. The *Sāma Veda*, on the other hand, deals with the problem of animal life; and so we are told that whatever is in the *Sāma Veda* is also in the *Rig Veda* (X, v, 58-61); but ob-

when we understand its correct use that we shall be able to get a meaning bearing on the laws of life. But if we interpret it in some other way, we shall find no reference to active life. If, on the other hand, we take it in its correct sense, we shall find that there is a close connection with the idea of life (1-2). 2

ACTION: HOW DESCRIBED—We can see our motive of action in our own aim. Action consists of parts, and should be understood by means of them; (and this would explain why words need to be divided into parts,—for that is how they express the idea of the parts of an action). We 3 cannot say that words are mere sounds (and cannot do this), because we see that they produce certain results; 4–5 and if words were mere sounds, the sacred books would be useless. We cannot say that their value lies in the tone of 6 their recitation; for if there were no proper meaning, they could not have any value. The tone of recitation 7–8 does indeed produce certain effects; and that is how the

viously not *vice versa*, for the *Rig Veda* deals with all that is in the world of Nature too.

The *Yajur Veda*, even as its name indicates, refers to action in terms of sacrifice; and so it would limit itself to the actions of man, in so far as living creatures are concerned. But it would also deal with the action of the great forces of Nature in terms of the idea of sacrifice.

The *Atharva Veda* would appear to be a later composition, as there is no mention of it in the *Mīmānsa* or even the *Bhagavad Gītā*. Its author is said to be *Atharvan*, who is believed to be the first to institute the worship of *Agni* and offer *Soma*. As *Agni* refers to the intellect and *Soma* to the mind, the *Atharva Veda* may be said to deal with these, and so limit itself to the actions of man.

Thus the *Rig Veda* includes everything,—the living and the non-living; the *Sāma Veda* deals with the problem of the living; *Yajur* with the actions of man and Nature as a sacrifice; and *Atharva* with the actions of man alone.

value of the outward form of the text is measured when the words are not divided into parts; and we can see the proof of this for ourselves (3-10). 9 10

THE TEXT MUST NOT BE CHANGED—Any deviation from the natural form of the text would mean that it does not belong to the Veda. This is particularly enjoined in the second part of the *Sāma Samhitā*, where we should take the *śruti* as it is; (for if we make any change, we shall find) that the words do not yield a proper meaning (11-12). 11 12

WORDS DENOTING ACTION SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED—If there is a word denoting action, its meaning can be obtained in its usual form without making any change. In such a case a change would not be for the best; (and we should adhere to its original form even if) the object concerned should appear in an unfavourable light (13-14). 13 14

SPECIAL CASES—When a word has a number of meanings, we should accept that which refers to action. When there are different meanings,—the correct meaning, because of its change of form (in accordance with the method of interpretation),—might appear to be an uncommon one. There are, however, certain technical terms in the text (to enable us to understand it), for otherwise there can be a number of variations of meaning (15-16). 15 16

WORDS AND THEIR ORIGIN—Words whose origin can be traced are the best; and the meaning of other words can be traced by means of them. But there are also a number of words whose origin cannot be traced. We can understand their meaning, but not in the same manner as that of others (17-18). 17 18

NEED OF A NEW INTERPRETATION—It is possible to say that if there were but a single meaning of words, there would be no need to have this multiplicity of forms. But it is only because we are unable to get any sense out of the text, that we have to think of some other meaning, even as is common among the people. (The new meaning given to words is not foreign to the text,) and it is only a question of making a proper use of its language (19-21).

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PART III

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

(Continued)

The real meaning of a word is often very different from its common one; and we can understand its idea by dividing it into parts or referring it to its origin or root (1-5).

The meaning of certain words has been specially defined: for instance, *viśva-jit* (all-conquering) means *sarva-pṛshṭha* (or universal action); and *Jyotishṭoma* is action,—with special reference to mind-energy or electric energy. If we do not interpret the text in this manner, the whole of it would become meaningless (6-11).

It is in the same manner that we get the meaning of *Soma*, and can understand the idea of the purification of the sacrificer through it (12-15).

There is a law in connection with the division of words into parts; and if we follow it, we can get a proper meaning of the word *puroḍāśa* which, in its original form, makes little sense. But we should not divide words into parts if we get a properly balanced meaning of the text otherwise. On the other hand it should be followed in the case of a word like *nirmanthya* (to be churned) which makes little sense in its existing form (16-18).

It is not possible to accept the ordinary meanings of words like *Soma* (moon) or *uttara-vedi* (northern altar of the sacred fire), because they do not make any sense as they are (19-21).

The explanation of the meaning of a word can be obtained in three ways: by means of its special definition, or its common meaning, or division into parts. The common meaning of the word *uttara-vedi* is not suitable; but where two meanings are equally balanced, as in the case of the word *gati*, we can take that which we consider appropriate (22-25).

The meanings of certain words like *svara-sāma*, *eka-kapāla*, and *āmiksha* can be obtained by piercing through their "disguised" forms; but we can do so when we have the entire text before us (26-27).

The meaning of certain words is obtained from the function they perform. Thus action may be said to be like a sacrificial post; and so the word *yūpa* (sacrificial post) refers to action. This is a deliberate mode of expression and is not accidental (28-29).

In case of doubt, we may follow the common meaning of a word, if it serves our purpose; but it may not be its Vedic meaning, which can usually be obtained by dividing words into parts (30-34); and in the light of this the word *pṛshṭha* would mean "action", and no other meaning would suit the text (35-36).

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE TEXT—A word that in ordinary speech is the name of an action, may mean something very different when used in the Vedic text; but, even if it 1 is quite new, we can understand its meaning by dividing it into parts. The meaning of a word may also be obtained 2 by referring it to its origin;[1] and the idea of action can 3 be obtained by combining together the different parts of a word; for in the absence of this, it cannot be proved. 4 With regard to a great action, involving the function of the mind,[2] the correct meaning is always associated with the parts of words; and we should take it that that is the correct way of understanding the *śruti* (1-5). 5

WORDS WITH DEFINED MEANINGS—(The meaning of certain words has been specially defined: for instance,) the word *viśva-jit* has, from the very beginning, the same meaning as *sarva-pṛshṭha*.[3] Indeed, all that relates to

[1] The origin would refer to the root etc., from which a word is derived.

[2] The word in the text is *satra*, which means a great *Soma* sacrifice; and *Soma*, as we have seen, refers to the mind, and sacrifice to action.

[3] *Viśva-jit* means "all-conquering"; while *pṛshṭha*, as the *Mīmānsā* explains at the end of this part, means "action". The idea obviously

Jyotishṭoma is the same as *pṛshṭha*;[1] for that is the meaning of the word *pṛshṭha*: or the meaning may be obtained from the idea of a *Soma* festival, lasting six days[2]; and all this can seen by piercing through the "disguise" of words.[3] Indeed, the word *Jyotishṭoma* is entitled to be associated with the word *pṛshṭha*; and we cannot say that there are separate rules in regard to the two words; for if we do so and interpret the text accordingly, the whole language would become meaningless (6-11).

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is that a person can conquer or succeed in everything by means of action (Cf. BhG. IV, 12).

[1] We have explained that *Jyotishṭoma*, which is said to be a name of a *Soma* ceremony, really means "a mass or rays of light"; and now we are told that its idea is the same as that of *pṛshṭha* or "action": that is to say, it is really the action of light. The seven divisions of *Jyotishṭoma* would accordingly refer to the seven divisions of light, arising from its action.

[2] *Soma*, as has already been explained, refers to the mind; and so does the number six,—for the mind is the sixth after the five senses; and the *Mīmānsā* explains it in this manner too.

We are told that the meaning of *Jyotishṭoma* can be obtained by referring to the idea of a *Soma* festival,—that is, the display of the mind or its energy, which is said to be electric. *Jyotishṭoma* may thus be said to be a grand display of electric energy (See AppendixII).

[3] We are told that we can get the correct meaning of these words by piercing through their "disguise"; and this, as the *Mīmānsā* has explained, is done by dividing them into parts, and assigning meanings to these parts. This may also be done by tracing them to their roots. So far as the word *Jyotishṭoma* is concerned, we may divide it into *jyotis* and *stoma*, when the meaning would be " (*stoma*) mass of (*jyotis*) light"; while the word *pṛshṭha*, which usually means "height, top", may be referred to its root, *pṛ*, meaning "to be busy or active".

This word is generally believed to be made up of *pra-stha*, meaning "standing forth prominently"; but the *Mīmānsā* tells us that we should pierce through its "disguise"; and in that we are not allowed to change "*pṛ*" into "*pra*"; and so the real form of the word is *pṛ-stha* and not *pra-stha*; and its correct meaning, "(*stha*) standing in association with

MEANING OF SOMA—It is in this manner that we can understand the idea of the purification of the sacrificer through *Soma*[1] (or the function of the mind). We cannot say that we get the meaning of the word from its original or uninflected form, for we get it by means of its division into parts; and we can understand it by seeing through its "disguise"[2] (12-15).

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RULE REGARDING DIVISION OF WORDS INTO PARTS—(There is a rule in connection with the division of words into parts). We find that when we describe the ingredients of a substance, we get a proper idea of the substance itself; and it is this that has been done in connection with the words used in the *śruti*. (They need to be divided into parts in order to give us an idea of what they contain,) like the word *puroḍāśa*, which tells us nothing in its original form.[3] But this rule in regard to the division of words into parts should not be followed where there is

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(*pr*, 'to be active') action." This agrees with the meaning of the word as it is given at the end of this part (VII, *iii*, 35-36).

[1] *Soma* refers to the mind; and sacrificer is actor or doer of the deed. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that if we understand the text aright, we shall also understand how a person is "purified" when he uses his mind properly and acts. The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us how actions can purify the soul (BhG. V, 11).

[2] The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we get the real meaning of the word *Soma* by dividing it into parts,—*sa*, *u*, *ma*—when the meaning would be "(*sa*) the mind associated with (*u*, *ma*) the senses." This is the meaning of "seeing through the disguise of a word".

[3] The common meaning of the word *puroḍāśa* or *puroḍaś* is "a mass of ground rice rounded into a kind of cake (usually divided into pieces, placed on receptacles, and offered as an oblation in fire). The *Mīmānsā* tells us that it makes little sense as such, and we can get its real meaning by dividing the word into parts.

The word is really *puras-ḍāśa*, which may be divided into *p*, *u*, *ra*, *s*, *ḍ*, *āśa*,—when its meaning would be ("*āśa*) obtaining (*ḍ*) *Prakṛti*,

already a properly balanced explanation of the text; whereas it should be applied in the case of words like *nirmanthya*[1], etc., which make little sense as they are (16-18). 17 18

REASON FOR REJECTING COMMON MEANINGS—(It is not possible to accept the ordinary meaning of certain words: for instance,) we have to reject the meaning of the word *Soma* as the moon or wine, because it would be highly improper to bring forward a vessel containing the one or the other.[2] Similarly, we are unable to accept the meaning of the word *uttara-vedi*[3] (as the northern altar for the sacrificial fire), because it contains little substance in its original form (19-21). 19 20 21

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associated with (*s*) the mind, (*ra*) the senses of action, (*u*) the senses of knowledge, and (*p*) the objects of the senses". The word accordingly gives us the idea of *Prakrti*, associated with the mind, the senses and their objects; and that is its real meaning.

It will be found on examination that its meaning as "a mass of ground rice, etc." is subsidiary to its idea as *Prakṛti*; for rice, as the best kind of grain, which it is said to be, would represent Nature or the whole vegetable kingdom, even as the *Mīmānsā* tells us; and its division into parts would correspond to the divisions of *Prakṛti* into intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, etc., as has already been explained. There is also a reference to fire, which would refer to the intellect.

[1] The word *nirmanthya* means "to be churned", but it makes little sense as such. But if we divide it into *nir-manthya*, and derive *manthya* from *mantha* or *man*, *tha*,—meaning "(*tha*) an auspicious prayer, associated with (*man*, 'to think, understand') thought or understanding"—the idea of "churning" is transformed into that of "thinking, observing, understanding"; and so we can understand the real idea of the story of the "Churning of the Ocean" or *Prakṛti*.

[2] *Soma* refers to the mind,and the vessel which contains it is the brain.

[3] The word *uttara-vedi* does not make sense in its common meaning as the northern altar for the sacrificial fire, specially, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, there is no reference to any altar whatever. But the word *uttara* also means "higher, superior", and *vedi* "knowledge, science"; and if we interpret it as "higher knowledge", we shall find that it makes good sense.

THREE WAYS OF EXPLANATION—The explanation of the the meaning of a word can be obtained by associating it with some special meaning; by taking the common meaning which we have heard; and by dividing it into parts. 22
As we find it difficult to accept the common meaning of *uttara-vedi*, we have to reject the second method, and make use of the first and last. When, however, there 23
are two equally balanced meanings, we should take that which suits the context best, as in the case of the word *gati*. The difficulty in accepting the common meaning 24
of *uttara-vedi* is that it does not fit into the context, for there is no reference to an altar; and to interpret it as "the northern altar made for the sacrificial fire" would be to make use of an argument that has not yet commenced. (22-25). 25

The meaning of certain words like *svara-sāma*, *eka-kapāla*, and *āmiksha* can be obtained by piercing through their "disguise"; but we can understand them when we 26
have the entire text before us, for then we get a direction about what should be done (26-27). 27

(The meaning of certain words is obtained from the function they perform: for instance,) in a thing that is produced from action, action may be said to be like a *yūpa* or a sacrificial post;[1] and this is a deliberate and 28
not an accidental mode of expression (28-29). 29

CASES OF DOUBT—In case of doubt we should follow the common meaning of a word if it serves our purpose; 30

[1] The word *yūpa* is defined to mean "action"; and this is what the *Mīmānsā* tells us in a subsequent chapter too, where it is said to refer to action meant for the benefit of all (XI, iii, 2-7). This would explain why the "animal" (man) has to be tied to a *yūpa* or a sacrificial post if it wishes to be happy and free.

but it may not be the real Vedic meaning,—and for reasons that have already been explained. It is in this manner that 31 we get other meanings of the text, because they appear to be on the same level with the real ones; but we can get 32 a proper meaning if we interpret words in the manner explained. When we find that what remains of the 33 meaning of a word has no bearing on the idea of a sacrifice, we should get its real meaning by dividing it into parts, and treating each part as if it were a name by itself. 34 According to this the word *pṛshṭha* would mean "action", 35 even as we have been taught, and also because no other meaning would suit the context[1] (30-36). 36

PART IV

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION
(Continued)

There is good reason for following this method of interpretation (1). The common meaning of a word arises from retaining its existing form (2); but if we pronounce words correctly, we shall know their real meaning, which will be obtained by dividing them into parts (3-4). There is nothing irregular in this, and it enables us to know the exact meaning of the text (5-6)

The meaning of a word should be determined by means of its division into parts (7). Roots should not be divided into parts (8); and roots and parts of words should not be mixed together in the same word (9).

The secret of this method of interpretation consists in dividing words into their parts; and this is the meaning of "seeing through the disguise" (10). The common meaning of a word is its meaning without this "disguise" or division into parts (11). In case of doubt or difficulty there are suggestions in the text to guide us (12).

It is necessary to have knowledge to be able to understand the text; and there is a reference to it in a special way (13-14).

The design of composition is such that each part is closely connected with the other, and there is no lack of words to complete the sense (15).

[1] We have already explained that the real meaning of the word *pṛshṭha* is action.

A "disguise" is a collection of qualities, from which we have to draw our own conclusions (16-17); and we can understand these qualities by means of inference (18). "Seeing through the disguise" consists in our ability to show how things are connected with one another (19). But this method of division of words into parts applies only to the principal or the most important words (20).

METHOD OF INTERPRETATION—This is the reason for following this method of interpretation. Its result is in conformity with the previous statements of the text; and it is worthy of all honour and praise (1). 1

COMMON AND REAL MEANING—What is called the common meaning of the text, current among the people, arises from our allowing its obvious form to continue. But if we 2 pronounce the words correctly, we shall find before long that the real meaning is different. That meaning is de- 3 termined by means of the very words of the text,—words that serve to fix the meaning of other words too; and 4 it arises from the parts into which they can be divided. It is not possible to draw an irregular or irrelevant conclusion in this way, because there is always a confirmation or explanatory translation of the real meaning in what follows. The different parts of a word hold each other 5 in mutual check, with the result that we can know the exact meaning of the text even as it was conceived in the author's mind (2-6). 6

AN ILLUSTRATION—The meaning of a word should be determined by means of its division into parts which, when put together, are so closely connected that they are like a single name, and can easily be pronounced like the word *go* (a cow) uttered by a boy (7). 7

ROOTS—With regard to the roots of words, since that is their norm, their meaning should be determined according to their position in the text; and a root and subsidiary parts of a word are not permitted in one and the same expression[1] (8-9). 8 9

MEANING OF "DISGUISE"—The secret of this method of interpretation lies in reducing words to their rudimentary form, by dividing them into parts; and this should be done in all cases where this method is applied. This is indeed the meaning of "seeing through the disguise" (10). 10

THE COMMON MEANING—When a word is under a "disguise", but we take it as if it had none, that should be regarded as its common or popular sense (11). 11

[1] It follows from this that roots cannot be divided into parts. At the same time we cannot have roots and subdivision of the remaining part of a word in the same expression. For instance, if we derive the meaning of the word *pṛshṭha* from its root "*pṛ*", we cannot divide the remaining portion *shṭha* (or *stha*) into parts. Similarly, we cannot divide the word *Kṛshṇa* into *Kṛ*, *sh*, *ṇa*,—for that would be a root (*kṛ*) and a division of the remaining portion of the word into parts.

The meaning of the word *Kṛshṇa* has accordingly to be obtained from all the letters composing the name,—*K*, *ṛ*, *sh*, *ṇa*—when it would be "(*K*) *Prakṛti*, (*ṛ*, 'to reach, obtain') associated with (*sh*) the mind and (*ṇa*) the intellect". That is to say, when we believe that *Prakṛti* or Nature is governed by a law that is both good and intelligent, we get the idea of God, that is *Kṛshṇa*; and it will be found that this is the highest conception of God that a man can understand, and *Kṛshṇa*, as the highest "incarnation" of *Vishṇu*, retains this character throughout the range of sacred literature.

In this connection we have explained that the idea of goodness is inherent in desire, which is the special attribute of the mind; and so the association of the mind with the intellect (*sh-ṇ*) in *Kṛshṇa* gives us the idea of an intimate connection between goodness and intelligence. We get the same in the name *Vishṇu*,—*V*, *i*, *sh-ṇ*, *u*.

SUGGESTIONS FOR GUIDANCE—In case the words in the text are evenly balanced, and yet we believe that they are under a "disguise" which needs to be pierced, we shall find that there is at least one word to point the way,—just as we can understand the idea of the contents of a whole plate from a single grain (12). 12

NEED OF KNOWLEDGE: HOW EXPRESSED—When in a series of days we say something that relates to the twelfth day,—that, in its original idea, would refer to only one day, the twelfth. But if we mean something more than this, it would require special knowledge to express it; and that is done in terms of the reference to a particular day; and 13 there is good reason for doing so[1] (13-14). 14

DESIGN OF COMPOSITION—The design of composition is such that each part of the text is closely connected with the other, and there is no lack of words for making additional points (15). 15

CHARACTER OF "DISGUISE"—The "disguise" of a word should be regarded as a collection of qualities, from which we have to draw our own inferences; and if we succeed, the result is worth while,—like the idea of a proper person or thing. This, however, cannot be obtained from the 16 meaning of words as they are, but only from the parts of the "collection" spoken of as a "disguise". We can under- 17

[1] The number twelve, as has already been explained, refers to Time as well as Nature. It also refers to the intellect, as the first manifest form of *Prakṛti* or Nature: for we have the ten senses, with the mind as the eleventh, and intellect as the twelfth. As the special attribute of the intellect is decision or definite knowledge, the idea of knowledge is expressed in terms of the duration or happenings of the twelfth day.

stand the qualities of these objects by means of the process of inference; and "seeing through the disguise" consists 18 in our ability to show how things are connected with or dependent on one another. We must, however, take note 19 of the fact that the distribution or division of words into parts refers only to the principal words; and so far as detached statements are concerned, the meaning of words should be obtained from their common or popular sense (16-20). 20

CHAPTER VIII

PART I

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION: THE LAW OF ACTION

Let us consider certain words that are said to have a "disguise" (1-2). The word *Soma* is such a word; and it has not been properly understood because it has been taken as a whole word, and not divided into parts (3-5). The word *sruch* is another; and we cannot accept its common meaning, because it would render the whole idea incomplete (6-9).

Desirable things have been associated with the new and the full moon (10-11).

Animals too have desires; and the only difference between them and men is that the latter have desires relating to religious devotion (12-13).

The number eleven refers to the function of the mind, expressed in two ways,—attraction and repulsion. There is the idea of action too; but in the case of animals it is expressed in terms of *yūpa* or the sacrificial post, but without reference to desire (14-16).

The idea of the number twelve is important (17).

The idea of a piece of pasture land, as also of things that have a body or material form, is expressed in terms of "this, that" (18-19).

Where action cannot be described properly, it is compared with its ideal form (20). Even active life or the life of an active man is represented in the same manner (21); and this has been done to keep knowledge a secret ((22).

Activity arises from association with desire and the *Guṇas* (or attributes of things) (23); and we can escape from the evil effects of actions by distinguishing between different kinds of actions (24); and so one activity is changed into another (25).

A single action cannot be divided into parts; but there is an option before it is undertaken (26-27). An option is determined by means of singleness of aim; but a person may not be able to exercise it (28-30). This gives rise to different aims (31); but in case of difference of opinion, the matter has to be decided by reference to the intellect, which alone can make for action (32-33).

We can understand the idea of the gods of the Vedas by dividing their names into parts (34); and they represent Nature which is truly imperishable (35-36).

Nature is represented by means of herbs or the vegetable kingdom, as that is its most obvious form (37). It is also

represented by means of a cloud (containing water) (38); and it is in this manner that we can understand the meaning of the text (39).

When water is sweetened, every part of it is transformed; and it represents the idea of the transformation of Nature (40); and Nature is indeed unborn (41-43).

CERTAIN "DISGUISED" NAMES—Let us consider certain specific symbols or names used in the text, and which, with the meaning they have in their "disguised" form, appear to be like names (1-2).

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SOMA—(The word *Soma* is of this kind, for we are told that) there should be appearance of activity in *Soma*, because of the appearance of desire[1]; and we can understand the idea if we see through the "disguise" of the word[2]. It has not been properly understood, because the word has been taken as a whole (and not divided into parts) (3-5).

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SRUCH—The text contains the word *sruch* (the common meaning of which is "a wooden ladle for pouring clarified butter on the sacrificial fire"). But this is followed by certain words by way of explanatory repetition, from

[1] If we know that *Soma* means the mind, we can understand that, as the attribute of the mind is desire, wherever there is desire, there must be an activity or function of the mind: or we might say that the mind becomes active by means of desire; and so there is activity in *Soma* (mind) because of the appearance of desire.

[2] As the *Mīmānsā* has explained, in order to pierce through the "disguise" of a word, we need to divide it into parts. The word *Soma* has accordingly to be divided into *sa, u, ma*—when its meaning would be "(*sa*) the mind associated with (*u, ma*) the senses of knowledge". But, as we have two letters for the senses of knowledge,—and the idea of the senses of knowledge and action is closely intertwined, and the Tongue is both a sense of knowledge and action,—we can take it that there is a reference to the senses of action too.

which we find that no ladle could have been meant. We cannot say that the word does mean a ladle, on the ground that it occurs in a formula which cannot be changed; because if it were so, it would require a number of other words to complete the sense (and they are not to be found in the text). We hesitate to accept this conclusion because we do not apply ourselves to the task of finding out the real meaning of the text[1] (6-9).

DESIRE AND THE MOON—We should understand that there are desirable things in the world; and we find (from the text) that desires are associated with the new and the full moon[2] (10-11).

ANIMALS AND DESIRES—We can see from certain characteristic signs that animals too have desires; and the difference between them and men is that the latter have desires relating to religious devotion or consecration (12-13).

NO. 11—There is in things associated with the number eleven[3] (mind or desire) something that is related to the

[1] Similarly, the word *sruch—sru, ch*—would mean (*sru* 'to rouse, stir') to stir (*ch*) the mind". *Sruch* means, therefore, "stirring the mind"; and that is why it is said to be "a ladle for pouring clarified butter on the sacrificial fire,"—for "clarified butter" refers to goodness as an attribute of desire or the mind; and *Sruch* is something that stirs the mind or produces desire.

[2] As has already been explained, the Moon refers to the mind, which has desire for its attribute. We have also pointed out that the new moon refers to desire, and the full moon to its completion in action; and so desires are associated with the new and the full moon.

[3] The number eleven refers to the mind, as being the eleventh after the ten senses, or the five "elements" and their five properties, to which the ten senses are closely allied. As desire is a special attribute of the mind and inseparable from it, this number can refer to desire as well.

pressing out of the *Soma-juice*[1]; and that can be understood in two ways from the sight of what is seen.[2] it is the idea of this activity that is to be found in the parts of words[3]. With regard to animals, the same idea is to be found in the sight of *yūpa* or the sacrificial post.[4] But the essence of the idea of *Soma* is not obvious (in the word itself)[5] (14-16). 14 15 16

No. 12—Among numbers the idea of the number twelve[6] is specially important (17). 17

"This, That"—The idea of a piece of pasture land (or a place of residence) is expressed by means of "this, that, etc."; and these expressions would also apply to other things that have a body or material form (18-19). 18 19

Action and the Ideal—So far as action is concerned,—where it cannot properly be described by means of the

[1] *Soma* refers to the mind, and its "*juice*" is obviously desire. Thus we might say that the mind is related to desire (or a thing associated with the number eleven—the mind—is related to the pressing out of the *Soma-juice*—or desire).

[2] Desire expresses itself in two ways,—attraction and repulsion (Cf. BhG. III, 34).

[3] It is this idea of the different activities of the mind that is expressed in the different parts of words; and so, in order to understand these activities, we have to divide words into parts. This is the logic of this method of interpretation.

[4] *Yūpa* or a sacrificial post, as has already been explained, refers to action meant for the benefit of all. But there are a number of these sacrificial posts in a great sacrifice, indicating that there are a number of different kinds of such actions that a person has to perform. The point of this *Sūtra* is that in the case of animals the different kinds of actions are expressed in terms of sacrificial posts.

[5] We have to divide the word *Soma* into parts to understand its meaning: it is not clear otherwise.

[6] We have explained that the number twelve refers to Time, *Prakṛti*, as well as the intellect.

application of this rule (that is, in proper terms), we can get the totality of its result, as well as its necessity, together with the idea of the doer of the deed, by means of comparison with its ideal, because that is how the whole idea has been knitted together. The idea of activity can be re- 20 presented in the same manner too, because it refers to action[1]; and this has been done so that it may not easily 21 be understood[2] (20-22). 22

MEANS OF FREEDOM—Activity arises from association with desires and *Guṇas* or the attributes of things;[3] but we 23 can escape from the evil effects of action by distinguishing

[1] If, for instance, the author is unable properly to describe the functions of the mind in a particular case, he may compare it with the Moon, which is a symbol of the mind, and so may be regarded as its ideal. Similarly, the character of *Prakṛti* may be referred to the Ocean or to waters in general; and there are a number of such instances in the sacred books.

[2] The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the Vedas contain an account of the knowledge of the ancients, some of which is secret knowledge, and is not meant to be easily understood.

[3] The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that all action arises from the three *Guṇas* (*Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*), which are said to arise from Nature or *Prakṛti* (BhG. III, 5, 27, 29 etc.) It is these that make for the bond of life,—*Sattva* for knowledge and joy, *Rajas* for action, and *Tamas* for heedlessness and sleep (BhG. XIV, 5-20). All things in the world, faith, food, penance, alms and sacrifice, as well as renunciation, knowledge, action, actor, intellect, fortitude and joy—partake of the character of *Guṇas* or the attributes of Nature (BhG. XVII, 2-22; XVIII, 20-39). Indeed, there is no entity on earth or among the gods in heaven that is free from the three *Guṇas*, born of *Prakṛti*: so says the *Gītā* (BhG. XVIII, 40).

We have been told that the appearance of desire means the activity of the mind (MS. VIII, i, 3); and now this *Sūtra* tells us that it is desire that makes for all activity. This means that the mind is associated with all action.

between different kinds of action;[1] for activity can also arise from another state of change,—namely, the purpose the intellect has in view[2] (23-25). 24 25

ACTION AND OPTION—A single action cannot be divided, because it has a single direction or urge; but there is an option before it is undertaken. This option arises as a result of conclusions drawn from things with opposite properties[3] (26-27). 26 27

DETERMINATION OF OPTION—An option is determined by means of singleness of aim, and it marks a change from an existing state. It is possible that a person may not be able to exercise his option, because he may have indistinct ideas about things, for it depends on the nature of the conclusions he is able to arrive at. We can see in this manner that a person may have different aims. But where there is divergence of opinion, the matter has to be decided by reference to the intellect,[4] because that is 28 29-30 31

[1] According to the *Sāṅkhya* we can escape from action itself by means of discrimination, when we realise that the soul is different from all that is in Nature. This, however, is not what the *Mīmānsā* says. It only tells us that we can avoid the evil effects of actions by distinguishing between different kinds of actions, and doing only good and intelligent deeds. We have the same idea in the *Bhagavad Gītā,* which tells us that we cannot obtain freedom from action by refusing to perform actions or by means of renunciation (BhG. III, 4-5); but a person can attain to the highest goal by performing actions without any attachment (BhG. III, 19). It is also necessary to distinguish between action, inaction, and improper action (BhG. IV, 17-18)

[2] We have been told that activity arises from association with desires and the *Guṇas;* but it is also due to the function of the intellect, which enables us to distinguish between different kinds of actions, and so to avoid their evil effects.

[3] This refers to a consideration of the pros and cons of things.

[4] Intellect plays a most important part in action, for it has to decide to act; and without its decision no action can take place.

how all action is performed; and it is by means of the intellect that all things connected with action are produced (28-33).

THE IDEA OF THE GODS—We can understand the idea of the gods of the Vedas by dividing their names into parts[1]. (They represent Nature, which consists of) imperishable matter[2], and is uncreated or unborn; and that is so because of the essence of its vital power[3]; and we can arrive at this conclusion by making a study of its character (34-36).

NATURE: HOW DESCRIBED—Nature is said to consist of herbs (or the vegetable kingdom) because that is its most obvious or manifest form[4]. We can also understand it

[1] This is how the idea of the principal gods of the Vedas has been explained in MM. I, Chapter IX.

[2] The word in the text is *Hiraṇya*, which has a number of meanings, including "imperishable matter", which would appear to be the most suitable here. There are a number of references to *Hiraṇya* and *Hiraṇya-garbha* (the Golden Egg) in the sacred books; and they have all a reference to Nature.

[3] The *Bhagavad Gītā* also tells us that not only *Purusha* (God), but *Prakṛti* too, is without a beginning; that is, it is unborn (BhG. XIII, 20).

[4] There are a number of references to plants, medicinal herbs, forest life, and different kinds of grain,—all of which have a bearing on the idea of Nature or *Prakṛti*. We have seen that the sacred Fig-tree refers to it; and all references to forest life in the sacred books are really references to the ideas associated with Nature.

It may be of interest to observe that *Karṇa* in the *Mahābhārata* and *Kumbha-karṇa* in the *Rāmāyaṇa* represent the philosophy of Nature or *Prakṛti*. The word *Karṇa* has a number of meanings, one of which is "furnished with chaff (as grain)". It refers, therefore, to grain as the seed of the vegetable kingdom, fit for cultivation; and the idea of these two characters can be understood in this light throughout the two Epics.

from the use of the word *charu*[1] (a cloud) in the text; and it is in this manner that we can get a properly developed (or mature) meaning of the *śruti* (37-39). 38 39

SWEETENED WATER—When water is sweetened, all its ingredients share the property of its sweetness (or what it contains), as a result of which its own character is transformed[2] (40). 40

NATURE IS UNBORN—When we look at Nature as it is in its entirety, we cannot resist the conclusion that it is unborn, if we accept its essential attributes; and that is in conformity with the statement previously made[3] (41-43). 41 42 43

PART II

ACTION AND THE MIND: THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

In all actions, of whatever kind, the mind comes first, because of its attribute, desire (1); and this is represented by the exclamation *vashaṭ* (2), and also the invitation to eat and drink (3). The acts of buying, marrying, etc. are of the same kind (4); but they should all be performed as a sacrifice (5-6); and that is why those words are so important (7-8).

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[1] A cloud is a receptacle of water, which represents Nature (MS. VIII, ii, 16).

[2] Sweetened water represents the idea of the transformation of *Prakṛti* into something that is sweet, or as embodying the idea of God. This can be done by means of the idea of Sacrifice, which can sweeten *Prakṛti*, and link it up with God. It is this idea that is expressed in terms of the transformation of *Sikhaṇḍin* from a woman (*Prakṛti*) into a man (*Purusha* or God) in the story of the *Mahābhārata*.

[3] There is a previous statement that *Prakṛti* is unborn (*Sūt.* 35).

An animal is associated with *puroḍāśa* or Nature (9-10); and the idea of sacrifice in connection with Nature should be understood from the "sacrifice" of animals (11-12), the offering of substances mixed with clarified butter, and the sight of an intelligent person (13-14).

Nature is represented in terms of curd and water (15-16), or animals (17); but it is generally conceived to be a fluid substance, and is represented by curd, milk, and water(18-23).

A perfect function of the mind or the intellect is the result of unity of action (24); and it is easy to understand this idea of perfection by means of that of sacrifice (25-26).

The number thirteen represents the idea of perfection or completion of things (27-28); while the number fifteen signifies a sudden end to all action (29).

These expressions signify perfection of different kinds (30); but that alone is real perfection which attains its end through sacrifice (31); and it is easy to understand its idea in the text (31).

IMPORTANCE OF THE MIND: HOW DESCRIBED—In all acts of emulation the mind (*Soma*) comes first; so also in all acts of sacrifice associated with the soul (in honour of *Indra*); and that is so because of the nature of desire (or what relates to *Soma* or the mind)[1]; and this is represented in the text by means of the exclamation[2] "*vashaṭ*", as well as by the invitation to eat and to drink. The acts of buying, approaching, shining in front, marrying, holding, laying down, and binding together,—are all of that kind. But each of these actions should be regulated by sacrifice,

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[1] As has already been explained, *Soma* refers to the mind, and *Indra* to the self-conscious soul (*Prajñātman*).

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the mind comes first in all actions, of whatever kind, including those associated with the soul; and that is due to the fact that all action is preceded by desire, which is an attribute of the mind.

[2] *Vashaṭ* is an exclamation uttered by the *Hotṛ* priest at the end of the sacrificial verse, on hearnig which the *Adhvaryu* priest casts the oblation offered to the deity into the fire.

We have explained that the *Hotṛ* priest refers to the mind, and the *Adhvaryu* to the senses; and so this exclamation signifies that the mind *directs* the senses to act.

because it is a form of sacrifice. But the mind (*Soma*) is praised most[1] because of its part in action, though there is praise for others too; and that is how we understand each principal name in the Vedas (1-8). 5 6 7 8

NATURE AND ANIMALS—We can now understand the reason for the association of animals with Nature (or *puroḍāśa*)[2]. Indeed, an animal should be regarded as a modification of the idea of Nature; and that is so because of the universal conception of the great forces of Nature, 9

[1] This would explain why a whole book of the *Rig Veda* (IX) is devoted to the "praise" of *Soma:* it is intended to explain the character and functions of the mind.

[2] We have explained that *puroḍāśa* really refers to Nature. The *Mīmnāsā* tells us that the reference to animals in the sacred books is really a reference to Nature and its powers, because that is how we get the idea of their personification as gods.

There are a number of such references to animals in the sacred books, and they need to be interpreted in this light. For instance, we have a reference to a host of monkeys and bears in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and they constitute the great army of *Rāma*, the hero of the Epic. It would be impossible to understand the idea of the Epic as a Veda or a book of knowledge, as it is described to be, in its existing form; but if we understand the real meaning of names, in accordance with the method explained in the *Mīmānsā*, we shall find that it is really a narrative of different systems of philosophy. We shall then find that *Rāma*, who is also spoken of as *Chandra* or the Moon, refers to the mind; while the ten-headed *Rākshasa*, *Rāvaṇa*, represents the ten senses of knowledge and action; and the conflict between them corresponds to that between the mind and the senses, and the systems of thought based on their character. *Sītā*, in this "story," refers to the idea of Sacrifice in Nature; and both *Rāma* and *Rāvaṇa* lay claim to her; but, for obvious reasons, it is *Rāma* alone who can succeed. In this conflict of ideas both seek the assistance of Nature,—*Rāma* of monkeys and bears, and *Rāvaṇa* of his brother *Kumbha-karṇa*, who represents the vegetable kingdom as symbolic of Nature. The whole story has been composed in this form, and will be explained in this light in its proper place.

which are personified as gods.[1] (The idea of sacrifice associated with Nature can be understood) from the consecration of animals effected by sprinkling holy water on them, as well as from the ceremony of carrying fire round the sacrificial animal[2]. The idea of offering a substance mixed with clarified butter as a burnt offering is derived from the same source;[3] and we get the same idea from the sight of a capable or competent person[4] (9-14). 10 11 12 13 14

NATURE AND A FLUID SUBSTANCE—Nature should be regarded as being of the form of curd or coagulated milk, because that is said to be its common appearance.[5] Or it is like water or a liquid substance, if we take into consi- 15

[1] The gods represent the great forces of Nature which, in their turn, are represented by animals; and so the gods are represented in the form of animals too,—as human beings and others.

[2] Nature is governed by the law of Sacrifice: that is to say, it is characterised by goodness, intelligence, etc.; and this idea of the law of Sacrifice is described in terms of the "sacrifice" of animals, —for they represent Nature. As fire refers to intelligence, carrying the fire round an animal would imply that we agree that animals have intelligence.

[3] Clarified butter refers to goodness, while fire or "burnt offering" to intelligence; and the two together give us the idea of sacrifice.

[4] The sight of a capable or competent person shows that there is both goodness and intelligence in Nature; for a man, being an animal, is part of Nature too.

[5] Curd is said to represent Nature; and that is its idea in the story of the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*, where *Kṛshṇa* is described as being very fond of both butter and curd. As *Kṛshṇa* is God, this would represent the affection of God for Nature, or of *Purusha* for *Prakṛti*. The same idea is expressed in terms of the love of *Kṛshṇa* and the *Gopīs*, as well as of the sixteen thousand "wives" of the Deity. As a woman refers to Nature, they all represent different forms and forces of Nature, which are drawn towards God. All this will be explained in its proper place.

deration the totality of Time.[1] But it may be described in terms of an animal, if we consider it in terms of our next of kin, or of life nearest allied to our own.[2] Nature, however, is generally conceived to be in a fluid state, and is represented by curd,—which is the product of both curd and milk. Or we may regard milk and curd to be the same, because they are made by the same power.[3] On the other hand *dadhi* (or thick curd) arises from general hardening (and so represents the process of hardening in Nature); while water, because of the importance of curd, is, as we might say in popular language, for the sake of the curd.[4] All this is in accordance with the law of Nature, as we can see every day (15-23). 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23–23a

[1] This means that if we take into consideration long periods of time, *Prakṛti* or Nature appears to be not like curd, but like water; so Nature is described in terms of Waters both at the beginning and end of life. This will explain all references to Waters in the sacred books, and their association with God: for instance, *Vishṇu* is said to lie on the waters at the commencement of life, and so on.

The different forms in which water appears would also refer to Nature: for instance, we have been told that the cloud does so. Similarly, rivers, seas, ocean, etc. all refer to Nature or *Prakṛti*.

[2] This would explain the reference to monkeys and bears in the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. They represent Nature, as being nearest allied to man.

[3] It is the same power of Nature that produces milk in the cow, and curd out of milk.

[4] We cannot have curd unless there be water in milk; and so water may be said to be there for the sake of curd. But it has another significance too. We have been told that the original form of Nature corresponds to that of water, but in course of time it hardens into that of curd; and this may be said to be the relation between water and curd.

It may be of interest to point out that the ancients believed that whatever is in the organic cell is also in Nature (*Yathā piṇḍe tathā Brahmāṇḍe*); and the organic cell is like curd or a jelly-like substance. Thus when there is a mention of water in the sacred books, we should

Mind, Intellect, and Unity of Action—When we see a perfect function of the mind (*Soma*) or a clear function of the intellect (a sacrifice lasting twelve days),[1] we find that it arises from unity of action (24). 24

Sacrifice and Nature—When we hear the expression "he sacrifices", we may take it that the perfect being who is said to sacrifice, is *Pravṛtti*, which is synonymous with *Prakṛti* or Nature[2] (25). 25

Perfection of the Mind: how Described—If we take a certain period of time, say two days or nights, we shall find that we get the idea of wholeness or perfection from the sacrifice or proper function of the mind;[3] and that is signified by the direction that a person should make a sacrifice (26). 26

No. 13—On the thirteenth days or nights the sacrifice is completed, because there is, on these nights, a direction in regard to a certain posture, which signifies the attainment of objects; and so we may reasonably infer (that 27

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take it that it refers to Nature in its pristine form; whereas a reference to curd gives us the idea of Nature in its later or maturer state.

[1] We have explained that *Soma* refers to the mind, and the number twelve to the intellect; and so a sacrifice lasting twelve days would refer to the action of the intellect.

[2] *Pravṛtti* means activity or active life; and the idea of *Prakṛti* is the same. The point of this *Sūtra* is that when there is a reference to sacrifice in the sacred books, we should take it that it normally refers to Nature or *Prakṛti*: that is, Nature is characterised by the law of Sacrifice, or acts in accordance with it. This has already been explained.

[3] The reference in the text is to the eleventh night; and the number eleven,—as has already been explained—refers to the mind.

This *Sūtra* tells us that there is a direction that a person should make a sacrifice on the eleventh night; and that means that his mind should always function in a spirit of sacrifice.

this number represents the idea of the completion of things[1]) (27-28). 28

No. 15—Again, when an action is suddenly concluded, its idea of perfection is represented by the fifteenth day or night. There is also a mention of the path of those who drink water out of pitchers. These expressions give us an idea of wholeness or perfection[2] (29). 29

PERFECTION THROUGH SACRIFICE—These expressions convey the idea of a certain kind of wholeness or perfection, because that is the meaning of these words. But real 30 perfection is that which attains its end through sacrifice,[3] because that is the teaching of the sacred books; and it 31 is easy to understand this symbol or mode of expression of the idea of sacrifice (30-32). 32

[1]The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the number thirteen represents the idea of the completion of things, or the attainment of objects. This would explain the reference to the thirteen years of the exile of the *Pāṇḍavas* in the story of the *Mahābhārata*. Of these the first twelve were to be spent in the forest, and the last in a place where they could not be discovered. We have seen that a forest refers to Nature, and the number twelve to the intellect; so that they were required to examine the whole problem of Nature in the light of the intellect. Then, as after the intellect there is the unmanifest soul, they had to remain unknown during the thirteenth year; and, as this completes the whole inquiry after truth, the number thirteen represents this idea of completeness there too. All this has already been explained (MM. IV, 351, *seq.*)

[2] When a person suddenly decides to give up all things, retire into a forest, and lead a simple life,—drinking water out of a pitcher,—it is something good, and may be said to be a kind of perfection; but it is a limited kind of perfection.

[3] Real perfection is attained by means of sacrifice or good, intelligent, selfless and self-controlled action. It is on this kind of action that the *Bhagavad Gītā* lays emphasis throughout (Cf. BhG. VI,1-32, etc.).

PART III

INTELLIGENT ACTION AND SACRIFICE: THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

In a series of intelligent actions, the last is likely to be the best (1-2). We should always act intelligently (3): acts of sacrifice are always guided by reason (4): so too are all other actions,—even habits (5-8).

In the formation of habit the innate disposition of a man is very important (9). Habits grow through a series of actions, but not actions limited to a single day (10-11).

The *Gāyatrī* verses and certain other hymns deal with this problem of disposition (12-15). But they have to be interpreted by means of the method of division of words into parts (16-18). There are, however a number of words which have to be interpreted in a different way (19). But we must not mix up words or omit any sentence (20). We have to depend on our intelligence in interpreting the text in this manner (21): only the meaning should be obtained from the words themselves and it should be confirmed as we proceed with the text (22-25).

Even in the *Rig Veda* we get the correct meaning of words by dividing them into parts (26-27); and this is to be found everywhere (28). Nor does it conflict with our taking words complete as they are (29-30), for the meanings obtained in the two ways are often the same (31-33). But it would be better to divide words into parts (34-35); and we can always check up whether our meaning is correct or not (36).

THE LAST ACTION IS THE BEST—If a person performs a series of good and intelligent actions (or acts of sacrifice), the last is likely to be the best, if they are all performed in the same place. Such an act should be deemed to be 1 regulated by the deity[1],—as a matter of language or mode of expression, because that is what is commonly heard (1-2). 2

IMPORTANCE OF REASON—When there are a number of

[1] The best actions are commonly spoken of as the actions of the gods. But the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that there is an element of divine power in all actions (BhG. XVIII, 13-14).

directions or forces impelling us to action, we should follow that for which we can give a good reason, as indeed we do in the case of an intelligent act[1] (3). 3

PLACE OF REASON IN HABIT—There are many kinds of good and intelligent actions (or acts of sacrifice) which yet are characterised by conflict; but when actually performed, we find that they too are guided by reason, and not impulse; and we find that it is so in all other things 4 that we see. *Bādari*[2] says that it is even so in the case 5 of habits of long standing, because they too are a kind of action. *Jaimini*[3] says that a habit arises from the connec- 6 tion of imperceptible but intelligent actions performed every day; and that is why we speak of a habit of six days.[4] 7–7a Habit can be recognised in a multitude of forms; and we can do so when we understand the effect of actions done (6-8). 8

PART OF DISPOSITION—In this formation of habit the innate nature or disposition of a man should be deemed to be the most important, because it is the cause of bringing things together into close connection. Habit begins 9 with disposition, and grows through a series of actions. 10 But where such a series is limited to a single day, the action should be regarded as a normal one, (and not the result of habit) (9-11). 11

DESCRIBED IN THE VEDAS—In the *Gāyatrī* verses there is a particular mention of what relates to the disposition

[1] The word in the text is *Agni*, which refers to the intellect.
[2] *Bādari* is the name of a philosopher.
[3] *Jaimini* is the celebrated author of the *Mīmānsā Sūtras*.
[4] This *Sūtra* (7a) does not occur in certain texts.

of men. When, however, we consider the power of nature or disposition, we find that there is no real distinction between it and an intelligent action[1] performed over a length of time; and we should readily state that it is so. 12 This idea of the power of disposition occurs also in a number of other metres, which are widely apart from the *Gāyatrī*; and the same language is used in them too. 13 This, however, does not occur frequently,—not even in two out of twenty metres, if we reckon them in that way (14-15). 14-15

How to Interpret the Text—But the language of the text is such that a word relating to an object should be understood by means of the parts of which it is composed, for otherwise we cannot cover the entire range of its idea; 16 and the regular succession of the parts of a word should be as in the case of the word *go* (cow),—just as we 17 utter it.[2] 18 There are, however, a number of words which have to be explained in a way different from that in which they are pronounced. 19 There are cases where we can get the best meaning if we do not mix up one word with another or omit a sentence.[3] 20 But this method of inter-

[1] The word in the text is *Agnishṭoma*, which means "mass or praise of *Agni*". As *Agni* refers to the intellect, it has been rendered as "intelligent action." It may also be understood as "a function of the intellect."

[2] The word *go* can be divided into *ga*, *u*—according to the rules of *Sanskṛt* grammar. This *Sūtra* tells us how to divide words into their parts: we should utter a word as it is commonly spoken, and then divide it into the syllables or letters which compose it, in accordance with the rules of grammar.

[3] The author has already explained that there are three ways of finding out the meaning of words: we may take their ordinary meaning; or their meaning may have been specially defined; or we may divide them into parts in the manner explained.

pretation is not derived from anything defined in the sacred books (and we have to use our own intelligence in the matter). (In any case) the meaning of a name 21 should be obtained from the name itself; and we should find the same idea in a number of different metres in succession. This has already been stated and is nothing 22 new; (but it is necessary that we should get this confirma- 23-24 tion, because) there can easily be a doubt in regard to a new expression, specially when there is a conflict of opinion in connection with the meaning of a name (16-25). 25

INTERPRETATION OF RIG VEDA—Even in the words used in the hymns of the *Rig Veda* we can get their correct meaning by dividing them into parts in the manner already stated; and this is to be found everywhere. But this does 26-28 not mean that we cannot take words as a whole without dividing them into parts; for we can do so even in this system of interpretation. But if we wish to be quite certain 29-30 whether the meaning of a word taken as a whole is correct, we should see that the meaning of the parts gives us the meaning of the whole, because there is a close connection between the parts of a word and the word as a whole. 31 There is thus an obvious connection between the two ways of interpreting the meaning of words,—for the word taken as a whole is connected with the parts into which it can be divided. But we should prefer the meaning obtained 32-33 by means of the division of words into parts, and it should be done in the rest of the text. In any case, if 34-35 the correct meaning is not completely obtained, we shall find that there is no coherence in the verses in the very passage of the text[1] (26-36). 36

[1] This would serve as a check, warning us that we should begin again. This is found to be correct from experience.

PART IV

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

The word *darvi-homa* is the name of a sacrifice (1-2); so also *vastu-homa* (3-4).

The reasons for dividing a word into parts is that the different ingredients of an object can be specified (5-7). It is in this manner that we get the meaning of the words *Agni*, *havish*, and *Soma* (8-10). On the other hand we do not get the meaning of the word *svāhā* in the same manner, and it is different from *vashaṭ* (11-13). The word *svāhā* invokes a blessing on action, and implies that after one work is done another should begin (14-15); and we get this from the first part of the word, which is better than the second (16-17). It is in this manner that we get a reference to a law of life, and pierce through the "disguise" of words (18-21). But this is not the only method of interpretation (22).

If, however, we divide words into parts, and find that the meaning of one fits into that of the following two, we should take it that it is correct; and then we can arrange our ideas of action by means of inference (23-24).

We find that there is a reference to medicinal herbs as well as to sacrifice; and their ideas can cohere only if we understand the text aright and with reference to a law of life (25-27).

MEANING OF CERTAIN WORDS—*Darvi-homa* (or an oblation made with a ladle) is the name of a sacrifice, because of its connection with the word *Homa*.[1] That is the meaning of (1) the word current among the people, because the person who engages in this action is said to perform a sacrifice. But (2) when the word *vastu-homa* (the house of sacrifice) occurs in the text, it should be understood to mean a sacrifice (or a good and intelligent action) performed by all persons; (3)

[1] *Homa* is an act of making an oblation to the gods by casting clarified butter into the fire. As clarified butter refers to goodness, and fire to the intellect, it means a good and intelligent action, or an act of sacrifice.

and the directions in regard to a sacrifice arise from this connection (1-4). 4

REASONS FOR DIVIDING A WORD INTO PARTS—The reason for dividing a word into parts is that the different ingredients of a substance can be specified. We assign meanings 5 to the parts of a word, not because it is the practice of common men, but because those who understand the use of words can get a different (or a better) meaning in that way; and we have this from the experience (or teaching) of 6 many competent persons (working on the text). It is 7 in this manner that we get the meaning of the words *Agni* and *havish*;[1] and their real meaning has no connection 8 with what is commonly spoken about them. It is in this 9 way that we should be able to get the real meaning of the word *Soma*,[2] which is not apparent at the surface (5-10). 10

SVAHA AND VASHAT—On the other hand by uttering the word *svāhā* we do not get the same meaning that we do when we utter the word *vashaṭ*; and that is due to the fact that there is no connection between them, and there is also a special mention of their meanings in this system of interpretation, from which we find that there is a fundamental difference between their ideas. That is so because 11

[1] If we divide *Agni* into parts, we get *A,g,n,i*,—and the meaning is "(*a*) intellect associated with (*g,n*) the senses and (*i*) the mind".
The word *havish* or *haviṣ* may be divided into *ha,vi,s*, when the meaning would be "(*ha*) intellect (*vi*) distinguished from (*sh* or *s*) the mind". The emphasis in this word is on the intellect as distinguished from the mind; and so it means "a burnt offering, or anything offered as an oblation with fire"; and we have explained that fire refers to the intellect.

[2] We have already explained that the meaning of *Soma* can be obtained by dividing it into *sa, u, ma*, when we shall get the idea of "(*sa*) the mind associated with (*u, ma*) the senses".

of the difference in their meanings; and we can understand it when we know the reason for their use[1] (11-13). 12 13

As the word *svāhā* invokes a blessing, it can be uttered only after the deed is done; and so it is used for a higher purpose, even as we find in the case of the number seventeen.[2] But this does not mean that since the deed is done, nothing else should follow.[3] When we understand the reason for this, we find that it is true of all animals (that after finishing one, they begin another action). It is this purpose that is served by the word *svāhā*, because that is its object (in invoking a blessing); and were it otherwise, we should find something to obstruct us in the original form of the word itself (14-15). 14 15

[1] The reason for this is explained in the following *Sūtras*. We have explained that *vashaṭ* signifies that the mind is satisfied that a particular action should be done, and it directs the senses to do it. *Svāhā*, on the other hand, invokes a blessing on action, and asks for more and more action,—each following each. There is thus a fundamental difference between them: the one indicates that only necessary action should be done, while the other upholds the idea of action without end,—provided, of course, it is performed as a sacrifice, and is a "blessed" action.

[2] The number seventeen refers to the soul. There are four *Ritvij* priests, each of whom has three assistants, making a total of sixteen; and after them is the *Yajamāna*, sacrificer, or the soul, as the seventeenth. The highest purpose of action is that it is performed for the sake of the soul (Cf. BhG. V, 11); and it is also that it should be "blessed", and done again and again.

The number seventeen can also refer to the intellect, as the mind is represented by the number sixteen (ten senses, five attributes of the "elements", with the mind as the sixteenth),—and so the intellect can be represented by the number seventeen; and we have seen that the intellect and the soul may, for practical purposes, be identified.

[3] The word *svāhā* implies that one action should follow another; and we find that all animals are governed by this law. They cannot abstain from action even for a moment (Cf. BhG. III, 5).

How to Understand the Meaning of Svaha—There are some who believe that this idea of *svāhā* is not contained even in the original form of the word. But it has been [16] said that in an assemblage of things the following member of a series is inferior to the preceding one; and this has a [17] reference to our effort to understand the meaning of words: only when we apply this rule we should see that the meaning refers to a law of life. That is so because [18] the words used are suitable; and we can see through [19] their "disguise" in this manner.[1] If, however, there is no [20] real reference to a law, we shall not find it in the meaning of the parts of a word (16-21). [21]

Different Ways of Interpretation—Nevertheless we cannot say that this is the only method of interpreting the text, because there are cases where certain parts of a sentence are missing and have to be supplied: again, when we divide words into parts to get their meaning, we can arrange these parts in various ways. But if we divide a word [22-23] into parts, and find that the meaning of one fits into that of the following two, we should take it that we have found its correct meaning; and then we shall be able to get the idea of a perfectly good and intelligent action (*Homa* sacrifice) because of its consistency throughout; and then [24]

[1] These *Sūtras* tell us that if we divide the word *svāhā* into parts, the first would be the most important, and we can get its meaning from it. The word may accordingly be divided into *Sva*, *ā*, *hā*, meaning "(*sva*) the soul, (*ā*) leading to or associated with (*hā*, 'an exclamation of satisfaction') satisfaction". Hence it expresses the satisfaction of the soul with action, with the result that it can continue to act. This reference to the soul would explain the idea of the number seventeen in a previous *Sūtra* (14).

we can get the idea of two more good and intelligent actions by means of inference in this way[1] (22-24a). 24a

MEDICINAL HERBS—We find that there is a reference to medicinal herbs, and they are invited (or invoked) on certain occasions; and it is necessary that they should be understood in their proper role[2]. We find by means of 25 inference that the text refers to two acts of sacrifice (*Homa*);[3] 26 but there is an opposition between them (or their ideas do not cohere), with the result that we are unable to make any progress with the text. We find that our failure to understand the idea from the sentence used in the text persists; and it is in such cases that there is a reference to a law of life, which can be substituted for the other (or ordinary) meaning[4] (25-27). 27

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[1] This *Sūtra* does not occur in certain texts.

[2] As plants or the vegetable kingdom refer to Nature, medicinal herbs would refer to the healing powers of Nature. Thus they enable us to understand the idea of the essence of goodness in Nature, and so are associated with the idea of its sacrifice.

[3] The two acts of sacrifice would obviously refer to the idea of sacrifice associated with Nature and man. Medicinal herbs refer to the essence of "sacrifice" in Nature, and their use by man to his own ends.

[4] This *Sūtra* explains the circumstances in which we are obliged to think of a different method of interpreting the text, which would enable us to understand it in the light of a law of life.

We find that medicinal plants are invoked, and there is a reference to two acts of sacrifice; but all this does not appear to make any sense, with the result that we are unable to make any progress with the text. This compels thought, and we are obliged to think of some other method of interpretation to enable us to understand all this.

The whole idea has already been explained.

CHAPTER IX

PART I

SACRIFICE AND THE INTELLECT
THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

The most important thing is Sacrifice, because it sanctifies (1-2); and so is associated with Dharma. Purification and sacrifice are synonymous terms, and their relation corresponds to the fruit of action and the deity who grants it (3-4); and it is not necessary to divide words into parts to understand this (5).

Sacrifice is associated with the idea of a god (6-9); and we may also compare the idea of its importance with that of a guest (10).

When we give a particular name to an object, there is usually a good reason for it,—that is, because it has certain qualities; and this can be done when the word is quite new (11-14).

When names are arranged in this manner, they can cover the entire range of the subject-matter of Dharma; and their meaning is fixed. There are also certain instructions in connection with them; and when a name is repeated, the repetition is for the sake of further explanation (15-25).

When the intellect is associated with desire, it is like the full function of the mind; but it can perform only one act at a time (26-28).

The relation of the intellect to the other faculties is like that of the husband to his wife; and this enables us to understand the idea of dedication. However, a person can perform only one action at a time (29-35).

If the *Mantras* of the Vedas have a rational meaning, we must find out a way of interpreting them in that light; and when we do so, we shall find that the whole idea is transformed into that of a law of life. But it does not lead to the conclusion that we must renounce action, for the meaning is different and of a higher character (36-44).

Certain ideas have been personified: for instance, *Sarasvatī* has been described as a woman; and the result is that an object gets a special distinction from being described in that way, and all this can be done by using a single correct word (45-48).

There are, however, certain instructions given in the text which should be strictly adhered to,—specially in connection

with *Sāman* hymns; while with regard to the rest, we can use our intelligence (49-53).

With regard to hymns that are not to be sung aloud, the instructions are that they should be understood without any change; and it is only in the case of those that are to be sung aloud that we are required to change the form of words or divide them into parts; and that is indicated by their having to be sung aloud (54-58).

SACRIFICE AND PURIFICATION—An act of sacrifice is the chief thing, and it is obligatory. Its scanctifying effect exists in all things, and it is performed for the sake of that effect. An act of sacrifice makes for the purification of a proper person, and it should be performed for the sake of that purification. Sacrifice is associated with Dharma (the law of righteousness) because its object is purification, and it is linked up with purification; and that is the reason why sacrifice should be performed. Indeed, purification and sacrifice are synonymous terms. The relation between purification and sacrifice corresponds to that between the fruit and the deity who grants the fruit[1] (1-4).

(These ideas are easy to understand and have been directly expressed; and) we do not need to divide words into parts to know their meaning (5).

SACRIFICE AND A GOD: SACRIFICE AND A GUEST—In all our actions we should aim at acting like a god;[2] and that

[1] This means that the fruit or result of an action performed as a sacrifice is the purification of the doer of the deed. There are a number of references to this idea in the *Bhagavad Gītā*. All action makes for bondage, except that performed as a sacrifice; and those who partake of the remnants of sacrifice are freed from sin (BhG. III, 9, 13). There are many kinds of sacrifices; but the best is the sacrifice (or proper use) of knowledge,—for all action is made complete in knowledge (BhG. IV, 24-33); and it is by means of knowledge that a person can cross over all evil, for there is nothing in the world which can purify like knowledge (BhG. IV, 36-38).

[2] The gods represent the great forces of Nature working according

should be our object, even as the object of food is to satisfy hunger. It is in this way that we can have a complete idea 6 of the meaning of sacrifice; and it is for this reason that 7 sacrifice is associated with the idea of a god. But, as has 8 already been stated, an act of sacrifice is the best in itself, and that is its primary conception; while its association with the idea of a god arises in a secondary manner. We get 9 this idea of importance in that of a guest,[1] but not in every action; for the satisfaction in connection with a guest arises from his own importance (6-10). 10

REASON FOR A NAME—When we give a particular name to an object, it is because there is usually a good reason for it; and when the meaning has been fixed, there should 11 be no variation from it, so far as the object is concerned. 12 The name given to an object is intended to serve some purpose, though there are several names for which no particular reason can be assigned. But (very often) the reason why an object is given a particular name is that it possesses certain qualities; and its meaning can be fixed if 13 it is quite new[2] (11-14). 14

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to the law of sacrifice,—that is, intelligently and for the well-being of all; while the opposite idea of Nature,—that it makes for sorrow, evil and death, is represented by the "demons" or *Asuras;* and the conflict between the two, as described in the sacred books, is the conflict between these two points of view, and the systems of thought based on them.

Acting like a god would therefore signify action as a sacrifice or perfect action like that of a great good force of Nature, like the sun, moon, etc.

[1] A reference to a guest in the sacred books is sometimes meant to illustrate the idea of sacrifice; for it is obligatory to be kind and considerate to a guest; and that is the basis of action conceived as a sacrifice.

[2] A number of words used in the sacred books are quite new.

NAMES AND THE IDEA OF DHARMA—When names are arranged in this manner, they can cover the entire range of the subject-matter of Dharma. This does not apply only 15 to such words as have been specially adapted for the purpose, as that is likely to cause confusion. Nor is it due to 16-17 the subject-matter of the text or the authority of learned men, because they are used in the same sense in different places, and this cannot be ordered by force. There is a reason for the meaning of these words: for instance, good people, though widely apart, are drawn together by means of objects of sacrifice; and that is why sacrifices are performed. (Even so words of the same kind, though widely apart, have the same meaning because of a common bond between them) (15-19). 18-19

THE MEANING IS FIXED—The meaning of these words is fixed; and if we utter them in a low tone, it is because of the instructions of the *śruti*, which are due to the character of the ideas sought to be expressed.[1] It is in this 20 manner that we get the real meaning of *yajña* or sacrifice (20-21). 21

IDEA OF REPETITION—When a name is translated or repeated in some other form, the repetition is for the sake of explanation, and is intended to convey the same idea. 22 This is not so merely because we have been taught that it is so, because there is no mention of the word *yajña* or

[1] We have explained that there are three ways of reading the Vedas, —singing aloud, silent recitation or recitation in low tone, and normal reading. Of these the first indicates that the form of words should be changed, for that is what we do in singing; the second, the opposite of this, indicates that there should be no change; while in the third, we can do as we think appropriate.

sacrifice in the text (and so the idea is inherent in the words themselves). These words are found in the same 23-24 place, and are closely allied; and this cannot be secured by complusion or force (22-25). 25

LAW OF THE INTELLECT—The Dharma of *Agni* (or the law of the intellect) with reference to an object of desire, —when the latter is intense—is that it is like the full moon (or the full function of the mind).[1] But the intellect 26 (*Agni*) can function in association with only one object at a time; and the other faculties, subordinate to it, act only to serve its purpose. It is because the intellect comes 27 under the influence of desire, that its state becomes like that of the full function of the mind[2] (full moon) (26-28). 28

RELATION OF INTELLECT AND OTHER FACULTIES—(The relation of the intellect and other faculties may be compared to that of a husband and wife). A wife may offer sacrifice together with her husband; but she comes after him, and that is true in all cases without exception. We 29 arrive at this conclusion by means of inference, because all things are directed towards the best;[3] otherwise the 30

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[1] *Agni* refers to the intellect, and the full moon to the full function of the mind when it is engaged in action. This *Sūtra* tells us that when the intellect desires anything intensely, it becomes just like the mind when it acts. We get the same idea in the *Mahābhārata*, where we are told that when the intellect desires anything, it is called the mind (*Śānti P.* XII, cxciv, 20).

[2] This is the same thing as saying that when the intellect desires anything, it is called the mind.

[3] The reference to husband and wife in the text signifies the relation subsisting between the intellect and the other faculties of man,—his mind and the senses; and is meant to illustrate their idea. It must not, therefore, be taken in its literal sense, as referring to the actual

explanation of the idea or an act of dedication would be as difficult as the erection of a building at night. There 31 may be an error because of improper arrangement of words or their parts, or inconsistency of our inference; 32 but the repeated experience of those who have studied the functions of the intellect[1] should,—because of their superiority—be regarded as the law of life (29-33). 33

FIRST THINGS FIRST—When we are surrounded by a number of desires, we should, as in the case of a preliminary sacrifice, attend to those which are necessary; for 34 a man can do only one thing at a time, even though he may attempt to do a number of them simultaneously. So long as he lives, he has to begin every time afresh whenever he wishes to perform an action, because that is the law (34-35). 35

HOW TO INTERPRET THE TEXT—If we believe that some (rational) meaning has been put in the language of the *Mantras* or hymns of the Vedas, we shall have to agree that it is something that has been left out and not included in their ordinary meaning. But if we do not search for it, we shall not find it, because it has been fixed in the names themselves; and since that is so, there is no further 36 mention of it. There is thus a different and a more suitable meaning of these hymns. We cannot, however, say that 37

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relationship of husband and wife. Indeed, we have been told that man includes a woman too; and the precedence given to the "husband" does not necessarily belong to a man unless he is really the best.

[1] The word in the text is *sāmidhenī*, meaning "a verse recited when the sacrificial fire is kindled". As fire refers to the intellect, the "kindling of fire" would refer to the function of the intellect.

the exact qualities of an object have been expressed in these words in this manner, because they can be obtained only by means of a closer, inner connection. But when 38–39 we understand the real meaning of the text, we shall find that, because it has a different and a higher meaning, the whole idea is transformed into that of a law of life; 40 and this transformation takes place in the most essential part of the text. The new meaning would be found to 41 have no connection with any other meaning, and would be acknowledged to be the best. But this is not based on 42 the conclusion that we should renounce all actions, because there is a different and a higher meaning of the text (36-44). 43–44

PERSONIFICATION—There is mention of certain special forms that can be given to things: for instance, what relates to *Sarasvatī* has been given the garb of a woman, because it is not possible to find the same exact details of description in any other statement of particulars regarding her (*Sarasvatī*).[1] That is the purpose served by 45 describing an object as an animal. That is what we are enjoined to do; that is why we have the category of a man; and that is what is repeated again and again in the sacred books. Indeed, an object gets a special distinction from 46 being described in this way; and it can be done by using 47

[1] *Sarasvatī* is said to be the name of a river; and, as water symbolises Nature, and so does a woman, she is represented as a woman. Indeed, this is the idea of all goddesses in sacred literature: they represent *Prakṛti* and are described as women. The gods too refer to Nature, but with special reference to the law of sacrifice, with which the goddesses are only indirectly concerned.

but a single correct word.[1] All this that has been stated 48
has been done by putting things together, and representing
them correctly. In case, however, there is a different 49
explanation (or authority) in the sacred books themselves,
this statement should be modified; for if there are two 50
equally satisfactory ways of interpreting the text, there is
likely to be a doubt about it (and so the direction given
in the text should be preferred) (45-51). 51

HOW TO INTERPRET THE SAMAN HYMNS—The meaning of
the *Sāman* hymns should be in accordance with this
teaching; for there is a fixed rule in regard to the inter- 52
pretation of these hymns, based on a special reference
in the *śruti*;[2] while with regard to the rest, we can use
our intelligence. With regard to the hymns that are not 53
to be sung aloud, the teaching is that they should be
understood in their original form, as they are.[3] It is only 54
that part of the *śruti* which has to be sung aloud, that
has to be given its proper place; and it has a different posi- 55
tion because of its special importance, which is indicated
by means of its connection with singing aloud. The fact 56
that these hymns have to be sung aloud is not due merely
to an injunction to that effect; it is so because of their
special importance[4] (52-58). 57-58

[1] To personify an idea or to represent it as an animal or a man is the simplest and the briefest way of describing it. It is perhaps also the best.

[2] The special reference in the *śrūti* would indicate that these hymns have to be sung aloud, implying that the form of words used in them has to be changed.

[3] We have already explained that the recitation of hymns in a low tone,—being the opposite of singing—signifies that the form of words has not to be changed, and we should take them as they are.

[4] The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the *Sāma Veda* deals with the pro-

PART II

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

According to some all *Mantras* are intended to be sung, as that is the best way of remembering them; but this is an erroneous view (1-2).

The law of life is action; and so it is best described in terms of action (3); and action, in its widest connotation, is the subject-matter of the *Rig Veda* (4-5). But we can get this only if we interpret the text properly (6-16); and we can succeed if we divide words into parts, and practise the art in accordance with the rules of grammar (17-23). We should bear in mind that there is unity of idea underlying the whole text; and we must not omit any part of it (24-31). In case of doubt we should consult competent teachers; though there are sometimes differences of opinion among them (32-34). However, this method of interpretation involves a complete substitution of one meaning for another, with a new natural order of connection between words, which would itself be a test of its correctness (35-38). According to *Jaimini* it would be stupid to ask for more (39).

The cause of this form of composition is that the properties of objects, which are closely connected with one another, should be properly described (40); and so if there are any examples, they too should be in the same form (41). This is possible because the words are quite new (42-43); and there is no similarity between the original and the new meaning (44). But it is only when we are unable to get a proper meaning from the original form of the text, that we should adopt this method (45-47).

If the words or their parts are badly arranged, we cannot get the correct meaning; and this is how we can test this method (48-50). But this does not apply to great phenomena, which take place in accordance with a law, such as the new and the full moon, which are described as gods (51).

These phenomena do not give us the idea of Time (52-54), which cannot be personified as a god (55-60).

ALL HYMNS ARE NOT TO BE SUNG—According to some all *Mantras* or hymns are *Sāmans*,—that is, intended to be

blem of all living creatures; and, as some of this would be secret knowledge, the words used are under a "disguise", and we need to change their form to understand their real meaning. That is the important reason why this method has been adopted.

sung aloud—on the ground that that is the best way to remember them, and we are enjoined to do so; but this is an erroneous view (1-2).

Action, and its Idea in the Rig Veda—(The law of life is action; and so) Action is an accurate description of the law of life. It is expressly mentioned that action is the subject-matter of the *Rig Veda*,—action conceived as a sacrifice, like the sacrifice of cooking food;[1] and there is no restriction in regard to the comparison and contrast of the idea of action in connection with any object (3-5).

How to Understand This—But we cannot get this by means of the ordinary meaning of words; and we can get their real meaning if we realise that they have been used in some other sense. If we take the words of the text as as they are and give them their common meaning, we find that there is no reference to action even in two of them, taken one by one; and in such a case we should understand that their correct formation, in connection with the text and its explanation, is the same as in the case of the word *Agni*.[2] (But we have to be careful in our task) and unless the words (in their new meaning) produce the desired

[1] A sacrifice is a good and intelligent action; and eating cooked food is such a good and intelligent action on the part of man; and so it is symbolic of the idea of sacrifice. On the other hand giving up cooked food, and living on the produce of the forest is symbolic of renunciation of action; and this has already been explained.

[2] We have explained that we can get the meaning of the word *Agni* as intellect, associated with the mind and the senses, by dividing it into parts.

effect, we should not admit their connection with one another; and this condition is an integral part of this method. It is, however, possible to say that this is what we do and yet do not succeed. In any case, if we wish to interpret the text correctly, we should accept only such meanings as have a bearing on the idea of action;[1] and according to the directions of the *śruti*, the reference to action should be found in a *tṛcha* or a strophe consisting of three verses. If, on the other hand, we accept the usual meaning of words, we shall find that the whole idea is changed for the worse, as we can see for ourselves (6-16). 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND TEST OF ITS CORRECTNESS—When we divide a word into parts, each sound (syllable or letter) should be complete in itself; and that is the meaning of the correct formation of words. It is in this manner that we can find a different meaning of the text, and its entire teaching would remain unbroken in this way. We can get the real meaning of the whole *śruti* by means of repeated practice, relating to the composition of words; and we can see through their "disguise" in this manner. This excellence of meaning is produced by means of a definite cause;[2] and we should accept the meaning 17 18 19 20 21 22

[1] The text has the word *grahaṇa*, which means "the hand"; and it is an instrument of action.

[2] We are able to get this meaning because of the correct formation of words or the application of rules of grammar in connection with their compounding. But a subsequent *Sūtra* tells us that the cause of this form of composition is that the properties of objects, which are closely connected with one another, should be properly understood (*Sūt.* 40); and that is done by means of the meaning of each part of a word.

of parts of words in immediate succession to one another;[1] 23
and we can resort to this practice because there is unity
of idea underlying the whole text. This applies specially 24
to certain verses derived from the *Pragātha* stanzas of
the *Rig Veda*,[2] and also the *Pragātha* stanzas themselves. 25-27
But in our effort to see through the "disguise" we must
not omit or exclude anything (17-28). 28

AUTHORITY OF TEACHERS—If the text had only one meaning,
we should doubt its value, both in respect of the *Rig* 29
Veda and *Sāma Veda*; for we have been taught by com- 30
petent teachers that there should be correlation or con-
tinuity of thought in the Vedas. If, therefore, we find 31
that the text can be interpreted equally well in two ways,
—the change of form of words should be made with
due regard to the injunction of these teachers, who
know how it has been composed (29-32). 32

But *Bādari* says that when there is a reference to the
character of objects, we should understand their names
as they are, because each object has a separate existence
of its own. On the other hand some others say that, even 33
as in the case of the hymns of the *Rig Veda*, there is no
conflict between the properties of objects (and their names). 34
But in this method of interpretation,—since the funda-
mental notions are so different—there should be a com-
plete substitution of one meaning for another; and the
change of form should be complete, as people would say. 35

[1] This may be illustrated by means of a name,—say *Kṛshṇa*. We can divide it into *K*, *ṛ*, *sh*, *ṇa*, and have to take the meaning of each letter one after the other. So too with regard to other names. (Cf. p. 185, n.).

[2] *Pragātha* is the name of a stanza. The eightsh *Maṇḍala* of the *Rig Veda* contains a number of these stanzas.

We shall then find that there is a new natural order or
connection of words in the text; but if we are uanble to 36
get a proper meaning, this order too will cease to exist. 37
Indeed, this natural order itself would give us the explanation of the meaning of the text; and *Jaimini* says 38
bluntly that it would be stupid to demand more (33-39). 39

OBJECT OF THIS FORM OF COMPOSITION—As the text has been composed for a special purpose, namely, to describe the laws of life,—and it is free from all extravagance—the cause that has made for this form of composition is the idea that the properties of objects should be correctly described, for they are closely connected with
one another; and it requires that if there are any examples 40
to be cited, they too should be in the same form. We 41
should be able to get all this from the meaning so obtained, because that is the purpose of this formation of
words. Thus, when a name is used in this form of com- 42
position, it would undergo a change, because it is quite
new.[1] Indeed, there is no similarity between the original 43
and subsequent meaning of a word, because that is the very purpose of this form of composition, which is based
on the correct formation or use of words. But it is only 44
when we are unable to get a proper meaning, that words
should be construed in this manner; and if we are satisfied 45
with the one meaning as it is, there should be no division
of words into parts; and their meaning should be deter- 46
mined on the basis of their description (40-47). 47

[1] The *Mīmāṅsā* tells us quite clearly that a number of names used in the text have been newly coined for this purpose. Indeed, it would be impossible to have this form of composition without it.

TEST OF CORRECTNESS—If, however, the words (or their parts) are badly arranged, the change would be for the worse, and there would be no consistency of ideas, with the result that the correct meaning cannot be determined. 48 In this manner we can find out the correct meaning of any two *Sāman* hymns by means of oneness of inference drawn from circumstances, and feel convinced in regard 49 to the true meaning of words in the same manner as in connection with their original form[1] (48-50). 50

SPECIAL CASES—But this rule does not apply to two actions (or sacrifices) performed in accordance with a law, which take place at different times, such as the new and the full moon. These phenomena (or actions) are personified as gods and honoured as such; and that is how they are connected with the meaning of the text. We cannot 51 say that this is intended to give us the idea of Time,[2] and so Time should be personified in the same manner (that is, as a god), because that is not the principal topic of the text; and we get this from the description of the 52-53 text itself. Nor can we say that, if it is not possible (to 54 agree that the new and the full moon refer to Time),—the idea of Time should be like that of *Agni*[3]—because (that

[1] The hymns of the *Sāma Veda* have been specially mentioned because it is necessary to change the form of words used in them. This, as has already been explained, is indicated by their having to be sung.

[2] The new and the full moon do not express the idea of Time. As has already been explained, the moon refers to the mind; and so the new moon is the birth or the earliest function of the mind as desire; while the full moon represents its association with action.

[3] *Agni* refers to the intellect; and the perception of Time, as has already been explained, is purely intellectual. Hence it may be argued that Time should be represented in the same manner as *Agni*,—that is, as a god.

too does not fit into the text, and) we have to see what constitutes the principal topic of the text and what does not. Indeed, there is uniformity of representation in regard to the idea of both Time and *Agni* throughout the text; for what is worshipped as a god is their different spheres of activity.[1] We cannot even say that we should honour Time as a god at least at the beginning of things (preliminary sacrifice), because we cannot conceive of it at that stage[2] (or it cannot be acted upon by anything) (51-60).

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[1] The *Mīmānsā* explains that Time cannot be represented as a god, because a god represents the great forces of Nature acting in accordance with the law of sacrifice,—that is, as creating and sustaining life. But Time cannot always be understood in this light,—for it is often believed to be a great destructive force: hence it cannot be represented as a god.

It may be of interest to observe that the *Bhagavad Gītā* describes *Kṛshṇa* (God) as revealing himself to *Arjuna* in the form of Time; but the latter is unable to bear the sight (BhG. XI, 15-46).

Time, in the sacred books, is often represented as a Serpent; and the word *Kāla* means Time as well as a poisonous serpent. This is the idea of *Kālīya*, the serpent, subjugated by *Kṛshṇa* in the story of the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*; and it would be explained in its proper place.

The association of Time with the idea of a serpent has also a special significance of its own, and is not merely due to the fact that some serpents are deadly, and so is Time believed to be. The ancients believed that Time is part of the energy of the Sun,—a radiation, which has the form of a wave, and could best be represented as a Serpent-wave, or a Serpent. This has been explained at some length elsewhere (MM. I, 107-118).

It may be of interest to observe that *Vṛtra*, who is described in the Vedas as a serpent, conforms to the same idea (Cf. MM. I, 304-310).

[2] It may be argued that Time should be represented as a god at least at the beginning of things,—when life is created; for then at least it cannot be regarded as destructive. The answer to this is that at that stage we cannot conceive of Time at all; and so it cannot be personified in any form,—even as a god. But when life begins, Time begins to act upon things, and cannot be acted upon by anything itself.

PART III

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

(Continued)

When a word is divided into parts, we may begin from the beginning or the end as may be convenient: only we must remember that there is a cause for all things (1-3).

According to some there should be no change in the form of words used in the text. But a change should be made where necessary, and for reasons already explained (4-6).

A "disguise" means that we need to have a proper meaning of the text; and there are rules in regard to the manner of seeing through it,—both as to whether words should be divided into parts or not (7-14).

If the meaning of words taken as a whole is incompatible with the character of the text, we should be able to find an alternative meaning; for, if the parts of a word are the same, it would be wrong to construe it in only one way (15-19).

If an expression is quite new, its form should not be changed, unless there are express directions to that effect in the text (20-23).

If the meaning of a word has not been defined in a special way, we cannot define it ourselves; but if we are unable to get a proper meaning, we can divide a word into parts; but the word cannot come to possess any new properties by reason of this division (24-28).

A name is formed when we utter a particular word and give it a particular meaning; but certain words express the idea of a single action, and no change should be made in their form. This, however, does not apply to a word like *tvach* (29-31).

The form of the word *medha-pati* should not be changed, for its meaning has been defined (32).

In this method of interpretation we get two series of words, —the original one and that formed by means of division into parts; and we should see that they correspond each to each in an exact order (33).

The word *svāmī* has a special meaning; and so also *Devatā*; and they retain their meanings throughout (34-39).

Words which express the idea of a single action should remain unchanged in form (40).

The form of the names of a large number of gods should be changed; and their ideas should be connected with one another (41-43).

METHOD OF INTERPRETATION—When a word is reduced to its rudimentary form (or divided into parts),—so far as its meaning is concerned—its first part is like a subsequent part. In the whole mass of the parts of a word, the meaning

is due to its rudimentary form, and is not affected by the manner of construing it; and we can understand this if we see through its "disguise"[1] (1-2). 1 2

The true state of a thing is produced by means of some definite cause, according to its place; and we can understand this if we see through the "disguise" of words.[2] According to some, however, there should be no change in the form of words, as it is unauthorised; but they say so because they look only to the symbols used in the text (and not to their meaning). On the other hand a change should be made where necessary, and for reasons already explained (3-6). 3 3a 4 5 6

PUROPOSE OF "DISGUISE" AND THE NEED FOR PIERCING THROUGH IT—A "disguise" is for the purpose of desiring to bring out the real meaning of the *Mantras* or the hymns of the Vedas; and there are rules in connection with the method of seeing through it, both in respect of words 7

[1] When we divide a word into parts to understand its real meaning, it makes no difference whether we begin with the first letter or syllable and proceed, step by step, to the last,—or begin with the last and go back, step by step, to the first; for all these are symbols, with definite meanings; and when they are brought together in a word or name, it means that certain ideas or substances are connected together in a certain way. For instance, we may divide the word *Kṛshṇa* into *K*, *ṛ*, *sh*, *ṇa*; and it would make little difference to the idea whether we begin with *K* and end with *ṇa*, or *vice versa*. In some cases, however, there is a definite advantage in beginning from the one or the other end; but, on the whole, there is little substantial change in the idea. In the case of *Kṛshṇa* it would clarify the idea if we begin with *K*, for it gives us the idea of Nature; so that we get the idea of God, beginning with Nature and ending in the supreme Intellect; and that is what *Kṛshṇa* really signifies.

[2] This *Sūtra* does not occur in some texts. The point of this is that when we see through this "disguise" of words, we understand not only the real idea of a thing, but also its cause.

taken as a whole and divided into parts.[1] If we find that [8] the common meaning of a word, current among the people, is defective, (we should take it that it is incomplete, and so) understand it in the light of its completer or more highly evolved form. Indeed, in such a case there should be good reason for allowing a word to remain in its original form, without dividing it into parts; for it would be im- [9] proper not to make a change in order to remove a defect, specially when there is no difference between the two forms of a word; and a change is made in order to remove [10] the defect. But when the defect has been removed, the [11] meaning of words in the latter form should be as suitable as in the original one. Indeed, when we get the true meaning [12] of the text, we find that it is free from defect; and we see [13] an illustration of this in our own desires, because we under- [14] stand what is proper when we are free from the influence of what is improper[2] (7-14). [14a]

NEED OF AN ALTERNATIVE MEANING—If we find that (in case we accept the meaning of the text as it is) certain erroneous ideas arise and they are incompatible with the character of the text, we should be able to find an alternative meaning; because if the parts of a word are the same, it

[1] A "disguise" does not refer only to the division of words into parts. The meaning of certain words has been specially defined, and they have to be taken as they are, and are not to be divided into parts: yet they too are under a "disguise", which is "pierced" when we take them as defined.

[2] This *Sūtra* does not occur in some texts; but it clarifies the idea of the preceding one. We understand a thing as being free from defect only when we refer it to our own desires: that is, when we like a thing without any reservation, it appears to us to be so. Similarly, the new meaning would appear to be free from defect when we like it.

would be wrong to construe it in only one way; and we come 15
to this conclusion because we are able to get a better explanation; and its excellence is like a double sacrifice.[1] 16–16a
But we should do this (find an alternative meaning by means of dividing words into parts) only when there is no suitable meaning, and anything else fails to satisfy us. (All expres- 17
sions, however, are not like that); for instance, *Dyāva-Pṛthivī* is not an expression of this kind, because we can get its meaning from the origin of the sounds which compose it[2] (15-19). 18–19

If an expression is quite new, its form should not be changed;[3] and it is not necessary to point to any precedent or rule in such a case. But if we change the form of such an 20
expression, it should be done in accordance with some express direction in the text; and, if the rules are the same, 21
the idea of *adhrigu*,—in what relates to a *Soma* sacrifice—should be obtained in the same manner.[4] In this case the 22

[1] This *Sūtra* does not occur in some texts. The point is that, if the original meaning appears to be good enough, but the new one is better, we should accept the latter, for it is doubly good, or a double sacrifice. We have already explained that a sacrifice is a good and intelligent act.

[2] *Dyu* and *Pṛthivī*, commonly spoken of as *Dyāva-Pṛthivī*, are said to refer to Heaven and Earth. But their meaning can be understood from the "sounds" or letters which compose their names, when it would be found to refer to the senses of knowledge and action (See MM. I, 358-361).

[3] The "new" expression does not refer to newly coined words, made to express new ideas, to which the *Mīmānsā* has referred a number of times. The "new" expressions in the present *Sūtra* refer to words used only once and not repeated again.

[4] *Adhrigu* is the name of a formula concluding with an invocation of *Agni*. As *Agni* refers to the intellect, and *Soma* to the mind, "the idea of *adhrigu* in what relates to a *Soma* sacrifice" means the use of the intellect in connection with the function of the mind; and we

meaning is to be found in a substitute expression, because no change of form is necessary (20-23). 23

METHOD OF DIVISION OF WORDS INTO PARTS—If the meaning of a word has not been handed down (or explained) by the sacred books themselves, we cannot hit upon the correct explanation ourselves; but if we are unable to get a proper meaning, we should resort to this method of interpretation (by means of division of words into parts). 24 A name is intended to convey an idea; and if its meaning is obtained from the name itself, we should retain its existing form; for it cannot come to possess any special properties by reason of its new formation (or division into parts). 25 The essence of this has already been explained; 26 for when we take words as a whole, with their parts joined together, the meaning that we get is not of a lasting value,— 27 whereas we understand them better by piercing through their "disguise" (24-28). 28

FORMATION OF A NAME—(This is how a name is formed). We utter a particular word once, and give it a particular meaning; and then repeat the same: when we do this, it should be construed to be a name, with a limited connotation (or range of activity). 29 But there are a number of words the form of which is not changed, just as there is no change when there is only one action to describe. 30 But the term "once" (referred to in the previous *Sūtra*) means "acting suddenly or at once"; and it follows from this that this rule

have seen how closely allied the two can be. The next *Sūtra* tells us that we should not divide the word *adhrigu* to get its real meaning, but substitute one expression for another,—the function of the intellect for *adhrigu*, and the mind for *Soma*, when we shall understand what it means.

cannot apply to the word *tvach* ("skin"). In such a case we have to go down to the rudimentary form of a word in the manner explained, proceed from one part to the other, and add them together, till in the fully lengthened form we get the name (and its meaning)[1] (29-31). 31

MEANING OF MEDHA-PATI—The expression *medha-pati* (or lord of sacrifice) is always used in the sense of one who has mastered the great forces of Nature (and so is described as the lord of the gods).[2] This is the inherent connection between the two expressions (*medha-pati* and "lord of the gods"); and so if we find that this expression has been used, but we do not understand its meaning, we should not make any change in its form (but accept its idea as explained[3]) (32). 32

APPLICATION OF THIS METHOD—When we apply this method of interpretation, we get two series or assemblages of words (the original one, and that formed by means of division into parts); and we should see that the second corresponds to the first in an exact order,—the first word of the first series to the first word of the second series, and so on (33). 33

[1] We have been told that the form of certain words should not be changed; but this rule does not apply to the word *tvach*, which means ordinarily "skin". If that does not make sense, we are asked to divide it into parts in the manner explained.

[2] The "lord of sacrifice" is really the soul; and it is for this reason that is called the "lord of the gods", for the soul alone can master the great forces of Nature, to which the gods refer. Indeed, even as the *Sāṅkhya* tells us, Nature itself acts for the sake of the soul, and so is subordinate to it.

[3] We are required to accept the meaning of the word *medha-pati* or "the lord of sacrifice" in the manner explained, that is, as the soul.

SVAMI—(There are certain words which have special meanings: for instance,) whenever the word *svāmī* (or master) is used in the text, its higher meaning is associated with the idea of a god (or the great forces of Nature)[1]; while with regard to the idea of a "wife" some other word (and not *svāmī*) is used. It might, at first sight, appear to be 34 incongruous (or meaningless) to associate the idea of a "master of a sacrifice" with that of a god; because if he offers a sacrifice, it would be because he wants to gain some object; whereas if he is called a "master" it should mean that he has already obtained everything. But if we divide 35 the word into parts in accordance with the general rule, we shall find that the idea of a master is contained in the word (*svāmin*) itself[2]. But if the word is associated with 36 two gods, it is only once that it needs to be drawn out of its original form, and divided into parts; for the word has 37 only one meaning throughout the text; and that is so because of its permanent connection with its parts and the meaning given to it. And thus, since this connection is 38 known, the form of the word can be changed in its light (34-39). 39

WORDS EXPRESSING THE IDEA OF A SINGLE ACTION—Nevertheless, when a word expresses the idea of a single action,

[1] The word *svāmī* or "master" also refers to the soul; and so it is associated with the idea of the gods in the same manner as *medhapati*, and for the same reason.

[2] The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we can get the meaning of "master" or soul from the word *svāmin* (or *svāmī*) itself, if we divide it into parts. There are a number of ways of this division; and we can derive the word from *sva*, which means "the soul". It may also be derived from *sva* and *min*,—when the meaning would be "master of property". Thus we find that both the meanings,—master as well as soul, are contained in the word itself.

it should not be divided into parts, because it would lose its meaning thereby (40). 40

HOW TO OBTAIN THE MEANING OF GODS—The rule in regard to the case of a large number of gods is that there should be a change in the form of their names; that is, 41 they should be reduced to their rudimentary form[1] (by means of division into parts). But (even in their case) it is 42 only when we are unable to get a proper meaning, that this should be done; and even though the gods express their own separate or individual ideas, there should be a close and constant connection between them[2] (41-43). 43

PART IV

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION: THE LAW OF ACTION

There is a special meaning attaching to the number 26, which cannot be understood by means of addition or by dividing the word into parts (1-6).

It is necessary to use our intelligence to understand the idea of numbers: for we have to take them together as well as separately, like the ribs of an animal; or we may compare them to the relation between husband and wife; or between the institutor of a sacrifice and the priests employed by him to assist (7-11).

We should accept what the sacred books say about these numbers; but the idea of their total is important (12-14); and so also of the ribs of an animal (15-16).

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[1] This is how the idea of the principal gods of the Vedas has been explained in another place (MM. I, Chapter IX).

[2] The gods of the Vedas represent the great forces of Nature; but while these forces can be separated, there is also a close inherent connection between them. The same, says the *Mimānsā*, should be the case with the gods.

It is said that the horse has 34 ribs. But this number refers not to ribs of a horse, but to Nature or *Prakṛti*, which is said to have thirty-four parts. This is supported by the sacred books, though we are permitted to make small changes in the details of this idea (17-24).

We can obtain the meaning of certain words like *śyena*, *śalā*, *Kaśyapa*, *Kavasha*, and *sreka-parna* from their reference to the context and the manner in which they have been formed (25-26). We can find out the meaning of *adhrigu* from the purpose for which it is used (27). But we cannot understand a main idea from a casual expression (28). The meaning of *dhārana* should be of the best (29); and if the text refers to the idea of action, we should select that meaning of a word which has a bearing on action (30).

A thing should not be said to exist before its time has arrived (31).

When we see food being prepared on the fire, we should take it that it is meant to be eaten (32-34).

If a thing is not suitable for teaching, it would be found to be in a form which no one can understand (35); and except for this we should be able to understand the real meaning of all words (36-37).

If it is necessary to give up this method of interpretation, we should do so,—but only in conformity with rules: otherwise we should apply it without reserve (38-39).

It is necessary to control desires; and this should specially be done in a state of prosperity; and it is necessary to control them even in eating and drinking (40-44).

This method of interpretation means a new approach to the Vedas, and throws a new light on their value (45-53); but we can understand this only if we admit the necessity of action, without which all our attempts would be futile (54-55).

We should understand that the word *ājya* is a substitute for something else (56-57).

So far as action is concerned, it is a law that if we suspend one, we must begin another (58). The idea of the renunciation of action is expressed in terms of forest trees; but that should come at the end of life (59). On the other hand the idea of sacrifice is represented in terms of a god (60).

No. 26—When we say twenty-six, we get to this number by means of addition, as in the case of twenty-six animals. (But, so far as the text is concerned, this does not satisfy us). Yet, if we take the basic form of the word, we find that it is not a fit case for division into parts; and if we actually divide it, we find that it should not have been altered. Now, if we do not take these numbers in their totality, we find that they admit of a connection; but there is no

connection if we change the form of the word, or take them in their totality[1]. We cannot get the real idea of this number by means of addition, nor yet by dividing the word into parts; and we see that it is so when we understand its proper meaning. We do not have this problem in the case of all compounds (or combinations); and the direction in this case is that the meaning should be obtained by means of all the numbers[2]; and so far as reducing a word to its rudimentary form is concerned, it should be resorted to in the manner explained (1-6).

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2-3

4-5

6

USE OF INTELLIGENCE—(It is necessary to use our intelligence in order to understand the idea of these numbers: for instance,) the ribs of an animal are very important to its life, and function collectively; and they cannot be separated without injury to the animal. This is how (in order to understand the idea of these numbers) we have to use our judgement; and that is the real purpose of the intellect.[3] The rule in such cases is that we must take all numbers together; but, as they cannot be combined, their

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[1] The *Mīmānsā* tells us that if we take the number twenty-six as a whole number, it would not convey any idea to us. Nor can we understand anything if we count one, two, three, etc., and go up to twenty-six; nor yet if we divide the word used in the text into its parts.

[2] We have to adopt some other method of finding out the real meaning of this number; but it is necessary that, when we fix upon the meaning, it should include all the numbers, from one to twenty-six.

[3] The importance of this number may be compared to the ribs of an animal,—and it is said that the ox has twenty-six ribs. These ribs function collectively, and cannot be separated; and we have to use our intellect to understand the idea of the number twenty-six in the same manner.

association together is like that of the state of a wife[1], as has been taught in the sacred books. In such a case, if we may appeal to a precedent, the change of meaning would correspond to the idea of a person who institutes a sacrifice, but employs a priest to perform it[2]; but if there is no precedent, their association should correspond to that of a wife[3] (7-11). 9 10 11

IMPORTANCE OF EXPLANATION GIVEN IN THE SACRED BOOKS—What is taught in the sacred books in connection with

[1] As these numbers cannot be combined, we might compare them to the status of a wife, who is associated with her husband, and yet has a personality of her own.

The number twenty-six refers to the idea of God in relation to all that is contained in Nature as well as the soul. The *Sāṅkhya* tells us of its twenty-four topics,—(1) unmanifest *Prakṛti*, (2-4) intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, and the mind; (5-14) the five great "elements" and their respective properties; and (15-24) the ten senses of knowledge and action. The *purusha* or the individual soul, it says, is the twenty-fifth (SS. I, 61). Above all this is the idea of the Supreme *Purusha* or God, and that is represented by the number twenty-six.

[2] The number 26 refers to several categories that go to make up the idea of Nature, soul, and God. We can thus take them together as well as separately; and they may be said to assist one another. If, therefore, there is a precedent for the comparison, we may refer them to the idea of the institutor of a sacrifice, who engages a priest to assist him.

[3] But if there is no such precedent, we may compare them to a husband and wife.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the idea of the number twenty-six has been represented in various ways: in terms of the ribs of an animal, of the relation between husband and wife, and between the institutor of a sacrifice and the priests who assist him.

We have already explained that the relation between husband and wife corresponds to that between *Purusha* and *Prakṛti* (or God and Nature); and the "institutor of the sacrifice" is the soul, and the "priests" he employs are the different faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, and the senses. The number twenty-six refers to all these.

the idea of numbers should be accepted without any change, because that is their all-pervading character; but 12 the total is as important as the ribs of an animal; and even 13 if the numbers are added together, there should be no change in their idea[1] (12-14). 14

If there is no special explanation of a name in the sacred books, we should never say that there is; and if the ribs of an animal mean anything special, there should be a special mention of it in the sacred books. Thus the word *paśu* 15 (an animal) is important; and if it is added to or combined with some other word, it is because of that importance[2] (15-16). 16

No. 34—It is said that the horse has thirty-four ribs; and, as there is a special reference to this number, it has a special significance. The reference to the number thirty-four 17 cannot be to the ribs of a horse; and if we reject this meaning, we should put Nature or *Prakṛti* in its place, because it has thirty-four parts, as has expressly been stated in the sacred books[3]. There are verses in the *Rig Veda* in support 18

[1] The total—twenty-six—is important, because it refers to God, soul, and all that is included in Nature or *Prakṛti*; and when we understand what it signifies, it would make no change in the idea if we add its parts together. These, as has already been explained, are the senses, the "elements" and their properties, mind, *ahaṅkāra* and the intellect, together with the idea of the unmanifest *Prakṛti*, soul, and God.

[2] When the word *paśu*, meaning "an animal" occurs in connection with the idea of "ribs", we should take it that they refer to the ribs of an animal; not otherwise. For instance, when it is said that an ox has 26 ribs, we should take it that an animal is meant; but if there is only a general mention of these ribs, we should take it that they have some other meaning.

[3] We have explained that the number twenty-four refers to Nature

of this explanation; and so it is only right that it should be accepted without hesitation or doubt. But there is 19 authority for making a change in parts of this idea, even as we do in the case of water or food.[1] But the whole 20

or *Prakṛti*, as consisting of (1) the Unmanifest, (2-4) intellect, *ahankāra* and the mind; (5-14) the five great "elements" and their respective properties; and (15-24) the ten senses of knowledge and action. If to these we add the ten functions of the ten senses, we get the number thirty-four, as completing still more fully the idea of Nature or *Prakṛti*.

The addition of the ten functions of the ten senses is by no means arbitrary, for we have a reference to the ribs of a horse which, as the *Upanishads* and the *Mīmānsā* both tell us (X, iii, 65-68) refers to the senses; and so in dealing with the idea of this number we have to take into special consideration the significance attaching to the horse, who is said to have thirty-four ribs.

[1] But the *Mīmānsā* tells us that we can make a change in the details of this idea, even as we do in the case of water or food. Their essence remains the same; and any change we make can refer only to details.

Now the sacred books tell us that there are thirty-three gods, and their creator is *Prajāpati*, the thirty-fourth; and all this should refer to Nature or *Prakṛti*, for that is the general significance of the number thirty-four; and we have seen that the gods refer to the great forms and forces of Nature. It would therefore be of interest to consider how this number is made up.

The sacred books tell us that this number is made up of twelve *Adityas*, eleven *Rudras*, eight *Vasus*, with *Dyāva-Pṛthivī* or the two *Aśvins* making a total of thirty-three. These should accordingly refer to the thirty-three manifest forms of Nature.

Now an *Aditya* is the name of the sun; and the twelve *Adityas* are said to refer to the sun in the twelve months of the year. But the sun is also a symbol of the intellect, as we have seen in the case of *Agni*; and so the twelve *Adityas* would refer to the function of the intellect, as including itself, *ahankāra* or the I-as-an-actor, and the elements and their properties.

With regard to the eleven *Rudras*, we have seen that the number eleven refers to the function of the mind, as including itself and the ten senses. The name *Rudra* also refers to the mind, for it is a name of *Siva*, who refers to it.

idea would be negatived if there were no connection between the parts of this number.[1] (It is, however, permissible to make a little change in detail, without affecting the main idea: for instance,) a liberal-hearted person, if he has the owl for a neighbour, may be described as a "mower of grass"; or we may substitute the word sword for a hatchet or knife, to express the glory of the arm of the person who uses it (17-24). 21 22 23 24

SPECIAL TERMS—The meaning of certain words like *śyena*, *śalā*, *Kaśyapa*, *kavasha*, and *sreka-parṇa*, which have a well-known form, should be obtained in accordance with a definite juxta-position or association of ideas; and 25

The word *Vasu*—*Va*, *su*—means literally "(*su*) born of (*va*) Nature"; and so the eight *Vasus* refer to the eight divisions of *Prakṛti*, —intellect, *ahankāra*, mind, and the five great "elements"—mentioned in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (BhG. VII, 4). There is a reference to the eight *Vasus* in the story of the *Mahābhārata*, and there too their idea is the same.

We have observed that *Dyāva-Pṛthivī* refers to the senses of knowledge and action, and so do the two *Aśvins*, or horses, as they are called.

Thus we see that the number thirty-three refers to the manifest forms of Nature; and whatever variations there are do not affect the main idea. The thirty-fourth, *Prajāpati*, may be said to be the creator of all this; but his idea does not correspond to that of a moral creator of the universe. That is developed later in the ideas of *Siva* and *Vishṇu*; and *Siva* means the good, and *Vishṇu* is the supporter of life.

[1] We have explained that the different entities included in this number are all connected with one another. Indeed, the "elements" and their properties, and the senses and their functions can all be integrated; while with regard to the rest, the intellect is said to be the first manifest form of *Prakṛti*, and all the rest arise out it in order: *ahaṅkāra* from the intellect, the mind from *ahaṅkāra*, and so on.

these words should be taken in the manner in which they have been formed[1] (25-26). 26

In order to get the real meaning of the word *adhirgu*, we should find out the purpose for which it is used[2] (27). 27

We cannot understand the principal idea from a casual expression; but where an expression is meant to serve some higher purpose, its meaning in connection with the latter should be accepted. In the case of the word *dhāraṇa*, we 28 should take it to refer to a higher purpose[3]; and if the text 29 refers to the idea of aiming at action, the meaning of other words should have a bearing on action (28-30). 30

A thing should not be said to have appeared (or to exist) if we are told that its time has not arrived (31). 31

When we see a gift of food being prepared on the fire, we are confirmed in our belief that it is meant to be eaten; and so it may be compared to honey and water (32). 32

Thus, where the correct formation of words is not possible (or we are unable to divide words into parts), we may have language of this kind; and the use of it arises from inability 33 to divide words into parts (33-34). 34

If a thing is not suitable for writing or teaching, it

[1] We can get the real meaning of these words in accordance with this method of interpretation: they have either to be divided into parts, or have a specially defined meaning. According to this *śyena* would refer to Nature, which fills us with desire; *śalā* is an argument relating to the functions of the ten senses; *Kaśyapa* symbolises a withdrawal of the senses from their objects; *kavasha* signifies protection from the evil effects of desire; and *sreka-parṇa* the relation of the universe to one creator.

[2] *Adhrigu* refers to the intellect, as has already been explained.

[3] The word *dhāraṇa* has a number of meanings,—"holding, preserving, restraining, immovable concentration of the mind". The last, being the highest, should be accepted. In the case of other words, the meaning bearing on action should be preferred.

should be deemed to be something that is contrary to the law of life (Dharma); and in such a case we shall find that there is no proper connection between the different parts of the text; and the whole arrangement of words would be irregular. Except for this, there should always be some explanatory reference or translation of meaning somewhere in the text, to indicate what the real meaning is; for the prohibition of knowledge would not be proper in such cases (35-37). 35 36 37

If it is necessary to give up this method of interpretation,—even where it is possible to apply it, for we can divide words into parts—we should give it up where its application is expressly prohibited. Otherwise, on principle, we should apply it without reserve, as freely as if we had to go across and get at the thing (correct meaning). This rigid practice in connection with the application or otherwise of this method of interpretation follows a certain law, as in the case of food[1] (38-39). 38 39

CONTROL OF DESIRES: HOW DESCRIBED—(Desires are of many kinds, and) we are required to restrain them, because that is the law of a man's life. This restraint should specially be exercised in a state of prosperity, because there is then a natural tendency to indulgence. Indeed, we have to exercise restraint even in the case of eating cooked food or boiled milk; and this is expressed by means of the word *apanaya* (which means "taking away"), and its idea should be understood in the light of the statement of particulars in the text, where it is said to be like a pot of milk (for 40 41 42

[1] There can be rigid rules in connection with eating food,—what should or should not be eaten. Even so there are rules in connection with this method of interpretation, as to when it should or should not be applied.

carrying it away); while the expression "boiled milk" is 43
for the sake of illustration[1] (40-44). 44

RESULT OF THIS METHOD OF INTERPRETATION—This method of interpretation means a new approach to the Vedas; and whenever we have recourse to it, we should accept the new meaning only when it has something worthwhile to teach; and the division of words into parts is 45 intended for that purpose; and we need to resort to it when 46 there is nothing else to guide us. Indeed, the value of 47 the *śruti* arises from the chief importance of this method; 48 and the explanation of the meaning of the text is intended to serve this purpose (or to give us something of real value). We make use of the correct formation of words 49 (by means of their division into parts), in order to get sense out of the text; and when we do so, we get other things of importance out of it too. For instance, there is an expres- 50 sion which means "encircled with *Agni* or fire", but it makes little sense in that form; whereas if we apply the general rule of interpretation, we find that it has a meaning full of excellent sense[2]. If, however, we are unable to get a proper 51 meaning by means of this method, we shall find that we do not get any meaning at all; or if we do, the result would be self-contradictory, as in the case of the word *iḍānta*, which has no meaning at all.[3] Indeed, as each word is connected 52 with the one that precedes it, we cannot say that it is com-

[1] The word *apanaya* means "taking away; bad policy"; and its use implies that certain desires should be "taken away' or shunned; and so it is like a pot for "carrying away" milk, which is an object of desire. It is in this manner that the idea of restraint is illustrated.

[2] As *Agni* refers to intelligence, "encircled with *Agni*" means full intelligence; and that makes excellent sense.

[3] There is no word like *iḍānta* in the dictionary.

plete in itself; and we actually find that it is not so (45-53). 53

BELIEF IN ACTION—(But we can understand the real meaning of the text only if we admit the necessity of action; for) action is the basis of all sacrifice[1]; and if we deny the necessity of action, we might just as well give up all attempts at finding out the real meaning of the text by means of the proper formation of words (or their division into parts). If we do so (deny the necessity of action), it would be as futile to try to understand the text as to undertake a subsequent sacrifice (or a sacrifice with clarified butter) without performing a previous one.[2] Action is the distinguishing 54 attribute of all things; and if we deny action, it would mean the end (or destruction) of everything (54-55). 55

AJYA—When we get the word *ājya* in the text, we should understand that it is a substitute for something else; and we shall know what that is when we cast away the "substance" (that it commonly means); and understand it com- 56 pletely[3] (56-57). 57

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[1] Cf. BhG. III, 14.

[2] Unless we understand the law of action, we cannot understand the Vedas, even as we cannot undertake a subsequent sacrifice (or action) without a preceding one.

The word in the text is *ājya*, which commonly means "clarified butter poured over the sacrificial fire"; but, as has already been explained, it really signifies goodness. The point then would be that we cannot do a good deed unless we know how to act.

[3] We have already explained that the meaning of the word *ājya* has to be derived from *aja—a-ja*—when it would mean "(*a*) not (*ja*) poison" or "(*a*) like (*ja*) enjoyment". It accordingly refers to action that is not evil, and may even give joy.

ACTION AND ITS RENUNCIATION—With regard to action, the rule is that when one action is suspended, we have to resort to another, for there is no essential difference between them. So far as the idea of the negation of action (or sacrifice) is concerned, it is expressed in terms of forest trees; but its proper place is at the end.[1] On the other hand, the form of anything associated with the idea of sacrifice corresponds to the state of a god (godhead)[2] (58-60).

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[1] The idea of renunciation of action is represented in terms of life in the forest; and there are innumerable references to it in the sacred books. But this is the last stage of our life, says the *Mīmānsā*, when alone renunciation has a meaning.

[2] We have already explained that the idea of sacrifice is associated with that of a god. Indeed, that is the literal meaning of the word *Deva*,—*da*,*i*,*va*— "(*da*) sacrifice (*i*) associated with (*va*) Nature": or Nature governed by the law of sacrifice.

CHAPTER X

PART I

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION: DESIRE, PURPOSE AND ACTION

The special characteristic of this explanation is that it enables us to understand the working of the laws of Nature and the great forces associated with them,—which are otherwise unintelligible (1-3).

Desire is an inseparable attribute of the mind; and once it begins, it goes on without end, expressing itself in newer and newer forms, and beginning its course each time afresh. It is a precursor to action; and may be compared to a preliminary sacrifice (4-8).

All action is meant to secure some purpose, and it involves an exercise of the intellect. But this applies to animate and not inanimate objects (8-10).

All this is given in the sacred books, and we can understand it if we interpret them aright. We shall then find that they refer to the law of action, and that the idea of a preliminary sacrifice fits into that of desire (11-15).

In this manner we can explain the idea of *ājya* as well as *prayāja* (16-18). The word *paśu* is self-explanatory; but we have to change the form of the word *kapāla* to understand its meaning (19-26).

So far as the planets are concerned, each name has its own special meaning, and they refer to the great forces of Nature. But if we divide these words into parts, we should make use of our knowledge to understand their idea (27-30).

When we find that the meaning of the text is self-contradictory, we should understand that it is possible to get its correct idea by changing the form of words (31-32); but it is necessary to have knowledge to be able to do so, for different words have to be treated in different ways (33-46). We do not give any meaning we like to a word, and have often a good reason for doing so (47-50).

Each action is meant to secure an object, for which necessary means have to be provided (51-54). There must also be a sequence of cause and effect; and it is in this manner that we get the meaning of an obscure word by reducing it to its rudimentary form (55-58).

SPECIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THIS EXPLANATION—The special characteristic of this explanation is that when we substitute one meaning for another, we come to know the working of the laws of Nature, and the association together of the great elemental substances of which it consists; for all this has been taught in an indirect manner (1-3).

DESIRE AND MIND: A PRECURSOR TO ACTION—Desire is an attribute of the mind, and is associated with it from the beginning; and when once it begins its course, it goes on, expressing itself in newer and newer forms. It is very important to understand this; for such is the nature of the mind that, when desire seeks a new object, it begins its course every time afresh. (Desire is a precursor to action, and) may be compared to a preliminary sacrifice[1],—though the latter may not have the same connection with the mind[2]; and there is unanimity of opinion on the point (4-8).

OBJECT OF ACTION—All action is meant to secure some object, and there can be no action without some purpose or aim; and the latter arises because of its connection with the intellect.[3] But this does not apply to inanimate objects like a pillar or a stump of a tree, which is fixed in one place (9-10).

[1] As sacrifice refers to action, a preliminary sacrifice is something that may be said to precede action; and, as desire does so too, they may be said to have common characteristics.

[2] Desire is intimately connected with the mind, and the two are inseparable; but not so a preliminary sacrifice and the mind. However, we can compare desire and a preliminary sacrifice, as being similar in certain respects,—as both are precursors to a great action.

[3] Purpose is always associated with the intellect. In order to have a purpose or aim, it is necessary to come to a decision; and that is the function of the intellect.

THE SACRED BOOKS, AND HOW TO UNDERSTAND THEM —(All this is described in the sacred books, and we can understand it if we interpret them aright). But it is only when something is obscure or is left unexplained, that we should change the form of words in order to understand their meaning; and we shall find that the names are like that, because the outward form of the *Mantras* (or hymns) is like that; and so the idea of *prayāja* (a preliminary sacrifice) would fit into the narrative, when we see through the "disguised" form of the word[1] (11-15). 11 12 13 14 15

It is possible to hold that we should be able to get the meaning of the word *ājya*, and its connection with *Agni* in the same manner;[2] and that should give us its connection with some force of Nature (deity)[3], because of the similarity of action between the two (16-18). 16 17 18

[1] When we understand the idea of the text, we shall find that the idea of *prayāja* or a preliminary sacrifice fits into that of desire, to which it has been compared.

We are told that we can get this meaning by seeing through the "disguised" form of the word,—that is, by dividing it into parts. *prayāja,—pra,yā,ja*—would then mean "*(ja)* peculiar to or connected with *(yā)* attaining *(pra)* very much"; and that which is "very much connected with attaining an object" may easily be said to be desire.

[2] *Ajya*, as has already been explained, refers to goodness; and we can get its meaning by means of division into parts, in a manner similar to that of *prayāja.*

Agni refers to the intellect; and so we can connect *ājya* or goodness with it.

[3] A god or deity refers to the great forces of Nature; and both intellect and goodness can be conceived to be great forces that work through different forms of life in Nature. It is not only man, but other creatures too, that are characterised by both goodness and intelligence; and so they may be said to be like forces of Nature. Hence, both *ājya* and *Agni* can be connected with the idea of a god. Indeed, *Agni* is always personified as a god; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that *ājya* too can be conceived of in the same manner.

PASU—This, however, does not apply to the word *paśu*, for its meaning is obtained from the word itself; though 19-20 we can get it by piercing through its "disguise" as well[1] (19-21). 21

KAPALA—But in the case of the word *kapāla*, it is necessary to change its form and divide it into parts[2]; for its 22 meaning is obscure, and leaves something to be explained; and if we divide it into parts, we shall get a proper meaning in the same manner as we do in the case of the word *svāhā*.[3] 23 That is the object of an imperfect or obscure word, for it makes the sense self-contradictory. We cannot say 24 that the defect persists even after a word has been divided into parts; for we find that it disappears, as in the case of the word *kapāla* (22-26). 25-26

PLANETS—So far as the planets are concerned, each particular name has a particular meaning, so that we can

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[1] The word *paśu* means "an animal". The *Mīmānsā* says that the word is self-explanatory, though we can get its meaning by dividing it into parts as well. *Paśu*—*pa*, *ś*, *u*—would then mean "(*u*, *ś*) the senses associated with (*pa*) their objects"; and this would be the rudimentary idea of an animal,—a creature who has senses of knowledge and action, and associates them with their objects. It is said that there are five kinds of *paśus* or animals,—men, horses, cows, goats, and sheep; and of these the cow and the horse symbolise the senses.

[2] The common meanings of the word *kapāla* are "a cup, an alms bowl, a skull"; but they are obscure. The word may, however, be divided into *k*, *pa*, *ā*, *la*,—when its meaning would be "(*k*) the intellect (*apa*) away from (*ā*) leading to or association with (*la*) the functions of the ten senses". It signifies, therefore, a decision by the intellect to refrain from all action; and that is symbolised by the "alms-bowl" and "skull",—for a man must believe his end to be near if he renounces action, and seeks to live on charity.

[3] We have already explained the meaning of *svāhā*,—*sva*, *ā*, *hā*,—as expressive of the satisfaction of the soul at action, so that action is blessed, and continues without end (VIII, iv, 11, 16-21; p. 209, n.).

understand their ideas properly[1]. Where, however, the name of a planet is not mentioned, there is always some other word, with a special meaning, to convey its idea; and, as it refers to a great force of Nature (deity), the whole idea is properly arranged in this way. There is no inconsistency between the idea of a planet and a great force of Nature (deity), because we are able to infer that a planet is really such a force; and if, in this case, we change the form of a word and divide it into parts, we should make use of our knowledge to get its meaning (27-30). 27 28 29 30

WHEN TO CHANGE THE FORM OF A WORD—When we find that the text is self-contradictory, we should understand that there is a second meaning too; and that is the reason for the change of form of words, for it enables us to explain the real meaning of the text. Indeed, where the text is self-contradictory, the form of names should be changed (31-32). 31 32

In certain cases, however, we may have to add something to find out the real meaning of an expression, as, for instance, in the case of the word *prayāja*,[2]—for each

[1] According to the ancients, the planets are seven in number,—the Sun, Moon, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus, and Saturn; and to these are added *Rāhu* and *Ketu* or the "ascending and descending nodes". These are obviously great forces of Nature, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us.

It may be of interest to point out that these planets were believed to correspond to all that is in Nature: the Sun to the intellect; the Moon to the mind; and the remaining five planets to the five great "elements", —Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth—and their respective properties and the corresponding senses of knowledge and action. All these figure in ancient astronomy as well astrology; and the whole idea has been discussed at some length elsewhere (MM. I, 153-158).

[2] The literal meaning of the word *prayāja*, as already explained, is "that which is very much connected with obtaining something";

part of a word may refer to a different force of Nature. 33
Similarly, the word *charu* should be regarded as a variation of *havis*, because of its connection with sacrifice;[1] 34
and we shall find that it is so when we arrange it properly and understand it aright. Similarly, the word *odana* is 35
a variation of *anna*, because it is connected with it;[2] but 36
in this case there are no two meanings of the words[3]
(33-37) 37

But in the case of the word *kapāla* a doubt arises within us as to the propriety of its meaning, and we consider it
necessary to change its form[4]; and that, because of the 38
special characteristics of its principal part, is true of *charu*
too; but we can understand it because of its being regarded 39
as another *havis* or burnt offering, and also by seeing 40
through its "disguise"[5] (38-41). 41

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and when we understand this to refer to desire, we are adding something of our own to make the idea intelligible.

[1] The word *charu* means "a kind of vessel; an oblation of rice, barley, or pulse, boiled with butter and milk for presentation to the gods or the manes". But if we divide it into parts—*cha*, *r*, *u*—the meaning would be "(*cha*) the mind, associated with (*r*) the senses of action, and (*u*) the senses of knowledge". It refers, therefore, to the function of the mind in association with both the senses of knowledge and action. It is, accordingly, a complete function of the mind, which may be identified with that of the intellect, as we have been told. Now *havis* means a burnt offering; and, as fire refers to the intellect, it signifies the function of the intellect. Hence *charu* is a variation of *havis*, when we understand what these words really signify.

[2] Similarly, *odana* means "cooked rice", and *anna* means "food"; and the one is a variation of the other, for rice is said to be the best kind of grain.

[3] But in this case, says the *Mīmānsā*, the idea is clear enough, and there are no two meanings of these words.

[4] The meaning of *kapāla* has already been explained (See p. 248, n.)

[5] The relation between *charu* and *havis* or the function of the mind and the intellect has already been explained.

On the other hand the meaning of the word *odana* ("boiled rice") is suitable in itself[1]; but the form of even this word may have to be changed if it is used in connection with some extraordinary statement; and it is in this manner that we see through the "disguise" of words (42-44).

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CASES OF "DISGUISE"—We see that the word *kapāla* has this "disguise" when we consider its meaning in its original form; while in the case of other words this arises from our inability to understand them; and in some cases it may also arise from contradiction[2] (45-46).

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REASON FOR A MEANING—But even though a word may have another meaning, (it cannot be anything we choose to call it: for instance,) we cannot say that *kapāla* means "a cake of flour". (There must be a reason for giving a a certain meaning to a word: for instance,) the word *charu* means "a pot or vessel," because it is connected with "drinking", and a vessel or pot can hold a liquid; and in the absence of this distinction we would always be uncertain about its idea[3]. But in the case of the word *charu*,

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[1] Normally the word *odana* does not need to be divided into parts, because its meaning as "boiled rice" is suitable, and it can easily be substituted for *anna* or food, as has already been explained. But in certain circumstances the form of even this word may have to be changed.

[2] These are three different ways in which we can understand that a word has a "disguise": we may have a doubt about its real meaning, as in the case of the word *kapāla*; or we may not be able to understand it at all; or the meaning may be contradictory.

[3] This means that even the ordinary meaning of a word, believed to be under a "disguise", has some reason for it. It may be called its secondary sense; and this would explain how the meaning of the *Mantras* is as continuous as the philosophic rendering of the hymns. This is equally true of the "stories" of the Epics and the *Purāṇas*, which are as continuous as their more philosophic explanation.

we can get its real meaning by piercing through its "disguise"; and if we break it up into parts, we shall do away 48
with all that is meaningless in its original form; because 49
so long as we associate it with the idea of eating (a cake
of flour), we cannot get the idea of action out of it[1] (47-50). 50

ACTION, OBJECT, AND MEANS—(Each action is meant to secure some object, for which necessary means must be provided: for instance,) if we wish to make a round mass of things, we must mix them together; and in order to 51
mix them together, we must "throw" or "pour" them into one another. Even so, if we wish to cook anything, 52
we need to provide fire underneath, and a cover or lid 53
on top (51-54). 54

SEQUENCE OF CAUSE AND EFFECT—(Further, there must be a sequence of cause and effect: for instance,) we cannot get the idea of what is very large or very small from a

[1] We have explained that the real meaning of the word *charu* (*cha*, *r*, *u*) is that it refers to the function of the mind in association with the senses of knowledge and action. We cannot get this meaning of the word if we associate it with the idea of eating.

It has, however, been observed, that the word is connected in a secondary sense with the idea of "drinking"; and that is the reason for its meaning as a "vessel or cup"; and the idea of "drinking" is connected in a subsidiary way with that of the mind too. We have explained that *Soma* refers to the mind; but it is also said to be a kind of wine; and we have explained that the "juice" of the plant refers to desire, which is an attribute of the mind. Hence, the idea of "wine" or "drinking" is connected with that of the mind; and, as the energy of the mind is said to be electric, wine would possess some electric properties too.

It is in this manner that primary and secondary ideas are connected together in the sacred books; and the two meanings of the text appear to run as if on parallel lines.

cake of flour, because the argument has nothing to do with the desire for eating. Similarly we cannot get the idea of shining or blazing out of it. Thus, when the meaning of a word is indistinct or obscure, we can get its real idea by reducing it to its rudimentary form (55-58).

PART II

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION: LIFE AND ACTION

It is necessary to understand the meaning of words in the light of their context; but in certain cases the ordinary meaning is unsuitable, and we have to find out a better one (1-5).

Action consists of parts, corresponding to which words too have been divided into parts to express their idea (6-12).

Articles of food express the idea of pleasure or satisfaction; but even these words may have to be divided into parts if necessary (13-14).

Certain words cannot be divided into parts; the meaning of some has been defined; while others have to be divided into parts to be understood (15-16).

Those who are devoted to spiritual knowledge cannot be accused of misconduct; and if we understand the language of the text properly, we shall find that they have acted properly all the time (17-20). But words should be divided into parts only when their common meaning is not satisfactory (21).

Certain ideas are associated with certain objects; and it is necessary to know them in order to understand the real meaning of the text (22-53).

We should not act under the urge of desire; but the desires of those who make sacrifices should be satisfied (54-56).

All action is performed by the living: the action associated with the dead refers to their funeral rites (57-59).

Health is necessary to life, and the idea can easily be understood; but in certain cases it may be necessary to divide words into parts to get it (60-61).

Actions meant for the sake of Dharma should always be performed. If we are obliged to omit any, they should be secondary, and not principal actions (62-63). If, however, we

omit a small portion of such actions, we should not be troubled about it (64).

There can be no extinction of action, because some part of it will always remain (65); and thought is closely allied to action (66). This is easy to understand; and in this case it is not necessary to reduce words to their rudimentary form to understand their meaning (67).

But in the case of certain words relating to fundamental objects, it is necessary to divide them into parts to understand their meaning (68). In certain other cases, however, we may have to adopt a different course (69-70).

We sometimes find that the latter part of a statement contradicts an earlier one. This is intentional, and is meant to indicate that we have to divide words into parts to understand their meaning (71-74).

MEANING DEPENDS ON THE CONTEXT—(We can understand the meaning of words only in the light of their context: for instance,) the word *kṛshṇala* (meaning "a small piece of gold", does not appear to make sense, and) seems to indicate immaturity of expression; but it can have this meaning if it is clearly stated that it is used in connection with a donation or a gift (1-2). 1 2

If the words *upastaraṇa* and *abhighāraṇa* have any permanent value, their common meanings as "spreading over" and "besprinkling" cannot be of any use; and we have to find meanings of a more permanent value in order to explain them, for otherwise there would be confusion (3-4). 3 4

The word *chatur* (meaning "the number four"), which appears to serve no special purpose, signifies "completeness" when understood in its exact sense; and it is for this reason that we get the word *chatura* again and again (for it is the same as *chatur*, but means "clever, skilful")[1] (5). 5

[1] We can get the real meaning of the word *chatur* by dividing it into parts,—*ch, t, u, r*—meaning "(*cha*) the mind associated with (*t, u, r*) the senses of knowledge and action"; and so, like *charu*, it

PARTS OF AN ACTION, AND OF A WORD—Action is measured in terms of its principal achievement, but it consists of a number of parts into which it can be divided; and they all contribute to that achievement. We get the idea of numbers, because in every case they represent the parts of a principal action. Similarly, it is equally impossible to get a single word to express the idea of all the parts of such action; and it would be necessary to combine together a number of words to express the idea of but a single achievement. In any case it would be impossible to describe all the changes an action undergoes by adding together words in this manner. It may be possible to do so in the case of certain kinds of actions which relate to the idea of a sacrifice or an intelligent action; but it would be impossible to do so with regard to the rest. Indeed, the thing will not work if the meaning of each part does not blend with that of the other; (and so it is necessary to get a proper meaning of words) (6-12). 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

ARTICLES OF FOOD AND DRINK—So far as articles of food

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represents the complete function of the mind, which may, for practical purposes, be identified with that of the intellect. It is for this reason that it refers to the idea of completeness or skill in action.

There are a number of references in the *Upanishads* to the importance of the number four: for instance, the cow is said to stand on four legs, a stanza on four verses, etc.

It may be of interest to point out that there are four stages in the evolution of things in Nature: for instance, the organic cell passes through four stages to attain to maturity. As this would appear to be the law of life, the number four represents the idea of completeness.

The word *chatura* is sometimes distinguished from *chatur*,—the one meaning "clever, skilful", and the other "the number four"; but the two may also be used in the same sense alike. Hence, the use of the word *chatura* should tell us that the meaning of *chatur* is also the same,—that is "clever, etc.".

and drink are concerned, they signify pleasure or satisfaction; and the idea is so clear, that it would serve no useful purpose to change the form of these words to understand their meaning. But even they may have to be changed if there is no reference to a receptacle (or recipient) of food (13-14). 13 14

AN ILLUSTRATION—Thus the word *ājya-bhaksha* (meaning, "eating or drinking clarified butter") should be taken in its original form,—as a whole expression,—because it should not be divided into parts.[1] On the other hand the meaning of the word *hiraṇya*[2] ("gold") is like the making of an offering in the fire (an intelligent action); while that of the word *ājya*[3] is obtained by dividing it into parts (15-16). 15 16

NEED OF PROPER UNDERSTANDING—(It is necessary properly to understand the language of the text to know the exact idea: for instance,) those who are devoted to spiritual knowledge are for ever engaged in acts of sacrifice; and their ability to have that knowledge is tested by their acts, because sacrifice is a part of their very nature or

[1] As *ājya-bhaksha* refers to an article of food and drink, it expresses the idea of pleasure clearly enough, and so it is not necessary to change its form.

[2] *Hiraṇya* means "gold", which is allied to the sun, as silver is to the moon; and the one refers to the intellect and the other to the mind. As fire or *Agni* also refers to the intellect, *hiraṇya* (gold) is said to be like an offering made to fire. It is accordingly one of those words the meaning of which has been defined.

[3] We have explained how the meaning of *ājya* can be obtained by dividing it into parts.

These three words tell us how the text has to be interpreted: we should take some words as they are; the meanings of some are defined; while others have to be divided into parts.

character. Such persons should be able to attain to all that they desire as a matter of right; and it would be a calumny to say that they are guilty of misconduct in anything that they do. If, however, they are accused of misconduct, it would be found, on a proper examination of the language of the text, that they have acted suitably to the occasion.[1] (It may be necessary to divide words into parts to understand all this;) but if the words give us a single satisfactory meaning, they should not be divided into parts (17-21). 17 18 19 20 21

SPECIAL TERMS: DADATI—(Certain ideas are expressed in a certain way, and it is necessary to understand them to know the real meaning of the text: for instance,) the gift given to the *Ritvij* priests has a meaning corresponding to the actions of each;[2] and we get it from the proper idea of the word *dadāti* (meaning "he gives") (22). 22

DAKSHINA: A PURCHASE: PRODUCE OF FOREST: REMNANTS OF FOOD—Again, a gift implies a certain sense of satisfaction or enjoyment,—because that is the object of action, as we find among the people. It is *dakshiṇā*, because of its appropriateness;[3] and it should not be held in low 23 24

[1] The *Mīmānsā* has already referred to the supposed "misconduct" of *Indra*. *Kṛshṇa* too is similarly accused; but if we examine the language of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa* properly, we shall find that what the *Mīmānsā* says here is literally true.

[2] We have explained that the *Ritvij* priests refer to the four faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, and the senses—which take part in action. Each of them is given a "gift" to indicate that it has done its work properly.

[3] The idea of satisfaction derived from the action of each of these faculties is expressed in terms of *dakshiṇā* or gift given to the "priests", because the word means "a gift" and also signifies "skill, cleverness". Hence it is appropriate.

esteem because it ministers to satisfaction or enjoyment, —for all action is performed with the object of obtaining something. It is this idea that is expressed in terms of (25) purchasing or paying for a thing; while the acquisition (26) of something that grows naturally in a forest is called food that has merely to be fetched; for it is obtained without (27) doing any work, and that is the reason why it is praised.[1] (28) The remnants of food may also be regarded in the same light[2] (23-29). (29)

OTHER MEANINGS OF REMNANTS—(The idea of remnants may also be taken in a different way). If an object is intended for some important use, it may be described in ornate terms; but all remnants are alike. A learned man (30-31) or a spiritual teacher may come to the conclusion that all things are alike; and so we may, from this, form a general notion that all things should be regarded as alike (and so they may be described in terms of remnants of food).[3] It is in this manner that we find a different meaning (32) in the language of the text (30-33). (33)

HONOUR OF *Ritvij* PRIESTS: THEIR "WAGE."—Simi-

[1] Living on food grown in the forest signifies a life of renunciation of action, as has already been explained. It has merely to be fetched, and is very different from what has to be paid for.

That is the reason why those who believe in renunciation praise this kind of life, or living on food grown in the forest.

[2] Living on remnants of food may also be regarded as a symbol of renunciation, as is signified by the word *kapāla*, which means "a beggar's bowl",—and beggars live on such remnants.

[3] As all remnants may be regarded as alike, remnants of food may also express the idea that all things, however apparently different, are really the same. That is, he who lives on remnants, may be said to believe this.

larly, the honour paid to the *Ritvij* priests in a great *Soma* sacrifice is not for the purpose of saluting them, but is meant to express the idea of our own actions; and the payment of a "wage" is intended to show that it is in connection with *Soma* that they do so[1] (34-35). 34 35

PROHIBITION AGAINST ACTION: HOW DESCRIBED—The idea of prohibition against action is like that of action too; and it is expressed in terms of proceeding, as a matter of duty, to that part of the sacrificial enclosure where the fire has been extinguished[2] (36-37). 36 37

DAKSHINA—The word *dakshiṇā* does not refer to prohibition in any case[3]; and so is constantly repeated by means of a number of synonyms (38). 38

[1] We have already explained that the four *Ritvij* priests refer to the four faculties of man; while *Soma* refers to the mind. All these faculties engage in action, which is caused by desire, an attribute of the mind. Hence the *Ritvij* "priests" are associated with a *Soma* sacrifice, or a proper function of the mind.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us clearly that we honour these "priests" because they act for us (or the soul,—the "institutor" of the sacrifice); and they are paid for their task, to indicate that these faculties really act at the bidding of the soul, and in answer to our desire.

[2] The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the prohibition against action,—or inaction, as it may be called—is really like action, or is another form of action. It is a kind of action at a certain stage of our life, when our intellect tells us that the spark is extinguished, and so it is our duty to renounce all action. It is at this stage that action is prohibited, and it is described in special terms: we have to proceed, as a matter of duty, to that part of the sacrificial enclosure (symbolic of action) where the fire has been extinguished (our intellect tells us that the spark has died out).

It may be of interest to point out that the *Bhagavad Gītā* too tells us that what is called inaction is really a form of action (BhG. IV, 18).

[3] The word *dakshiṇā* signifies skill in action, and not inaction; and so it cannot in any case refer to prohibition against action.

DESIRE, ACTION AND A GIFT—There is a characteristic mark of the mind (desire) in the concluding part of an action, because the mind enters into every part of it. In the circumstances, the offer of a gift (which represents the idea of satisfaction in action) should be regarded as a matter of duty[1] (39). 39

THESE MEANINGS ARE DEFINED—We do not get these meanings by reducing words to their rudimentary form, but by means of a distinct injunction to that effect. We get 40 them from the text itself, through the usual form of words; and there is no ambiguity or doubt, even as there is none when we speak of a double sacrifice[2] (40-41). 41

HOW TO OBTAIN THE MEANING OF Ritvij PRIESTS—In these circumstances different *Ritvij* priests should be selected for the grant of these "gifts"; and the meaning of each 42 of them can, without exception, be obtained by reducing their names to their rudimentary form; and we shall find that there is only one system of connecting the parts of words with one another[3] (42-43). 43

[1] This means that action is not only preceded, but also followed by desire, as a result of which a person engages in one action after another. This also implies that we are satisfied that the previous action should come to an end; and, as *dāna* or gift represents this idea of satisfaction, it is a duty to offer it at the end of an action.

[2] A double sacrifice means an action that is doubly good and intelligent; and there can be no ambiguity about its idea.

[3] The different *Ritvij* priests refer to the different faculties of man, each of which has its own special part to play,—though all of them have their share in action. Hence, we must find out which of them has the most important role at any particular moment of time.

We have already explained that their meanings can be obtained by dividing their names into parts (See Appendix I).

DANA—When we get the word *dāna* (a gift), we should understand that it really means the attainment of an object of desire, or satisfaction or enjoyment arising out of it; and it is used in connection with the function of the mind[1] (*Soma*). There is no such satisfaction in the case of an evil deed (or the act of an enemy); and so we are told that it would be bad policy to give *dakshiṇā*[2] (or a sacrificial fee) to an enemy (44-46).

44 45 46

BONE-SACRIFICE—(The bone-sacrifice refers to death); and while it is necessary to perform it, it should be performed (not by the *Ritvij* priests, but) by others,—for they are not permitted to take part in it[3]; and all that which has been said in this connection should be regarded as appropriate (47-48).

47 48

JAPA—We find from the statement of the sacred books that the consecration (or sacrifice) of *japa* (or silent repetition of a sacred name) signifies action without any (selfish) aim; and the desire for it is intended to indicate that (selflessness of action)[4] (49).

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[1] The idea of *dāna*, as expressive of the idea of satisfaction, has already been explained. As desire is an attribute of the mind, we have a reference to the mind in this *Sūtra*; and the word for it is *Soma*.

[2] *Dakshiṇā*, as has already been explained, signifies "skill in action"; and so conceives of action as something good. It is therefore said to mean a sacrificial fee. An enemy is one who does evil, and *dakshiṇā* cannot be offered to an enemy.

[3] The four *Ritvij* priests or the four faculties of man act at the bidding of the "master of the sacrifice" or the soul; and so they can function only when a person is alive. Hence, they cannot take part in a "bone-sacrifice" which is meant to express the idea of action in connection with the dead.

[4] This would explain why the *Bhagvad Gītā* gives the highest place among all sacrifice to *japa* (BhG. X, 25): it symbolises the idea of a purely selfless action.

ACTION WITH A PURPOSE—But we are also required to perform other actions,—characterised by a purpose or aim—though they would be regarded as being of a secondary importance. But actions which are prompted by personal 50 gain,—where we do not know the exact nature of our desire —should be regarded as unsuitable, and should not be done. 51 Where, however, there is no motive of personal gain, the object of action becomes as sweet and melodious as a well-recited hymn; and such actions should always be 52 performed, as being worthy of all praise (50-53). 53

ACTION AND URGE OF DESIRE—We should not act under the urge of desire; and if we are able to eliminate it in some cases, we shall succeed in others too. But the desires 54 of those who act in a spirit of sacrifice should be satisfied; 55 but these desires should not be limited to blessing some particular object only[1] (54-56). 56

ACTION OF THE LIVING AND THE DEAD—All action is associated with living creatures; and no action, however small, which involves the function of the mind,[2] can be performed by the dead. It is, however, possible to think of action 57 in connection with both the living and the dead, if there is a clear reference to that effect. But when a person dies, 58

[1] The *Bhagavad Gītā* conceives of desires that are not opposed to Dharma as worthy of all praise (BhG. VII, II); and we are told that the wise ones are ever intent on doing good to all (BhG. V, 25). The desires of good men should, therefore, not be limited to securing some particular object only: they should be for the benefit of all.

[2] The expression in the text is *sarva-svāra*, which is the name of a *Soma* sacrifice lasting for a day only. As *Soma* refers to the mind, and the period of a day is a short one, this has been rendered as referring to "action (sacrifice) involving the function of the mind (*Soma*), however small (lasting a day)".

the action associated with him refers to his funeral rites[1] (57-59). 59

LIFE AND DEATH—If a person is alive, it should be presumed that he wishes to keep in health; and it is not necessary to make a special mention of it, because life is meant for health (or health is essential to life). But there may be a 60 special mention of it too; and its idea will be obtained by means of a division of words into parts in the manner already explained (60-61). 61

OBLIGATORY ACTIONS—We should always perform actions which are meant purely for the sake of Dharma (duty or righteousness). If, however, we are obliged to omit some, 62 they should be secondary and not principal actions (62-63). 63

OMISSION OF SMALL THINGS—But if we omit a small portion of such actions, we should not think of it, for calculation depends on the quantity to be calculated (or it would be necessary to think of it if a large portion were involved) (64). 64

NO EXTINCTION OF ACTION—There can be no extinction of action, because some part of it will always remain; and 65 if we understand this relationship, we shall find that calculation is only a modified form of quantity (or thinking is proportionate to the amount of work), for the two are equal: only the amount or quantity comes first, and thinking or calculation afterwards. If we understand this rule, 66

[1] The expression in the text refers to a bone-sacrifice, which is said to be a part of funeral rites, and so refers to them.

it is not necessary to reduce words to their rudimentary form to understand their correct meaning (65-67). 67

MEANING OF WORDS RELATING TO DRAVYAS OR FUNDAMENTAL SUBSTANCES—But in the case of words relating to the original properties of things, it is necessary to divide them into parts, according to the nature of the substance (*dravya*)[1] concerned, because they are original substances, and not produced from something else, like effect from a cause. But in the case of words which refer to occasional 68 things, produced by some cause,—since they are an effect (and not the cause), their meaning may be obtained by means of division into parts, if that is how they have been framed. In this case, however, if we find that the meaning 69 so obtained is contradictory, we should give up the attempt to divide them into parts, and take them as they are, because that is how they have been formed to refer to action (68-70). 70

IDEA OF CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS—We sometimes find that a subsequent part of a statement contradicts an earlier one. That is indeed intentional; for, when there 71-72 is an absence of sense, it is an indication that we should understand the correct use of words (that is, by means

[1] The word used in the text is *dravya*, which has a number of meanings. But when used in a philosophical sense, it refers to a fundamental substance mentioned in the *Darśanas* or systems of philosophy. The *Vaiśeshika* mentions nine such *dravyas*,—the five great "elements," space, time, mind and the soul.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that when words refer to these fundamental substances, it is necessary to divide them into parts to understand their meaning, for they have been framed in that manner. We have already been told that a number of words used in the text are newly coined for the purpose.

of division into parts). We follow this method, with its change of form of words,—because the text makes sense in this manner; and so we conclude that it is intended that the real meaning should be found in that way (71-74).

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PART III

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

We can get only the main idea by changing the form of a word; while subsidiary ones are obtained from words that lie in close proximity. There is no difficulty in understanding the real meaning of the text in this way (1-3).

Words have been newly coined to fit into this scheme, and each succeeding idea is connected with the preceding one (4-5). A single word can describe a composite action in this manner (6-8). But all words cannot be treated in the same way (9-12). and the meaning of certain words, like *hiraṇya* is the same, whether we divide them into parts or accept their common idea (13-15). This method of interpretation is based on the substitution of one form of a word for another (16-19). It becomes necessary to resort to it because we cannot get a rational meaning of the text otherwise (20-22): for instance, it is only in this way that we can get a proper meaning of the number six when it is used in a certain context (23). But it requires deep study and repeated practice (24-29), as may be seen from an illustration (30).

The meaning of the principal word enables us to understand the rest; and this may be illustrated too (31-35). The meaning may sometimes be obtained by means of effect produced by a certain cause (36-38). In the case of *dravyas* or fundamental substances referred to in systems of philosophy, their idea is obtained by dividing words into parts (39-40). All words are directly or indirectly connected with the principal word (41-45).

The meaning of certain words has been defined; of others can be obtained by dividing them into parts; but the two are often connected with each other (46-50). This change of one form of a word for another is like an exchange (51-54); but it is a strictly equal one (55); and the whole idea can be illustrated (56-57). The test of the correctness of this method consists in the result it can produce, as we may see from certain illustrations (58-75).

IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPAL WORD—When the form of a word is changed,—such is the character of the language

used—that it can express only the main idea; while with regard to subsidiary ones, they are expressed by means of other words in close proximity. When a word is changed 1 to its rudimentary form, there is no difficulty in the way of understanding its real meaning; and that is due to the 2 fact that we get a kind of power over the meaning of words in this way (1-3). 3

NEWLY COINED WORDS—The meaning of the principal word is connected with its parts; and so it should be deemed to have been newly coined for the purpose.[1] If we follow this method, we shall find that every succeeding idea is connected with what precedes it; and we accept it because of its uniform application throughout. Indeed, 4 if it is correct that words should be divided into parts to get their meaning, we cannot use any other method which does not divide them into parts (4-5). 5

A SINGLE WORD CAN DESCRIBE A COMPOSITE ACTION—If the idea of an action can be described by putting down a single word,—it would need to be subjected to this method (that is, divided into parts), when we shall get its real meaning in the manner explained. This has to be done 6 because the original name,—as it is—is ineffective otherwise; whereas the parts have the power to give us a mean- 7 ing equally like the word itself (6-8). 8

CAN ALL WORDS BE TREATED ALIKE?—It is possible to say that all words should be regarded as principal words in

[1] It would obviously be impossible to get the correct meaning of words by dividing them into parts, unless they are newly coined or specially formed for this purpose; and that is what the *Mīmānsā* tells us.

this manner (that is, they should be divided into parts to be understood). But if that were so, all methods or rules 9 of interpretation should give us the same true meaning of the text; so that there would be but one uniform method 10 of interpretation, and those who believe in reducing words to their rudimentary form would be able to change all of them. This method would then apply to all words denoting action; and all other words would correspond to the form of the principal word. Thus when all words can be 11 treated uniformly, and we are able to get the required result,—that would be our authority for holding this to be the correct way of using words[1] (9-12). 12

HIRANYA-GARBHA—The word *Hiraṇya-garbha*[2] is of the aforesaid kind, as is evident from the hymns of the Vedas; 13

[1] The argument of these *Sūtras* is that if there is but one method of interpretation, we should always be able to get the correct meaning, however we interpret the text. Thus, if we are able to get the correct meaning by dividing words into parts, that should also be their common meaning; and if we find that it is so, we shall agree that all words are like principal words, and can be treated alike.

However, as we find that the common meaning is not the same as that obtained by means of division of words into parts, it is not possible to have a single method of interpretation.

But there are cases where the common meaning is the same as that obtained by means of division into parts; and the *Mīmānsā* goes on to give an illustration of that; and it is only in such cases that we can do what we like,—take the common meaning or divide words into parts.

[2] The word *Hiraṇya-garbha* belongs to that class where the common meaning is the same as that obtained by means of its division into parts. The common meaning of the word *hiraṇya* is "gold imperishable matter"; and of *Hiraṇya-garbha*" the Golden Egg", out of which the great creator *Brahmā* is said to have been born.

Now if we divide the word *hiraṇya* into parts,—and that is the principal word—we get *h, i, ra, ṇ, ya*—and the meaning is "(*ya*)

and that is so because it does not conflict with its rudimentary form; and we shall find that its latter meaning is in harmony with the meaning of the hymns (13-15). 14 15

SUBSTITUTION OF ONE FORM FOR ANOTHER—This method of interpretation is based on the substitution of one form of a word for another; and that may be described as its transformation or change; and the meaning of its parts is in accordance with what is taught or authorised[1]. Indeed, we accept the traditional meaning of words because we do not know the real import of the Vedic hymns. But when we "purify" words or use them correctly, we find, as a result, that they convey a very different idea (or refer to a very different business); and there is no difficulty in reducing them to their rudimentary form (16-19). 16 17 18 19

NEED OF A NEW INTERPRETATION—The rule in regard to this method of interpretation is that, if we have a doubt in regard to the meaning of a word, whatever other meaning

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that which is (*ṇ*) the intellect, associated with (*ra*) the senses of action, and (*i*) connected with (*h*) the mind". Thus it signifies intellect, associated with the mind and the senses,—that is, in action; and the *Mīmānsā* has already explained that the real meaning of the word is intellect, to which the idea of gold is said to correspond; and so the meaning is the same whichever way we interpret the word.

Similarly, *Hiraṇya-garbha* would mean "(*garbha*) containing (*hiraṇya*) imperishable matter" or *Prakṛti*, which is said to be imperishable: hence it refers to Nature, the first manifest form of which is the intellect, which is said to correspond to gold. Thus the parent of *Brahmā* is *Prakṛti* itself; or he may be said to be the first idea of God arising out of an examination of the character of Nature, for that is how we get the idea of God.

[1] The meanings of the letters of the alphabet as well as syllables, which constitute the parts of words, are such as may be found in a good dictionary.

we give it should be in conformity with the nature of the word; and that is possible because of the suitability of the new (or correct) form of words, and the connection of their parts with one another. We have to resort to this method because the statements in the text are conflicting; and that calls for an explanation (and we are able to get it in this way) (20-22).

AN INSTANCE—For instance, it has been said that a person consecrates himself for the purpose of a *Soma* sacrifice by means of six things. (As we are unable to understand this,) we find it necessary to make out the idea of these things; and we can do so by using our intellect[1] (23).

NEED OF STUDY—It is by means of repeated study or practice that we can get the meaning of the principal word in this way; and we can get the result (or the real meaning) of the hymns by thinking over the same point again and again. But the composition of the sacred text is such that those who believe in the method of reducing words to their rudimentary form cannot fail to get the correct meaning; and in their case even constant practice is not necessary. A succession of ideas cannot be produced by means of constant practice, for they are produced by some other cause; and so we have to adopt some other way of understanding the text. Thus, it is not possible to have a uniform method of interpretation applicable to all cases (24-29).

[1] *Soma* refers to the mind, and it is the sixth in order after the five senses. Hence the six things required in a *Soma* sacrifice or the function of the mind are the senses and the mind.

AN ILLUSTRATION—(This may be illustrated by means of an example:) It is said that there is a special cause for kindling the sacred fire; but if a change is made in its subsidiary parts, an additional fee should be paid (to the priest)[1]; for that is how the statement is connected together. 30
If we understand how all this is arranged, (that is, if we understand the correct meaning of this), the rest will be in its proper place (30-31). 31

We find that a change is necessary (and it has to be made in the principal words); for it is only in what does not refer to the main subject that we have the option to do as we like. 32
When, however, a person is in doubt as to whether he should give up (omit) a particular course or not, both the options[2] may be open to him. 33 Thus the words *vāsa* and *vatsa*, though apparently different, may express the same idea. 34
We can understand their character by means of inference, when we shall find that the reason for these names lies in the close connection of their parts[3] (32-35). 35

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[1] It is not difficult to understand this: for *Agni* means the intellect, and so kindling the sacred fire refers to the function of the intellect. Similarly, *dakshiṇā* or "fee" is skill in action; and "payment" or *dāna* implies satisfaction. The real meaning would thus be as follows: "It is said that there is sometimes a special cause for the exercise of the intellect (kindling the sacrificial fire); but the action consists of a number of parts; and if it is necessary to make a change in any of these parts, we should see to it that the work is done with proper skill and gives satisfaction (an additional sacrificial fee should be paid)".

[2] The two options are that we may take the common meaning of a word or divide it into parts. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that both these options are possible in certain cases; and gives instances of the words *vāsa* and *vatsa* to explain the idea.

[3] The common meaning of *vāsa* is "clothes"; and of *vatsa* "a young one." These two meanings are apparently very different; but the *Mīmānsā* says that, if we divide these words into parts, we shall find that they are closely allied; and then we shall see, by means of inference, the reason for their common meanings too.

SPECIAL MEANINGS—If we wish to know the real meaning of the word *dāna* (gift), we should understand it through

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Accordingly, the word *vāsa—v, ā, sa*—means "(*sa*) the mind (*ā*) associated with (*v*) Nature"; while *vatsa—va, t, sa*—means" (*sa*) the mind associated with (*t*) the senses of action, and (*va*) Nature". We see that there is very little difference between the ideas they convey; for both refer to the association of the mind with the objects of Nature: only *vatsa* implies more of (the senses of) action.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that both the meanings of these words are correct and allied together; and that the idea of "clothes" and "young ones" is connected with the function of the mind and its association with the objects of Nature. Let us see how that can be made good.

If the common and "literal" meanings of these words are connected together, it means that a person should wear clothes, and have children, when his mind functions properly in association with the objects of Nature.

Now the attribute of the mind is desire; and we know that a man desires to live, and also to propagate his species,—for then he lives through his young ones again. The most elementary desires in connection with existence are food, shelter, and clothes; and a man shares the first two of these with the lower animals; and it is only the third,—wearing clothes—that distinguishes him from them. The art of making and wearing clothes is thus a distinguishing characteristic of a civilized man—though even savages cover their bodies in some sort of way. Wearing clothes may thus be said to symbolise a belief that certain desires,—over and above those for the barest existence—are good, and it is necessary to satisfy them. It implies, therefore, a belief in the necessity of performing good actions, which too is a distinguishing characteristic of a civilized man.

There are a number of references, to the wearing and removal of clothes in the sacred books; and they need all to be interpreted in this light. For instance, the attempt to remove the clothes of *Draupadī* in the story of the *Mahābhārata* is meant to illustrate the point of view of those who believe that it is not necessary to perform good actions,—for sooner or later all things must come to an end. The attempt fails, because this cannot be admitted; for that would mean that we must put an early end to our own life. The idea of *Kṛshṇa* taking away the clothes of the *Gopīs* in the story of the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa* has a similar significance; and the whole idea would be explained in its proper place.

It may be of interest to observe that this is the real explanation of

the effect (or result) it can produce[1] (36). 36

The real meaning of the word *pāka* (cooking) is obtained from what is done to *anna* or food[2] (37). 37

We can get the meaning of the word *abhighāraṇa* (sprinkling clarified butter on the fire) in the same manner[3] (38). 38

The rule in regard to *dravyas* (fundamental substances like the "elements", etc.) is that the meaning of the names should be obtained by means of their division into parts.[4] 39 If, however, the parts of names appear to be alike, we should get the meaning of the principal substance by using our intelligence (39-40). 40

RELATION OF PRINCIPAL WORD TO OTHER WORDS—When a word is placed in juxtaposition to the principal word,

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the difference between the *Digambara* and *Svetāmbara* schools of Jainism: the one believing that we should not, and the other that we should wear clothes. The real point of the *Digambara* school is that it is not necessary to perform even good actions if one wishes to make himself free from all association with Nature; while the *Svetāmbara* school holds otherwise.

The idea of having young ones has already been explained; and it is for this reason that the *Mīmānsā* tells us that one of the duties of a *Brāhmaṇa* or an intellectual person is to have children.

Thus we see how both the words *vāsa* and *vatsa* are closely connected with the desires of man or the function of his mind.

[1] The *Mīmānsā* has already explained that *dāna* or gift signifies satisfaction in action; and that is the reason why it is made. It produces a certain effect,—satisfaction—and so that is what it signifies.

[2] It is necessary to cook food; and that is signified by the word *pāka*: that is, it refers to the necessity of performing actions.

[3] We have seen that clarified butter refers to goodness; and sprinkling it over the fire is associating goodness with intelligence,—for that is what fire really means.

[4] The *Mīmānsā* has already told us that this is the way of getting the real meaning of *dravyas* or fundamental substances like the great "elements," time, space, mind and the soul.

its meaning should conform to the statement of the text. 41
But there may be some words which are not connected with the principal word, but have been spread over, and are connected with the rest of the text: we should assume that they too are in their proper place. With 42
regard to other words, which do not appear to conform to this rule,—they too are in their proper place, and do not contradict the rest of the text. Their meaning is easy to 43
understand, even like that of the common people; and their 44
place in the text corresponds to the idea of animals, which have their different characteristics. But there is no restric- 45
tion in regard to the use of the term (animal), because of uniformity[1] (among all) (41-46). 46

MEANING OF "GO" AND "DANA"—But the real meaning of the word "*go*" (cow) should be obtained by means of its division into parts;[2] and we feel convinced that that is 47
the correct way of getting it; and that is what is meant by 48
seeing through its "disguise". Similarly, the word *dāna* 49
should also be understood by means of its division into parts,[3] when it would be found to convey a

[1] The word *paśu* is applied to five kinds of animals,—men, cows, horses, goats, and sheep. They are different, and yet, says the *Mīmānsā*, they have certain common characterisics.

[2] If we divide the word "*go*" into parts,—*ga*, *u*—the meaning would be "(*ga*) the senses of knowledge, associated with (*u*) the senses of knowledge". The "*go*" or the "*cow*" accordingly refers to the senses in general and to those of knowledge in particular. We have already explained that the senses of knowledge are closely allied to those of action, and one of them—the tongue—is both a sense of knowledge and of action. Hence their ideas can be interchanged; and we can say that the "cow" refers to both the senses of knowledge and action, or to the sense of knowledge alone, as should suit the context.

[3] If we divide the word *dāna* into parts,—*d*, *ā*, *na*—the meaning

different idea from that of a "gift" (47-50). 50

CHARACTER OF CHANGE OF FORM OF A WORD—We change one meaning for another in the same manner as is popularly done when we purchase an article; and we can see for 51 ourselves that it is so when we divide words into parts. 52 The meaning of words should, however, be the same throughout, for otherwise we cannot understand them; 53 and that should be so even though they refer to different actions (51-54). 54

THE TEST OF CORRECTNESS—When, however, we buy or exchange one thing for another, we know that the two things are not absolutely equal, and they have different names. (On the other hand) the rule in regard to the interpretation of the Vedic text is not based strictly on the model of buying or exchange (for in this case, though one form is exchanged for another, the terms are equal and the names are the same): only it is necessary to use our intelligence, for they are special terms, and our criterion of correctness is the result that is achieved (55). 55

AN ILLUSTRATION: DHENU—An example of this is the word *dhenu* (meaning "a cow"). The meaning of the word *go* (a cow) is the same; and if we reduce the words to their rudimentary form, we shall find that they are similar too. We can make this change (divide *dhenu* into parts) in the same manner as we divide the word *ishṭi*

would be "(*d*) sacrifice (*ā*) associated with (*na*) the senses of knowledge"; and it would signify "the sacrifice or proper function of the senses of knowledge;" and the idea becomes different from that of a "gift".

into parts.[1] All such words are like that; and in the same manner the word *dakshiṇā* fits into the plan of the text, and means only one thing ("skill in action").[2] When we divide words into parts, we should use our intelligence in the process of making a change, so as to produce unity of result; and it is in this manner that we get a connection between the different meanings of a word in the light of the idea of different actions signified by it[3] (56-57). 56 57

TEST OF CORRECTNESS—These rules of interpretation do not depend on authority so much as on what they can

[1] We are told that if we divide the word *dhenu* in the same manner as the word *ishṭi*, we can get its correct meaning, and it will be found to be the same as that of the word *go*; and their common meaning is the same, *viz.*, a cow.

Now we can divide the word *ishṭi* into *ish*, *ṭ i*, when its meaning would be "(*ish*, 'to desire') desire, associated with (*ṭ*) the senses of knowledge and (*i*) the mind"; and that is the idea of desire it conveys.

We are asked to divide the word *dhenu* in the same manner,—that is into *dhe*, *n*, *u*,—when the meaning would be "(*dhe*, 'to nourish') nourishing (*n*) the senses of knowledge, associated with (*u*) the senses of knowledge". Thus we find that the word *dhenu*, when divided into parts, refers to the senses in general, and the senses of knowledge in particular, in the same way as the word *go*; and their meanings are also the same.

[2] Similarly the word *dakshiṇā*, which is a feminine form of *dakshiṇa*, has to be divided into, *daksh*, *i*, *ṇa*,—when its meaning would be "(*daksh*, 'to act to the satisfaction of') action performed to the satisfaction of (*i*) the mind and (*ṇa*) intellect"; and that is why it means skill in action, and is associated with *dāna*, which means satisfaction.

These are instances to explain this method of interpretation, where roots or verbs like *ish*, *dhe*, *daksh*, can be combined with other letters in the division of words into parts. But we are told that roots themselves are not to be subdivided.

[3] These examples explain how the common meanings of words are linked up with their real ones.

Brāhmaṇa.[1] The mistake committed by people in grasping this is the same as in the case of the word *hiraṇya*. But the difference between the idea of a horse and a cow is that the former is associated with an actor, because it can turn or wind about (more freely than a cow).[2] It is by means of this special symbol that we can obtain the meaning of the word. But this method of interpretation also makes a special claim, according to which, if we change the form of the word *aśva* (meaning a horse), we shall get its real meaning in the same manner as in the case of the word *hiraṇya*.[3] In the same way we can get

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[1] The common meaning of this would be that the gift of a cow or a horse is the same (or there is no difference between them), for both are to be given to a *Brāhmaṇa*.

But we know that the word "*go*" (cow) refers to the senses of knowledge, and a *Brāhmaṇa* to the intellect, while *dakshiṇā* means skill; and so the real meaning is that the idea of the senses as expressed by the word "*go*" (cow) is the same as that expressed by the word "*aśva*" (meaning a horse). That means that the horse also refers to the senses in the same manner as the cow, for both are associated with the intellect (*Brāhmaṇa*); and their "skill" in action is the same.

[2] The next *Sūtra*, however, tells us that there is also a difference between their idea: for the horse is associated with an actor,—that is, the senses are those of action, as distinguished from those of knowledge, with which the cow is associated; and we are able to make this distinction, because the horse can turn about more freely than a cow. Thus both the cow and the horse refer to the senses in general; but when we distinguish between them, the one refers to the senses of knowledge, and the other to those of action; and it is by means of this special symbol, says the *Mīmānsā*, that we can understand this distinction.

It may be of interest to point out that the *Upanishads* too tell us that the horse refers to the senses,—more specially those of action.

[3] We are asked to divide the word *aśva* into parts in the same manner as the word *hiraṇya* when, we are told, we shall get its real meaning as referring to the senses of action. We have seen that we have to divide the latter into all the letters composing it; and so we

the meaning of *Soma-chamasa*[1] (a cup for drinking *Soma*) (65-68). 68

Words for Animals—In this scheme of interpretation we have to change the form of all words denoting animals, if we cannot admit that they can be animals[2] (69). 69

Need for a Change of Form—It is possible to hold that there is nothing special in the giving of a gift to a *Brāhmaṇa*. But, if the gift is to be made in connection 70

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must do the same in case of *aśva* too (and if we divide it into *aś*, *va*, —as in the case of words like *ishṭi*, *dakshiṇā*, etc., we shall not be able to get any sense out of it).

Now if we divide the word *aśva* into *a*, *ś*, va,—the meaning would be "(*a*) like (*ś*) the senses of knowledge, associated with (*va*) Nature or *Prakṛti*"; and we know that what is "like" or resembles the senses of knowledge are the senses of action; and that is further indicated by the reference to Nature, the special attribute of which is action. This is how we can get the meaning of the word *aśva* (meaning a horse), as the senses of action.

[1] We are asked to divide the word *Soma-chamasa* in the same manner to get its meaning. We have seen that we have to divide the word *Soma* into *sa*, *u*, *ma* to get its meaning as "(*sa*) the mind associated with (*u*, *ma*) the senses"; and now we have to divide *chamasa* into *cha*, *ma*, *sa*, when the meaning would be "(*sa*) he who is (*ma*) the senses of knowledge, associated with (*cha*) the mind"; and so *chamasa* gives us the same idea as *Soma*. In this case the last part of the word (*sa*) means "he" in the same manner as "*ya*" does in *hiraṇya*; and that is why the two have been put in the same class. We can now understand why *chamasa* means "a cup for drinking *Soma*".

[2] It is not possible regard animals, so called, as animals, because their actions do not correspond to those of the latter. For instance, they all can speak,—monkeys, cranes, fish,—all. The monkey-chief, *Hanumān* knows the *Sanskṛt* language too. We are told that we must change the form of these words to understand their meaning. Indeed, we shall then find that their idea is very different. This has been explained in the story of the *Mahābhārata*, and will be found to be true in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Purāṇas* too.

with an act of sacrifice, it should not be in connection with a prohibited act. (Since, however, it is to be made in connection with the latter too,) that is the reason why the meaning of the word *dakshiṇā* has to be obtained by means of division into parts.[1] Thus, when there is this kind of defect in the character of a *Brāhmaṇa*, it becomes necessary to make a change in the form of a word. That is so because we get a meaning bearing on the misdeeds of men, whereas the idea of *dakshiṇā* (or sacrificial fee) is always associated with excellence of design or plan (70-73). 71 72 73

DAKSHINA AND ADHVARYU PRIEST—Thus, when there is a mention of the *Adhvaryu* priest in connection with a sacrifice, the form of the word *dakshiṇā* should always be changed.[2] Indeed, as all kinds of *dakshiṇā* are produced 74

[1] When we understand the real idea of a prohibited act and of *dakshiṇā*, we shall understand why there is no objection to giving *dakshiṇā* in connection with such an act too.

As the *Mīmānsā* tells us in the course of these pages, a prohibited act is one which should not be done because of the obstalces in its way; but there can be no real objection to a man attempting to do even the impossible and showing skill in it too. Hence, as *dakshiṇā* means skill in action, a person may get recognition for his skill even in an action believed to be impossible.

But if we take the meaning in its ordinary sense, a *Brāhmaṇa* or a good man is shown to be of shady character, for doing prohibited things; and he who gives him *dakshiṇā* on such occasion is equally so. But if we understand the meaning of a *Brāhmaṇa* as an intelligent person, of prohibited action as an action full of obstacles, and of *dakshiṇā* as skill in action,—the whole idea would be changed, and we shall find everything to be in its proper place.

As *dakshiṇā* means "skill in action", it is always associated with "excellence of design or plan".

[2] We have seen that the *Adhvaryu* "priests" refer to the senses of knowledge and action; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that whenever there

by the intellect, the share of the *Adhvaryu* is of a restricted kind[1] (74-75). 75

PART IV

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

The meaning of seeing through the "disguise" of a word is that we should reduce it to its rudimentary form, connect the parts together, and understand its real meaning (1-5). We can understand the meaning of all the *Prajāpatis* in this manner: only we must not import our own ideas in the matter (6-12), for there is a unity of idea underlying the "disguised" form of words (13-15).

In certain *Sāman* hymns it is not necessary to change the form of words to understand their meaning; in a number of others, however, it is (16-20).

In the *Pavamāna* hymns sung at the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice, it is necessary to change the form of words: we are also permitted to make a change at our discretion. The words used are quite new, and the method of interpretation depends on the nature of the text; and the only test is that we should be able to understand the text properly (21-25).

When we divide a word into parts, the word itself should remain intact; but there should be no change in its form if it makes good sense otherwise (26-29).

The word *budh* needs to be understood in a special manner (30). If it is stated that there should be no change in the form of the name of a god, no change should be made (31-32).

We have to use our intelligence in interpreting the text, specially if there is a conflict of opinion (33-38). Certain ideas have been expressed by means of similes and metaphors (39); and the "purification" or correct form of a word really means that it is being expressed more exactly than before,—that is, by means of division into parts (40-41).

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is a reference to their taking part in a sacrifice or a good and intelligent action, we should assume that they would act with skill, and so they should be paid their *dakshiṇā* in recognition of it; and if we change the form of the word into *daksh*, *i*, *ṇā*, we shall know that it refers to skill.

[1] All kinds of skill (*dakshiṇās*) are produced by the intellect; and so the share of the senses can only be of a limited character. Hence the *Adhvaryu*, who refers to the senses, can get or claim only a small share of *dakshiṇā*.

In the hymns of the *Rig Veda* beginning with the word *Manotā*, the form of words should not be changed (42). We can understand the meaning of words in different ways; and in certain cases from the effect they produce (43-47).

We should be able to get the idea of a god from a strophe consisting of three verses (48). Planets too are a kind of gods; and in some cases the form of their words should not be changed (49). But we need to use our intelligence to understand their idea (50).

All things exist for the sake of others, except the soul, which exists for the sake of its own self. This is expressed by means of the invocation of the gods, who represent the great powers of Nature; and we can understand their idea from the fundamental substances themselves (51-54).

The idea of *dadhi* (curd) is important, and we can understand it if we divide the word into parts: so too in the case of the word *ājya* (clarified butter) (55-57).

Where the form of a word is changed, there is an implication that it has not been clearly expressed in its original form. But this may not be so; and we may change its form because it has been stated that we should do so (58-59).

CRITERION OF CORRECTNESS—If the symbols[1] used in the rudimentary form of a word are not properly connected together,—far from getting a proper idea of action,—we shall get confused more and more. The rule in regard (1) to the connection of these symbols is that the change made in the form of a word should correspond exactly to its rudimentary form[2]; and in every case we should be able to understand (2) more and more of what is taught in the sacred books by means of this rudimentary form. There is unanimity (3) of opinion on this point; and this is the meaning (4) of seeing through the "disguise" (1-5). (5)

[1] These symbols are the letters and syllables which compose the original word,—the parts into which it can be divided.

[2] The point of this is that when we alter the form of a word by dividing it into its parts, there should be no change in the contents of the word: for instance, when we divide the word *pṛshṭha* into parts, we cannot have it as *Pra-stha* (as is often done), but only as *Pṛ-shṭha*. Similarly, *Kṛshṇa* must remain as *K*, *ṛ*, *sh*, *ṇa*, and not as *K*, *ra*, *sh*, *ṇa*; and so on.

AN INSTANCE: PRAJAPATIS—This is true in respect of what relates to the *Prajāpatis* (lords of creatures), as we find from what is handed down in the sacred books; and we 6 can understand their meaning if we see through their "disguised" form.[1] If we are able to fix upon their correct 7 meaning, we shall find that it is like arrows that have hit their mark,—for such is the connection of the symbols used in the rudimentary form of these words. If, on the 8 other hand, we are unable to do so, the whole idea would become redundant; and then we shall have to get at the 9 correct meaning by means of some other connection. We 10 cannot say that the idea of *Prajāpatis* corresponds to that of a pre-sacrifice (or desire), because they have a different meaning[2] (6-12). 11_12

[1] *Prajāpati* means literally "lord of creatures"; and the term is applied to a number of gods,—Sun, *Soma*, *Agni*, *Indra*, etc. in the Vedas. In later times it is applied to *Vishṇu*, *Siva*, Time, etc. It is also used specially in connection with the ten "lords of creatures" created by *Brahmā*, *viz.*, *Marīchi*, *Atri*, *Angiras*, *Pulastya*, *Pulaka*, *Kratu*, *Vasishṭha*, *Daksha* or *Prachetas*, *Bhṛgu*, and *Nārada*. It would obviously be impossible to divide all these names into parts to explain their meaning: for the *Mīmānsā* says that this is what we must do to understand their idea. It would be enough to mention that the *Mīmānsā* is dealing with the Vedas; and so would refer to the idea of the *Prajāpatis*, as they are mentioned in the Vedas,— *Soma*, *Agni*, *Indra*, etc.; and the meanings of all these gods can be obtained by means of dividing these names into parts (Cf.MM.I, Chapter IX). But the meaning of all other names of *Prajāpatis*, even in later times, can be obtained in the same manner; for the same method of interpretation applies to all the sacred books throughout. The meaning of the ten *Prajapātis* created by *Brahmā* would be explained in connection with the story of that god in due course.

[2] The word in the text is *prayāja*, which is said to mean a "pre-sacrifice"; but, as has already been explained, it refers to desire, which precedes action,—for that is the meaning of sacrifice.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the idea of *Prajāpatis* is not identical with that of desire, for they have a different meaning. As the *Parjāpatis*

THE TEST OF CORRECTNESS—There is a unity of idea underlying the "disguised" form of words, and we can understand them if we change their original or common form. 13
But if we resort to some other way of interpreting them, the whole idea would become redundant. If, on the other 14
hand, we grasp them correctly, we can understand the whole idea (13-15). 15

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS METHOD—In the *Sāman* hymns, because of the different (or special) circumstances of the sacred text, no alteration in the language is allowed.[1] 16
But if in these hymns we are unable to understand the meaning, and something is left out (or obscure), we should make a change in the common form of words; and that will enable 17
us to understand the meaning of all words without exception. In the case of one set of these hymns, however, we 18
can get a proper meaning from the text as it is; and it is not necessary to make any change in the common form of words (16-19). 19

would refer to the gods of the Vedas, their idea is obviously different; for *Agni*, for instance, refers to the intellect. *Soma* refers to the mind, and is associated with the idea of desire; but not all *Prajāpatis*. The same is the case with their names in later literature: for instance, *Marīchi* refers to desire; and *Atri*, (*A-tri*) means "he who is like the mind"; but the idea of others is different.

[1] We have been told that, as a general rule, all *Sāman* hymns, which are intended to be sung, contain words the form of which has to be changed. We are now told that certain *Sāman* hymns contain matter of a special kind; and it is not necessary to change the form of words or make any alteration in the language. But even in these hymns, if we are unable to understand the meaning, we can change the form of words. The author then goes on to explain that there is a general rule in connection with the interpretation of these hymns, based on the kind of words used in the text. If they are long and sound pleasing to the car, no change should be made in their form; in another case, we may make a change.

A GENERAL RULE—There is a general rule in connection with the interpretation of these hymns. Where the words are long and give pleasure in their utterance, we can get an excellent meaning out of them as they are. Where, however, this is not the case, the form of words expressing the idea of fundamental substances (*dravyas*) should be changed. With regard to the rest, we should make a change only when we do not understand the meaning (20). 20

SPECIAL CASES: PAVAMANA HYMNS—(There are, however, some special cases.) In the *Pavamāna* hymns, sung at the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice, it is necessary to change the form of words; and we are also permitted to insert an additional word or to remove one according to our judgement.[1] The 21 words in this text are quite new, and the method of interpretation depends on the nature of the text,—for that is the 22 rule. But so far as the result is concerned, there is only 23 one rule,—namely, that we should understand the text properly; for that is the reason why we hear of (or read) these books everywhere; and the same names occur in the 24 whole mass of later works, because we can get their real meaning from their rudimentary forms[2] (21-25). 25

[1] We have observed that *Jyotishṭoma* refers to the mass or rays of light; and, as it is a matter of science, the knowledge of which is not stationary, we are permitted, says the *Mīmānsā*, to make certain additions and alterations. As we have explained, the number of these was at first only three, and then was increased to four, five, and finally seven. This would show that the knowledge of these rays was changing from time to time in those days; and the ancients came finally to the conclusion that there were seven such rays (See Appendix II).

[2]. A large number of names which occur in the Vedas are repeated in later works; and that is so because they refer to ideas and have the same meaning throughout. The *Mīmānsā* tells us how we can understand them.

APPLICATION OF THIS METHOD—When we wish to understand the meaning of a word by dividing it into parts, we should see that the word itself remains intact, and all its parts are put together. But we should not make any change 26 in its form if it makes good sense as it is. Similarly, if a word 27 does not make any sense from the very beginning, we should deal with it as we have been enjoined to do (that is, divide it into parts). But if, in spite of this, it conveys no intelligent idea, the rule regarding its division into parts would be valueless. Again, when objects fit into one another from the 28 very beginning, there should be no change in the form of words, because they and their meaning agree (26-29). 29

SPECIAL CASES—(Certain expressions have to be understood in a special way: for instance,) a word containing the root *budh*[1] has to be understood in a special manner, like words in the *Pavamāna* hymns, because there is a special instruction to that effect. Again, when we are specially told that 30 there should be no change in the form of the name of a god, no change should be made. If, however, we adopt a differ- 31 ent method in regard to such a word occurring in a certain passage of the Vedas, and reduce it to its rudimentary form, it would not make any sense (30-32). 32

In case of conflict of opinion (we have to exercise our intelligences, for,) as has already been stated, there can be no rules to guide us in such a matter. But if there is a con- 33 flict of opinion in regard to the meaning of the name of a god, the character of whose actions we know,—specially

[1] The root *budh* has a large number of meanings; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that we have to use our judgement in selecting that which suits the context; and we have the same latitude in this case as in that of the *Pavamāna* hymns, referred to in the preceding *Sūtras* (21-25).

as in the case of *Agni*,—we should reject all other forms of the name, and interpret it as we know it.[1] If, however, there is agreement of opinion, arising as a result of inference drawn from circumstances,—we should fix the meaning of the name in the light of actions performed by that god (33-35).

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Where it is possible to divide a name into parts, but its meaning has specially been defined, without reference to these parts,—what has already been stated should be done (that is, we should not divide it into parts, but accept the meaning as defined); and this should be done specially where such words refer to a single action. If there is a reference to a supplementary action (or sacrifice), it should come at the end of the previous action; for there it can serve a useful purpose, and we can get a connected meaning by dividing it into parts (36-38).

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USE OF SIMILES—(Certain ideas are expressed by means of similes: for instance,) when a word has been pronounced, it cannot be recalled: so too is an action; and it may be compared to the action of a sword. That is another rule in this connection (39).

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PURPOSE OF "PURIFICATION" OF WORDS—The "purification" or correct formation of words is for the purpose of enabling

[1] *Agni*, as has already been explained, refers to the intellect; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that wherever we have such definitions of words, we should not depart from them in any case. We have a number of such definitions in the sacred books: for instance, *Indra* has been defined to mean *Prajñātman* or the self-conscious soul; and that is how he should always be interpreted. We shall of course have to bear in mind the exact idea of the self-conscious soul, to be able to understand all the actions of *Indra* described in the sacred books,—from the Vedas downwards.

us to understand the meaning of such statements. It is possible to say that this is not a case of "purification" at all, for what is done is to express more clearly (or properly) what is not clear otherwise,—and that is done by means of the meaning of parts (40-41). 40 41-41a

CERTAIN HYMNS OF RIG VEDA—(In any case, certain expressions have to be interpreted in a particular manner: for instance,) in the hymns of the *Rig Veda*, beginning with the word *Manotā*, there should be no change in the form of words, because there is a special direction to that effect. Again, if there is a word, the meaning of which is important, but different from what, on mature consideration has already been appoved by our intellect[1], we should not accept it, unless it has occurred in a previous context too, and has been understood by means of the method of division into parts. Indeed, from all that has been stated in the text, we should be able to get at the source of what we want somewhere. We may not be able to say that the whole idea is as clear as that of the word *yūpa*[2] (a sacri- 42 43 44

[1] The word in the text is *Rathantara*, which is said to be a form of *Agni*; and *Agni*, as we have seen, refers to the intellect.

[2] The *Mīmānsā* describes the meaning of *yūpa* (or a sacrificial post) as follows:—

"If no particular object is secured when an action takes place, it should be deemed to have been done for the benefit of all, because it has been done at its own time. This is represented by the *yūpa* (sacrificial post), because it is not fixed at the time of action" (XI, iii, 2-4).

We can now understand how the idea of *yūpa* can be obtained by means of its "connection with action", as we are told here.

As *yūpa* means selfless action or action meant for the benefit of all, the idea of "being tied to a *yūpa*" is that a person should act in this manner; and it is for this reason that it is said that he who desires heaven (happiness) should "bind" himself to a *yūpa* made of *khādira* (or function of the mind).

ficial post), because it can be understood from its connection with action. But where there are two possible ways of looking at a thing, we can understand its idea from the effect it produces as surely as we can by reducing a word to its rudimentary form (42-47). 45-46 47

IDEA OF A GOD AND THE PLANETS—Similarly, we should be able to get the idea of a god from a strophe consisting of three verses, without dividing the word into parts. The planets are another type of gods,[1] and there are *stotra* and *śastra* hymns,—to be sung and recited—in their praise. They refer to action; and there should be no change in the form of these words. But we have to use our intelligence to understand their idea,—just as in the case of curdled butter we know that there is curd in it, and it is the result of the union or mixing together of two things,—curd and butter. Even so if we examine the text carefully, and consider the statement of what has taken place, we shall know the implications of it, although there is no specific mention of anything (48-50). 48 49 50

OBJECT OF ACTION: HOW REPRESENTED: SOUL AND THE GODS—Certain things exist for their own sake, and not for the sake of something else; and their idea is represented by the soul or "the master of the sacrifice".[2] But certain 51

[1] We have already been told that the gods represent the great powers of Nature. The planets are such powers too,—and so they are described as gods.

The terms of praise used in honour of the planets are said to refer to their actions; but we have to use our intelligence to understand the idea, in the same manner as we understand the nature of curdled butter.

[2] The "master of the sacrifice" is the soul, for whose sake the

other things exist for the sake of others; and their idea is expressed by means of invocation of the gods.[1] But we cannot understand all this from the "purification" of words or their division into parts, but rather from the names of the *dravyas* or the fundamental substances themselves (51-54). 52 53 54

Dadhi—There are passages in the Vedas where *dadhi*[1] (curd) has been described as a protector of *ājya* (clarified butter); and we can understand the idea if we divide the word into parts. It is only reasonable that we should do so, because the idea of *ājya* is important. The idea of *dadhi* is important too, because it is connected with *ājya* both at the beginning and the end. But the idea of *ājya* is also important; and there is a statement to the effect that 55 56

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different *Ritvij* priests (or the faculties of man) take part in the sacrifice (or action).

All these act for the sake of the soul or the "master"; but the soul acts for its own sake,—its "purification" or perfection through experience. This is explained in the *Sāṅkhya*, and accepted by all systems.

[1] The great powers of Nature (or Nature itself) act for the sake of others,—not their own; and so the gods, who represent them, are invoked at a sacrifice to show how the forces of Nature work in the world.

The *Sāṅkhya* tells us that the actions of *Prakṛti* or Nature are all meant for the sake of the soul; and when the latter has had experience of all that is in Nature, the bond between them breaks, and the soul becomes for ever free.

[2] The common meaning of *dadhi* is curd, and of *ājya* clarified butter; and when it is said that *dadhi* is the protector of *ājya*, because it comes both at the beginning and end of *ājya*,—the common meaning is that, as we make clarified butter out of curd, there is curd or *dadhi* at the beginning of clarified butter or *ājya*: then we find that after clarified butter has been made out of curd, some remnants of curd are left still; and so there is curd at the end of clarified butter too; and it is in this metaphorical sense that we can call curd

the meaning of the word should be obtained by means of division into parts[1]; and that is what is meant by "purification" or correct formation of a word (55-57). 57

REASON FOR DIVISION OF A WORD INTO PARTS—When the form of a word is changed, there is an implication that its idea has not been clearly expressed in its original or common

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the "protector" of clarified butter, because like a "protector" it is to be found both at its beginning and end.

But we have seen that the real meaning of *ājya* is "goodness"; and so *dadhi* must have a bearing on this idea. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we can get the real meaning of the word by dividing it into parts.

The word *dadhi*,— *da*, *dh*, *i*— would accordingly mean "(*da*) sacrifice associated with (*dh*) the mind, functioning as (*i*) mind"; that is, the action of the mind as pure mind, having desire for its attribute.

Now *ājya* is goodness associated with the function of the mind, and desire and goodness are closely allied; for every desire has an element of goodness in it,—so far at least as the person who has the desire is concerned; for no one can desire anything that will do harm to his own self. Indeed, it is meant to give him some kind of satisfaction, pleasure, or good.

Now, as it is the mind that creates desire, which has this element of goodness in it, *dadhi*, which means the proper function (sacrifice) of the mind (or desire), comes before *ājya* or goodness.

Again, we have been told that desire is at the root of action; and when one action ends, some desire still remains; and that is the cause of a succeeding action. Thus we might say that there is an element of *dadhi* (function of the mind or desire) after *ājya* (goodness or a good deed) once more. We may also say that *dadhi* "protects" *ājya* even as a proper function of the mind or a proper desire can protect goodness.

[1] It is in this manner that we can understand the real meaning of the text. We have already explained that the meaning of the word *ājya* has to be obtained by dividing it into parts. It has first to be reduced to *aja*, and then divided into *a*, *ja*, when we shall get its real meaning as goodness.

form. But it may not be so; and we may divide it into parts because there is a direction to the effect that we should do so (58-59). 58 59

PART V

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

When we divide a word into parts, some parts which have the same meaning may be dropped (1-5). We may begin with the first part and go on successively to the last; or, when so directed, begin with the last, and go back to the first (6). This is illustrated in a set of strophes consisting of three verses, where there is a description of what a man desires to do at mid-day (7-11).

The rule in regard to the expression of new ideas is that there should be a "disguise"; but when we see through it, the meaning should be clear, and there should be no doubt about it (12-14). The meaning of principal words is obtained by means of division into parts; of their synonyms without it; while with regard to the rest, we should change their form if their meaning does not appeal to reason (15). But it is necessary to have knowledge to be able to understand the meaning of some synonyms; while in some cases we may have to "negotiate" their meaning, though not in the case of the best synonyms (16-25).

Apart from certain "improvements", the text of the *Rig Veda* is the same as that of the *Sāma Veda*; and the repetition of certain parts is meant to complete our chain of reflection. In certain hymns this repetition is made by means of words which need to be divided into parts, but not in others; and in any case we must judge the whole thing by the results achieved (26-33).

The number sixteen refers to the mind, but not to its complete action (34-40), which can be understood only when the mind functions in association with the intellect (41-43). That is expressed by the number three; and that is how we distinguish between the two numbers (44-48). But the word *tra* ("three") does not always refer to the mind; it does so only in certain cases (49-54).

The number four signifies complete or full development (55-57).

We have an account of all that relates to living creatures in the *Sāma Veda*; but in its absence we may refer to the *Rig Veda*, which contains it too. It is important to understand the meaning of the principal words; and that will enable us to understand the rest (58-61).

If we know what *Indra* and *Vāyu* mean, we shall understand that they are inseparable, though they have their own special characteristics (62-66); and, as their connection is important, it is expressed by means of the word *agra*, which means "chief, foremost". The importance of their connection is proved by the fact that when they leave the body, it decays (67-74); and when they abide in it, it cannot (75-76).

If we examine the function of the mind, as represented by the number three, we shall find that it is like that of the intellect; but the latter is more important, because it can create order out of disorder by means of reasoning or proof, provided there is unity of action (77-82).

The idea of the number three and eleven is the same, and they can be substituted for each other (83-84); and this enables us to understand the idea of the number thirty-three, which is a multiple of the two (85-87).

All desires undergo a change through lapse of time; and so do words, expressing this idea, a change of form (88).

OMISSION OF CERTAIN PARTS OF WORDS—When a number of things are mentioned in succession and we have to make a choice in a particular place, those that come last are rejected, as in the case of a meaningless letter or syllable. 1 That has to be done when we see through the "disguise" of an expression; because otherwise there would be a doubt 2 in regard to its correct idea where more than one part has the same meaning in succession[1] (1-3). 3

RULE OF COMPOSITION AND INTERPRETATION—There is a rule sanctioned by tradition that the subordinate part of a word should come at its end; and the proof of this cal- 4 culation lies in the meaning we are able to obtain. When 5 we explain the meaning of a word by means of its division into parts, we should commence with the first part first,

[1] An instance of this is the word *Soma* or *dadhi*. When we divide *Soma* into *sa*, *u*, *ma*, both *u* and *ma* refer to the senses of knowledge; and unless one of them may be said to refer to the senses of action too, it has to be omitted. Similarly, in the case of *dadhi*,—*da*, *dh*, *i*— both *dh* and *i* refer to the mind; and, unless we specially emphasise the idea of the mind, the last one has to be omitted.

because that is how it begins. If, however, we begin with the last part first, we should do so when there is a direction to that effect (4-6). 6

AN INSTANCE—(An instance of this is to be found in) a set of strophes consisting of three verses, where there is a description of what a person desires to do at mid-day,—and it is a perfectly reasonable desire. To begin with, 7 we get this from the propriety of the manner of life at midday; and, as for the rest, we understand the idea from inference: for instance, we desire to halt or encamp at 8 mid-day; and the idea of this can be obtained by reducing words to their rudimentary form, at the very beginning 9 of the verse-triad. In one place there is a reference to 10 the letting of a dwelling place, for that is the right thing to do at the time (7-11). 11

RULE REGARDING NEW IDEAS—There is, among the rules we have, a fixed rule in regard to the peculiar characteristics of things,—namely, that where there is a new idea to express, it should be done by means of a "disguise"; and 12 when we see through this "disguise", the meaning should be as clear as that of the word *rātri*[1] ("night"). But 13 when altogether new names are used, there is likely to be a doubt as to their correct meaning,—because they must all have a proper meaning to convey (12-14). 14

SYNONYMS AND OTHER WORDS—When there are a number of additional names or synonyms used in their common

[1] *Rātri* means "night", and is one of the few words in *Sanskṛt* with a small number of meanings, which are clearly defined, and have all a bearing on the idea of night.

form, we should be able to get their meaning without making any change in that form. With regard to the principal names, which have these synonyms, we should get their meaning by means of their parts. With regard to the rest, we should change their form only if they are obscure (or their meaning does not appeal to reason) (15). [15]

NEED OF KNOWLEDGE—In case we are unable to understand the meaning of synonyms, we should acquire more knowledge, when we shall be able to understand them. [16] We shall then find that these names have an individuality of their own, because of certain arrangement of ideas expressed by them,—which are objective or refer [17] to the outside world; and we can get their meaning with- [18] out making any change in their utterance. It is possible [19] to hold that we should do all this only if the meaning is obscure (or opposed to reason),—for meaning is the measuring rod of all rules of interpretation. But in the case [20-21] of synonyms we do not have the same orderly arrangement as in the original names; and we have to "negotiate" [22] their meaning in order to conform to the latter. This, [23] however, is not necessary in the case of the best synonyms, which contain the idea of the original names in [24-25] themselves (16-25).

TEXT OF RIG VEDA AND SAMA VEDA—Apart from certain "improvements", the text of the *Rig Veda*, as fixed by tradition, should be the same as that of the *Sāma Veda*; [26] and the idea of repetition is to complete our reasoning or chain of reflection. In the *Sāmidhenī* verses, (which are recited when the sacrificial fire is kindled, and so refer to the commencement of intelligent action), this repetition is made by means of words which have to be divided into

parts to be understood. This, however, may not be true of all; but the peculiar character of these verses is such that they have a number of words which have to be reduced to their rudimentary form in order to complete their chain of thought. However, as has already been stated, the method of interpretation is to be judged by the measure of the result that is achieved,—even as in all other things we judge as we see. We cannot say that this applies to action too, because there is a rule which enjoins otherwise[1] (26-33). 27 28-29 30 31 32-33

THE IDEA OF NUMBERS: NO. 16—(It is necessary to understand the idea of certain numbers in this connection: for instance,) we can understand the idea of that which consists of sixteen parts by means of a certain change; and that, in this case, refers to a statement of all these parts.[2] We have to do this, because the rudimentary form of the word makes no sense; and it does not refer to the idea of a sacrifice (or action)[3], where we can reduce a word to its rudimentary form only if we are specially directed to do so; and we can understand this if we reduce (such an expression) to its rudimentary form. This number occurs in the sacred books, and we study them in order to reason about or reflect on things exhaustively; and it has already been stated that they do not make much sense. When, however, we say that this number does not refer to action, 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

[1] An action is to be judged more by its motive than its actual result; and a motive cannot be seen.

[2] The number sixteen consists of the five great "elements", their five properties, and the five senses of knowledge,—with the mind making sixteen.

[3] It does not refer to action, because it does not contain any reference to the senses of action.

what is meant is that it refers to its subordinate part;[1] for we can understand the idea of sacrifice (or action) only when the mind functions in association with the intellect;[2] and that is why it is expressly mentioned that such actions are worthy of praise (34-43). 41 42 43

No. 3—It has expressly been mentioned that the number three refers to *Soma*[3] (or the mind); and unless there is a reference to some expected result, it should be deemed to refer to that (*Soma* or the mind); and it has been praised for a variety of reasons. As the function of the mind is closely connected with that of the intellect, the mind may be identified with the intellect, when it is concentrated on a particular point or place[4] (and it is 44 45 46

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[1] But the senses of knowledge perform a kind of action too,—only it is of a subsidiary character; and as the number sixteen refers to them, it is associated with a subordinate kind of action.

[2] The word in the text is *āgrayaṇa*, which means "the first *Soma* libation at the *Agnishṭoma* sacrifice". As *Soma* refers to the mind, and *Agni* to the intellect, this has been rendered as "the function of the mind (*Soma* libation) in association with that of the intellect (*Agnishṭoma* sacrifice)". We have already seen that it is only when the intellect plays its own part that an action can be complete.

[3] We have already explained that *Soma* refers to the mind.

[4] The literal translation of the *Sūtra* (47) is as follows:—

"And because of *āgrayaṇa*, the direction of the word (number three),—because of its signifying a particular point or place,—is like the renewal of the sacred fire".

We have explained that *āgrayaṇa* means "the first *Soma* libation at the *Agnishṭoma* sacrifice", and so refers to the function of the mind (*Soma*) in connection with that of the intellect (*Agnishṭoma*). Again, as fire refers to the intellect, the "renewal of the sacred fire" would mean the renewal of the function of the intellect. The real meaning of the *Sūtra* would accordingly be as follows:—

"And because the function of the mind is linked up with that of the intellect (*āgrayaṇa*), the direction of the word (the number three, or the mind), when it signifies a particular point or place, is like that of the renewal of the function of the intellect".

this that is represented by the number three). We have to make a distinction between the idea of the two numbers (three and sixteen), because they have common properties,[1] —(and that is how it is made) (44-48). 47 48

OTHER USES OF THE WORD TRA (THREE)—The number three (idea of the mind) is praised in the sacred books because of its connection with *Agnishṭoma* (or the function of the intellect);[2] but this does not mean that whenever the syllable *tra* (meaning "three") occurs, it conveys the same idea: for instance, we have it in the word *śastra* (*śas-tra*),[3] and in this case the idea of "*tra*" is very different. But even the word *śastra* is worthy of praise because of its association with "*tra*"; and we can understand what it means when we see through its "disguise"[4] (49-51). 49 50 51

[1] The number three refers to the mind as being, for practical purposes, identified with the intellect, and so with action; while the number sixteen does not refer to action, as the *Mīmānsā* has told us: that is the distinction between them.

[2] There are a number of references to the number three in the sacred books, and it should always be understood to refer to the mind as closely allied to the intellect.

[3] The word *śastra* means "a sword"; and its syllable "*tra*" is derived from the root "*trai*" which means "to protect". *Sastra* (*śas-tra*) accordingly means " (*tra*) a protector of (*śas*, 'to kill') what kills"; that is, something that enables us to slay; and so it means "a knife or sword".

[4] "Seeing through a disguise" means dividing the whole word into parts; and so if we divide the word *śastra* into *śa*, *s*, *t*, *ra*,— the meaning would be "(*śa*) the senses of knowledge, associated with (*s*) the mind, and (*t*, *ra*) the senses of action". The word *śastra* refers, therefore, to the function of the senses of knowledge and action in association with the mind, and so it is a complete function of both. Thus when we speak of *śastra* as"a knife or a sword", it really means an argument relating to the character of this function, which can "cut" like a knife or a sword.

The difference between the two forms of "*tra*"[1] is due to the different statements made in the text. The syllable "*tra*" also occurs in the word *ati-rātra*;[2] but there it does not refer to these meanings of "*tra*"; though there may be a connection between them, which can be understood with reference to a statement which has not yet been made[3] (52-54). 52 53 54

No. 4—(The number four signifies completeness or full development; and so) we are told that on the fourth day we should take hold of the whole or the most perfect thing. We can verify this by examining the development of things, and see how results take shape,—as in the case

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The word *śastra* gives us another instance of a redundant letter (*ra*) which has the same meaning as the preceding one (*t*), and needs to be omitted.

[1] The two meanings of "*tra*" have already been explained in connection with the word *śastra*.

[2] The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the syllable *tra* in *ati-rātra* has to be taken differently; though even in this case it may have a reference to the mind, in conncetion with a subject that has not been dealt with in these pages. Let us see what that means.

Ati-rātra is said to be a part of the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice; but, as we have explained, the latter refers really to the mass of rays of light, of which *ati-rātra* is only one. It means " (*ati*) beyond (*rātra*) the night"; and so would correspond to the ultra-violet ray (See Appendix II). In the circumstances we have to take the word *rātra* as a whole word, and not divide it into parts; and so the syllable "*tra*" in it would not refer to the mind or (*t*, *ra*) the function of the senses.

[3] But the *Mīmānsā* says that even here the "*tra*" of "*rātra*" may be connected with the idea of the mind, in which case the meaning of *ati-rātra*,—*ati*, *r*, *ā*, *tra*—would be "(*ati*) beyond (*r*) the senses of action (*ā*) associated with (*tra*) the mind"; and so it refers to something that is beyond the character of the functions of the senses and the mind.

As *ati-rātra* is said to refer to a ray of light, we can make sense of its association with the function of the senses and the mind only if

of eating food.[1] But if we count this number (as one, two, three, four,) we cannot find the idea of completeness or wholeness in it; and that is so because this meaning of the number is to be found in a special way;[2] and then we should be able to count (the four stages of development)

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the latter refer to certain energies; and we are told that the energy of the mind is electric, while that of the senses magnetic; and so the association of the two gives us electro-magnetic energy (or electric energy in motion or action). The word *ati-rātra* would thus refer to something that is beyond or more powerful than electro-magnetic energy; and, as it refers to ultra-violet light, it implies that that is the character of the latter too. It follows from this that *rātra* or night has electro-magnetic properties.

[1] We have already explained that the number four refers to four stages of development in all states of life, beginning with the organic cell. We can think of four stages in eating food too: the materials, which must be prepared as food; then they must come to us as our share, to be finally eaten as food.

[2] We have explained the special manner in which the idea of the number four can be obtained. We can understand that it refers to completeness or the different stages of development when we examine it with reference to the development of the organic cell. We find that the cell passes through four stages to become mature; and, as the ancients say that whatever is in the cell is also in the whole universe (*Yathā piṇḍe tathā Brahmāṇḍe*), we may conclude that it is a law of universal application.

This would enable us to understand the idea of the "four arms" of certain gods and goddesses to which there is a reference in the sacred books. As the number four signifies completeness or perfection, and as arm is an instrument of action, "four arms" would express the idea of perfection of action; and when they are associated with a god or goddess who, as we have seen, represents the idea of a great force of Nature working in accordance with a good and intelligent law, they imply perfection in the working out of that law. Thus the four arms of *Kṛshṇa* would convey the idea of God as a perfect actor, who acts and yet is free from the bondage of action, because all His actions are a sacrifice: and we see that this is what the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us about *Kṛshṇa*.

too, as in the case of eating food[1] (55-57). 57

SUBJECT-MATTER OF SAMA VEDA AND RIG VEDA—We have an account of all that relates to living creatures in the *Sāma Veda* or *Sāman* hymns; but in its absence, we may refer to the *Rig Veda*; and that is the reason why the *Sāma Veda* is regarded as important.[2] Whatever is in the *Rig* 58 *Veda* is also in the *Sāma Veda*. If, however, there is something of special importance, it may occur in a different form; but it must have the same meaning, which is regu- 59 lated by the principal word. When we remove the cause 60 of difficulty in the way (that is, understand the meaning of the principal word), we shall be able to understand the whole idea of action in an intelligent manner (58-61). 61

[1] When we understand all this, we can count the four stages in connection with eating food; and this has already been explained.

[2] The importance of the *Sāma Veda* has been emphasised in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, where *Kṛshṇa* says,

"Of Vedas I am *Sāma Veda*" (BhG. X, 22); and we can now understand the reason for it.

In this connection we have already referred to the range of all the four Vedas: the *Rig Veda* deals with the problem of action, conceived in its widest significance and embracing the whole world of Nature. The range of the *Sāma Veda* is more restricted, as it deals with the problem of living creatures; but all that relates to them is to be found in both the *Rig* and *Sāma Vedas*. Then the *Yajur Veda* is said to deal with the problem of Sacrifice, which is a moral and intelligent action. The idea of action in the *Rig Veda* is a much wider one, as it includes *all* kinds of action, and not merely action conceived as a sacrifice. The *Yajur Veda* limits its range to such action alone; and as both man and Nature can be associated with such action, it deals with its chacarter in relation with both; and it is for this reason that it is divided into two parts,—the black and white *Yajur Veda*. Finally, the *Atharva Veda* deals with the moral and intelligent action of living creatures,—specially human beings. Thus we come down by stages from Nature to Man: and this is the subject-matter of all the Vedas (VII, ii, I, n.).

INDRA AND VAYU—If we understand from the beginning what *Indra* and *Vāyu* really mean, we shall know that they are inseparable.[1] But because of their different characteristics, there is a difference in their actions too;[2] 62

[1] We have already explained that *Indra* refers to *Prajñātman* or the self-conscious soul.

Vāyu is said to mean Air; and that would obviously refer to the vital breath in connection with *Indra* or the soul. Indeed, the soul is said to have the vital breath for its vehicle, because it is by means of it that it moves through the body; and we see that when the breath departs from the body, so does the soul, and a creature is said to be dead.

Thus, if we understand the idea of *Indra* and *Vāyu* as soul and vital breath, we can see that they are inseparable. There are a number of references to them in the Vedas and later works; and they are both described as *Soma* drinkers, and are invoked together as partakers of the juice; and this will explain the connection of the two with the character of the mind and desire, for that is the idea of *Soma* and its juice respectively. They are said to be freindly-minded, and a sovereign pair of heroes,—which is easy to understand. They are associated with horses and cows, (which refer to the senses), and are seated in the same chariot (or the body); while in the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* they are even identified.

[2] But the *Mīmānsā* tells us that they have different characteristics, and there is a difference in their actions too.

In this connection it would be of interest to observe that the great "element" Air is associated with Action, corresponding to which the Hand or the Arm is the special organ of action associated with it. *Vāyu* would accordingly refer also to *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor; and the relation of *Indra* and *Vāyu* corresponds also to that between the soul and *ahaṅkāra* (the I within us that acts). Now all systems of philosophy agree that the attributes and actions of the two are different, and it is necessary to distinguish between them. Indeed, the *Sāṅkhya* tells us,—and it is followed by the other systems, that *ahaṅkāra* is a creation of *Prakṛti*, while the *purusha* or the individual soul is altogether different. The *Sāṅkhya* believes that the *purusha* is not an actor, but only imagines,—according to it wrongly, of course,—that it is so; and it is only when it comes to have true knowledge of itself as something entirely different from all that is in Nature, and as devoid of all action too,—that it can become happy

and it is for this reason that each has his own place and distinguishing qualities. But they are connected together at the highest point;[1] and are, in any case, combined together, because of association with desire.[2] As there is an inherent connection between the parts of what they represent, it should enable us to understand the nature of desire, because it is connected with both[3] (62-66).

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THEIR CONNECTION IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORD AGRA—The connection between the two—*Indra* and *Vāyu*—is of the

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and free. On this point, however, there is a sharp difference of opinion among the different systems; and the final conclusion of *Vedānta* is that it is the soul that is the real actor within us. All this would be explained in due course.

[1] *Indra* refers to the soul and *Vāyu* to its vital breath; and so the *Rig Veda* tells that they are seated together in the same chariot (RV. IV, xlviii, 2) which, according to both the *Upanishads* and the *Mīmānsā*, refers to the body; and so they both abide in the body of living creatures, and cannot be separated.

The chief place of the soul is said to be the heart; and the *Upanishads* tell us that it abides in the "ether of the heart". As the chief characteristic of Ether is motion or sound, this means that the soul abides in the motion of the heart, which produces sound as well. The vital breath is also linked up with the heart; for though the lungs regulate the motion of breath in the body, they themselves are controlled by the heart.

[2] There can be no action without desire; and so *Vāyu* as *ahankāra* or the I-as-an-actor must be characterised by desire; and if we believe that the soul is an actor too, it also must be associated with desire. It may be of interest to point out that the *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeshika* and the *Mīmānsā* all agree that the soul is characterised by desire.

[3] We have explained how desire is connected with the soul as well as with vital breath, or the instrument of its action, *ahankāra* or the I-as-an-actor. Even if we assume that the soul does not act, we mus admit that it is characterised by knowledge; and we have seen that desire begins as knowledge, and ends as action; and the idea of the two is expressed by means of the new and the full moon.

highest importance, and lasts from beginning to end; and
that is expressed by the word *agra* (which means 'chief'). 67
But even if we believe that the bond between them is not
of the highest (or it is without the connection of the word
agra), we must admit that they are connected together
by means of a common invariable object (viz., life); and 68
we can see this connection for ourselves.[1] Indeed, the 69
connection between *Indra* and *Vāyu* exists from the very
beginning, (and is really expressed by by the word *agra*)
because of the position accorded to the latter; and that is 70
due to the fact that their essential character is the same, 71
as can easily be proved; for we see that there is decay 72
of the body when they leave it behind. We can under- 73
stand their meaning when we see through the "disguised"
form of these words[2] (*Indra* and *Vāyu*) (67-74). 74

The act of sustenance (of the body) is similar to that
of its decay (it is due to the association of *Indra* and
Vāyu); for so long as they abide in the body in their pre- 75
eminence, it cannot decay[3] (75-76). 76

[1] We can see for ourselves that the soul and vital breath are connected together from the very beginning. It is they together that make the body live; for they depart together, and when they do so, the body dies. This is made still more clear in the following *Sūtra* (73).

[2] Seeing through the "disguise" means understanding the meaning of a word by means of its division into parts; and it is in this way that the meaning of both *Indra* and *Vāyu* has been explained elsewhere (MM. I, 339-357; 412-419).

[3] There are a number of references to this idea in the story of the quarrel of the *prāṇas* or the vital organs of the senses in the *Upanishads*. We are told that it was agreed among the senses that he by whose departure the body seemed worse than the worst, should be deemed to be the best; and it was found that the vital breath had this eminence (*Chh. Up.* V, i, 1-15).

MIND AND THE INTELLECT—In connection with the character of the mind, as represented by the number three,—when something is to be properly expressed in the sacred books, its meaning should be obtained by means of division into parts.[1] Indeed, if we consider the character 77 of its functions over any calculated period of time, we shall find that it is like the intellect[2]. But the function 78 of the intellect should be regarded as a higher one, as it can create order out of disorder (or what is disarranged); 79 and that is done when proper proof is seen, and we attain 80 the object of our desire. But in both cases (whether it 81 is the mind or the intellect that functions), it is necessary that there should be unity of action[3] (77-82). 82

NO. 3 AND NO. 11—The idea of the mind, as represented by the number three, and as consisting of the number eleven, is the same, and they can be substituted for each other;[4] and this is how we should amplify 83

[1] We have seen that the word *tri* (meaning three) should be divided into parts,—*t*, *r*, *i*—when it would give us the idea of the mind functioning in association with the senses.

[2] This idea of the mind, as signified by the word *tri*, is, for all practical purposes, the same as that of the intellect; and we have seen how when the intellect desires anything, it is called the mind.

[3] Nevertheless, the intellect has its own special function too: and that is reasoning, decision, discrimination; and that is said to be higher than its association with desire, when it is transformed into the mind. But the proper function of the intellect as pure intellect, or in its form as mind, means that there is unity of action.

[4] We have seen that the number three refers to the mind in association with the senses; and the same idea is even more clearly expressed by the number eleven, which refers to the ten senses of knowledge and action, with the mind as the eleventh.

The words used in the text are *tryaṇikā* and *ekādaśinī*,—meaning "three-faced" and "consisting of eleven days" respectively. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that both these refer to the character and functions

the idea of the number of these days, when it is not clear otherwise (83-84). 84

No. 33—If we are able to rise to a height of thought, we can, by understanding the function of the mind in association with the intellect, see that all that is contained in the number thirty-three is but a substitute for what belongs to *Indra* and *Vāyu*[1] (or the soul and its vital breath). We are taught that we can understand all 85 this if we substitute what can be substituted for the numbers representing eleven; and we can know what this 86 means if we see through their "disguise" (85-87).[2] 87

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of the mind in association with the senses, when it may even be identified with the intellect; and this is how we should understand their idea when it is not clear otherwise.

[1] We have already explained that the number thirty-three, like the number twenty-three, refers to all manifest forms of Nature or *Prakṛti*; and all systems of philosophy agree that all this exists for the sake of *purusha* or the soul. Now the *Mīmānsā* tells us that the same idea of the soul, associated with its vital breath, is expressed by *Indra* and *Vāyu*; and so we might say that all that is comprised in the number thirty-three is but a substitute for what belongs to them.

[2] The number thirty-three is a multiple of the numbers three and eleven; and if we know what they represent, we shall find that they refer to all that is contained in Nature; for they refer to the function of the mind in various forms,—where the mind may, for practical purposes, be identified with the intellect.

The *Mīmānsā* further tells us that if we see through the "disguise" of the words *tri* and *ekādaśa* (three and eleven), we can understand all this. We have seen that *tri*—*t*, *r*, *i*—refers to the association of the ten senses with the mind. Now *ekādaśa* may be divided into *a*, *i*, *k*, *ā*, *daśa*—meaning "(*daśa*) the ten (*ā*) associated with (*k*) the intellect (*i*) arising from (*a*) the unmanifest". If we understand the "ten" here as referring to the five "elements" and their five properties, —we get almost all that is contained in Nature from these two words, *tri* and *ekādaśa*.

SPECIAL TERMS—All desire undergoes a change with lapse of time; and so words which express this idea also undergo a change of form. Such are words like *bhaksha* (food), *pavamāna* (flow of mind), *paridhi* (enclosure, etc.), and *kapāla* (an alms-bowl); and their form should be changed according to the effect produced by them[1] (88). 88

PART VI

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION: INTELLECT AND MIND: SACRIFICE AND SATISFACTION

There are different ways of reciting the sacred text, each of which has a bearing on the idea of sacrifice (1-2).

Intellectual perception alone is real knowledge; and it is by its means that we can measure Time, which is divisible into parts (3-5).

Similarly, there is a conciseness of expression in the idea of numbers,—e.g. the number eleven; and it can be divided into parts like the duration of Time; but the division should be such as can appeal to common sense, and follow a well defined pattern (6-10).

We cannot expand the number three in the same way; and its meaning has been defined: so is that of the word *pṛshṭha* (11-14).

The different *Sāman* hymns constitute a single whole, and can be understood by dividing words into parts; but this need not be done in all cases,—specially of words which refer to action (15-21).

It is not necessary to divide the word *tri* into parts, for its meaning has been defined; and we can understand the meaning of the word *stoma* by means of inference in connection with the word *Tri* (meaning 'three') (22-23).

In the case of *Bṛhat-sāman* and *Rathantara-sāman* hymns, we can get their meaning by dividing words into parts (24-26).

[1] We are told that it is necessary to change the form of these words to understand their meaning. But, as we can do so only with reference to the context in which they are used, it would not serve any useful purpose to analyse them here. We have however seen that we can get the real meaning of the word *kapāla* by dividing it into parts, when it gives us the idea of renunciation of action.

Pleasure or enjoyment in association with physical objects arises because of the action of the mind and the intellect; but an interval of time is necessary for its recurrence (27-31).

Enjoyment is not meant for students: all their life should be a sacrifice. Their time of enjoyment will come when they enter the next stage,—that of the householder's life. There are good reasons for making these divisions of life; but they are chiefly a matter of convenience, for life is a whole, yet divisible into parts (32-38).

One tenth expresses the idea of division; and the number ten of multiplication (39-41).

Similarly, one animal can express the idea of the character of many (42-44).

The meaning of a number of words in the text can be obtained by reducing them to their rudimentary form, as in the case of *Ritvij* priests, and the institutor of the sacrifice (45-54).

But the idea of "the master of the sacrifice" is not the same as that of "the master of the house" (55-56).

In the case of a number of synonyms there is a special mention of the manner in which their meaning can be obtained; but they must not be contradictory (57-59).

The function of the intellect can be like that of the mind (60).

Sacrifice makes for purification of action, while *dakshinā* or "sacrificial fee" expresses the idea of skill (61-63).

The idea of the division of time is like that of curdled butter,—together and yet apart (64).

All the faculties of a man get their share of satisfaction in performing action; and we can understand this by dividing words into parts (65-72). When we get a detailed description of an object in this way, it should convince us that we have hit upon the correct meaning. The whole process is intellectual, and enables us to think in a continuous chain (73-76).

There are, however, different ways of interpreting ideas: for instance, the function of the mind can be expressed in terms of wearing clothes, though it may necessitate a change of words to their rudimentary form (77-80).

DIFFERENT WAYS OF RECITATION AND THEIR IDEA—There are different ways of reciting the sacred text, and each verse has its own bearing on the idea of sacrifice (or good and intelligent action); and where a strophe consisting of three verses is concerned, we have to get the meaning by piercing through the "disguise" of words[1] (1-2). 1 2

[1] The *Mīmānsā* has told us that there are three ways of reciting the Vedas, singing, silent recital, and normal tone. The first indicates that the form of words should be changed; the second that it should

KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTION OF TIME—Intellectual perception alone is real knowledge; and it is only by its means that we can measure Time,[1] which exists for the sake of something else,[2] When we rise to a height of thought, and understand the many-sided application of the laws of life, we can understand the nature of Time.[3] We can also see that it can be divided into two parts, and represented in terms of the duration of a day.[4] There is no contradiction in this, because Time itself is divisible into parts, and we do not think of it as a whole (3-5).

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not; while the third would leave the matter undecided. We are now told that in a strophe consisting of three verses, we have to divide words into parts.

[1] We have already explained that the idea of Time is purely intellectual, and so too of its division into *Yugas*, *Manvantaras* and *Kalpas*. It may be of interest to observe that the ancients measured Time in terms of the motions of the sun and the moon, and their system continues to this day. But the sun and the moon represented, according to them, the energy of the intellect and the mind respectively; and so we might say that they measured time in terms of the latter; and this would show how purely intellectual the whole conception is, for the mind itself may, for practical purposes, be identified with the intellect.

[2] Time is the cause of change in all things in the world, but is not affected by anything itself. Hence it may be said to exist for the sake of other things, not its own. It is in this respect like Nature or *Prakṛti*, which is said to exist and act for the sake of the soul.

[3] The ancients may be said to have understood the nature of Time. We have already stated that they believed that it could be represented in the form of a Serpent-wave. As we can conceive of it only in terms of the intellect and the mind (or the sun and the moon), it may be said to be of the nature of a radiation, emanating from the sun and the moon,—specially the sun; and science tells us that these radiations have the form of waves. One of these radiations or waves is Time, and it has the form of a Serpent, as the ancients conceived it to be.

[4] The ancients divided Time also in terms of day and night; and so the sacred books tell us of the day and night of men, of the departed ones, of the gods, and of *Brahmā* himself; and *Yugas*, *Manvantaras*, and *Kalpas* are all associated with this idea: for instance, a day of

IDEA OF NUMBERS—Similarly, there is a conciseness of expression in referring to numbers, as consisting, for instance, of eleven parts, because they conform to the same pattern as the duration of time (that is, can be divided into parts in the same manner). We have to express ourselves briefly, because an unnecessary expansion of language is prohibited. But the division should be made in such a way that it appeals to the intelligence of the common man; and when we expand our idea, it should follow the fundamental pattern that has been laid down.[1] We should, as far as possible, accept this idea of the expansion of numbers; and in case of doubt, understand them in the light of their connection with the pattern (6-10). 6 7 8 9 10

WORDS WITH DEFINED MEANINGS—We cannot, however, expand the number three in the same manner, because it can be identified with something that we know, even like the word *prayāja*.[2] Similarly, the meaning of the word 11-12

Brahmā is no less than a whole *Kalpa*, consisting of innumerable years. We have a reference to this in the *Bhagavad Gītā* too (BhG. VIII, 17-19).

[1] We have seen how we can understand the idea of numbers,—5, 6, 10, 11, etc. We have to refer them to the corresponding *dravyas* or fundamental substances of philosophy, like the "elements", mind, senses, etc. For instance, the number eleven is made up of the ten senses and the mind,—making a total of eleven. It is in this way that we expand these numbers.

This division is said to be like the division of Time in the sense that each part, though connected with the other, is yet separate, and has its own story to tell.

[2] The number three, as has already been explained, refers to the mind; but that may be said to be its definition, and we cannot get at its idea in the same manner as in the case of the number eleven.

Prayāja means "pre-sacrifice", but really refers to desire, as a

pṛshṭha[1] is fixed, and it conveys the same idea wherever it occurs in the text: only the difference of its shades of meaning should be understood in the light of the context (11-14). 13 14

SAMAN HYMNS—The different *Sāman* hymns, when intelligently grasped, constitute a single whole, like the number three;[2] and the exalted meaning of these hymns is obtained by reducing words to their rudimentary form.[3] But their formation is not simple like that of the number 15 16

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precursor to action; and this has already been explained. This too may be said to be a definition or a special explanation of the word.

[1] *Pṛshṭha*, as has already been explained, refers to action (MS. VII, iii, 6, 36).

[2] We do not get the idea of the number three in the same manner as of the number eleven. Both of them convey the same idea, but the manner of getting at their meaning is different. Whereas we have to expand the idea of the number eleven into ten senses and the mind, that of the number three may be said to constitute a single whole. The *Sāman* hymns are said to be like that, and need to be interpreted in the same way.

Further, we are told that the *Sāma Veda* refers to all that belongs to the living; and all living creatures are characterised by desire, which is an attribute of the mind. As the number three refers to the mind, it is in this sense too that there is a connection between the *Sāma Veda* and the number three.

[3] As the hymns of the *Sāma Veda* are intended to be sung, we can obtain the real meaning of words by reducing them to their rudimentary form. But it cannot be obtained in the same simple way as that of the word *tri*, which by division into *t*, *r*, *i*, gives us the idea of the function of the mind in association with the senses. We have to use some intelligence in this case, as the idea of the senses of action is repeated twice (*t*, *r*); and instead of omitting one, we have to take it that the other refers to the senses of knowledge. But in the case of words used in the *Sāma Veda* we have to use our intelligence on a more extensive scale, when we shall find that the meaning is all in accordance with the rules of interpretation.

three, because their connection with the rudimentary form is not complete. We cannot say that this is contrary to the rules of interpretation, because it is really in accordance with them: only in case of doubt we should not divide into parts words which refer to action,—because they conform to their own pattern (15-21). 17-18 19-20 21

TRI AND STOMA—If we make a change in the contents of the number three, we shall have to do so in the case of all numbers (because it is a typical number).[1] The meaning of the word *stoma* is obtained by means of inference in connection with the idea of this number[2] (22-23). 22 23

BRIHAT AND RATHANTARA SAMAN HYMNS—In the case of *Bṛhat-sāman* and *Rathantara-sāman* hymns we should apportion ideas, and understand them in the same manner as we understand the word *viśva-jit*.[3] That would give us the best meaning, because no other meaning can come anywhere near it; and we can understand it by piercing through its "disguise" (24-26). 24 25 26

[1] We have seen that we cannot get the meaning of the number three by expanding it in the same way as the number eleven.

[2] If we divide the word *stoma* in the same manner as we divide the word *tri*, we shall get its meaning too; for then *s*, *ta*, *u*, *ma* would mean "(*s*) the mind associated with (*ta*) the senses of action and (*u*, *ma*) the senses of knowledge"; and we see that the meaning of *tri* is similar too.

The letters *u* and *ma* in this case refer to the senses of knowledge, and one of them can easily be omitted. This, as the *Mīmānsā* has told us, is in accordance with the rules.

[3] These hymns would appear to constitute the essence of the *Sāma Veda;* for *Kṛshṇa* describes himself in terms of *Bṛhat-sāman* hymns in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (BhG. X, 35).

Viśva-jit means "all-conquering"; but it is also a particular name of *Agni* which, as has already been explained, refers to the intellect.

MIND, ACTION, AND ENJOYMENT—When we rise to a height of thought, we realise that there is enjoyment in association with physical objects possessed of shape or form, because of the different actions of the mind and the intellect; and this sequence (of the function of the mind and the intellect, followed by enjoyment) is expressed in accordance with a certain pattern.[1] This enjoyment 27 comes at its appointed time at last; and whenever the 28 function of the mind and the intellect is repeated, enjoyment is repeated too, because it is connected with action every time; and it comes at its appointed time at 29 last. But the recurrence of enjoyment arises from the 30 passage of time, for a difference (or interval) of time is necessary for the purpose (27-31). 31

DIVISION OF LIFE INTO PARTS—Those who are initiated as students, cannot have enjoyment, because they are at a stage of life when enjoyment is not open to them. At this 32 stage even food should be taken in a spirit of sacrifice. 33 The time for enjoyment comes later; and that is so because there is a statement in regard to the division of life into parts, with reference to the functions of the mind,[2] by 34

The *Mīmānsā* has told us that it refers to action,—action of the intellect —by means of which we can conquer everything.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we can understand the meaning of these hymns in the same manner as we understand the real meaning of the word *viśvajit*.

[1] The text refers to the number thirty-three which, as we have seen, refers to the function of the mind and the intellect. It is a multiple of three and eleven, and refers to all that they signify. It is said that there are thirty-three gods; and that, as we have explained, refers to all manifest forms and forces of Nature.

[2] The stage of life, after that of a student, is that of a house-holder or a family-man; and, as the basis of this life is desire,—conceived in

means of which life itself is praised by all. As when one 35
day ends, another begins, even so there is a rule that
there is a higher life (after that of a student). We can 36
give a thousand reasons to explain the theory of the divi-
sions of life; but they are like the functions of the mind,[1] 37
and there is no particular rule against the idea (32-38). 38

TEN AND TENTH PART—We speak of the tenth part of a
thing, because it can easily be given away.[2] Similarly, 39
we speak of the tenth day, because there is a direction
in regard to it as signifying something special;[3] and the 40
reason for this is that it fits into the context (39-41). 41

ANIMALS—If there are a number of animals, we can know
the nature of all from the nature of one; but there is no 42
prohibition, of the nature of a rule, against praising an
object in parts, though that does not make for any definite 43

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its widest significance—it is associated with the function of the mind, which has desire for its attribute, in a special way. The reason why this life is praised is that it enables a man to realise the idea of sacrifice, for he must act selflessly, intelligently and for the benefit of the whole family to keep it up.

[1] The ancients divided life into four stages: of a student, a householder, one to whom the whole world is a family, and one who in the end must pass away. All this means different forms of knowledge and action, which are linked together by means of desire, which is an attribute of the mind. Hence they are said to be like the function of the mind.

[2] This would appear to be the basis of the decimal system, which makes for easy division; and it is believed to have originated in India.

[3] This would appear to refer to multiplication, the basis of which is the number ten. It may be of interest to point out that the numerals, from one to ten, had their origin in India; and they constitute the basis of all mathematical calculation to this day.

knowledge (or ascertainment), as we are told[1] (42-44). 44

HOW TO OBTAIN THE MEANING OF WORDS—The word *satra* is one which can be understood by being reduced to its rudimentary form;[2] and this, as we are expressly told, 45 is true of many other words. It is not necessary to point 46 out each word of this kind, because a single statement should suffice. However, we know that all kinds of words 47-48 are mixed together in the sacred text;—for there are many 49 words,—and it would serve no useful purpose to make a separate statement in regard to each. But in the case of a 50 number of words we have to get their meaning in the same manner as we get that of the *Ritvij* priests,—that is, by reducing them to their rudimentary form (45-51). 51

INSTITUTOR OF SACRIFICE—Even so there should be the institutors of sacrifices[3] too, who get their status as such because of their association with the names of the *Ritvij* priests. This should explain the idea of the purification 52

[1] Although one animal can give us an idea of the nature of all, there is no objection to describing different or a number of animals. That would not, however, add substantially to our fundamental knowledge, says the *Mīmānsā*. This means that there are instances of both kinds in the description of animals in the Vedas.

[2] *Satra—sa, t, ra*—means "(*sa*) the mind associated with (*t, ra*) the senses of action", and so it refers to the action of the mind. It is accordingly said to be a great *Soma* sacrifice; and *Soma*, as we have seen, refers to the mind, and sacrifice is action.

The letters *t* and *ra* both refer to the senses of action; but the two together would refer to the senses of knowledge and action, as has been pointed out in a number of other cases.

[3] "The institutor of the sacrifice" is the *Yajamāna* who, as we have already explained, refers to the soul; for it is the soul that calls upon the *Ritvij* priests or the different faculties of man to engage in action.

of the doer of the deed,[1] as in the case of one who kindles the sacred fire;[2] but if we have any doubt about the propriety of this method, we should deal with these words according to their pattern[3] (52-54). 53_54

MASTER OF A SACRIFICE AND MASTER OF A HOUSE—We cannot say that the idea of the name *svāmī* is the same as that of *gṛhapati* ("master of the house");[4] because if we understand the character of that which is well known, it does not mean that we can say the same of one that is not so well known, by means of the same characteristics (55-56). 55_56

[1] Action of this kind makes for the purification of the soul, even as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us (BhG. V, 11).

[2] Fire refers to the intellect; and so "kindling the sacred fire" means acting intelligently and in a spirit of sacrifice. Such an action is said to purify the soul and make for freedom from the bondage of action (Cf. BhG. III, 9; V, 11).

When we get a reference to the institutors of sacrifice, etc., we can understand the idea of the purification of the soul by means of intelligent action performed as a sacrifice: that is what the *Mīmānsā* says.

[3] But if we do not understand all this, we should deal with words according to pattern,—that is, divide them into parts or not as suits the occasion.

[4] The word *svāmī* refers to the soul, as we have explained; and so does *gṛha-pati* or "the master of the house"; for the body is the house in which the soul abides. But the idea of the two, says the *Mīmānsā*, is not the same. Indeed, broadly speaking, we can conceive of the soul in two ways: as an actor, and as a spectator; and the former would appear to correspond to *gṛha-pati*, and the latter to *svāmī*. This is supported by the reference to the "*Gārhapatya fire*" or the "fire of the householder", in connection with the three forms of *Agni*; and that, as we have explained, means intelligent action for the preservation of one's self and the family. Hence *gṛha-pati* is the soul as an actor, and *svāmī* as a spectator. It is easy to understand the idea of the soul as an actor, but not as a mere spectator; and the two cannot be identified.

SYNONYMS—In the case of a number of words which are used as synonyms, there is no special mention of the manner in which their meaning can be obtained (57). 57

CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS—We cannot make two contradictory statements at the same time: for instance, we cannot say that something has been undertaken as a sacrifice and has not,—for the two things are entirely different; 58 and it is only an awkward person who can make such statements (58-59). 59

INTELLECT AND MIND—The function of the intellect[1] can be like that of the mind, when we take into consideration a certain posture (or approach to a problem), specially where a large number of souls (sacrificers) are concerned; and that is so because of the close connection of the intellect with the mind[2] (60). 60

SACRIFICE—Sacrifice makes for wholeness (or freedom from taint);[3] and this happens even where a number of

[1] The expression in the text is "sacrifice lasting twelve days"; and the number twelve refers to the intellect, as eleven does to the mind; while sacrifice is action. Hence it refers to the function of the intellect.

[2] The *Mīmānsā* has already explained that the mind and the intellect may for practical purposes be identified; and we have pointed out that when the intellect desires anything, it is called the mind.

The word for the mind in the text is *satra*, which refers to a great *Soma* sacrifice, or a function of the mind.

The word for "soul" is *Yajamāna* in the text. The point of the author is that when a number of persons take part in an action, it is difficult to distinguish between the function of their mind and the intellect. In the case of an individual it is more easy; for the special attribute of the intellect is decision, judgement, or discrimination, which is difficult to spot in the case of a group.

[3] This is what the *Bhagavad Gītā* says too (BhG. III, 9).

persons engage in an act of sacrifice.[1] In this "wholen^ss" 61 of action there are a number of parts; and the rule in regard to the payment of *dakshiṇā*[2] signifies, every time, a difference of action; but the excellence of it arises from 62 the unity of actions of all. (61-63). 63

Division of Days—The rule regarding the division of days is that they are like curdled butter[3] (together, and yet apart) (64). 64

Jyotishtoma—With regard to what relates to *Jyotishṭoma* (mass or rays of light), there is a completeness of action (*dakshiṇā*); and that is so of all (rays of light), because, like Nature itself, they are engaged in the same action. Hence there should be a change of form of these names[4] (in order to understand them) (65). 65

Function of the Intellect—There is an express statement that in an intelligent action (ceremony lasting twelve

[1] The word in the text is *svāmī*, which refers to the soul, but more as a spectator than an actor. But even one who believes that his soul is a mere spectator, must act; and so the *svāmī* too engages in action.

[2] The idea of *dakshiṇā* has already been explained: it signifies skill in action; and each "priest" who takes part in a "sacrifice" is given his *dakshiṇā* because he has done the work specially assigned to him with skill. Hence *dakshiṇā* signifies skill in the performance of different actions. But with all this difference, there must be unity in all parts of an action.

[3] Curdled butter is butter and curd mixed together; and yet the two can be separated. The idea of the division of days or Time is similar. We can divide Time, and yet it is a continuous whole.

[4] This *Sūtra* tells us that in order to understand the idea of *Jyotishṭoma* we should divide words used in that connection into parts. It also tells us that these rays of light have a number of common characteristics (See Appendix II).

days), there is a distinct measure of skill (*dakshiṇā*) in each part (every day); and that is the pattern of expression in other actions too. In order to understand them, the form of all these words should be changed[1] (66). 66

Need of Change of Form—In case we are unable to apportion the share of payment for work done (among the different agents or faculties), we should change the form of all the words used in that context, (when we shall be able to do so); because the distinction between them is 67 expressed by means of the parts of these names (67-68). 68

Function of Different Faculties—The proper arrangement of all (the agents of action or faculties) goes on, according to the fundamental nature of each, every day; and we can understand it because we can isolate and consider all of them separately.[2] It is, however, possible to 69 say that we cannot always do so, because their meaning or purpose is not always the same, and they appear to be different at different times.[3] But we should be able to 70-71

[1] The number twelve refers to the intellect; and a ceremony lasting twelve days, to intelligent action. This has already been explained.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that in order to understand the part played by the different faculties of man in a certain intelligent action, we need to divide words into parts. This is made more explicit in the following *Sūtras* (67-68).

[2] It is possible to isolate the different faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, and senses,—and say which function has been performed by each.

[3] We have seen that the mind and the intellect can function in a similar way; the mind is sometimes spoken of as an organ of sense. The *Mīmānsā*, as we shall see in the course of these pages, also tells us that there is a close connection between *ahaṅkāra* and the mind, and *ahaṅkāra* and the intellect. It is therefore possible to say that we cannot always distinguish between these faculties of man; but the

distinguish between them by understanding their names in their correct formation, just as we interpret the expression "a ceremony lasting twelve days"[1] (69-72). 72

How to Decide—When we get a detailed description of an object by means of this "disguised" form of expression, we should be convinced in every case that it is correct; because this "disguised" form is of an all-pervading character, like the power of intellect (*Agni*) itself. Its 73 strength or efficacy consists in the fact that the text contains certain words whose meaning remains, as far as possible, unchanged; and that enables us to measure the correctness of the whole. The whole system is purely 74 intellectual; and in this process of thinking, the "residue 75 of thought" (or what is left over) is most important, because it enables us to continue to think and, in due course of time, to understand everything[2] (73-76). 76

An Illustration—If we desire to express the idea of the mind according to this pattern, the direction is that it should be done in terms of wearing clothes;[3] and it is 77 for this reason that the wearing of clothes has for a long time been regarded as the correct thing. It is in this 78

Mīmānsā says that we can, if we understand the text aright; for though connected, these faculties are different from one another too.

[1] A ceremony lasting twelve days refers to a great function of the intellect, as has already been explained.

[2] What the *Mīmānsā* says in respect of the Vedas is equally applicable to the Epics and the *Purāṇas*. Their text contains certain words, which can be taken in their common connotation, and they suggest what should follow; and then, if we reduce certain other words to their rudimentary form, we are able to understand the real meaning.

[3] The connection between the mind and wearing clothes has already been explained (p. 270, n. 3).

manner that we can express the idea of the mind: we must think of it in its essential character; and when we understand what it implies, we can bring it down (or express it in terms of the common life of man). If, however, in this process, we are unable to find a rational meaning, we should reduce words to their rudimentary form[1] (77-80).

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PART VII

THE PERFORMANCE AND RENUNCIATION OF ACTION: THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

When an animal acts, it acts as a whole entity (1-4).
Animals are said to be of five kinds; but they may be divided into two classes,—the invertebrate and vertebrate (5-8).
There is a reference to cooked and uncooked food: the latter refers to renunciation of action as the goal of life (9).
Action is performed by the whole man, including his intellect, mind, and the senses (10-11). The heart is the seat of satisfaction (12); but in the end all these are united together,

[1] The *Mīmānsā* tells us that there are two ways of getting at the correct idea of the working of the human mind. We should understand its essential character, and find out how a normal mind works; and then express its idea in terms of the common life of man. For instance, the special attribute of the mind is desire; and we see that what distinguishes man from other animals is the desire to wear clothes. Indeed, it is man alone who can make and wear clothes; and the other necessary desires,—to eat food and have shelter—he shares with other animals too. But clothes are a special characteristic of man,—a civilized man; and so we may associate the idea of wearing clothes with the function of the mind.

But if in spite of all this, we are unable to understand the meaning of the text, we should divide words into parts: and this is the second way of understanding the idea.

In the present case the word for clothes is *vāsa*,—*v*, *ā*, *sa*—meaning "(*sa*) the mind (*ā*) associated with (*v*) Nature"; and so we might say that the idea of wearing clothes is in harmony with the character of a natural, normal mind.

and so the body is compared to a chariot (13-14). But each faculty has its own share of satisfaction too (15).

We are not able to understand the character of the soul as it is; and so we must think of it in terms of these faculties (16); and he who uses his intellect gets the largest share of satisfaction (17).

Those who believe in Nature as the supreme creator of life do not agree that there is joy in action; but such persons deviate from the norm (18-19).

It is possible to say that there is joy in some parts of action, but not in others. But, as there is unity in action, there must be unity in satisfaction or joy as well (20-21).

He who urges another to action has also his share of satisfaction, though a small one; and even he who says that he has no satisfaction, has it too (22-23).

We can understand all this from the text if we understand its language correctly. The words used have two meanings; but there is no contradiction between them (24-34).

Where the motives are equally balanced, the intellect appears to get no satisfaction in deciding between them; but even in this case there is satisfaction, whatever it may decide. But in ascertaining whether, as a result of this, a person is happy or not, there might well be a difference of opinion. Except for such cases, a wife should always join her husband in action (35-38).

It is not easy to describe an action in words; and if we find that a certain expression is unsuitable, we must not suppose that it is meaningless (39-43); and we may have to divide it into parts, as in the case of the word *sruva* (44-45).

There can be no great action without the association of the great forces of Nature. This, however, does not apply to subsidiary action (46-47).

In order to understand the meaning of the word *ājya*, we must divide it into two parts, in the same manner as we divide the expression *gṛha-medhīya* (48-50).

There are some who believe that all desires should be renounced (51); but the problem involves a number of considerations (52-56); and we cannot agree that both the views,—namely, that they should and should not be renounced—can be correct. But, if both these views are to be found in the text, we should admit that we have not understood it aright; and if we do so, we shall find that all desires are not regarded as evil (57-63).

When we change the form of a word, all that is required is that its new meaning should be formed out of the meaning of its parts; but we should fix upon one meaning,—such as can appeal to our intellect (64-67).

Those who are opposed to this method believe that there is no authority for this division. But no authority is necessary, for we commonly divide words into parts to understand their meaning; and this takes us into the secret of this plan of interpretation (68-73).

A CREATURE ACTS AS A WHOLE ENTITY—When we say that an animal performs an intelligent act, it is the whole animal that does so, because it is impelled to it. It acts through every part of its body, just as we do when we lay hold of a thing. The idea of the separate functions of the different parts of the body arises out of our own imagination. A person has to perform a number of different functions again and again; and that is the reason why we ascribe these functions to different parts of the body. But when we examine the character of action and consider it in detail, we find that its divisions are like the divisions of clarified butter[1] (1-4).

DIVISIONS OF ANIMALS—Animals are said to be of five kinds;[2] but they have two divisions which should be specially mentioned. There is a class of animals which is without shoulder-blade, skull, back-bone, and thigh-bone; and when we specify another class of animals, we find that it is altogether different; and it would be meaningless to include the one in the other. In the circumstances we cannot assign any common characteristics to them.[3] But though there is nothing in common between them, there should, nevertheless, be a proper enumeration or specification of them; for if we merely see them, we cannot understand them (5-8).

[1] We cannot divide clarified butter or "*ghee*' into parts, even if we try to do so.

The word in the text is *ājya* which, as we have seen, also refers to goodness, associated with desire. We cannot divide goodness too.

[2] The five kinds of animals are said to be men, horses, cows, goats, and sheep.

[3] This corresponds exactly to the modern division of animals into invertebrate and vertebrate.

COOKED AND UNCOOKED FOOD—There is a reference to cooked and uncooked food in the sacred books; and we may say, as a general rule, that the idea of uncooked food corresponds to that of renunciation of action as the goal of life[1] (9). 9

HOW IS AN INTELLIGENT ACTION PERFORMED—When an action is performed as a sacrifice, we say that it has been performed by *Agni*,—understanding the word in its rudimentary sense (that is, as intellect); but its further deve- 10 lopment takes place by means of the mind, acting in association with the five senses[2] (10-11). 11

THE HEART—He who acts, wants some satisfaction as its result; and so there is a place above the breast (the heart) which, like the mind, makes for the development of action.[3] In the end, however, all these are united into 12 one; and it is because of this that the body is compared to a chariot.[4] This is not contrary to the teachings of the 13

[1] If a person believes that he must not eat cooked food, it means that he believes in the renunciation of action as the goal of his life. He must, in that case, live on the produce of the forest,—things that grow without any effort on the part of man; and this, as has already been explained, symbolises the idea of renunciation of action.

[2] The word for the mind in the text is *tri* ("three"), and for the senses *śara*. We have seen that the former refers to the mind; while the latter is the name of the number five which, as we have seen, refers to the five senses. We can get the same meaning by dividing it into parts,—*śa*, *ra*—when it would mean "(*śa*) the senses of knowledge, associated with (*ra*) the senses of action".

[3] The heart is said to be the seat of pleasure and pain; and so the soul, abiding in it, partakes of it. The heart is said to make for the development of action, and its energy is like that of the mind (Cf. MM. I, 63).

[4] The *Upanishad* describe the body as a chariot (*Kaṭh. Up.* I, iii,3; *Mait. Br. Up.* II, 6; etc.). We can now understand why it is so: a

sacred books. Nevertheless, there should be a measure of the satisfaction of each faculty, because we do not always find joy in action[1] (12-15). 14 15

The Soul—But we do not find that entity (the soul) which can assign these shares of satisfaction to the different faculties; and so there has to be a change in the conception of the "enjoyer" of this satisfaction.[2] As for the rest (the other faculties), we know them, and nothing special need be said about them. But he who uses his intellect, gets the largest share of satisfaction, like the heart itself[3] (16-17). 16 17

Belief in Nature—Those who believe in Nature as the supreme creator of things, do not accept this pattern of thought (that there is joy in action); and so, though they are intelligent men, they do not find joy in action.[4] But 18

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chariot consists of a number of parts, and yet moves as a whole; the body does the same.

This should enable us to understand the real idea of "car-warriors" in the *Mahābhārata*. They are persons who have different ideas about the character of the human body.

[1] There are some who do not believe that there is any joy in action; and so it is necessary to examine the problem in detail, when we shall find that each faculty of man gets its share of satisfaction in action.

[2] The *Upanishads* speak of the soul as the enjoyer; and the *Gītā* says so too (*Kath Up.* I, iii, 4; BhG. XIII, 22-23). The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we cannot understand the soul as soul; and so we have to grasp its idea in the light of the other faculties: for instance, it may be identified with the intellect.

[3] It is the soul that uses all the faculties, including the intellect; and so the highest satisfaction in action belongs to the soul.

[4] The text refers to *Maitra-Varuṇa*; and we have explained that the former refers to the intellect, and the latter to Nature as the supreme creator of things. We have also explained the idea of the combi-

that is possible only if the mind and the senses, which are closely connected with action, deviate from their normal state[1] (18-19). 19

Two Views—It is possible to say that there are two ideas of satisfaction or joy in action; because there are two kinds of action.[2] But, as there is unity of action, there 20 must be unity of satisfaction too; and it would be contrary to reason to divide it[3] (20-21). 21

Sharers in Satisfaction—(There are a number of sharers in this satisfaction; for instance,) he who urges another to action has his share of satisfaction too, though it is of a limited kind, like the satisfaction derived from the cooking of the marrow of bones. Even he who says that 22 he gets no satisfaction in action, has also his share; and we see that it is so when we understand the secret of action, and look at it in its entirety (22-23). 23

How to Understand This—All this can be understood from the text if we understand the method of interpreta-

nation of the two; and it has been rendered here as "an intelligent person who believes in Nature as the supreme creator of things.

[1] The *Mīmānsā* tells us that no sensible person, in his normal state of mind, can really believe that there is no satisfaction in performing actions.

[2] It may be said that some actions give pleasure, but there are others that give pain; and so we have two kinds of actions.

[3] But the *Mīmānsā* tells us that there is saitsfaction in the performance of all kinds of action, and we cannot divide satisfaction in this way. The result of an action may be pain; but when a person performed it, he expected to derive some satisfaction out of it. Hence, even those actions the result of which is pain, are characterised by satisfaction. We must not mix up the result of action with its performance, for the law of the two is different; and the result may often be unexpected.

tion, and alter the common form of words; and it would
be unnecessary to repeat the whole thing again. We 24
should remember that the words have two forms, as in
the case of *Agni*;[1] and we cannot get their correct meaning 25
from only one. The additional meaning arises from the 26
fact that it has been given that sense; and (in a number
of cases) we can get the explanation of the meaning
without dividing words into parts; and there should be
no change in the form of a word when the meaning has
been defined by special instruction. It will be found in
such cases that the words which have this meaning have
been newly coined for the purpose. But there is no 27
contradiction between the two meanings of these words,
for no such instance is known. Nor can such a contra- 28-29
diction arise through want of understanding, because
the two sets of meanings are of equal value, as we can 30-31
see for ourselves, if we understand them correctly. When 32
we do so we shall find that these words are new; and so 33
all that has been stated in the text is true, and should
take place[2] (24-34). 34

SATISFACTION OF THE INTELLECT—Where the motives of
an action are equally balanced, the intellect appears to

[1] *Agni*, as we have seen, has two meanings,—fire, and intellect.

[2] There are a number of references in the sacred books to things which are apparently impossible: for instance *Hanūmān* leaping over the ocean, or bringing down a portion of the *Himālayas* on the palm of his hand. But if we understand the real meaning of *Hanūmān*, the ocean, and the *Himālayas*, we shall understand that what has been stated in the text is true, and did take place. A number of such events in the *Mahābhārata* have been explained in another place (MM. III-V); and those in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa* would be explained in due course.

get no satisfaction in deciding which to prefer. But it should not be so; because we find from experience that whatever the intellect may decide, there is some satisfaction in it; and so that cancels the statement previously made.[1] But in ascertaining whether, as a result of this, a person is really happy or not, there might well be a doubt or a difference of opinion.[2] Except for such cases, the wife should always join her husband in acts of sacrifice (good and intelligent actions), and any prohibition against her doing so would be meaningless (35-38).

NEED OF REPETITION—It is not easy to describe an action in words; and so it is necessary to repeat its idea by way of explanation. If in the text a certain expression is not suitable, or does not make sense, what follows should be equally unsuitable too. But if we are able to get the correct meaning of the latter,—such is the language of the text—we find that we can overcome the difficulty of understanding the earlier part. But if we hastily come to the conclusion that the whole thing is meaningless, we cannot make any point or advance any further. Again, if we make a violent "assault" on the language of the text to "grasp" it, we shall not succeed[3] (39-43).

AN ILLUSTRATION—If, for instance, we take the meaning

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[1] The previous statement in *Sūtra* 35 that the intellect gets no satisfaction in certain cases, is cancelled by the following one.

[2] The *Mīmānsā* distinguishes between satisfaction obtained when an action is performed, and its result. The result of an action may be pain or unhappiness; but when a person engages in action, he gets some satisfaction out of it at the time; and this cannot be disputed.

[3] This is found to be true of the *Mahābhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*; and so it may be said to be true of all sacred books.

of the word *sruva* (as a "ladle") and do not divide it into parts, the result will be that it will not make any sense. 44 Even if we do not disallow its meaning (as a "ladle"), we shall find that we have to do so, because there is a direction to that effect in the text[1] (44-45). 45

NATURE AND ACTION—If the great forces of Nature[2] have no share in it, no great action undertaken by any one can materialise. This, however, does not apply to subsidiary 46 action, which can take place without reference to them (46-47). 47

MEANING OF AJYA—In order to understand the meaning of the word *ājya*, we should so arrange as to divide it into two parts and no more[3] (when we shall understand that it refers to the idea of goodness in desire). But because we 48 are told in one place that all desires should be renounced, it does not mean that that should be regarded as a rule. Hence it is necessary always to have an explanatory repetition to indicate what exactly is meant. It is thus necessary to have 49 a constant explanatory repetition of the word *ājya*[4]; and to understand how to divide it, we should do as in the case

[1] If we divide the word *sruva* into parts,—*s*, *r*, *u*, *va*—the meaning would be "(*s*) the mind, associated with (*r*) the senses of action, and (*u*) the senses of knowledge, and (*va*) objects of Nature."

[2] The word in the text is *Devatā* which, as has already been explained, refers to the great forces of Nature.

[3] We have already explained that we have to reduce the word *ājya* first of all to *aja*, from which it is derived, and then divide *aja* into *a*, *ja*,—when we can get its correct meaning as signifying goodness, which is inherent in all desire.

[4] *Ajya* means goodness associated with desire; and so it is a kind of desire which should not be renounced. In order to understand this clearly, there should be an explanatory repetition of the idea, so that there should be no ambiguity.

of the expression *gṛha-medhīya*[1], which too requires an explanatory repetition (48-50). 50

Those who oppose this view (regarding desire) find their authority (or fixed rule) in one set of sacred books, according to which what they understand is said to be of excellent meaning, and based on the character of what the senses perceive (51). 51

A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS—(In this connection a number of questions arise:) Can we accept the idea of desire from both sets of sacred books? Is it not true, at least in the 52 light of the evidence of the senses, that all desires should be renounced? Is it possible to understand anything 53 that is opposed to the evidence of the senses? and so on. 54-55 But will not the sacred books be rendered useless, if that were so? (52-56).[2] 56

AN ANSWER—(The answer to these questions is that) if the text is full of meaning and we have understood it, we cannot agree that both views are correct in the same place (namely, that all desires should be renounced, as well as that they should not). But since all parts of the text 57

[1] We have to divide the expression *gṛha-medhīya* into two parts,—*gṛha* and *medhīya*—in order to understand its meaning. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that the word *ājya* has to be divided into two parts in a similar manner. That is possible only if we reduce it to *aja*, and then divide it into *a*, *ja*; and this has already been explained. '*Gṛha-medhīya*' means "relating to domestic sacrifice".

[2] The idea of these *Sūtras* is that although we find in some sacred books that all desires should be renounced, we really cannot do so; and since these books contain nothing that is incongruous, we must take it that we have not properly understood them. This is made more clear in the following *Sūtras*. We can renounce all desires only when we die.

are full of meaning, we must admit that we have not understood them properly. It would not be correct to say that 58 the other view (regarding desire, namely, that it is not an evil) should be regarded as secondary, because the text would, in that case, become meaningless; and were it 59-60 really so, we should not be able to change the meaning by changing the form of words; whereas we find that if we do make a change, we get a different meaning (which makes sense). This is not mere hearsay, because it is not 61 based on any oral authority in respect of the rudimentary form of words (and we can test it for ourselves)[1] (57-63). 62-63

METHOD OF INTERPRETATION—When the form of a word is changed, it does not become subject to any restrictions. The main condition, however, is that when we interpret it in this manner, its meaning should arise from the meaning of its parts, as in the case of the word *pṛshad-ājya*.[2] In this way both meanings (the common one and that obtained by means of division into parts) arise from a fixed rule; and the rule regarding the meanings of parts is also fixed in the same manner.[3] But we should fix upon a single meaning 64

[1] The point of these *Sūtras* is that, if it be correct that we should renounce all desires, as some sacred books are believed to say, we should not be able to get a different meaning when we divide words into parts. This is not mere hearsay, and we can test it for ourselves. This discussion is continued in (X, viii, 12-18.)

[2] *Pṛshad-ājya* means "curdled butter or *ghee* mixed with coagulated milk"; and we get this meaning from its parts,—*pṛshad* and *ājya*. If this is permitted, there can be no objection to our extending the same principle and getting the meaning of a word by dividing it further into its syllables and letters: for the authority in both cases is the same. This is what the *Mīmānsā* tells us.

[3] All meanings are fixed by means of the application of the rules of grammar. The syllables and letters composing a word have their fixed

which, by virtue of its excellence, appeals to our intellect.[1] 65
When, however, the idea of the text appears to be self-contradictory, we should seek some other meaning, as is the common practice of the people[2]; and then we shall find 66
that the plan of the text is that we should get the correct meaning by means of the division of words into parts (64-67). 67

AN OBJECTION AND ITS ANSWER—Those who oppose this method of interpretation have a doubt about it on the ground that there is no authority for these sounds (or parts of words) in the sacred text. But if we take the expression 68
pṛshadājya as a whole word, we yet have to divide it into parts in order to understand it. It may be a clever thing 69
to do, but it does not fit into the fixed rule (if there be one, that we should not divide words into parts to understand their meaning). And this takes us into the secret 70
of this plan of interpretation; for if it is appropriate to divide this word into parts, it is equally appropriate to divide other words too,—specially when we get an idea of differ-

meanings too, like all other words; and we have to follow a good dictionary.

[1] We are, however, required to fix upon one meaning, which we regard as most suitable.

[2] But a letter or syllable may have a number of meanings; and we are not bound to give the same meaning to the same part every time and everywhere. This method of interpretation gives us a certain latitude to fix meanings according to the requirements of each case; only we must not invent our own meanings.

It may be of interest to observe that this is exactly what has been done in *The Mystery of the Mahābhārata*; the meanings of letters and syllables are, as a rule, the same throughout; but a certain variation has been allowed.

ent actions in this way.[1] It is not necessary that every one 71
should have heard about this method; for the main point is
that it should be based on a uniformity of rules (68-73). 72-73

PART VIII

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION: THE PROBLEM OF DESIRE

There are certain rules of interpretation of the text (1-4). It is possible to have this system because a number of words are new; but the existing words may also be used if they are equally suitable, and there is no difficulty in using them (5-11).

The sacred books have examined the idea of a total renunciation of desire; and it really refers to certain special cases where, because of some dangerous obstacle, action is not advised or allowed; otherwise they enjoin action, and we can understand the meaning by dividing words into parts (12-18).

It is a rule that in the *Mantras* or hymns of the Vedas, no words should be left out; and we can understand the meaning of all if, where necessary, we divide words into parts (19-22). Thus, if we understand the meaning of the words *Agni* and *mās*, we shall be able to make progress with the text (23-28). But it requires some skill to coin a word to have a particular meaning; and when we understand their character, we can interpret them by dividing them into parts, as in the case of *ājya* and the number seventeen (29-34).

Good and evil desires can both be associated with an intelligent action (35-40); but, though he who uses his mind can combine goodness with intelligence, there is no constant union of the two (41-42).

We need to use our intelligence in testing the correctness of our meaning (43-46); and in this manner we can understand the idea of the silent perusal of the text as well as of *Prajāpati*. It is not possible to describe adequately the laws of Nature in words, for language is all too weak for the purpose; and so their idea is expressed in accordance with certain rules (47-52).

[1] This, as the *Mīmāṁsā* tells us, is our authority for dividing words into parts, and no other authority is required. If we can divide the word *pṛshad-ājya* into two parts to get its meaning, we can also further divide it or any other word into its component syllables or letters or both. The test in each case is the meaning we are able to obtain. This is the secret of this method of interpretation.

Vishnu refers to the function of the mind in association with the intellect and the objects of Nature; and all his actions can be understood in this light. It is this idea that has been expressed in terms of the no-moon and the full-moon night (53-58).

Certain expressions have only one meaning, while others have two; and it is necessary to use our intelligence to understand them, otherwise we shall find that we have made a change for the worse. Nor should we give an arbitrary meaning to a word; and a meaning can be regarded as properly fixed only when it yields a proper result; and it must, in any case, arise from the word itself, with all its parts unbroken (59-68).

The flow of Time is like one desire following another in an endless chain: hence Time is represented in terms of two successive desires (69-70).

RULES OF INTERPRETATION—If in the text there is a contradiction in respect of a matter that has been decided, or of a statement that has not been made, we should doubt if there really is such a contradiction. We cannot say that [1] we must accept the meaning as we find it, because it is possible to define the meaning of a word in two ways, if there are equally good reasons for doing so. But if our [2-3] doubt about the correctness of meaning is misplaced, we shall find that certain parts of the text will not fit into our ideas based on that doubt; and yet, whatever method of interpretation we use, the entire text should be included in it (1-4). [4]

NEW WORDS AND OLD—It is because the words used in the text are quite new that it is possible to have an explanation of their meaning in this manner. This would not be [5] possible in the case of existing words, used as they are, because they will make for a contradiction. But if a new [6] word is not invented, an existing word may be used if it can explain the idea. But if it does not give the required meaning, or if its meaning remains the same as before, a better word should be used. But it may be done by means of an [7]

old word, if it is equally suitable; and a subsidiary statement [8] can easily be made in this manner. It is not correct to say [9] that we cannot succeed, on the ground that the use of old words will involve a contradiction of ideas,—because they would be preceded by a number of other words, and that will enable us to understand the meaning (5-11). [10-11]

MEANING OF TOTAL RENUNCIATION—If there is a general statement, made by a sensible (or an initiated) person, to the effect that there should be no gifts, oblations, or the cooking of food, we should take it that it applies to all such acts (so that such a person may be said to believe in a total renunciation of action). But this is the law of life accord- [12] ing to those who believe in the annihilation of all desires; whereas he who has desires, must accept what has clearly been taught,—(namely, that he must act); and he can [13] come to this conclusion from a general idea of things. [14] If, however, we accept the other view, (namely, that all action should be renounced), we shall find that certain words in the text will have to be omitted; and in that case we should conclude that this view is unwarranted (or is true only in an exceptional case). In case of a total negation of action, we should doubt the correctness of our meaning. [15] Even if there is a statement of a general rule that all actions should be renounced, and we are unable to find an appropriate alternative meaning, it should be construed to refer to some special case where, because of some dangerous obstacle, action is not advised or allowed. But if the [16] statement refers to a subsidiary matter, we should take it that it relates to a particular case; and the words of the text, taken as they are, should be divided into parts in the same manner as we divide the word *ājya*, because their meaning in their common form is not permitted in such a case; and it [17]

can be obtained only by changing their form (12-18). 18

CHARACTER OF THE TEXT—(The character of the text is such that) if, in interpreting it in the light of desire or action, certain words are left out or remain unexplained, we shall find that it is due to the fact that we have not understood some statement of particulars which has yet to be made. In the *Mantras* or hymns of the Vedas (it is 19 a rule that) no words should be left out unexplained, if we understand their meaning in the light of their parts; 20 and even if a particular idea does not appear to have been mentioned, we shall come to know of it, because there will 21 be some contradictory statement to point it out (19-22). 22

INSTANCES—If we know what the offering made to *Agni* means (namely, that it refers to the action of the intellect), we shall be able to make progress with the text; and the 23 same thing applies to the word *mās*, because it is of the 24 same kind, and we can understand it in the same manner, 25 when we see through its "disguise"[1] (23-26). 26

When we interpret a word in this manner, its meaning should correspond to the statement of particulars given in the text; and so when we understand the meaning of the 27 word *mās*, we see that it has been used (for the mind) 28 to prevent repetition (27-28).

EXERCISE OF SKILL—To produce or coin a word to have a

[1] The word *mās* means "the moon", which, as we have seen, refers to the mind. If we see through its "disguise" or divide it into parts, —*m*, *ā*, *s*—the meaning would be "(*s*) the mind, (*ā*) associated with (*m*) the senses of knowledge"; and we notice that its idea is similar to that of *Soma*, which has the same meaning too.

particular meaning is a matter of skill. When the principal idea is characterised by intelligence (*Homa*), it is possible to superimpose on it the idea of goodness (*ājya*) too.[1] But when the two are not balanced, we should do as the people do (that is, balance them); and all this can be effected by means of the parts of words; but it can be accomplished 29 by means of intelligence. For instance, in the case of the 30 word *ājya*, the required effect is produced by means of its two parts; and if we use our intelligence, we can understand its meaning at once.[2] The text tells us that it is sprinkled over the fire twice; and we should be able to understand the meaning of this too from what has been taught.[3] 31 Having equated words in this manner, we should proceed methodically to distribute them; and we shall find that 32 their meaning can be determined in the same manner as that of the number seventeen;[4] for if we wish to describe an 33 intelligent act (*havis*),[5] we shall find that it has to be divided into parts in the same manner (29-34). 34

TWO KINDS OF DESIRE: A SIMILE—There are some who maintain that an intelligent action is performed by means

[1] The text refers to *Homa* and *ājya*; and the one means intelligence and the other goodness, as has already been explained.

[2] We have explained that it is necessary to reduce *ājya* to *aja*, from which it is derived; and then its meaning can be obtained by reducing *aja* to two parts,—*a*, *ja*.

[3] The common meaning of *ājya* is "clarified butter"; and it is said to be sprinkled over the fire. But it really means "goodness", while "fire" means "intelligence". To sprinkle "clarified butter" twice over the "fire" would, therefore, mean a double measure of goodness added to intelligence, so as to make it extremely good.

[4] The number seventeen, as has already been explained, refers to the soul or the intellect.

[5] *Havis*, as has already been explained, refers to an intelligent action.

of two kinds of desire[1] (good and bad); and they explain this idea in a manner that appeals to our intelligence, by comparing desires to a collection of peasants or working men (some good, some otherwise). This claim in regard to the character of desire is not unwarranted, because it is in accordance with an eternal law; and so the whole idea is complete and has been properly expressed. This being so, action cannot be performed by means of only one kind of desire, because we have to take into consideration the character of the doer of the deed; for the totality of desire is indeed like the mass of people (some good, some otherwise). All desire, however, does not arise from the doer of the deed; and since this can be understood from the meaning of the parts of words used in the text, it is not necessary to point this out separately. This is how we explain action; and because it is a proper method of doing so, the parts of words, in their "disguised" form, should tell us what is appropriate to the occasion. But, though he who uses his mind[2] can combine goodness with intelligence[3], there is no constant union of the two, because at different times they can remain apart (35-42).

35 36 37 38 39-40 41 42

NEED OF INTELLIGENCE—(We need to use our intelligence

[1] The word in the text is *puroḍāśa*, which means "*Soma-juice*". As *Soma* refers to the mind, its "*juice*" is obviously desire. Hence *puroḍāśa* means "desire arising from the mind".

[2] The word in the text is *Soma*, which refers to the mind.

[3] The word in the text is *sāmnayya*, which means "any substance mixed with clarified butter and offered as a burnt offering". We have explained that "clarified butter" refers to goodness; while fire (burnt offering) to the intellect; and so the mixture of the two is a combination of goodness with intelligence. The author has already told us that an intelligent action is not always good action or characterised by a good desire; and this is emphasised again.

to test the correctness of our meaning: for instance,) if an idea is expressed by means of the parts of a word, and, while so interpreting it, we have a doubt in regard to its real meaning, it would give us two meanings, associated with the character of two great forces of Nature (gods).[1] But it is not possible (to have two such forces), even as it is not possible to speak of two intellects in a man. Indeed, we have been taught that each idea (and so a part of a word) refers only to one great force of Nature; and *Bādarāyaṇa* agrees that that is the rule; and we find that it is so when we understand which of the meanings has to be rejected, and know the other (or the correct) one (43-46). 43 44 45-46

Silent Reading of the Text—When in the text there is a reference to its silent reading, we may interpret it as we like, if the materials of action (sacrifice) are not known; or if they are fixed, it is so because it is of a universal character; and the same is true of the great forces of Nature.[2] This is the system of those who follow rules in a scientific manner, because they can explain the text properly in this way; and we should be able to understand the real idea of *Prajāpati*[3] by means of the application of this rule. It is 47 48-49 50 51

[1] A god refers to the great forces of Nature. As the text deals with the working of the great laws of Nature, it describes the working of the great forces of Nature, which should not be mixed up.

[2] We have been told that in case where the text has to be recited silently, there should be no change in the form of words. Here we are told that we may do so if we like in certain cases,—where either we do not know the "materials of action", or they are fixed, because they relate to universal laws, as in the case of the great forces of Nature. In such cases there is no difference in meaning whether we take words as they are or divide them into parts.

[3] *Prajāpati* is an instance of a great power of Nature,—something of the character of a universal law; and so the meaning of his name

not possible to describe the laws of Nature adequately in words,—for language is all too weak for the purpose; and so the whole idea is expressed by means of the governing rule in this system[1] (47-52). 52

VISHNU—If we understand the idea of *Vishṇu* through a study of the sacred books, we find that he refers to that which refers to the functions of the mind *(hautra)*, where the mind is associated with the intellect as well as the objects of Nature. This is signified by the no-moon night,[2] and becomes intelligible when we understand what relates to the functions of the mind *(hautra)* (53). 53

The same idea can be understood in terms of the night of the full moon; and we can understand this if we know the

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is the same whether we take the word as it is or divide it into parts. *Prajāpati* means "the lord or creator of all created beings"; and we must agree that there is one, for these creatures have not created themselves. But his idea is not the same as that of God, conceived in a moral sense; and this has already been explained.

[1] The governing rule in this system is that if we get a rational meaning without dividing words into parts, we should accept it; otherwise we should divide words into parts.

[2] *Hautra* means "relating to *Hotṛ*", who refers to the mind.

It is said that the moon is invisible on the no-moon night, because it dwells with the sun. As the moon refers to the mind, and the sun to the intellect, the idea of the moon dwelling with the sun is the same as that of the union of the mind and the intellect; while the night refers to Nature, as the day to *Purusha* or God, as we have explained. Thus we might say that the no-moon night is symbolic of the association of the mind (moon) with the intellect (sun) as well as the objects of Nature; and it is this that is represented by *Vishṇu.*

The *Mīmānsā* has explained that if we divide words into parts, we should be able to get their real meaning. It has also told us that this should specially be done in the case of the gods referred to in the Vedas. As *Vishṇu* is one of these gods, we should be able to get his exact idea by dividing the name into parts; and that will enable us to see if it fits into the meaning given here.

meaning of the principal words.[1] In the same manner we shall find that if we divide words into parts, the hymns of the Vedas become as easy to follow as the principal words.[2] Then we shall understand how, when the no-moon night changes into the new-moon night, it represents the uninterrupted succession of goodness combined with intelligence,[3] by means of the character of

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The word *Vishṇu*,— *V*, *i*, *sh*, *ṇ*, *u*—would mean "(*u*, a particle implying assent or emphasis) verily (*ṇ*) the intellect and (*sh*) the mind (*i*) associated with (*v*) Nature"; and so we find that the analysis of the parts of the name gives us the same identical meaning.

We are told that *Kṛshṇa* is a perfect "incarnation" or embodiment of the idea of *Vishṇu*; and so his name too should give us the same meaning; and we find that it is so: for *Kṛshṇa*—*K*, *ṛ*, *sh*, *ṇa*—means "(*ṇa*) the intellect and (*sh*) the mind (*ṛ*) associated with (*k*) Nature". We notice that the idea is exactly the same. (Cf. MM. I, 398-412).

It has been said that the no-moon night refers to the union of the moon and the sun, or the mind and the intellect; and that is indicated in the conjunct consonant *sh-ṇ* in both *Vishṇu* and *Kṛshṇa*.

It may be of interest to observe that the sun and the moon actually travel together during the period covered by the no-moon night. They are together in the east on the morning of that day, and set together in the west in the evening; and so they are said to dwell together.

[1] We have already explained that the full moon refers to the full action of the mind, when desire develops into deeds; and the *Mimānsā* tells us that the idea of *Vishṇu* is represented also by the full moon, —that is, by the full function of the mind, when the latter may, for practical purposes, be identified with the intellect. That is, it represents the union of goodness with intelligence in the working of the great forces of Nature; and that is the idea of *Vishṇu*, says the *Mīmānsā*. It also tells us that we can understand it if we know the idea of the principal words,—that is, the sun and the moon here. If we understand that they refer to the intellect and the mind, we shall know what the exact idea is.

[2] We have been told that if we understand the real meaning of words by means of this method, the *Mantras* or hymns would be transformed into *Vidhi* or the laws of Nature.

[3] The word used in the text is *sāmnayya* which, as has already been explained, refers to goodness combined with intelligence.

desire[1]; and when we understand the detailed description of *Agni* and *Soma*, we shall see how they can both be fitted into the idea of the full moon.[2] Although the no-moon night is the opposite of the full-moon night, both of them represent, by special arrangement, the same idea[3]; and *Vishṇu* occupies the same place in both.[4] It is in this manner that we can understand the meaning of other terms used in the text (54-58). 55 56 57 58

SPECIAL CASES—An expression for a formless or abstract idea, uttered at once, should not be arranged in two different ways, as it would lose its connection thereby; and that is due to the fact the parts of words are intended to serve a different purpose; and the use of such words enables us to understand the law of symbols used in the text.[5] But if there is lack of intelligence in the application of this method, we shall find that we have made a change for the worse; for 59 60 61

[1] The word in the text is *puroḍāśa* which, as has already been explained, refers to desire as an attribute of the mind.

[2] We have already explained that *Agni* refers to the intellect, and *Soma* to the mind; while the full moon refers to the full function of the mind, when it may, for practical purposes, be identified with the intellect. Thus the combination of *Soma* and *Agni* is the combination of the mind and the intellect, which is symbolised by the full moon.

[3] The no-moon night gives us the idea of the union of the moon and the sun or the mind and the intellect; and the full-moon does the same.

[4] *Vishṇu* refers to the union of the mind with the intellect; and so is associated with both the no-moon and full-moon nights.

[5] The *Mīmānsā* has already explained that the purpose of the parts of a word is to express the idea of the different parts of an action or an object; that is, to define things exactly and accurately But if the thing itself is formless or indefinite, no useful purpose will be served by dividing the corresponding word into parts.

instance, we shall get two meanings of the word *puroḍāśa*,[1] because of the different ways of understanding it; and we 62 must use our intelligence so as not to create (unwarranted) relationships between the meanings of words. We must not 63 agree to an arbitrary meaning of a word, because the words used in the text have a special significance of their own; 64 and they are so inter-connected, that not a single word can be left out. But the meaning should be regarded as properly 65 fixed only when it yields a proper result,—and that should be obtained with all the parts of a word remaining uninjured or whole, when we have discovered a suitable meaning, and there is a proper effect of that meaning on the rest of the text. In the absence of this, we should take it that the method of interpretation has not been intelligently applied. 66 (However we interpret the text,—whether in the common way or by division of words into parts,) the meaning in both cases should arise from the manner in which the words are arranged; and we must remember that the parts of a word 67 exist not for themselves, but for the sake of the meaning of the whole; and they serve this purpose like sticks of green wood used to stir the sacrificial fire whenever required (59-68). 68

As one desire follows another in an endless succession, such is the uninterrupted flow of Time; and so Time is represented in terms of two successive desires. This is 69 done to avoid repetition, and to elicit praise (69-70). 70

[1] The word *puroḍāśa* has a number of meanings,—sacrifice, prayer, *Soma-juice*, etc., and we have to use our intelligence to fix upon a proper one and to explain it correctly too. Even if we take it to mean *Soma-juice*, we have again to explain it as meaning desire. If we do not use our intelligence, we shall get more than one meaning of the word, and that will cause confusion.

CHAPTER XI

PART I

ACTION, EFFORT AND RESULT: THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

Every action has an aim, and there is unity in all action; but the result of each action is different (1-4).

Each part of a word refers to a separate action, or its object or result (5-8), as well as the character of the doer of the deed (9-10).

We can express the idea of a single action by means of a single note, and that is the best mode of its expression (11-15); and this is based on the principle that there is only one exercise of intelligence at a time: it also prevents repetition (16-18); but we can do as we like in the concluding parts of a word (19).

All action implies effort and also an expectation of result; but the result arises out of something more (20-21). When, however, the result accompanies action, its idea should be described by means of the common meaning of words; or we may do as we like. But if a whole idea is expressed by means of a single word, it is necessary to divide the latter into parts (22-25).

The common people judge an action by its result. The idea of result is important, for an action comes to an end only when its result does so (26-28). The result of an action corresponds to its purpose or design (29-32); but it is not possible to lay down any fixed rules as to how this purpose should be expressed (33-34). If there is no expectation of result, an action may be said to have been performed for its own sake (35).

We should, as far as possible, avoid repetition (36-37), for it can easily cause confusion (38-42).

The principle of interpretation is that we should take the common meanings of words; but if they do not make sense, we should divide them into parts (43-46). We cannot, however, put in much in the last portions of a word (or the text) (47-50).

All intelligent action involves a reference to the forces of Nature (51-52); and we can understand this if we divide words into parts (53); and this design of division is indicated by the *Krama* method of reading the text (54-55). When, however, the parts of an action are equal, the idea can be expressed by means of a single note (56).

The parts of a word which have the same meaning should be in close proximity to one another (57-61); and this rule commonly applies to all principal words (62).

We cannot have a single method of interpretation (63-64); but whatever method we adopt, it should have a regular plan, and be governed by definite rules (65-67).

There is a difference of time even in notes uttered simultaneously. This has a special importance, and is expressed by means of a separate rule (68-71).

UNITY IN ACTION—As each action, taken separately, is connected with a purpose or aim, there is a unity in all actions performed by creatures; and that is expressed by means of the connection of each part of a word with the other. We should thus be able to assign a motive to each [1] action, even as we assign to it an effect or result; and all [2] this is in accordance with a law. So far as effect is concerned, [3] it is for the sake of something other than the action; for that is its law, as we may see in every principal action (1-4). [4]

HOW DESCRIBED—(All this is described by means of words, which need to be divided into parts to be understood). With regard to the parts of a word,—as they consist of different notes, (each of them represents an action or a part of an action), and they should each, according to this design, have a separate effect. As there is a separate pur- [5] pose in the case of each action, even so there is a separate meaning in the case of each note of a word; and so we might say that a singleness of purpose makes for a singleness of action. We cannot deny that this is true (of the different [6] notes or parts of a word), for if it is true that every action has a purpose, (and it has to be described by means of words), it follows that this can be done by means of the different notes or parts of words, each with a meaning of its own (5-8). [7-8]

CONNECTION BETWEEN ACTIONS AND WORDS—Every person has his own manner of performing action, and each

action has a purpose of its own; and it is in order to represent this that the principal words in the text are divided into parts. (This illustrates the connection between actions and words), for the commencement of action is preceded by words (9-10). 9 10

HOW DESCRIBED—We should be able to describe the idea of an action by means of a single note, and we can succeed in the task, with the result that our aim and achievement would be expressed in the highest form. We cannot say that it is impossible to achieve this result, because each note can refer to an action, so that there would be no lack of proper expression. Nor can we say that a single note cannot represent a single action,—for each object of action is separate, and it can be made equal to a single note; and there would be no need of further sub-division (11-15). 11 12-13 14-15

A SCIENTIFIC METHOD—This mode of expression is based on the principle that there is a single exercise of intelligence at a time; and the arrangement is such that there is no repetition. That is easily seen, because we can get the meaning if we read the text according to *Krama*.[1] Each principal word is capable of being handled as the author thinks fit; and that is the reason why the whole presentation is so fine. It is in this manner that action should be described, for in any other mode of writing there is bound to be a repetition of words (16-18). 16 17 18

[1] The idea of *Krama* has already been explained. It indicates that each part of a word is a separate entity, and conveys an idea of its own. It also ensures that no part of a word is omitted or lost sight of in any case.

AN EXCEPTION—But if the concluding parts of a word are not distinct, and if we are able otherwise to get a satisfactory meaning of special terms, we may deal with them as we like[1] (19). 19

ACTION AND RESULT—All action implies effort; and, as we expect a result when we cultivate the soil, there should be result following an effort or the commencement of an action. Those who act, lay claim to the result of action; 20 but it arises only when something special takes place[2]; 21 and that too immediately after an act is done; and we have the same thing in the case of the sub-division of words into parts.[3] Where, however, the result accompanies action, 22 the meaning of a word is its common meaning; or we may, 23 by common consent, take it as we like[4]; and if the mode of expression is such that the idea is not clear, a number of words may be used. But if we wish to express the 24 whole idea by means of a single word, we have to divide it into parts (20-25). 25

[1] In certain cases the idea of the last part of a word is not clear. For instance, when we divide the word *Vishṇu* into parts,— *V*, *i*, *sh*, *ṇ*, *u* —we get its real meaning from *V*, *i*, *sh*, *ṇ*; and the last *u*, which is interpreted to mean "verily", can easily be omitted; or we may deal with it as we like.

[2] The *Bhagavad Gītā* also tells us that we can act, but we cannot claim to get the fruit of its result (BhG. II, 47).

[3] We have to do something special to get the meaning of words after dividing them into parts,—that is, use our intelligence. The result of an action requires something similar too: something special following an action.

[4] "Doing what we like" means that we may take the common meaning of a word, or divide it into parts, as we like. It would make little difference to the word, for the meaning would be the same in both cases. We have seen that there are instances of this kind.

RESULT AS A CONTINUATION OF ACTION—So far as the common people are concerned, they understand the idea of action in terms of its result. Its direct perception also arises from that (result); and it is for this reason that it is only when the result of an action comes to an end, that the action itself really comes to an end too. As a matter of common practice, however, we do not understand this; so that we often believe that there is an end to action when we have described its meaning in words (26-28). 26 27 28

CONNECTION BETWEEN RESULT AND AIM—The result of an action corresponds to its design or plan; and if we use our power of inference properly, we should be able to get the idea of the entire result of action from what we expect to happen. But where there is only one action, the result should arise immediately; only in such a case there is no fixed rule for measuring it. All that we can say is that when a person has done with one result, he plans another (29-32). 29 30 31 32

DIFFICULTY OF MEASURING PURPOSE—If a word does not convey its meaning properly, its repetition would be as useless as the repetition of food. As the meaning of a word cannot be limited to one sense, whereas the purpose of an action is connected with the principal word, it is not possible to lay down any fixed rules as to how this purpose in action can be described in words. Its only measure is that it should be fixed separately in each case (33-34). 33 34

ACTION PERFORMED FOR ITS OWN SAKE—There should be no repetition if, by uttering one word, we are able to express the whole idea, and if a single direction applies to

all cases simultaneously. If there is no expectation of the fruit of action, the action should be regarded as having been performed for its own sake (35). 35

CASES FOR REPETITION AND NO REPETITION—But it would be necessary to have repetition in cases of removal of doubt, purification, and great and glorious deeds, because what has been said about the principle of simultaneity (should apply to such cases). 36 But if a thing has been expressly stated or defined in a particular manner, there should be no repetition at all (36-37). 37

CASES FOR AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION—If we are able to obtain everything from the text, but it is done by means of too many words, we should believe that there is an alternative to it. Indeed, we shall find that it is so; 38-40 but it is not so in a number of cases in succession: it is so only in a few scattered places (38-42). 41-42

PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION—The principle of interpretation is that we should follow the fixed rules of composition, and they should be varied only for some special reason; 43 but we should see that the meaning of the text is uniform throughout. 44 It is in this manner that we can understand all other meanings of the text; 45 and that, as has already been explained, can be done by reducing words to their rudimentary form, because we can get an uninterrupted sequence of meaning of the text in this manner (43-46). 46

WHAT CAN BE STATED AT THE END—In the last portion of the text it is not possible to put in all that we might like to do, if it has not already been stated before. 47 But

if there is an earlier statement of particulars to the same effect, we may put in whatever we like by way of further explanation. This is permitted, because the idea is to make a complete statement of all particulars, and to satisfy the requirements of many other things (47-50).

INTELLIGENT ACTION AND FORCES OF NATURE—The rule in regard to an intelligent action[1] is that it involves a reference to Nature[2] as a whole; and this has already been explained. It is for this reason that the knowledge of Nature[3] is forbidden in the case of children (51-52).

EFFECT OF "DISGUISE" AND KRAMA—Even though we may be satisfied that we have got all that we wanted out of the text, we shall find,—if we refer to its "disguised" form—that it is connected with the great forces of Nature.[4] In this design or form of presentation, each part of a word represents a distinct part of a principal action, and expresses its meaning. This is also indicated by the *Krama* method of reciting the text, for if we pronounce all parts of a word simultaneously, it would be incompatible with *Krama*.[5] Where, however, the parts of an action are equal

[1] The word in the text is *Agni-hotra* which, as we have seen, refers to intelligent action.

[2] The word in the text is *yuvāgū*, which means "rice gruel, or any weak decoction of other kinds of grain". The *Mīmānsā* has already explained that grain,—specially rice, refers to Nature.

[3] The word in the text is *payas*, which means "water;" and that, as the *Mīmānsā* has already explained, refers to Nature.

[4] The word in the text is *Devatā* which, as has already been explained, refers to the great forces of Nature.

The "disguise" of an expression refers to its formation by means of its parts.

[5] This explains clearly the object of reciting the text according to *Krama*. Each part of a word has to be pronounced separately,

or the same, we can pronounce all the parts simultaneously because they can be represented by a single note, and we cannot perceive any difference between them. These parts of a word should, however, be very close to each other, because they have the same meaning. In this manner we can understand other meanings too, says *Kāmukāyana*[1] (53-58).

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A Proper Mode of Expression—This is a proper mode of expression; and where we are unable to understand the meaning of the text, it should be regarded as the normal mode of expression, because that is what we mean when we speak of the correct formation and use of words.[2] Even a single word, unconnected with any other word, is intended to mean the same thing.[3] (There is no obscurity about it) for it is to be found everywhere, and is clear like a lamp (59-61).

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A Single Method is not Possible—(It may be argued that) this rule should commonly apply to every principal word, for it stands separately by itself.[4] According to

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because it represents a distinct part of a principal action; and so we must not pronounce all the parts of a word simultaneously.

[1] *Kāmukāyana* is the name of a teacher or philosopher. The *Mīmānsā*, however, does not agree with a number of his views.

[2] The "correct formation and use of words" (*Sańskāra*) refers to their formation by means of parts, for we can get their correct meaning in that way.

[3] A single word, unconnected with any other word, is meant to be like a single note or a part of a word; and would serve the same purpose as the latter,—that is, express the idea of a part of an action.

[4] There are some who believe that, as the principal word stands by itself, it should be deemed to be like a single word, unconnected with any other word, and so serve the same purpose as the latter; and, as we take this "single word" as a whole word, without dividing it

Kāmukāyana, there should be only one way of interpreting the text, for otherwise there would be a conflict in the measure of values. But if this rule does not make for a proper meaning of the text, a single method of dealing with it would be irrational. According to *Bādarāyaṇa*,[1] there should be some method in our plan of interpretation, and there should be no break in the explanation. But there are some who hold that there should be a uniform method of dealing with all words. However, we cannot say that there are no rules in connection with our method of interpretation, for it is all governed by definite rules (62-67).

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TIME FACTOR IN ACTION: HOW DESCRIBED—As has already been explained, the parts of words expressive of things of equal or the same value, should be uttered simultaneously, because we cannot perceive any difference between them. But there may be a difference even among such things, arising from the difference of time. That, however, should be expressed in a special way; for the Time-factor is important, and so there should be a special rule in connection with it.[2] It is in this manner that we can understand the different meanings (or implications) of the same thing. But this is not governed by a general rule, and depends on the statement of the facts as they are (68-71).

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into parts, we should do the same with the principal word. But the *Mīmānsā* has told us that we need to divide the principal word into parts to understand its meaning. This is accordingly an opposite view, and is rejected by the *Mīmānsā*.

[1] *Bādarāyaṇa* is the celebrated author of *Vedānta Sūtras*.

[2] There is a reference to Time later in this Chapter (See XI, ii, 21-25; iii, 11-12; iv, 19-20).

PART II

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

If a single note expresses the idea of principal things, they should be found together, and should have the same maker (1)

All things are connected together in accordance with a law; and even so the meanings of all expressions are connected with the principal word (2); but not so the meanings of parts of words where the great forces of Nature are concerned (3). In other cases, however, it should be possible to have this connection (4); and it is in this manner that we understand the meaning of the text (5).

Each part of a word is separate, because it has to correspond to each part of an action, and has a bearing on the idea of the principal word (6-7); but not so in the case of the great forces of Nature (8-9).

There is a theory in connection with the idea of the parts of a word, which enables us to understand the rest of the text (10). In certain cases we can easily understand the meaning of an expression from that of its parts, for they have been formed in accordance with this theory (11-16). In the case of animals, however, this theory needs to be modified, because the nature of their impelling force is different (17); but we can represent the function of the mind and its relation to desire in this manner (18-19). With regard to words formed in accordance with this theory, we can understand their meaning from their parts (20-22).

An intelligent action is connected with the great forces of Nature; but the latter may be different at different times (23-27).

If the principal word is removed, we cannot understand the meaning of the text (28-31).

We can understand the real idea of the gods only if we divide their names into parts; but it requires intelligence to do so, and there should be general agreement about it (32-44). No great knowledge is, however, required to understand all this (45-48).

There appear to be two intelligent conceptions of life in the sacred books, and according to one of them we are required to renounce all action. But we should understand what all this really means (49-54).

A principle or rule means that what applies to one case should apply to all similar cases too; but, as there are different categories of actions, there are also different sets of rules (55-66).

A SINGLE WORD AND PRINCIPAL THINGS—If a single note is used to describe something in connection with principal things, they should be found in the same place and at the same time, and should have the same maker (1). 1

CONNECTION BETWEEN OBJECTS, ACTIONS AND WORDS—If there were no prescribed law, we should have to admit that there is no close connection between actions. But since there is a law, and things are closely connected with one another, the meaning of all expressions should be related to the principal word. But this is not so with 2 the parts of a word in their relation to the principal word, in the case of the great forces of Nature, with reference to their relation to the objects of life.[1] But if each action 3 is governed by a law, it should be possible to express the idea of this connection by means of a single note, because it can be closely connected with the principal object. 4 Thus, all parts of a word can be closely connected with one another; and it is in this manner that we can understand the rest of the meaning of the text (2-5). 5

PARTS OF A WORD AND THE PRINCIPAL WORD—There is a reason why each part of a word should be separate, even as we find in the case of the principal word; because it is a law of life that all action is performed for the sake of something else; and it is necessary to remember this, because the idea of action is not always clearly understood. 6 The text is so arranged, that each part of a word has a bearing on the idea of the principal word, and can be

[1] The expression in the text is *Dravya-Devatā*; and we have explained that *Devatā* refers to the great forces of Nature, and *Dravya* to certain fundamental substances like the great "elements," etc.

explained in its light; and it is in this manner that the whole text has been integrated (6-7). 7

FORCES OF NATURE AND PARTS OF WORDS—But the idea of the great forces of Nature, in their relation to their objects, does not correspond to that of the parts of words, because the direction in regard to the latter is of a subsidiary character, whereas that in respect of the forces of Nature is a special one (8-9). 8-9

THEORY OF PARTS OF WORDS—There is a theory[1] in connection with the parts of words, explaining how and why they are brought together, as well as the distinction between them. When we understand this, we shall understand the distinction between the different kinds of actions that has been made by means of them, as also their connection with the principal word, which will enable us to understand the rest of the text (10). 10

ILLUSTRATIONS—In words like *ishṭi*, *rājasūya*, and *chatur-*

[1] This theory, as has already been explained, is that a great action is divisible into a number of parts,—each of which is denoted by a part of a word. Ordinarily each part of an action is described by means of one or more words; but in this system each letter or syllable does duty for a whole word or even a number of words. It is, therefore, a simpler and briefer way of describing an action.

Now the question is, what is the connection of the parts of a word with the principal word in the text? It is obvious that the parts of a word must be connected with one another, because they represent parts of an action, which are connected together in accordance with the law of life. The *Mīmānsā* says that the parts of a word are also connected with the principal word, with the exception of cases where we are dealing with the great forces of Nature in their relation to their objects; for these are major ideas, and so the words describing them are complete in themselves, without reference to the principal word in the text.

māsya,—as they are characterised by unity of action—we should find the characteristic features of their parts.[1] 11
We cannot, however, say that the difference in the idea of action, as expressed by them, arises from the difference of Time, because they are conceived as parts of a whole, and we can distinguish between them as we can in the case of animals.[2] They refer to different states of action;[3] 12–13
and, as they have been formed in accordance with the theory (referred to above), we should know what they

[1] We have explained that the meaning of the word *ishṭi* can be obtained by dividing it into *ish*, *ṭ*, *i*,—"(*ish*, to desire) desire, associated with (*ṭ*) the senses of knowledge and (*i*) the mind".

Similarly, *rājasūya*—*r*, *ā*, *ja*, *s*, *ū*, *ya*—would mean "(*r*) the senses of action (*ā*) associated with (*ja*) what is produced by (*s*) the mind (*ū*) woven with (*ya*) the intellect". It refers, therefore, to the function of the intellect and the mind, in association with the senses of action; and that is the idea of *rājasūya* as a sacrifice.

In the same manner *chatur-māsya*,—*chatur*, *m*, *ā*, *s*, *ya*—would mean (*chatur*) skill associated with (*m*) the senses of knowledge (*ā*) associated with (*s*) the mind and (*ya*) the intellect". It means, therefore, skill in action, where the intellect, mind, and the senses play their part.

[2] We find that these words represent three different states, to which there is a reference in the following *Sūtra*; and so the difference between them is not due to a mere passage of time, when one thing changes into another. They may rather be distinguished as separate ideas, in the same manner as we distinguish between different kinds of animals,—men, horses, cows, goats, and sheep.

[3] The three states represented by these words are as follows:—

Ishṭi refers to desire, which comes into being when the mind awakens and is associated with the senses of knowledge at least;

Rājasūya is the function of the mind and the intellect, when they engage in real action; and

Chatur-māsya refers to skill in such action, by means of which a person can act and yet be free from the taint of action,—in the same sense in which the *Bhagavad Gītā* calls *Yoga* "skill in action (BhG. II, 50).

mean from the parts of which they are composed. It is in this manner that we can understand other meanings too; and find them in the parts of words (11-16).

CASE OF ANIMALS—In the case of animals, however, this theory will have to be modified, because the nature of their impelling force is different[1] (17).

THE MIND—We can represent the action of the mind in this manner, and fit it into the idea of desire, which is its special attribute, and arises at the same time with it, even as we have understood it (18-19).

ISHTI—With regard to the different ideas of action signified by these (three) names,—as they have been formed in accordance with this theory—we should be able to get their real meaning from their parts.[2] With regard to the first of these (namely, *ishṭi* or desire), the idea of Time is specially associated with it.[3] We can take this word *ishṭi* like any other word, for its result will be the same in whichever way we take it[4] (20-22).

INTELLIGENT ACTION, TIME, AND THE FORCES OF NATURE—

[1] The *Mīmānsā* has already explained that the idea of animals is so clear that it is not necessary to divide words into parts to understand their meaning.

[2] We have seen how we get the meaning of these words by dividing them into parts.

[3] We have been told that desire arises at the same time that the mind begins to function: hence the idea of Time is involved in that of desire.

[4] The word *ishṭi*, taken as a whole word, means "desire"; and if we divide it into parts we get the same meaning again. This is one of those words which we can take "as we like".

If we are dealing with one clear intelligent action (*Homa*), it should refer to only one act of the great forces of Nature (*Devatā*), if it is declared to have been done at one time. 23
If, however, the times are different, the forces of Nature may be different too. In conclusion we might say that 24 all intelligent action is like that,[1] because anything dif- 25 ferent is not possible; and this is only an explanatory 26 repetition of what has already been said; (only it has been 26a stated more directly) because it would be contrary to rules to think of the intellect as being different at different places[2] (23-27). 27

IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPAL WORD—If the principal word is omitted, we cannot understand the meaning of the text; 28 and it would be incorrect to imagine that we can, in spite of it; for the connection between understanding and the principal word is as close as that between the great forces of Nature and the fundamental substances associated with them.[3] Each word, complete in all its parts, is 29

[1] The expression in the text is *yūpa-āhuti*; and the *Mīmānsā* has already explained that *yūpa* refers to selfless action; while *āhuti* means "offering oblation with fire to the deities"; and, as fire refers to the intellect, and the deities to the forces of Nature,—it means an intelligent action associated with the great forces of Nature. *Yūpa-āhuti* would accordingly mean such selfless action,—implying that the great forces of Nature act intelligently and selflessly; and it is for this reason that the idea of sacrifice can be associated with them; and the *Bhagavad Gītā* can tell us that "rain arises from sacrifice" (BhG. III, 14); for rain may be regarded as the result of a good, intelligent and selfless action of the great forces of Nature.

[2] The intellect of a man is the same, though it may act differently at different times, because of different circumstances.

[3] The expression in the text is *Dravya-Devatā*; and *Dravya* refers to great substances like the great "elements," etc.; while *Devatā* signifies a great force of Nature. The two are obviously connected together.

accordingly made to fit into this plan of composition; 30
and we can understand its meaning if we see through its
"disguise" (28-31). 31

MEANING OF GODS—It is only when we divide words into parts, that we can eliminate erroneous ideas about the gods of the Vedas.[1] Thus if we understand the mean- 32
ing of the words *Dakshiṇa-Agni* and *Varuṇa-praghāsa*, their whole idea would, because of change of place, be altered.[2] There may be no direction to point to this 33

[1] The *Mīmānsā* has already told us that we can get the real meaning of the gods of the Vedas by dividing their names into parts; and then we shall find that they refer to the great forces of Nature, working intelligently, selflessly, and for the well-being of life itself.

[2] The common meaning of *Dakshiṇa-Agni* is "the southern altar of *Agni*"; and of *Varuṇa-praghāsa* "a periodical oblation offered at the full moon of the month of *Ashāḍa*, for obtaining exemption from *Varuṇa*'s noose".

But these meanings make little sense. On the other hand, if we understand that the word *Dakshiṇa* refers to skill, and *Agni* to the intellect,—*Dakshiṇa-Agni* would mean "a skilful action of the intellect".

Similarly, *Varuṇa* is the god of waters which, as the *Mīmānsā* has explained, refer to Nature or *Prakṛti*; while *praghāsa* means "a devourer". Thus *Varuṇa-praghāsa* would mean "*Varuṇa*, the devourer" or "*Prakṛti*, the devourer". This obviously implies that a certain belief in *Prakṛti* or Nature makes it into a "devourer"; and that can only refer to Nature being the sole supreme creator of life; for, if we believe this, we must agree that there can be no peace or happiness without renunciation of action,—and that means that we must put an end to our life. Hence this belief makes Nature into a destructive force,—a "devourer".

This is the "snare" or "noose" of *Varuṇa*,—belief in Nature as the supreme creator of life; and we are told that in order to obtain "exemption" or freedom from it, we must make oblation at the full moon of the month of *Ashāḍa*. Now, we have seen that the full moon refers to the full function of the mind, when the latter may, for practical purposes, be identified with the intellect; while the word *Ashāḍa* is derived from *A-shāḍa*, which means "not to be overcome".

interpretation; but we should understand it in the same manner as we understand the reference to the full-moon.[1] 34-35 There is at least a direction in regard to the connection with the idea of the full moon;[2] and it is even so in the present case (32-37). 36-37

Opinion of Learned Men—All this, however, is not laid down in the text; but it is obtained by something higher still,—the unanimous opinion of learned men; and we 38-39 invoke their authority, because the idea has not been distinctly expressed (38-40). 40

The Language of the Vedas—The language of the Vedas is like that; and that is not due to any difference between 41 the authors of the text, but rather to their fullest agreement; and we can understand their real meaning if we 42-43 see through the "disguise" of words (41-44). 44

How to Understand This—It does not require a great deal of knowledge to understand all this: what is necessary

"The full moon in the month of *Ashāḍa*" refers, therefore to the determination of the mind or the intellect not to be overcome by this belief, and to act in a spirit of sacrifice, by means of which we can act and yet be free from the taint of action, and so be free from the "noose of *Varuṇa*".

[1] The idea of the full moon has already been explained.

[2] There is authority for the association of the Moon with the mind, for the *Rig Veda* tells us that the Moon was created out of the Mind of the Supreme (RV.X, xc, 13); and there are repeated references to the association of the two in the sacred books.

The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we have to use our intelligence, and understand the meaning of other words in the same manner as we understand the idea of the full moon,—as a full expression of the function of the mind. It is not necessary to have detailed directions or definition of words in every case.

is that we should know the measure of words (or how to divide them into parts and understand their meaning). 45-46 Thus if we understand the meaning of the word *Agni*,[1] we can get the meaning of other words too by means of the same principles (of interpretation). There is, however, 47 a difference between the mode of composition of different authors of the text (45-48). 48

TWO VIEWS REGARDING INTELLECT—When we think of *Agni* (or intellect) in the light of any general rules, we find that its idea is the same as that of a great creative power.[2] At the same time there is another equally important view (in connection with the function of the intellect), according to which we are required to go and dwell in a forest (or renounce action). Hence in any hymns addressed to *Brahman*, we should have a clear (or separate) direction as to which idea (of the intellect) is meant to be conveyed.[3] But if the statement is the same 49

[1] *Agni* refers to the intellect, as has already been explained.

[2] Intellect (*Agni*) is a great creative power; and we create things if we act in its light.

This is one view of the intellect,—namely, that we should act and create; the other follows.

[3] The other important view of life, also in the light of the character of the intellect, is that we should renounce action. As these are two entirely different views of life, there should be a clear indication as to which of the two is really meant.

These two views would appear to correspond to the idea of *Nir-bīja* and *Sa-bīja Samādhi*, to which there is a reference to both in the *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* systems of philospphy. *Samādhi* meant "intense contemplation of a particular object, as a result of which the contemplator becomes identified with the object contemplated"; and so it is a function of the intellect. *Nirbīja-samādhi* is that act of contemplation which is not followed by any further action; while *Sa-bīja samādhi* is that which is. The one stands for complete renunciation of action,

(in both cases), and there is no attempt at "refinement" (or distinction), it is because there is common ground (in regard to the whole conception of life).[1] Indeed, if we understand the nature of things, we shall realise that there can be no question of associating anything good with what is worthless.[2] But we cannot say that the function of the senses is an evil even in the autumn of our life;[3] and there is unanimity of opinion in the matter. The expressions used in the text in this connection are quite clear, as we can see for ourselves (49-54).

50 51 52–53 54

MEANING OF A PRINCIPLE—(A principle or rule means that what applies to one case should apply equally to all similar cases: for instance,) it is a rule that when the mind

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while the other for action; and both are based on the character of the idea of the intellect.

The *Brāhmaṇa* portion of the Veda refers to *Brahman*.

[1] Both the ideas are correct,—only at different stages of life. We must act so long as we live; but when death approaches, we must renounce all action. Hence there is common ground between these two points of view,—time or stages of life.

[2] When death draws near, the body becomes "worthless", and we cannot associate any action or anything good with it. It can only be buried or burnt.

The expressions in the text mean "shavings, shearings", and "act of sprinkling clarified butter or *ghee*"; and the former has been rendered as "something worthless", and the latter as "something good". We have seen that "clarified butter" signifies something that is good.

[3] A man can cease to act only when he is actually dying; and he cannot regard action as an evil even in the autumn of his life. Renunciation of action is possible only in the winter of life, not its autumn, —that is, only when the end is near.

The text refers to the number "five" which, as has already been explained, refers to the functions of the senses, for there are five senses of knowledge and five of action.

functions[1] (or desire awakens), we have to pay for it; and if we anticipate this in one case, we should be able to do so in all similar cases too: A principle or theory is like that; and similar statements made in the text are of this 55 kind. But even if there is no express mention of what 56 we should anticipate, we should assume it, if it is warranted by the meaning of the text: for instance, we know 57 from experience that what is true of an initial action is true of a supplementary action too (55-58). 58

DIFFERENT KINDS OF ACTION—With regard to serious actions, the rule is that they should be performed after due preparation, and for a higher end. Again, we may 59 have the same kind of actions if the occasion for them is the same. In the case of a supplementary action,—if 60 it continues in the same place—its withdrawal may be represented in the same manner as an animal "dragged away."[2] But there may still be cases of misconduct, as 61 is well known. This is not a mere supposition, for we 62 know what happens when such acts are done; and we find 63 that the result is like that.[3] It is, however, true that it 64 would be a mere supposition if it had no relation to real action; for an action has a meaning only in the light of 65

[1] The word in the text is *peya*, which means "to be tasted or drunk"; and that, as in the case of *Soma* or "wine", refers to the function of the mind or its attribute, desire. The idea is that, if we wish to drink something, or satisfy our desire, we must pay for it. We cannot get something for nothing; and so this may be said to be a principle or a general rule.

[2] The idea of an animal being "dragged away" is explained in the next chapter (XII, ii, 30-37), where it signifies restraint in sex life. The idea here is also the same.

[3] Indulgence or excess is a kind of misconduct, and it leads to well known evil results.

its result. This is like a mixture of things, and we have to sort out its purpose from the statement of particulars (59-66). 66

PART III

THE INSTRUMENTS AND OBJECT OF ACTION

The meaning of the parts of words should be the same throughout (1).

When no particular purpose is served by an action, it should be deemed to be for the benefit of all (2). This is represented by *yūpa* or a "sacrificial post" (3); and we can understand its meaning by dividing it into parts (4-7). The *svaru* (another word for a sacrificial post) completes the whole idea of action (8-10). Its time of occurrence may, in certain cases, be compared to a sacrificial seat (11-12).

If in a great sacrifice a person casts away the best, it means that there is a doubt about the action itself (13).

A person does the best he can at a time; and this is represented by the direction that we should follow up the working of the mind early in the morning, for the mind is at its best at the time (14). The direction to engage in a sacrifice means the same thing (15).

Animals too have a mind (16). The union of the mind with the intellect makes for the best action, as well as freedom from its bondage (17-19). The parts of a great action are represented by the days for which a sacrifice is said to last (20).

The main factor of action is the I-as-an-actor (21-22). It may be regarded as an aspect of the soul, which is said to be a non-actor, if we wish to distinguish between the performers of action (23-24). But it is not like the intellect, though in popular language they may be taken to be so (25-33).

We should fix upon the instruments of action in the light of our knowledge; and this enables us to understand the character of the soul. When a person has acquired complete knowledge, he can take these instruments as he likes, because they all serve the same purpose (34-35).

A person should do his best, for there is no fixed time for death; and he who dies in the midst of a great and good action is the best (36-37). One cannot become the best by a mere study of the sacred books; he does so by acting like a leader, for the leader is really the best (38-41).

The difference of opinion regarding action is contained in the sacred books themselves: but their purpose is the same,—

the attainment of perfection (42); and when we understand them properly, we find that they support the idea that all good and intelligent actions should be performed (43-45).

No one can tell anything about the time of creation of life,—for the best of minds cannot know it (46-53). When it is said that some one knows, it is only an exuberance of language (54).

RULE REGARDING PARTS OF WORDS—If the parts of a word are properly used in a certain sense on a principal occasion, they should be used in the same sense on another occasion too,—for that is the rule[1] (1). 1

ACTION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL: ILLUSTRATED BY YUPA—If no particular object is gained when an action takes place, it should be deemed to have been done for the benefit of all, because it has been done at its own time. This is the idea of *yūpa* (or the sacrificial post), because it is not fixed at the time of action; and so only one such post is seen[2] (2-4). 2 3-4

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THIS—But we should always have a correct formation[3] of words to get their real meaning; and

[1] It would be found on examination that not only words taken as a whole, but also their parts have the same meaning in the text. These parts consist of syllables and letters,—specially the latter; and they have all a number of meanings in *Sanskṛt*. But their range of variation, when used in different word-formations, is strictly limited. This applies to all sacred books, from the Vedas downwards (See *Introduction*, for the meanings of the letters of the alphabet used in the text).

[2] *Yūpa* means "a sacrificial post"; but, as it is not fixed at a prescribed time, it represents the idea of action meant for the benefit of all. As only one such post is seen at a time, it means that only one such action can be performed at a time.

[3] The "correct formation" of a word means its division into parts; and so the *Mīmānsā* tells us that if we divide the word *yūpa* into its parts, we shall know its real meaning; and we shall also find that it is used in the same sense everywhere.

The word may accordingly be divided into *y*, *ū*, *pa*, when its meaning would be "(*y*) the intellect (*ū*) woven with (*pa*) the objects of the senses". *Yūpa*, accordingly represents the idea of a highly

this should be done at once; because if we know what *yūpa* signifies, we can, from an enumeration of particulars and the application of rules, know that whenever the word is used on other occasions, it will have the same meaning; and that will enable us to understand the whole design at once (5-7). 5 6 7

SVARU—The word *svaru*[1] should complete the whole theory (of action), because it has no time of its own; and we can easily understand the result, which is caused by means of a common conception, and arises from the experience of our own mind (8-10). 8 9 10

TIME OF OCCURRENCE—The time of occurrence may be compared to the sacrificial seat; but not always. If, however, there is a statement in respect of it to that effect, it should be taken to be so (11-12). 11 12

DESCRIPTION OF DOUBT—If in an important action, lasting many days, a person casts away the best of what has been achieved, it should,—since it is so unprecedented (or con-

intellectual action, requiring the function of the intellect in a special manner; and that, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, is to be understood as meant for the benefit of all. This may be said to be a definition of the word. There is a reference to such action in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (BhG. V, 25).

[1] *Yūpa* means action meant for the benefit of all; and *svaru* action performed with a purpose; and this completes the whole theory of action. *Yūpa* is fixed at its own time; while *svaru* has no time of its own,—implying that it may be fixed at all times; and so it refers to a very common idea of action,—that which is performed with a purpose, and is within our own experience. If we divide the word into *s*, *va*, *r*, *u*,—the meaning would be "(*s*) the mind, associated with (*va*) Nature and (*r*, *u*) the senses of action and knowledge." It is thus an action performed with a desire, an attribute of the mind.

trary to law)—raise a doubt as to whether something has not gone wrong with the beginning or the end of such action (13). 13

IDEA OF EARLY MORNING WORK—It is possible that the hand may not, sometimes, act in accordance with the direction of the intellect: still the law of action is that a person does the best he can at a time. It is for this reason that we are directed to follow up the working of the mind early in the morning, for it is at its best at the time (14). 14

IDEA OF BREAKING SILENCE—If a person breaks silence in order to disclose the truth, and bids us engage in a sacrifice (or a good and intelligent act), it should be deemed to be like that (or for the best) (15). 15

CASE OF ANIMALS—We see the same characteristic in the case of animals too, so far as their desire is concerned[1] (16). 16

FREEDOM FROM THE TAINT OF ACTION—The object of the union of the function of the intellect with that of the mind[2] is that good actions or actions well performed would become the best in every part. It is only when this happens, that a person can make himself free from the limitations of action[3]; for that is the reason for these limita- 17

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[1] What is true of men is also true of all animals: they too regard their desires as being the best for them, for the time being.

The word in the text is *puroḍāśa*, which refers to desire, as has already been explained.

[2] The words in the text are *Agni* and *Soma*, which refer to the intellect and the mind.

[3] We get the highest form of action when the mind is merged in or identified with the intellect; for then desire becomes one with Dharma, and action is transformed into a sacrifice, by means of

tions.[1] For the same reason, a supplementary or minor action cannot take the place of a major one, so far as the fulfilment of its purpose is concerned[2] (17-19). 18 19

PARTS OF AN ACTION: HOW DESCRIBED—In a great sacrifice (or action) lasting many days, each day represents a part of such action, well performed, because that is what it is meant to do (20). 20

IMPORTANCE OF AHANKARA OR I-AS-AN-ACTOR—But the main thing in action is the I-as-an-actor[3], ever ready to act at all different times. It functions at once, and again and again, because it is connected with what has to be done in a very special way (21-22). 21 22

AHANKARA AND THE SOUL—It is possible to regard it as a part of a mental organ which does not act (that is, the soul)[4],

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which, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us, all the taint of action is removed. The *Mīmānsā* says the same.

[1] The reason for the limitations or taint of action is that we should think of a way of escape; and that leads us to the idea of Sacrifice, the highest form of action.

[2] A major action is action performed as a sacrifice, while a minor one is different. Thus a minor action cannot take the place of a major one.

[3] The word in the text is *Subrahmaṇyā*, which is said to be a particular recitation of certain *Mantras* or hymns by the *Udgātṛ* priests; and it is sometimes used for the *Udgātṛ* priest himself. We have already explained that of the four *Ritvij* priests, the *Udĝātṛ* refers to *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor; and that is the meaning of *Subrahmaṇyā* here: it refers to the *Udgātṛ* priest or *ahaṅkāra*.

[4] *Ahaṅkāra* is usually conceived to be different from the soul,—specially where the latter is regarded as a non-actor. But, if we regard the soul to be an actor, *ahaṅkāra* would be regarded as an aspect of the soul itself: that is when the non-acting soul becomes an actor, we call it *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor.

because it enables us to point out its function, in case we wish to distinguish between the performers of action[1] (23-24). 23-24

AHANKARA AND THE INTELLECT—We cannot, however, say that it is like the intellect,—on the ground that, so far as the body of a living creature is concerned, it appears to be like the intellect and functions for its sake,—because its action is of a universal character[2]; and we can understand 25-27 this if we know their characteristics;[3] But we cannot say that 28 their characteristics are the same and so they are alike,—because we have never been taught like that, and we know that they belong to essentially different types. Nor do they 29-30 arise from the same action or manner of action, because we see that it is so, if we examine with care the origin of a

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It may be of interest to point out that different systems have their own ideas of the soul as an actor. The *Sāṅkhya* believes that it is really a non-actor, and so entirely different from *ahaṅkāra*. The *Nyāyā* and the *Vaiśeshika* would associate the soul with action; the *Mīmānsa* gives us both the ideas of the soul; and so does *Yoga*; but *Vedanta* conceives of it purely as an actor,—taking the place of *ahaṅkāra* itself.

The idea of *ahaṅkāra* has come to be degraded in later times, and it has been described as Egoism even in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Bhagavad Gītā*. It is in this sense identified with *abhimāna*; and its idea is represented in the story of the Epic by *Abhimanyu*, the son of *Arjuna*,—for the latter refers to the soul (Cf. MM. IV-V).

[1] If the soul is a non-actor, we must have an actor, and that is *ahaṅkāra*.

[2] The function of the intellect is decision, discrimination; while *ahaṅkāra* is a universal actor, ever ready to act at all times. Not so the intellect, which acts only under certain conditions: that is, when there is something to decide.

[3] The functions of *ahaṅkāra* and the intellect are not the same, as we have explained. The special characteristic of the intellect is to decide; while that of *ahaṅkāra* is to act. But, as the intellect may decide to act, it becomes closely associated with *ahaṅkāra*; and

whole action[1]. In popular language, however, they may be taken as we please, because the terms are not always used in an exact sense (25-33). 31-32 33

NEED OF DEFINITION—We should, however, fix upon the instruments of action in the light of our knowledge of what is to be done[2], even as we know the character of the mind together with its desires[3]. The purification of the soul[4] is said to be achieved by this means[5]; and when that is done, a person may do as he likes[6] (34-35). 34 35

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that is why the latter is said to act for the sake of the intellect. Nevertheless, they belong to two essentially different types, as the *Mīmānsā* says.

[1] When we examine the origin of action, we find that the decision to act comes first, and then some one within us engages in action. The former is the intellect that decides, and the latter *ahaṅkāra* that acts; and it is for this reason that, in the evolution of life from Nature, *ahaṅkāra* is said to arise from the intellect.

[2] There are four instruments of actions (besides the soul),—intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind and the senses. They all act together, but different actions require more of the one than the other; and it is this idea that is represented by the four *Ritvij* priests and the three assistants of each, as has already been explained. The *Mīmānsā* tells us that we must find out, in the light of what has to be done, which instrument of action is needed most.

[3] The word in the text is *rijīsha*, which means "the *Soma* plant after its juice has been pressed out"; and we have explained that *Soma* refers to the mind, and its juice to desire.

[4] The word in the text is *yajamāna* which, as has already been explained, refers to the soul.

[5] The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that the *Yogis*, free from all attachment, perform actions with their body, senses, mind, and the intellect for the purification of their soul (BhG. V, 11); and the *Mīmānsā* says the same.

[6] When we have attained to a state of purification of the soul, we shall find that it is really the soul that acts through all these organs; and so we could take the latter in whichever way we like, for it would make no difference to the idea.

THE BEST—But a person should make use of the best instruments of action, for his time is limited, and there is no fixed time for death. But he who dies in the midst of a sacrifice (or a great and good action) should be regarded as the best of men; for he is like a stick of green wood used for stirring the sacrificial fire (which burns itself in the task). A person does not become the best merely by reading the sacred books. He can do so only by acting and causing others to act, as a leader does. This is not an improper use of language (to compare the best of men with a leader), because the leader is really the best in respect of what is expected of him (36-41). 36 37 38 39 40-41

NECESSITY OF ACTION—But this difference of opinion in regard to action arises from the views expressed in the sacred books themselves[1]. Nevertheless, the object of the whole matter is essentially the same,—the attainment of perfection. There is, however, nothing new in this: only what exists already appears to have an entirely new meaning. When we understand the language of the sacred books in its rudimentary form, we realise that all that is associated with action, performed in the light of the full moon,[2] should 42

[1] The sacred books really enjoin action: at the same time they contain passages which appear to lend support to the idea of its renunciation too. But there is no essential difference between the two statements,—for their object is the same,—perfection of the soul; and that can be achieved at one stage by means of action, and at another by means of its renunciation. The latter refers to the time of death; and, as that is inevitable, there must come a time when a person must renounce all action. This is what the sacred books really mean when they speak of renunciation; and the point is made still more clear in the following *Sūtra* (44).

[2] The full moon, as has already been explained, refers to the full function of the mind, when it may, for practical purposes, be identi-

be done; and we should perform all actions intelligently, 43
because there is no difference of opinion in the matter
when the question of death is not involved[1]; and the pro- 44
cedure is the same in all cases (42-45). 45

CREATION—It is said of all things, without distinction,
that creation follows desire[2]: only the time of creation can-
not be told. Can we say that this means a reversal of the 46
function of the mind, for which there is no authority[3]? 47

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fied with the intellect. It refers, therefore, to action which is characterised by desire that is unopposed to Dharma, to which there is a reference in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (BhG. VII, 11). The *Mīmānsā* tells us that it is laid down in the sacred books that such actions should always be performed (Cf. BhG. XVIII, 5-7; 47-49).

[1] We have already explained that it is only at the time of death that a person can renounce all action. So long as he lives, or when the question of death is not involved, he must continue to act, and act intelligently: that is what the sacred books say.

[2] There are a number of references to the creative power of desire (or the mind) in the sacred books. The *Taittirīyaka Upanishad* has the following:—

"He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He brooded over himself; then sent forth (or created) all,—whatever that is" (II, vi).

Thus we might say that wish or desire precedes action; and creation is a form of action.

[3] The point of this *Sūtra* is, "Is desire first, or the mind first?" If we agree that desire is an attribute of the mind, it follows that the mind must come first. In such a case can we say that desire is the cause of all action or creation?

In the Hymn of Creation in the *Rig Veda* we are told that in the beginning there was but One Thing, and apart from it there was nothing whatsoever. There was nothing but darkness round; and all that then existed was void and formless; and that One was born by the great power of *Tapas*. Thereafter rose first of all Desire,—Desire, the primal seed and germ of the Mind (RV. X, cxxix, 1-4).

We gather from this that Desire itself is a creation, and follows *Tapas* or "severe meditation", which is a function of the intellect. It is for this reason that we find in the *Sāṅkhya* that the first creation of Nature or *Prakṛti* is the Intellect, and the Mind comes later.

or that Time alone is the cause of the improvement of things, which are connected with one another[1]? Or can we say that we can know the time of the creation of things,[2] as is the opinion of those who are well versed in the knowledge of the sacred books? (46-49). 48 49

WE CANNOT KNOW THE ORIGIN OF THINGS—But all this is untenable, as it is contrary to reason. Nor is it a fit case for changing the form of words to understand their meaning, because it arises from a reference to another rule (that is, appeal to reason). Even in the most excellent hymns of the Vedas there is no mention of the powers of the mind which can know the origin of things.[3] We know that 50 51-52

[1] We cannot say that Time is the cause of creation. There is an element of time in all action or creation,—even as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that when an Age of Time comes to an end, all creatures return to *Prakṛti*; and when a new Age begins, another creation takes place; but it is careful to add that it is God who creates (BhG. IX, 7).

[2] No one can know the origin of things. The Hymn of Creation in the *Rig Veda* has the following:—

"Who verily knows, and who can here declare it,—whence it was born, and whence comes this creation?

The gods are later than this world's production. Who knows then whence it first came into being?

He, the first origin of this creation, whether he formed it all or did not form it,—

Whose eye controls this world in highest heaven,—he verily knows it,—*or perhaps he knows not.*"

If even the great Creator may not know the origin of creation, who else can?

But the point of this is that knowledge, in the sense man understands it, is not possible in this case; for knowledge requires a knower and the object to be known; while in the present case, when the Creator creates, there is no duality: for He is one without a second; and so there can be no knowledge as we understand the term.

[3] The *Rig Veda* has made it abundantly clear that no one can know the origin of things.

animals too have a mind; and the main point in this argument is that we can only compare the mind with the best of its class[1] (50-53). 53

AN EXUBERANT MODE OF EXPRESSION—The reference to knowledge of the origin of things is only an exuberance of language, arising out of a peculiar mode of expression (meant to emphasise things). In the same manner when we are unable to understand the meaning of a thing, we refer it to our ideal,—(the highest we can imagine, to see if we can) (54). 54

PART IV

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION: THE FUNCTION OF THE INTELLECT AND THE MIND

There are certain cases where it is necessary to divide words into parts to understand their meaning (1-3). But this method is subject to certain restrictions (4-8), which may be illustrated by means of the word *aveshṭi* (9-11). But all words must have the same meaning throughout, and variations must be specified (12-14).

Certain ideas are expressed in special ways: for instance, certain parts of the text are repeated to explain certain ideas

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[1] It may be argued that since animals too have a mind, perhaps they may know the origin of things, if man cannot. But, says the *Mīmānsā*, so far as man is concerned, the highest mind according to him, is the mind of man; and if that cannot understand the origin of things, we are justified in concluding that no one can.

It is indeed true that animals have a mind; but we can compare their mind only with the best of its class,—the mind of man, who is also an animal.

Thus we see that no one can know the origin of things; and so the next *Sūtra* tells us that when it is said that some one knows, it is only an exuberant mode of expression, intended to emphasise things.

(15). The parts of a great action can be expressed in terms of the days for which a sacrifice or a great action is said to last (16); and this can be understood by means of the parts of words (17). Certain parts of words are combined together to express the idea of the combination of the actor and the result of his action (18). The idea of Time is expressed by means of a change in the form of words (19-20); and so on (21-23).

Different objects act in different ways, and their meaning can be obtained by means of the parts of words (24-27).

The function of the mind implies a function of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor (28).

The term "simultaneous" is used only for the sake of illustration (29).

We can understand objects by means of their characteristics (30-32); but there is a difference between brain and brain (33-34).

The function of the intellect involves the idea of Time (35-36).

There is a difference in the intellectual powers of creatures, though they retain certain common characteristics (37-41).

Certain words in the text are repeated once or more frequently to express certain ideas (42-45, 47).

Consecration of knowledge means the exercise of intellectual powers in connection with action (46); and this is described by means of parts of words (48).

There can be only one action at a time (49-51).

Principles are more important than words (52).

The idea of simultaneity should be understood in its proper light; and so should certain words like *havish-kṛt*, etc. (53-56).

RULE OF INTERPRETATION—As there is unity or cohesion of ideas in the sacred books, the rule is that, if we find that there is mention of unusual or unheard of things relating to time and place in connection with the function of the mind,[1] we should divide words into parts, when we shall get the correct meaning of the text (1). 1

These unusual expressions are due to the cleverness of the author; but, even as one would desire it,—there is a rule, telling us that, in such cases, a whole expression is

[1] The word in the text is *rāja-sūya* which, as has already been explained, refers to the sacrifice or proper function of the mind in association with the senses and the intellect.

composed of parts. When we examine the origin or development of such expressions, we should remember that there is a fundamental unity of idea in the text, and that each separate note conveys a meaning of its own. It is in this manner that we can understand all other meanings of words (2-3). 2 3

RESTRICTIONS—We cannot say that this method of interpretation is without restrictions, because there is a specific mention of them; and their object is to prevent hasty conclusions. There is, however, but one purpose underlying this,—namely, to enable us to understand the real meaning of the text; while with regard to special meanings, there is a repetition of names to enable us to do so (4-8). 4-5 6 7 8

AN ILLUSTRATION—This principle is illustrated by means of the word *aveshṭi*[1]; and we can undertsand its real

[1] The common meaning of the word *aveshṭi* is "appeasing or expiation by means of sacrifices"; but the *Mīmānsā* tells us that it does not refer to this idea of sacrifice. We are asked to interpret it in two ways,—by piercing through its "disguise" (that is, division into parts), or associating it with the idea of desire; and both would give us the same meaning.

The word *aveshṭi*,—*ava*, *ish*, *ṭ*, *i*—would accordingly mean "(*ava*) away from (*ish*, 'to desire') desire, associated with (*ṭ*) the senses of knowledge and (*i*) the mind". It accordingly refers to "desirelessness or absence of desire."

The second method is that we should associate it with the idea of desire: and so we may divide the word into *Ava-ishṭi*, when the meaning would be "(*ava*) away from (*ishṭi*) desire"; and we see that the meaning is the same in both cases. We may, therefore, be satisfied that it is correct; and so the word *aveshṭi* illustrates the principle referred to in the previous *Sūtra*,—namely, that it prevents hasty conclusions.

As desirelessness,—in the sense that we may not seek desires—is of the essence of the idea of sacrifice, we can now understand why

meaning by piercing through its "disguise". We can also get it from the word itself by associating it with the idea of desire. It does not refer to sacrifice (as is commonly believed); and we can understand it if we connect it with the letters or syllables of which it is composed (9-11).

9 10 11

SYSTEM OF INTERPRETATION—In the case of all intelligent actions which purify, there is but one system, according to which each word has but one meaning throughout; and we can understand it if we pierce through its "disguise". If, however, there is an express mention of a different way of interpretation, the system should be varied accordingly (12-14).

12 13 14

EXPLANATORY REPETITION—The connection between the different parts of the text should always be represented by means of explanatory repetition to illustrate the idea (15).

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A GREAT ACTION: HOW DESCRIBED—In a great intelligent action, lasting twelve days[1], there are a number of different parts, which can be understood separately, because each has special characteristics of its own; and that can be understood by reducing words to their rudimentary form (16).

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Since each part of this action is characterised by intelligence, the idea of all can be completely understood at once in terms of the parts of words referring to such action, as clearly as if it were performed at mid-day (17).

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the word has sacrifice or expiation by means of sacrifice for its meaning. It is in this manner that the real and common meanings of words are linked together.

[1] The number twelve refers to the intellect, as eleven does to the mind, and ten to the ten senses of knowledge and action.

ACTION AND ITS FRUIT: HOW DESCRIBED—Since the fruit of action is closely connected with the doer of the deed, certain parts of words should be combined or uttered simultaneously, just as we express the idea of the intellect by means of the word *Agni*, and of the intellect and mind combined by means of the word *Agnī-shomīya*[1] (18). 18

PARTS OF TIME: HOW DESCRIBED. NO. TWELVE—When there is mention of Time, with its parts, there should be a change in the form of words which represent this idea (in order to understand their meaning); and this is 19 illustrated by the number twelve[2] (19-20). 20

OTHER CASES—Words signifying preparation for engagement in a great action should be taken separately, because they have a clear connection with the text in that way; and it 21 is in this manner that we can understand other meanings too (21-22). 22

Even where things have a separate cause or impelling force,—if they are closely connected together because they occur at the same time—they should be governed by the same system[3] (23). 23

But there is a difference between such things, as a result

[1] *Agni* refers to the intellect, and *Soma* to the mind; and the combination of the two is *Agnī-shomiya*.

[2] The number twelve refers to the intellect, which again is identified with the sun, as the mind is with the moon. As Time too refers to the sun, and may be said to be a kind of radiation from it, the number twelve also refers to Time. It will be found on examination that it constitutes the basis of the calculation of the time of day and night, the months of the year, as well as the great ages of Time,—all of which are multiples of the number twelve.

[3] These words have to be governed by the same rule that govern Time, to which reference has already been made.

of which their actions are different; and the meaning of these words should be found in the parts of their principal words and the connection between these parts. It is in this 24 manner that we can understand all such meanings. The 25 meaning of the expression *śvah-sutyā*[1] is like that; and there 26 are a number of different animals whose meanings have to be understood in the same manner[2] (24-27). 27

MIND AND AHANKARA—In the development of the function of the mind there is an implication of the function of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor[3]; and we can understand this if we refer the idea to *Prakṛti*, as in the case of the invocation of the deity[4] (28). 28

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[1] *Svah-sutyā* means "tomorrow's preparation for *Soma*"; and, as *Soma* refers to the mind, and morning to time, it refers to the function of the mind in relation to time,—morning, when the mind is said to be at its best. It means, therefore, the best function of the mind.

[2] We have to understand the meaning of a number of animals in the same manner. The sacred books refer to a number of animals,—horse, cow, dog, serpent, swan, fish, etc., etc., and they all express special ideas of their own.

[3] The words in the text are *sutyā* and *subrahmaṇyā*; and the former refers to the function of the mind, and the latter to *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, as has already been explained.

[4] A deity, as has already been explained, refers to the great forces of Nature; and the *Mīmānsā* tells us that we can understand the idea of the relation between *ahaṅkāra* and the mind if we refer them to their origin from *Prakṛti*, the idea of which is expressed by means of the invocation of the gods.

Now the *Sāṅkhya* tells us that *Prakṛti* is at first in a state of rest; and then, when it begins to create, the first thing to arise from it is *Mahat* or the intellect; then from the intellect arises *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor; and from *ahaṅkāra* the mind, the ten senses, and their objects. We may conclude from this that the function of the mind implies a function of *ahaṅkāra* as well, for the mind is said to arise from it.

IDEA OF SIMULTANEITY—Again, when *Indra* is described as "one who acts simultaneously", the implication of time (indicated by simultaneity) is for the sake of illustration, and is not intended to convery anything specific[1] (29). 29

INTERPRETATION BY MEANS OF CHARACTERISTICS—Among the multitude of animals there is one who is supreme by reason of his being able to collect water in a small jar, fight with a weapon or bear a lance, sow seed, and cook food; and we should be able to understand from this that it refers to the characteristic features (of a man). But 30 there may be a difference of opinion in the matter; and, in case of doubt, we should see if the description may not refer to some deity; for it may indeed be the action of 31 *Prakṛti*[2] (or Nature) (30-32). 32

This may be explained also in a somewhat different manner. We cannot conceive of action without reference to a state of rest; and, as *Prakṛti* implies action, we must think of it in a state of rest at first. Then, before there is action, there must be a decision to act; and as this is a function of the intellect, *Mahat* or intellect is said to arise from *Prakṛti*. But there must be a doer of the deed before an action take place; and that gives us *ahaṅkāra* arising out of the intellect. But the doer of the deed cannot act without desire, or the organs of the senses and their objects; and so we are told that the mind (which has desire for its attribute) and the senses and their objects arise simultaneously out of *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor. This would appear to be a simple, rational way of explaining the evolution of life from *Prakṛti*.

[1] No one can perform more than one action at a time,—not even *Indra* who, as has already been explained, refers to the self-conscious soul. When, however, it is stated that he can perform a number of acts simultaneously, we are to understand the idea of simultaneity in a relative sense; that is to say, *Indra* or the soul can perform a large number of action, and quickly too. *Indra* is accordingly called *śata-kratu*, or the performer of a hundred (innumerable) deeds.

[2] What is possible for man is even more possible for a great force

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BRAIN AND BRAIN—There is a difference between brain and brain (or the intellectual powers of men), because we know that there are some who are unfit to perform good and intelligent deeds (acts of sacrifice); and that is the teaching of the sacred books even in regard to our own people,—relations and friends. Indeed, 33 the main point is that we should understand all things in the light of the intellect, because our own people are different from one another, so far as intellect is concerned (33-34). 34

INTELLECT AND TIME—The intellect does not act at once or without deliberation, because there is always a difference of time between the function of the intellect and the doing of the deed (35-36). 35_36

DIFFERENCE OF INTELLECTUAL POWER—There is a difference of intellectual power among different classes of men, because their development is not the same. We can see for 37 ourselves that it grows (or decreases)[1], so that it cannot be the same in all. Even though the members of a species 38 have the same name, the brain (or the cranium that contains it) of some may be like a small earthen pot (with little substance in it). Nevertheless, each one persists in 39 retaining his original form; and they can all multiply and 40 spread (in different places) (37-41). 41

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of Nature or a deity: only in such a case the idea of "cooking food" may be very different,—ripening corn, for instance.

The word in the text is *liṅga*, which has a number of meanings, including "the image of a god; *Prakṛti*". It has been taken in the latter sense here.

[1] The word in the text is *vṛddhi*, which means both "growth" as well as "decrease, cutting off".

REPETITIONS—It has already been explained that a person acts as a whole (or as a single unit) in all that he does in a proper manner[1]. But in such a case there may be a number of meanings of the text, when, in order to understand it, there should be a repetition of the same idea, and we should read the text again.[2] But if the actions in question refer to different persons, this method requires that there should be several repetitions to enable us to understand the meaning,—for that is the peculiarity of the text (42-43). 42 42a 43

SPECIAL CASES—In the case of certain expressions which mean "gift", "reaping", "crossing over", and "pouring clarified butter over the sacrificial fire",—there should be only one repetition, as in cases where only one person is concerned, because there is only one motive of action. But where an action is described in more ornate language, (there may be several repetitions) as in cases where a large number of persons are concerned (44-45). 44 45

CONSECRATION OF KNOWLEDGE—When we speak of the consecration of knowledge, we mean a repeated exercise of our mental powers arising from a repeated performance of action[3] (46). 46

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[1] The *Mīmānsā* has told us that it is for this reason that the body has been compared to a chariot, which moves as a whole, though it consists of a number of parts.

[2] This *Sūtra* (42a) is a part of the previous one in certain texts; while in others it does not occur at all. It would be advisable to retain it, as it brings out the distinction between an action performed by one person and by several.

[3] There is a reference to the "sacrifice of knowledge" in the *Bhagavad Gītā* and we are told that all action is made more complete in knowledge (BhG. IV, 33); and the *Mīmānsā* says the same thing.

IDEA OF ONE REPETITION—With regard to a case where an action is referred to but one person, there is the method of division of words into parts to explain its meaning; and that is the reason why there is one repetition (or statement) only (47)[1]. 47

ACTION AND PARTS OF WORDS—In case of words denoting selection or a process of the intellect, every part of a word should denote a separate action (48). 48

ONE ACTION AT A TIME—As there is only one urge to action at a time, there can be only one action at a time. This is true in all cases,—in a state of unconsciousness or sleep, in conscious action like crossing a river, in an act of Nature like rain, and in an act of private consultation. It is so even in death, when all things come to an end (49-51). 49 50 51

IDEAS ARE HIGHER THAN SOUNDS—Higher than the sound of the hymns of the sacred text are the principles they teach. We require this in the case of the people too, after they have spoken at length (52). 52

MEANING OF SIMULTANEITY—There is no conjunction or combination of actions, because they cannot occur at the same time. But if we understand things in a special way, we may use the word "simultaneously".[2] Hence we should utter the words *havishkṛt*, *adhrigu*, *puronuvākyā*, and 53

[1] This *Sūtra* (47) would appear to be more appropriate as following No. 45, for it is a continuation of the same idea.

[2] There can be no real simultaneity; but when we use this expression, it should be understood in a special sense, as referring to the performance of a number of actions in quick succession.

manota[1] separately, to indicate the difference of time in regard to the occurrence of things. The *adhrigu* formula 54 signifies that the time fixed is over; and the same idea is ex- 55 pressed by means of the statement,—"It is going to be done" (53-56). 56

CHAPTER XII

PART I

SACRIFICE AND INTELLIGENCE: THE INSTINCT OF CREATION

Similar theories are governed by similar rules, and dissimilar theories by different ones: the object of action is to find out this (1). But a theory may change if there is a change in the time or attributes of things (2). We must, however, accept the best theory (3).

In the case of theories, the meaning of words, except in special cases, remains unchanged (4-6). *Jaimini* says that a person should reject his own theory if he finds a better one (7).

When *Soma* refers to the new and the full moon, it signifies action characterised by knowledge (8). Non-action is the opposite of action (9). All good men act and do good deeds (10-11).

Sacrifice arises from an inner urge (12). Cooking food is not the highest form of action (13). There are two kinds of intelligent action,—obligatory and optional—and both should be done (14); and we should understand their meaning in the text by dividing words into parts (15).

The instinct to have offspring is obvious; but actual creation

[1] *Havish-kṛt* means "preparing an oblation".

Adhrigu is the name of a formula concluding with an invocation of *Agni*.

Puronuvākyā means "an introductory verse".

Manota or *Manotā* is a hymn in *Rig Veda* (VI, i) containing the word *Manotā*. It also refers to the deity to whom the offering during the recitation of that hymn is dedicated. It may refer to *Agni* too.

depends on time and circumstances (16-18). It is stronger than reason, and breaks through restraint (19-21), which is not always good (22-23). We know how it begins and ends; and can understand the meaning of the text (24-29). It does not refer to renunciation, the idea of which is different (30-35); nor does it imply intelligence, unless it is meant to do some special good (36-41).

It is necessary to know the origin and effect of an action (42). The principle of an action should not be deduced from the manner of its performance (43). It should make no difference where an action is to be performed, unless it involves considerations of breaking up things (44-46.).

THEORIES—When a number of theories or principles are connected together by means of a common impelling force, those that are alike should be deemed to be governed by the same rule; while those that are not similar, by a different one. The object of the method of performing an action is to find out this; and we know that it is so at the time when we feel certain that we have understood what things are. But the entire principal idea of a theory may be changed 1 if there is a change in the time or attributes of things. 2 If there are a number of theories and we have a statement of their particulars, we should make use of the best theory, and arrive at our conclusion by its means, because that is the general purpose of a theory (1-3). 3

LANGUAGE OF THE TEXT—In the case of theories, the language of the text is such that even if we change the form of words by means of their division into parts, it would make no difference, because the meaning would remain the same. This, however, is not possible in certain 4 cases, as, for instance, in the case of the word *Agni*[1] (4-6). 5-6

[1] The common meaning of *Agni* is "fire"; but if we divide it into parts, we shall get a very different meaning,—intelligence.

WE MUST ACCEPT THE BEST THEORY— *Jaimini* says that a person should reject his own theory if he finds a better one (7). 7

ACTION AND INACTION—There are a number of meanings of the word *Soma*; but where it is associated with the new and the full moon, we should take it that it refers to action characterised by knowledge[1]. On the other hand, 8 non-action or negation of action should be regarded as a defilement of the idea of action. Men of worth should 9 be devoted to action, because it serves the purpose of sacrifice.[2] We are directed to perform good actions; but 10 we should be devoted to them even if there be no such rule (8-11). 11

AN INNER URGE TO SACRIFICE—There is an inner urge that makes for the performance of action as a sacrifice, for no animal goes to a place of immolation at the direction of another (12). 12

SATISFACTION OF HUNGER IS NOT THE HIGHEST END—So far as an intelligent action is concerned, we should not regard cooking food (or the satisfaction of hunger) as the highest end, because there are instances of those who have done this for a time and given it up.[3] There are two kinds of intel- 13

[1] *Soma* has a number of meanings,—moon, wine, etc. But its real meaning is the mind. We have explained that the new moon refers to the awakening of the mind in the form of desire or knowledge, and the full moon to its completion in action. Hence when there is a reference to *Soma* in connection with the new and the full moon, it means action characterised by knowledge.

[2] The *Bhagavad Gītā* also tells us that sacrifice is born of action (BhG. III, 14).

[3] The word in the text is *prā-jahita*, which is applied to fire that has been abandoned.

ligent actions,—obligatory and optional; and both should be performed as directed, because they are meant to do good. But if there is no proof of this, and we are led to a (14) different conclusion,—because we have not divided the principal word into parts, we should retrace our steps, and resort to this method of division into parts (13-15). (15)

INSTINCT TO HAVE OFFSPRING—We see that the instinct to have offspring exists; but how a creature comes to be (16) possessed of it depends on time and circumstances; and (17) the sacred verses are meant to promote it[1] (16-18). (18)

MORE POWERFUL THAN REASON—In this desire (or function of the mind) the function of the intellect is not seen, because it is meant to preserve (the species). In the same manner (19) a solemn vow, actually undertaken, also disappears; and that (20) is so because it means restraint (19-21). (21)

NOT ALWAYS GOOD: HOW TO UNDERSTAND IT—We cannot say that this is always good, because it is different in each case. The first aim is to lay hold of an object,— (22-23) because that is the purpose of desire; but that is not its (24) end,—for that is what we find everywhere in Nature.[2] But so (25-26) far as its obvious statement is concerned, we may say that it is so. But we shall not understand this if we divide into (27) parts the words used in the text; because they are closely (28) knitted together to correspond to the state of what has actually happened (22-29). (29)

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[1] There are a number of references to desire to have children in the sacred books.

[2] The word in the text is *Viśve-devas*, which means "all-gods"; and, as a god refers to the great forces of Nature, it refers to all Nature.

Does not Refer to Renunciation—Even if there were a different statement of particulars, we would still not be able to conclude that it refers to the renunciation of action[1], because both (action and instinct to have offspring) are meant to serve a common purpose of life. The idea of eating the remnants of food is not the same as that of renunciation of action, because their meaning is different.[2] A hired labourer receives a wage; but the idea of eating the remnants of food is not like that, because the former is connected with labour; while eating the remnants of food is in every essential part a matter of choice on the part of the doer of the deed (30-35).

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Not Always a Good or Intelligent Act—We cannot say that it is always an intelligent act;[3] but if it is meant to serve the purpose of a pious or a meritorious deed, it would surely be so. We cannot, however, say that the actions of a learned man are always pious, because no one has taught so; nor is it true of the mind,[4] because it is connected with all kinds of actions (36-41).

36–37

38–39

40–41

[1] The desire to have offspring cannot in any case refer to renunciation of action.

[2] The sacred books refer to living on remnants of food (Cf. BhG. IV, 31); but that does not refer to the renunciation of action. It signifies, as the following *Sūtras* make it clear, a voluntary act of austerity and abasement, which is a form of discipline in action.

[3] Sex life is not always governed by reason.

The word in the text is *Brāhmaṇa* which, as has already been explained, refers to the intellect.

[4] The mind is characterised by desire, which is not always of the best.

The word in the text is *Hotṛ* which, as has already been explained, refers to the mind.

IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE ORIGIN AND EFFECT OF ACTION—When we are dealing with a great action or a sacrifice, it is necessary to have knowledge in regard to its origin and the effect it is likely to produce; for then we shall know the different ways in which such an action can be undertaken, and every essential part of it can be properly done. Indeed, we should not deduce the principle of an [42] action from the manner in which it is performed. If an [43] action has to be performed in a different place or country, the resolution to perform it should not be changed. This, [44] however, does not apply to breaking up things that are held together, because the object of that is different (42-46). [45-46]

PART II

THE LAW OF CREATION

The motive of pleasure is powerful enough to lead to the attainment of objects (1). But it should not cause pain (2). Pleasure (or joy) should be the motive of the knowers of the Vedas too (3); and it exists also in deeds of service (4). But sometimes it is also not there (5).

Cooking meat for pleasure is forbidden, as it is contrary to the idea of sacrifice (6); but it may have some other meaning too (7).

None but living creatures have a desire to procreate, and it serves the purpose of Nature (8-10). The female is more active than the male at first; but the male becomes more active later (11-12). It is an act of sacrifice, and has no room for vulgarity (13-15). It is a creative act, and requires harmony; and involves in particular the function of the mind (16-21).

A law or usage is that which is followed by most men (22-23); and that is how we should understand the meaning of the text (24).

Meaning is more important than elegance of expression (25); but language, like a garment, should have both utility and beauty (26). But utility or meaning comes first, as in the case of the word *yūpa* (27); but when we understand its meaning, by dividing it into parts, we find beauty in it too (28-29).

We cannot always understand the desires of animals (30); and they are described in the sacred books in a special form,

which may appear to be new, but it significant, and would be found to be appropriate too (31-37).

POWER OF PLEASURE—In the case of average, ordinary men, it is pleasure that directs them to their object, because it is powerful enough to do so. But it should not cause pain; 1
and it is for this reason that the cooking of meat for pleasure is prohibited. It has specially been mentioned that 2
pleasure (or joy) should be the aim of knowers of the Vedas too.[1] We see that there is pleasure also in deeds of worship 3
or service; but sometimes we also see that it does not exist 4
(1-5). 5

PLEASURE AND SACRIFICE—The prohibition against cooking meat for pleasure is an enjoined or strict prohibition, because of its connection with the idea of sacrifice;[2] or, if 6
it means something else, it should be taken to refer to what is intended to complete an elliptical sense in connection with a description that has just begun (6-7). 7

DESIRE TO PROCREATE—There is, in connection with the function of the mind,[3] a desire on the part of an animal

[1] Vedas are books of knowledge; and knowledge should give joy. That is the test of highest knowledge.

[2] Sacrifice is an action meant for the benefit of all, without exception, and it includes animals too; and so slaying animals and cooking meat for pleasure would be contrary to the idea of sacrifice. Hence it is strictly prohibited. But if it is permitted,—we are told in the next *Sūtra*—the idea would be very different, as we find in the case of the Sacrifice of the Horse (Cf. MM. V, 782—795).

[3] The word in the text is *Savanīya*, which means "relating to *Soma* libation"; and we have explained that *Soma* refers the mind, and libation or sacrifice to action. *Savanīya* refers, therefore, to the function of the mind.

to cover an opening in the lower region of the body; but there can be no such desire for such a purpose on the part of anything else. This action takes place to serve the purpose of Nature;[1] and we can see the proof of it ourselves (8-10).

AN ACT OF SACRIFICE—This desire ceases to be active in those who are devoted to deeds of sacrifice. It is a law of Nature (*Prakṛti*) that, if a suitable female is invited to a male, it is she who should act; and we find that it is so. But the male, while under the influence of desire, becomes more active, because that is how the mind and the senses complete their purpose[2] (or are satisfied). But their union is an act of sacrifice, and they become free when the bond is released. It has clearly been taught that in this sacrifice of the night there is no room for those who are vulgar; and the difference in the means to secure the result is due to the difference in connection with time and speech. It should, however, take place when there is no desire to destroy the vital energy of the mind.[3] In the midst of the

[4] The word in the text is *Devatā*, which refers to Nature.

[2] The words in the text are *Soma* and the two *Aśvins*; and the former refers to the mind and the latter to the two kinds of senses, of knowledge and action. The two *Aśvins* mean "two horses"; and the "horse" in sacred literature, as has already been explained, refers to the senses. The "two horses" would, therefore, refer to the two kinds of senses,—of motion and action, or knowledge and action.

It may be of interest to observe that in the story of the *Mahābhārata Nakula* and *Sahadeva*, the two twins, are said to be the sons of the two *Aśvins*; and, as a son is said to represent his father, the twins of the Epic refer to the senses of motion and action, or the legs and arms of man. Indeed, the five *Pāṇḍava* brothers would be found to refer to the five parts of a man,—intellect, mind, *prāna* or vital breath as a vehicle of the soul, legs and arms (Cf. MM. III—V).

[3] The word in the text is *vaidyut*, which means "arising from lightning"; and lightning or electric energy is the energy of the mind.

process, and while it continues, all the means relating to it correspond to the function of the mind. In case of [17] imperfection, it should not be resorted to; but if it is meant to serve the purpose of Nature, it may yet be done. Those [18] about to begin should not be in a state of agitation or hostility, and should act in the even course of natural time, bearing in mind the object to be achieved. But it may be [19] done at once if a beginning cannot be made, or if there [20] is no time for making a beginning, or if there is a break at the very start (11-21). [20a–21]

CONCEPTION OF A LAW—When there is a conflict of opinion in regard to law or usage, that should be deemed to be so which is followed by most men; but the principal law [22] should be that which arises from ancient direction, as is common among the people. It is in this manner that [23] we can understand other meanings of the text (22-24). [24]

UTILITY AND BEAUTY IN LANGUAGE—If there is a conflict between the division of the words of a hymn into parts on the one hand, and elegance of expression on the other, —we should accept that which gives a suitable meaning. [25] A garment is meant for both utility and beauty, and should have both qualities (and the same is true of language). [26] For instance, in the case of the word *yūpa*, a new interpretation becomes necessary, because of the conflict between beauty and utility; and we have to see that there is no break in the continuity of the principal idea (that utility should come first). The word comes to have a different meaning [27] because of the statement of particulars in its place in the text; and then we see that the connection between its [28]

parts makes for both utility and beauty[1] (25-29). 29

Desires of Animals—In the case of the desires of animals, there can be a doubt as to their exact idea, if they are not natural (or are subject to change), because both (the pair) are not always characterised by reason. As there is a special 30 mention of animals in the sacred books,—and the text makes little sense—it should fill us with doubt as to its exact idea. 31 If we are told that an animal is "dragged away", it implies that it is in the middle of the act, because that is the rule of this mode of expression. It is quite new in its basic form, 32 —for were it otherwise, and were its main points similar to other expressions,—since the act is of an occasional character (and so different from others)—the whole idea would be rendered meaningless. In this case if we divide words 33 into parts, it would be an additional point of beauty, because there is no inconsistency in their common meaning; and it is like the case of one who, though he is not the chief, enjoys his drink from a cup of brass or bell-metal. But, as 34 it is necessary to exercise restraint in such matters, the idea, —so far as animals are concerned—has been described in well chosen words. But it may not be necessary to exercise 35 it if it does not cause injury. It is, however, necessary, if its 36 effect is evil or contrary to the teachings of the sacred books (30-37). 37

[1] The common meaning of the word *yūpa* is "a sacrificial post"; but that does not make much sense. It has been defined to mean action meant for the benefit of all (XI, iii, 2-7); and if we divide it into parts, we shall find that it not only makes sense, but makes for beauty too. The whole idea would then appear to be very beautiful. This has already been explained.

PART III

THE LAW OF CREATION

(Continued)

If intelligently performed, the act does not cause injury (1-2); but restraint is necessary (3); and it should be done intelligently and in a state of perfect tranquillity (4-5). A great deal, however, depends on one's own disposition (6-8).

Conditions of a single act (9-15). It is a powerful urge and one should avoid its evil consequences (16-17). Resolutions have a value of their own (18-19).

The language of the text in this connection is sometimes plain and sometimes ornate as occasion demands (20-22).

It is a secret act, and should be preceded by prayer (23-25). It is only very intelligent or holy persons who can limit themselves to a single act; and it should result in the birth of a child of special virtue (26-34). In general, however, it is meant to secure a variety of objects, and is caused by desire (35-38).

NEED OF RESTRAINT—If the act is performed in an intelligent manner,[1] the skin of the "dear one",—for that is the name by which it is called—should, in spite of several acts, remain uninjured. There is no incongruity in this, 1 because the skin of the "dear one" remains on the upper side. When it is taken out, there should be a restriction in 2 regard to its subsequent use, for otherwise it would lead to excess. But while the union lasts, one should do one's duty 3 in a specially intelligent manner, if something different has been done at the beginning; and it should be done in a 4 state of perfect tranquillity. After it has been done, it should 5 not be continued; and there should be a change, as in the 6 case of other functions of the mind.[2] But there may be no 7

[1] The word in the text is *viśva-jit* which, as has already been explained, refers to the intellect.

[2] The word in the text is *pavamāna*, which means "flowing clear as *Soma*"; and *Soma* refers to the mind. It refers, therefore, to the flow or function of the mind.

change, according as one's nature demands, because the urge corresponds to one's own disposition (1-8). 8

A SINGLE ACT—If a person desires to engage in but a single act,—as it is of a very refined or high character—all his attributes or auxiliary parts should take part in it. 9 But those who desire to engage in but a single act, should hesitate; because when united, there is likely to be a repetition on the part of one who initiates it. We cannot say that 10 he should repeat it if it satisfies his object, because it would be contrary to the sacred books to say so; and if it is done, 11-12 it should be in accordance with good counsel or rules; 13 and we see that there are persons who hesitate. There 14 should, however, be a state of satisfaction of desire after the lapse of some time (9-15). 15

A POWERFUL URGE—Those who are dominated by these thoughts, bring it about because that is the one object they seek, and forget everything else; but the union should 16 be such as is not attended with evil consequences (16-17). 17

IMPORTANCE OF RESOLUTIONS—Resolutions should be characterised by a sense of duty, because they can create such a sense of duty, and lead to action. Since action is performed for the sake of knowledge,[1] it may be undertaken 18 at all times if that is its end (18-19). 19

Pavamāna is also the name of certain hymns sung at the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice which, as has already been explained, refers to the action of light and its electric or electro-magnetic energy, which is also the energy of the mind. Thus the word *pavamāna* is always associated with the character of the mind; and we get the same idea by dividing it into *pava, māna*, "(*pava*) purification (*māna*) of what relates to the mind."

[1] The *Bhagvad Gītā* also tells us that all action is made more complete in knowledge (BhG. IV, 33).

THE LANGUAGE OF THE TEXT—When it is enough to make a plain or common speech, eloquence should be avoided, as in the case of eating or drinking. But we are advised to use learned language and not common speech, when the latter is used freely everywhere; and the point of changing the form is that others should not understand it (20-22).

20 21 22

A SECRET ACT—The reason why the act is performed unseen by others is that it is proper that it should be so.[1] So far as its origin is concerned, the desire arises from the influence of speech. As the *Mantras* or hymns of the sacred books are meant to serve the purpose of action, the act of union should begin after a prayer or recitation of the *Mantras*, for they are meant to serve all kinds of objects (23-25).

23 24 25

THE ACT—In accordance with eternal teaching, the first union takes place in an opening in the body[2]; and, as a result of a variety of actions, there is a continuity of the act, because anything else would not be possible; and it ends in besprinkling if it holds on for a long enough time (26-28).

26 27 28

A SINGLE ACT—Those who think of but a single act should hesitate, because all good counsel in this connec-

[1] There is a reference to the same point in the *Vedānta Sūtras*, where the reason given is that it is a union of souls; and so the two souls withdraw themselves from all other objects of life in order to be alone with each other.

[2] The word in the text is *dhārā*, which means "a hole in a pitcher; a stream or current of water". The reference is obvious.

tion is likely to collapse; but those who are endowed with 29
intelligence engage in it without such collapse (29-30). 30

ITS PURPOSE—The act is prescribed in the case of all those who are endowed with divine or holy knowledge, even as it is in the case of those who have intellect; and we see 31 that the union of a good and intelligent woman and a holy and skilful man is in accordance with this. Hesitation 32 in such a case arises from want of understanding of the teachings of the sacred books,—which are meant to secure 33 merit.[1] In the case of a skilful person, however, the union 34 is meant to secure a variety of objects. Those who are full 35 of desire,[2] should hesitate if they wish to engage in but a single act; for the union arises from what one desires 36 to do; and we see that it is a common enough occurrence 37 (31-38). 38

PART IV

CREATION AS A SCRIFICE: PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

We can understand all this by piercing through the "disguise" of words (1-4).

Considerations of money play a part, but not the most important one: hence a reference to wealth should be properly weighted (5-11).

It is a creative act, meant for great ends; and is different from the making of a cup or the boiling of milk (12-15). It is an act with an object, and is not prohibited (16).

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[1] This would appear to refer to children endowed with special merit, as being the object.

[2] The word in the text is *Hautra*, which means "relating to *Hotṛ*", who, as has already been explained, refers to the mind, which has desire for its attribute.

The vulgar ones cause injury, and should be properly instructed (17-21). There is harm in indulgence; and indulgence can never be advised (22-24).

As a pure act of sacrifice, it is permitted even in a state of dejection (25-29).

Perpetual restraint is advised only in the case of one who has lost everything (30-31). But there is a general lack of restraint resulting from traditional usage, when a man yields to desire, and does not listen to his soul (32-37).

We do not understand the nature of the soul, and believe that its highest function is like that of the mind (38-41). But the soul is different, and we can understand it in various ways: as that which causes all the faculties of man to act (42); we can know its existence because of memory (43); again it is a law that the fruit of action is meant for some one else, —and that some one is the soul (44-45); it is the fourth to complete the idea of action (46); and it is that for whose sake there is the offering of the monthly *śrāddha* to the deceased (47).

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE TEXT—Silent prayers,— disinterested, because unconnected with any action—and words of blessing and praise, should bring about the union of those who are engaged in sacrifice or good and intelligent deeds,—for there is a separate benediction in respect of them. We see, however, that the act of union 1 is common enough. But in the sacrificial texts and verses 2 recited to invoke the gods, we should hesitate to come to the conclusion that this is their subject-matter, because they deal with all kinds of laws of Nature. We can, how- 3 ever, understand their idea by piercing through the "disguise" of words (1-4). 4

REFERENCE TO MONEY—In the reference to acts of buying, we should doubt if that is the one meaning; though the 5 union may at first result from a sum of money; and this 6 kind of it can be seen. A pure act, however, arises from 7 the importance of the act itself; and so where calcula- 8 tions of money are involved, we should doubt if the reference is to this, because it would be contrary to the teach-

ings of the sacred books. But wealth can make a change for [9] the worse. As has already been stated, it should be an act performed for its own sake; and so we should refrain from doubting its power, because it is so important. But [10] money too can bring about a union, and is paid in consideration for the completion of the act. But every animal, in spite of its difference of action, acts in accordance with its nature (5-11). [11]

A CREATIVE ACT—We cannot say that the making of a cup or a tortoise-shell is of the same kind as this act, for the latter is meant for higher ends; and we know this [12-13] from actual results. The case with regard to boiled milk is [14] the same as has already been stated (that is, it is not like this act) (12-15). [15]

AN ACTION WITH A PURPOSE—Even if a person hesitates because there is a purpose in the act, it should still be done because of the importance of the obligation or the law. With regard to the rest (that is, where there is no hesitation), the act is commonly performed because of the result associated with it; and it is because of this that there will always be some act which will be full of purpose (16). [16]

THE PLACE—The optional and obligatory union takes place in a particular part of the upper leg; and because of a charming appearance, it results in an intimate bond. In [17] the case of the vulgar or the uninitiated, it may be in a wrong place, and in answer to a natural urge; and then [18-19] there is an injury, the reason for which has already been explained. In the case of the vulgar or the uninitiated, there [20] should be proper instruction. There is always harm in [21] indulgence; and we cannot say that indulgence can ever [22]

be advised,—for advice can only be in respect of something different (17-24). 23-24

AN ACT OF SACRIFICE—Even in a state of dejection, the obligation to act,—if it is necessary—should be accepted; 25 and it should be regarded as an intelligent act because of its connection with a sacrifice;[1] and everything else should 26 be left out of consideration if it conflicts with it. In such 27 a case a pure (or consecrated) act alone is enjoined; and 28 anything different from it should be eliminated (25-29). 29

PERPETUAL RESTRAINT—In case of a reference to perpetual restraint, we should doubt its advisability; but there is good reason for self-control. The reference to perpetual 30 restraint is really in respect of one who has lost his all,—wealth, virtue, or grace (30-31). 31

COMMON LACK OF RESTRAINT—Among a host of sacrificers or performers of good and intelligent deeds, there is but one whose actions are meant for the benefit of others; 32 and generally speaking, there is an absence of restraint. 33 But the principal act (even in such a case) is not prohibited; though, so far as the great function of the mind is 34 concerned,[2] it is like being full of desires,[3] but without

[1] The words in the text are *āhavanīya* and *āhuti;* and *āhavanīya* refers to one of the three sacred fires, and so signifies an intelligent act of sacrifice, performed for the sake of others. *Ahuti* means "offering oblation with fire to the deities"; and so means an intelligent act of sacrifice performed in the course of nature; and the deities refer to the forces of Nature.

[2] The word in the text is *sattra,* which means "a great *Soma* sacrifice"; and, as *Soma* refers to the mind, it means a function of the mind. The *Mīmānsā* has told us that the act is closely connected with the function of the mind, which has desire for its special attribute.

[3] The word in the text is *Hautra* which, as has already been explained, refers to *Hotṛ,* the mind, or its attribute, desire.

the co-operation of the soul.[1] This happens because of teachings of traditional usage; and is seen in all who have that object in view (32-37). 35 36 37

THE SOUL—We often use the term "master of the house" or the soul in a general way (without understanding its exact idea); and deny that there is anything higher than that; and associate its highest function with that of the mind;[2] and believe that to be the highest teaching (38-41). 38 39 40-41

PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL—But it is because of the power of the soul that all the other faculties of a man (his intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, and the senses,—called *Ritvij* priests) perform their functions.[3] Those who are intelligent, know the existence of the soul because of memory;[4] and also because of the fact that there is a law that the fruit of action is meant for some one else.[5] That 42 43 44

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[1] The word in the text is *gṛha-pati* which, as has already been explained, refers to the soul as an actor, and not a mere spectator.

[2] It is commonly believed that the highest function of the soul is to procreate. The idea of the "function of the mind" has already been explained.

[3] We have already been told that it is the *yajamāna* or the institutor of the sacrifice (or the soul) that engages the *Ritvij* priests (intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind and the senses) to act; and the latter act because of the power of the soul; for when the soul departs, they too cease to act.

[4] Memory lasts even after every part of the human body has undergone a complete change. It is, therefore, regarded as an attribute of something that is permanent within us,—that is, the soul. The *Nyāya* system regards memory as an attribute of the soul (III,i, 14; III, ii, 28-32, 40); so does the *Vaiśeshika*, but it also links it up with the mind (IX, ii, 6).

[5] The *Sāṅkhya* and other systems tell us that all action is performed for the sake of some one else; and the *Sāṅkhya* makes it clear that all that Nature or *Prakṛti* does is meant for the sake of the soul.

is so even where there is a combined function of the mind and intellect or a good and intelligent deed;[1] and we could deny this only if there were no one to experience the function of the mind.[2] We get the same idea from the reference that all things should be made fourfold,[3] as well as from the monthly *śrāddha* in honour of the deceased[4] (42-47).

45 46 47

[1] The word in the text is *sāmnāyya*, which means "a substance mixed with clarified butter and offered as a burnt offering". We have seen that "clarified butter" refers to goodness as an attribute of the mind, while fire is symbolic of the intellect. A mixture of the two is a combination of a good and intelligent act, or a function of the mind and the intellect.

[2] The *Bhagavad Gītā* describes the soul as an experiencer or enjoyer of things (BhG. V, 29; IX, 24; XIII, 22-23).

[3] We have already been told that all things are completed through four stages, and so the number four signifies completeness. Similarly, there should be four factors of action,—the fourth being the soul.

The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that there are three constituents of action,—the actor, the action, and the instruments of action (BhG. XVIII, 18); but the actor can easily refer to any one of the great faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, and the senses (*Ritvij* priests), which take part in an action. But these cannot function without the presence of the soul; and so we must bring in the idea of the soul to complete the tale.

[4] The idea of a *śrāddha* ceremony, held in honour of the deceased, would be meaningless without a belief in the existence of the soul. We have faith that the soul lives somewhere even after death, and *śrāddha* is offered to remember that; and so the word itself means faith.

APPENDIX I

RITVIJ PRIESTS

There are a number of references to the *Ritvij* priests in the *Mīmānsā*, and they are said to take part in a sacrifice at the desire of the *Yajamāna* or the institutor of the sacrifice. They are four in number,—*Brāhmaṇa*, *Udgātṛ*, *Hotṛ*, and *Adhvaryu*; and each of them again has three assistants. The assistants of the *Brāhmaṇa* are *Brāhmaṇāchchaṅsin*, *Agnīdhra*, and *Potṛ*; of the *Udgātṛ*,—*Prastotṛ*, *Pratihartṛ*, and *Subrahmaṇya*; of the *Hotṛ*,—*Maitrāvaruṇa*, *Achchhāvāka*, and *Grāva-stut*; and of the *Adhvaryu*,—*Prati-prasthātṛ*, *Neshṭṛ*, and *Un-netṛ*.

With regard to the principal *Ritvij* priests, the *Mīmānsā* has told us that the *Brāhmaṇa* refers to the intellect, and the *Adhvaryu* to the ten senses of knowledge and action; and it has further been stated that the meaning of all can be obtained by means of the method of interpretation explained in the *Mīmānsā*. Indeed, this should apply not only to the principal priests, but to their assistants too.

In this connection we have observed that the four principal priests are really the four principal faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, mind, and the senses; while the *Yajamāna* or the institutor of the sacrifice is the soul, for whose sake all of them act. We have also stated that the three assistants of *Brāhmaṇa* or the intellect are the three remaining faculties of man,—his *ahaṅkāra*, mind, and the senses; of the *Udgātṛ* or *ahaṅkāra*, the three remaining faculties,—intellect, mind, and the senses; of *Hotṛ* or the mind,—the intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, and the senses;

and of *Adhvaryu* or the senses,—the intellect, *ahaṅkāra* and the mind. The idea of all this obviously is that, when an action is performed at the bidding of the soul,—that is, a conscious or deliberate action—while the principal role may belong to any one of the four faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind, or the senses—they cannot act without the assistance of the remaining three. That is to say, all the four faculties of man are required to function in the performance of a deliberate action, though the principal role may belong to any one of them. Thus, when a person sees, while the principal role belongs to a sense of knowledge, the other three faculties also play their part.

We have observed that the *Yajamāna* or the institutor of the sacrifice is the soul, which desires that an action should be performed; and, as it cannot act by itself, it has to make use of these faculties. The *Yajamāna* is accordingly stated to engage these "priests" and to "pay" for what they do; and the *Mīmānsā* has explained that this "payment" is meant to show that the work has been properly done, and that the faculties derive their share of satisfaction from it.

As we have been told that it is possible to find out the meaning of all these names, let us see how it can be done.

The word *Ritvij* is derived from the root *Ri*, which has a number of meanings,—including "to pierce through, go toward, apply" etc., all of which imply action. The word *Rita*, derived from the same root, accordingly means "a sacred action". The word *Ritvij* is also derived from the root *Yaj*, which means "to sacrifice"; and sacrifice, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us, arises from action. The *Ritvij* priests may accordingly be said to be the devotees of action, and refer to the faculties of man that take part in it.

We have observed that the *Mīmānsā* has explained that the *Brāhmaṇa* refers to the intellect; and it may be of interest

to point out that that is also one of the dictionary meanings of the word.

Similarly, we are told that the *Adhvaryu* priests are ten in number, and this number refers to the ten senses of knowledge and action. In this connection we have explained that the word is really derived from the root *Dhvṛ*, which, when properly analysed, gives us the idea of the senses of knowledge and action (p. 71, n. 1).

The word *Hotṛ* is derived from the root *Hu*, which means "to sacrifice"; but as this does not explain the idea, we need to divide it into parts to understand its meaning. *Hu—h, u*—accordingly means "(*h*, the moon, a symbol of the mind) mind associated with (*u*) the senses of knowledge." *Hotṛ* would accordingly mean the mind associated with the senses of knowledge. We have a reference to the senses, because it is not easy to conceive of the mind entirely by itself; and the "mind associated with the senses of knowledge" gives us as good an idea of the mind as we can imagine. Indeed, the mind itself is sometimes spoken of as an organ of sense,—the sixth sense; and it may be of interest to point out that *Hotṛ* is also a name of *śiva*, who is specially associated with the character of the mind, as has been explained elsewhere.[1]

The word *Udgātṛ* is made up of *ud, gā, tṛ*,—of which the last is a suffix, as in the case of *kartṛ* etc., signifying an actor; and so we have to understand its meaning in the light of *ud* and *gā*. It usually means "a chanter of hymns"; and it would be permissible to infer that this should refer to *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, as being the chief actor or

[1] This has been explained in the author's *The Mystery of the Mahābhārata*, I, 388-392; II, 278-296. See also under *Rudra* and *Mahādeva* in that work.

"singer of hymns". The same idea is, however, conveyed by the two parts of the word, *ud* and *gā*. The word *ud* has a number of meanings, and implies "superiority in place, pride, pre-eminence, power, motion upwards," etc.—all of which can be associated with the idea of *ahaṅkāra*. Similarly, *gā* means not only "singing", but also "to obtain, to pursue, to come into a state," etc. *Udgātṛ* would accordingly mean "(*tṛ*, a suffix denoting an actor) he who (*gā*) pursues (*ud*) pride"; and that may be said to be a description of *ahaṅkāra*, even as we find in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (BhG. XVI, 18).

Thus we might say that the four *Ṛitvij* priests,—*Brāhmaṇa*, *Udgātṛ*, *Hotṛ*, and *Adhvaryu*—refer to the four faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra*, mind and the senses respectively.

We have now to understand the meaning of the "assistants" of the *Ṛitvij* priests.

Of the three assistants of a *Brāhmaṇa*, *Brāhmaṇāchchaṅsin* is composed of two parts, *Brahmaṇāt-śansin*; and the meaning is "(*śansin*) announcing, as arising (*Brahmaṇāt*) from *Brāmaṇa* (or what relates to a *Brāhmaṇa* or the intellect)". Now the *Sāṅkhya* system tells us,—and all others agree—that what arises from *Mahat* or the intellect is *ahaṅkāra* or "the I-as-an-actor"; and so this may be said to be the meaning of the word.

The second assistant of a *Brāhmaṇa* is *Agnīdhra*,—*Agni*, *i*, *dhra*—which means "(*dhra* or *dhara*) sustaining (*i*) the mind, associated with (*Agni*) the intellect". He refers, therefore, to the mind, associated with the intellect. We have already observed that we cannot think of the mind by itself, and so it needs to be associated with something else to be properly understood; and here it is associated with the intellect, as it is with the senses in the case of *Hotṛ*.

The third assistant of a *Brāhmaṇa* is *Potṛ*,—*pa*, *u*, *tṛ*—meaning "(*tṛ*, a suffix signifying an actor) he who refers to (*u*) the senses of knowledge, associated with (*pa*) the objects of the senses." As the senses of knowledge refer also to those of action, and one of them, the Tongue, is also a sense of action,—*Potṛ* would refer to the senses of knowledge and action associated with their objects.

Thus we see that the three assistants of the *Brāhmaṇa* or the intellect are *ahaṅkāra*, mind, and the senses of knowledge and action.

Of the three assistants of *Udgatṛ* or *ahaṅkāra* (I-as-an-actor), the first is *Prastotṛ*; and this word is derived from *Pra-stu*, meaning "to praise before anything else". It would accordingly refer to the first manifest form of life, praised before anything else,—and that can only be *Mahat* or the intellect, the first to arise from *Prakṛti*.

The second assistant is *Prati-hartṛ*,—meaning "(*Prati*) relating to (*hartṛ*) one who seizes or takes away, or one who severs or cuts off"; and that would obviously refer to the senses of knowledge and action whose function it is to do so.

The third assistant is *Subrahmaṇya*,—*Su*, *brahmaṇya*—meaning "(*Su*, good) goodness, associated with (*brahmaṇya*) what relates to a *Brāhmaṇa* or the intellect." As goodness is an essential element of desire, which is an attribute of the mind, it refers to the mind; and that would be the idea of the word,—mind associated with the intellect. We have already explained that the mind needs to be associated with something else to be properly understood.

Thus the three assistants of *Udgātṛ* or *ahaṅkāra* (I-as-an-actor) are the intellect, senses, and the mind.

Of the three assistants of *Hotṛ*, *Maitrāvaruṇa* means "descended or derived from *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*". We have

explained that *Mitra* refers to the intellect; while *Varuṇa*, the deity of the waters, refers to Nature or *Prakṛti*. We have already explained that what, according to the systems of Hindu philosophy, is derived from the intellect is *ahaṅkāra*; and that is specially mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya*, the system based on Nature as the supreme creator of the universe—symbolised by the idea of *Varuṇa*. Hence *Maitrāvaruṇa*, or what is derived from *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*, is *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor.

The second assistant is *Achchhā-vāka,—achchā, v, ā, ka* —meaning "(*ka*) the intellect (*ā*) leading to or associated with (*v*) Nature (*achchā*) clearly." Hence, he refers to the intellect.

The third assistant is *Grāva-stut,—g, r, ā, va, stut*— meaning "(*g*) the senses of knowledge and (*r*) the senses of action (*ā*) associated with (*va*) Nature, conceived as (*stut*) a hymn of praise." He refers, therefore, to the senses of knowledge and action.

The three assistants of *Hotṛ* or the mind are accordingly *ahaṅkāra*, intellect, and the senses.

Of the three assistants of the *Adhvaryu*, the first is *Pratiprasthātṛ*, meaning "(*prati*) concerning (*prasthātṛ*) one who urges on"; and that would appear to refer to *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, whose function it is to urge one to action.

The second assistant is *Neshṭṛ*. The nominative form of this word is *Neshṭā,—na, ishṭā*—and its meaning would be "(*ishṭā*, fem. of *ishṭa*) what is desired in association with (*na*) the senses of knowledge." As desire is an attribute of the mind, *Neshṭṛ* would refer to the mind in association with the senses of knowledge; and we see again that the mind needs to be associated with something else.

The third assistant is *Un-netṛ*, which is derived from *Un-nī*, meaning "to infer, discover by inference". As this

is a special function of the intellect, *Un-netṛ* would refer to the intellect.

Thus the three assistants of the *Adhvaryu* priests or the senses of knowledge and action are *ahaṅkāra* (or the I-as-an-actor), mind, and the intellect.

APPENDIX II

JYOTISHTOMA

A proper study of the different systems of Hindu philosophy would show that the ancients knew a great deal of science in the modern sense of the term. The evolution of Nature or *Prakṛti* from the unmanifest into the manifest, as described in the *Sāṅkhya*, cannot be regarded as anything but scientific; for we are told that it is based on inference derived from the working of the great forces of Nature and Man. The ancient idea of the great "elements,"—Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether—is undoubtedly different from the elements of modern science; but the ancients conceived of them as *Bhūtas* or the great forms of life which enter into the constitution of all things in the world; and it is in this sense that they have been conceived to be "elements". Again, their idea of Ether has given rise to a difficulty. But Ether, according to them, is characterised by the attributes of motion and sound, and is something that pervades everything. It may, accordingly, be regarded as a medium in which all motion, vibration or radiation takes place; and sound itself is a form of motion, as we know. There is thus no contradiction between the ancient and modern conception of this medium; and the difference is only in names.

It would be obvious to even the most casual reader of the different systems of philosophy, and of the *Mīmānsā* in particular, that the whole approach of the ancients to the problem of life is scientific. The Vedas are said to deal with the laws of action,—embracing all forms of life in the world of Nature and Man; and the great gods are said to

be nothing but personifications of the mighty forces that are at work everywhere. Indeed, Man, as a part of Nature, contains within himself the essence of all that Nature has; for without that there can be no knowledge of Nature itself, as the latter is limited to the reactions it can evoke in him. The energy of the senses, mind, and the intellect of Man is accordingly conceived to be a part of the corresponding forces of Nature itself,—the great "elements" (or the planets), and the moon and the sun respectively; while the soul,—even if we regard it as a separate entity—can be understood only in their light. The whole life of Man has accordingly been integrated into the life of Nature in the midst of which he lives.

But there are also certain direct references to the problems of physical science in the different systems of Hindu philosophy: for instance, the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeshika* have considered the question of the division (or splitting) of the atom. We are told that the atom cannot be divided; and again, that it can,—but, if it is divided, it would cease to be an atom. The origin of sound is traced to the meeting and parting of things, and to other sound or resonance. *Yoga* tells us that if we understand the relation of a body to motion, it can be made as light as cotton; and the *Mīmānsā* classifies animals into vertebrate and invertebrate, and examines the nature of Time. It also refers to *Jyotishṭoma*, which means literally "a mass of light", and tells us that its idea is based on scientific knowledge, and that we can understand it if we get the meaning of words used in this connection by dividing them into parts.

If, as we might imagine, the ancients knew a great deal of science in the modern sense of the term, it would be of interest to examine the idea of *Jyotishṭoma* in the light of the method of interpretation referred to in the *Mīmānsā*,

—that is, by means of the division of words into parts.

The word *Jyotishṭoma* (*Jyotis-stoma*) means literally "(*stoma*) mass of (*jyotis*) light". It is said to be the name of a *Soma* ceremony; and we are told that *Soma* should be regarded as most important in this connection.

Now we know that *Soma* refers to the mind which, according to the ancients, is said to be characterised by electric energy; and that is said to be its modern idea too. Thus, if *Soma* should be regarded as the most important thing in *Jyotishṭoma*, it really means that the most important part of the mass of light is electric energy or the electric ray.

Again, we are told that *Jyotishṭoma*, as a name of a *Soma* ceremony, is typical of a whole class of ceremonies, consisting originally of three, and later on of four, five, or seven sub-divisions. The names of the first three are said to be *Agnishṭoma*, *Ukthya*, and *Ati-rātra*; while the remaining four are *Shoḍaśin*, *Atyagnishṭoma*, *Vāja-peya*, and *Aptoryāma*.

If the word *Jyotishṭoma* signifies "a mass or rays of light", these subdivisions would also refer to the great disivions of light; and it would also mean that the ancients knew at first of three such divisions; and then, as their knowledge grew, they came to know of four, five, and seven of them. As the *Mīmānsā* claims that these divisions are based on scientific knowledge, and their meaning can be obtained by dividing these words into parts, in accordance with its method of interpretation, we should be able to know what they mean, and whether they have any relation to our present day knowledge of light.

The first division is called *Agnishṭoma* (*Agni-stoma*) which means "(*stoma*) mass of (*Agni*) *Agni*"; and, as *Agni* refers to the intellect as well as gold and the sun, it would refer to the rays of the sun.

The second is called *Ukthya*, a word which is derived from *Vach*, which means "to speak". But, as it does not convey any clear idea in any of these two forms, it is necessary to divide it into parts in accordance with the method of interpretation explained in the *Mīmānsā*. We have to take it in its rudimentary form as *Vach* (*Va,ch*), and the meaning would be "(*ch*, moon, symbolic of the mind) mind energy, associated with (*va*) Nature or *Prakṛti*." The word *Ukthya* would accordingly refer to the light of the moon, as *Agnishṭoma* does to that of the sun. But as the moon refers to the mind, the energy of which is said to be electric or like lightning, *Ukthya* would also refer to the radiation of lightning or electric energy as part of *Jyotishṭoma* or "mass of light."

The third division is called *Ati-rātra*, which means "(*ati*) beyond (*rātra*) the night (or darkness of night)". It may accordingly be said to refer to the ultra-violet rays, which would appear to correspond to this description.

The fourth is called *Shoḍaśin*, which means "consisting of sixteen parts"; and this number refers to the mind, with the ten senses, and their five objects, making a total of sixteen. We have pointed out that it is difficult to think of the mind by itself, and so it is often associated with something else, —more specially the senses and their objects; and that is signified by the number sixteen. But we have explained that the energy of the mind is said to be electric; and so it is necessary to find out what the idea of the senses and their objects in terms of energies may be. This has been examined at some length elsewhere (MM. I, 43, *seq*,); and it would be enough to observe here that the five great "elements" and their properties, which constitute the objects of the senses, are said to be characterised by magnetic energy; for they are said to have been created out of the mind; and, as electric energy, the energy of the mind, is transformed

into magnetic energy, even so is the mind said to be transformed into these "elements" and their properties. *Shoḍaśin*, or the mind associated with the ten senses and their objects, would accordingly give us electro-magnetic energy or the electro-magnetic rays of light.

The fifth is *Atyagnishṭoma* (*Ati-agni-stoma*), which means "(*ati*) beyond (*Agni-stoma*) the rays of the sun". Hence, if *Ati-rātrā* refers to the ultra-violet rays, this would obviously refer to the infra-red rays.

The sixth is *Vāja-peya*, which means "(*vāja*) energy (*peya*) fit to be drunk or absorbed." The word *Vāja* also means food, which, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, refers to Nature; and so *Vāja-peya* would refer to that energy of light which is absorbed by all Nature to make it grow. Again, the word *Vāja* is derived from the root *Vaj*, which also gives us the word *Vajra*, meaning "thunderbolt or lightning", associated with it. As the latter is electric or electro-magnetic energy, the energy signified by the word *Vāja* would be the same; and so we might say that *Vāja-peya* or the energy absorbed by matter is electric or electro-magnetic.

The last division is called *Aptor-yāma*; and *Aptor* is derived from *Aptu*, which again is connected with *Aptur*, meaning "active, busy". *Aptor-yāma* would accordingly mean "(*yāma*) cessation of (*aptor*) activity"; and so it implies that this is a destructive part of light, making for cessation of all activity.

The seven divisions of *Jyotishṭoma* are accordingly seven divisions of light or radiations of light,—(1) sun light (*Agnishṭoma*), (2) moon light or electric energy (*Ukthya*), (3) ultra-violet rays (*Ati-rātra*), (4) electro-magnetic rays (*Shoḍaśin*), (5) infra-red rays (*Atyagnishṭoma*), (6) electro-magnetic rays absorbed by matter (*Vāja-peya*), and (7) rays that make for destruction (*Aptor-yāma*). Of these the

electric or the moon light rays are, according to the *Mīmānsā*, said to be the most important; and there are a number of references to the power of the moon over all that is on earth in the sacred books. This would appear to be the reason why they are called *Ukthya*, meaning "deserving praise".

As all this is said to be based on scientific knowledge, it would be of interest to compare it with our present day knowledge of the subject.

Modern science tells us that there are seven kinds of radiations of light. Of these the visible ray has a spectrum of seven colours,—the colours of the rainbow,—with the violet at one end, and red at the other; and this visible ray may be said to correspond to *Agnishṭoma* or the ray of the sun, which has the same spectrum.

We are told that there are a number of radiations on either side of the red and violet ends of the spectrum; and beyond the red is the infra-red, which would obviously correspond to the *Ati-agni-shṭoma* (or that which is beyond the rays of the sun, as the word literally means).

Beyond the infra-red we are told there is the electric ray, which gives us the wireless rays; and this may be said to correspond to the *Ukthya*. As this refers also to the moon, the light of the moon would appear to have a special affinity for wireless waves.

At the other end of the spectrum we have the violet ray, and beyond it is the ultra-violet ray; and this would appear to correspond to *Ati-rātra*, or "that which is beyond darkness", as the word literally means. The word *Rātra* may also be analysed into *r*, *ā*, *tra*, meaning " (*tra*, which as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, refers to the mind) mind (*ā*) associated with (*r*) the senses of action"; and, as the energy of the mind is electric, and of the senses magnetic, *Rātra* would convey the idea of electro-magnetic energy, and imply

that this is the energy of darkness or night; and *Ati-rātra* would mean something more powerful ("that which goes beyond") than electro-magnetic rays. Thus, if the ultra-violet rays correspond to the *Ati-rātra*, it would mean that the ancients knew that these rays were more powerful than electro-magnetic rays.

Beyond the ultra-violet we get the X-rays, and their property is that they are absorbed by matter in proportion to its density. They may accordingly be said to correspond to *Vāja-peya*, which means the same thing.

Beyond the X-rays we have the *gamma* rays, which are said to have electro-magnetic properties; and they would appear to correspond to the *Shoḍaśin*.

Finally, beyond the *gamma* rays there are the cosmic rays, which are said to have great disintegrating properties; and they would appear to correspond to *Aptor-yāma*, which means the same thing.

APPENDIX III

THE FOUR CASTES

There are a number of references to the four castes in the sacred books, but their exact idea has not been properly understood. We have their first mention in the *Rig Veda*, where they are said to have risen from the body of the Supreme *Purusha* himself. We are told that they divided Him into parts; and out of his mouth rose the *Brāhmaṇa*; from both his arms came the *Rājanya*; his thighs became the *Vaiśya*; while the *śūdra* was created from his feet (RV. X, xc, 11-12). These are the four "castes": and of these the *Brāhmaṇa* is said to be the priest or the man of knowledge; the *Rājanya* or the *Kshatriya* is the warrior or king; the *Vaiśya* is the producer of wealth; while the *śūdra* is believed to be the servant of all the three.

If we examine the idea of the "castes" as emerging from the "body" of the *Purusha*, we shall find that they embrace all that is in him,—from his head to his feet; and, as the word also signifies "a man", they may be said to include all that is in a man: and this should enable us to understand what they really mean.

But the *Mīmānsā* has explained that the *Brāhmaṇa* refers to the intellect, and the *śūdra* to the objects of Nature; and that must put an entirely different construction on the whole idea. Indeed, if we follow this line of thought, we shall find that the two remaining "castes" also refer to the faculties of man, like the *Brāhmaṇa* himself.

The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that the four castes have been created by God by means of the division of actions and

Guṇas or the attributes of Nature (BhG. IV, 13): that is to say, a person is a *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kshatriya*, or a *Vaiśya*, according to his innate qualities and the actions he performs. We are accordingly told in the *Mahābhārata* that a person conforms to all these "castes" at different times.

In order to understand this idea more clearly, it is necessary to understand the idea of *Guṇas* or the attributes of Nature. They are said to be three in number,—*Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*—and to embrace all forms of life, except the soul. They should accordingly refer to the four principal faculties of man,—his intellect, *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor, mind, and the senses. But, as there are three *Guṇas* and four faculties, we have to find out how they can be made to agree.

The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us that each object of life contains all the three *Guṇas*,—though some may have more of *Sattva* than *Rajas* and *Tamas*, while others more of *Rajas* than *Sattva* and *Tamas*, and yet others more of *Tamas* than *Sattva* and *Rajas* (BhG. XIV, 10); and this would appear to correspond to the idea explained in the *Mīmānsā* that all the four faculties of man play their part in an action, though the principal role may belong to any one of them. This, as has already been explained, is the idea of the three "assistants" of each of the four principal *Ritvij* "priests".

The *Bhagavad Gītā* tells us of the characteristics of these *Guṇas*: *Sattva* is characterised by knowledge and joy; *Rajas* by desire and action; and *Tamas* by heedlessness and sleep (BhG. XIV, 6-9). It is obvious from this that *Sattva* corresponds to *Buddhi* or intellect, which has knowledge for its attribute; while *Rajas* corresponds to *ahaṅkāra* and mind combined,—for the attribute of the one is action and of the other passion or desire; while *Tamas* refers to

the senses as well as their objects, which are devoid of consciousness by themselves.

Now, if we associate the four castes with the three *Guṇas,* we shall find that the *Brāhmaṇa,* who signifies intellect, refers to *Sattva;* and the *śūdra,* who signifies the objects of the senses, to *Tamas.* Between them are the *Kshatriya* and the *Vaiśya*; and we can understand their relation to the *Guṇas* when we know what they really mean.

The word used in the *Rig Veda* is *Rājanya,* and it is easy to see its connection with *Rajas.* We are further told that he arises from the two arms of the Supreme; and we can easily understand that an arm is an instrument of action. But the text refers to *two* arms; and so we have to understand that there is something more to complete the idea of action; and that can only be desire, without which no action can be performed. We may gather from this that the *Rājanya* refers to *Rajas Guṇa,* or the idea of action and desire, or *ahaṅkāra* and the mind combined.

And now only the *Vaiśya* remains; and we may conclude that he would refer to the senses,—for they alone have been left unaccounted for; and so would correspond to *Tamas* in terms of the *Guṇas.*

Thus, we would say that the *Brāhmaṇa* refers to the intellect and *Sattva*; the *Rājanya* or the *Kshatriya* to *ahaṅkāra* and the mind as well as *Rajas*; and the *Vaiśya* to the senses or *Tamas*; while the *śūdra* signifies the objects of the senses, and can refer only to *Tamas.*

But we have been told that we can get the exact meaning of these "castes" from the words used in the text itself; and that is possible if we follow the method of interpretation explained in the *Mīmānsā.*

Now we are told that the *Brāhmaṇa* has risen from the "mouth" of the Supreme; and the word used in the text is

Mukha, which means "head, chief, the best"; and this, as we can easily see, corresponds to his idea as intellect, which is obviously the best.

We have explained that the word *Rājanya* is associated with *Rajas*; and the two arms of the Supreme refer to the two parts of action,—desire and action. Hence *Rājanya* or the warrior caste refers to the mind and *ahaṅkāra* as well as to *Rajas*. The idea of *Kshatriya* (*Ksha*, *tri*, *ya*) is the same,—for the meaning of the word is "(*ya*) he who is (*tri*, three, which, as the *Mīmānsā* tells us, refers to the mind) mind, associated with (*ksha*, lightning or electric energy, a characteristic of the mind) the mind". The word *Kshatriya* gives us, therefore, the idea of the mind, conceived as pure mind,—as characterised by desire and having in it the germ of action.

The word *Vaiśya* is an elongated form of *Viśya* (*V*, *i*, *ś*, *ya*), which means "(*ya*) he who refers to (*ś*) the senses of knowledge (*i*) associated with (*v*) Nature or *Prakṛti*". As the senses of knowledge may include those of action too,—and one of them, the Tongue, is both a sense of knowledge and action, the *Vaiśya* would refer to the senses of knowledge and action; and the idea of the latter is also implied by the reference to Nature or *Prakṛti*, which is characterised by action.

The *Vaiśya* is said to arise from the "thighs" of the Supreme; and the word in the text is *ūru* (*ū*, *r*, *u*), meaning "(*u*) the senses of knowledge and (*r*) the senses of action (*ū*) woven together". Thus we see clearly that the *Vaiśya* refers to both the senses of knowledge and action.

The *śūdra*, as the *Mīmānsā* has explained, refers to the objects of Nature; and the idea of Nature is contained in the word itself.[1] He is said to arise from the "feet"

[1] The word *śūdra* may be divided into *ś*, *ū*, *udra*, when the meaning

of the Supreme, and the word used in the text is *Pad* (*Pa*, *d*) meaning "(*d*) giving (*pa*) the objects of the senses." Thus we see how the *śūdra* refers to the objects of Nature.

It is in this manner that we can get the real idea of the Caste System, as originally conceived by the ancients. The *Brāhmaṇa* refers to the intellect and *Sattva*; the *Kshatriya* to *ahaṅkāra* and the mind, as well as *Rajas*; while the *Vaiśya* refers to the senses of knowledge and action as well as *Tamas*. These refer to the four faculties of man, which take part in action and partake of its results. The *śūdra*, on the other hand, refers to the objects of Nature which, being inanimate, cannot have knowledge or possessions; and, as they are meant to serve the purpose of the living, the *śūdra* has been degraded into a "servant" whose only purpose in life is to serve the three higher "castes". It is not necessary to point out how far the original idea of the Caste System has been lost in later times, and with what tragic results.

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would be "(*ś*) abiding in (*ū*) what is woven with (*udra*, 'an aquatic animal' or 'water', symbolic of Nature or its objects) objects of Nature".

THE MIMANSA SUTRAS
OF
JAIMINI

(Sanskrit Text)

अथ

श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीतं पूर्वमीमांसादर्शनम्

प्रथमोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. ॐ अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा ।

२. चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः ।

३. तस्य निमित्तपरीष्टिः ।

४. सत्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षमनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात् ।

५. औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धस्तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशोऽव्यतिरेकश्चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं, बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् ।

६. कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात् ।

७. अस्थानात् ।

८. करोतिशब्दात् ।

९. सत्त्वान्तरे च यौगपद्यात् ।

१०. प्रकृतिविकृत्योश्च ।

११. वृद्धिश्च कर्तृभूम्नाऽस्य ।

१२. समं तु तत्र दर्शनम् ।

१३. सतः परमदर्शनं विषयानागमात् ।

१४. प्रयोगस्य परम् ।

१५. आदित्यवद्यौगपद्यम् ।

१६. वर्णान्तरमविकारः ।

१७. नादवृद्धिपरा ।

१८. नित्यस्तु स्याद्दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात् ।

१९. सर्वत्र यौगपद्यात् ।

२०. संख्याभावात् ।

२१. अनपेक्षत्वात् ।

२२. प्रख्याभावाच्च योगस्य ।

२३. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

२४. उत्पत्तौ वाऽवचनास्स्युरर्थस्यातन्निमित्तत्वात् ।

२५. तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन, समाम्नायोऽर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ।

२६. लोके सन्नियमात्प्रयोगसन्निकर्षः स्यात् ।

३३. बुद्धशास्त्रात् ।
३४. अविद्यमानवचनात् ।
३५. अचेतनेऽर्थबन्धनात् ।
३६. अर्थविप्रतिषेधात् ।
३७. स्वाध्यायवद्वचनात् ।
३८. अविज्ञेयात् ।
३९. अनित्यसंयोगान्मन्त्रानर्थक्यम् ।
४०. अविशिष्टस्तु वाक्यार्थः ।
४१. गुणार्थेन पुनः श्रुतिः ।
४२. परिसंख्या ।
४३. अर्थवादो वा ।
४४. अविरुद्धं परम् ।
४५. संप्रैषे कर्मगर्हानुपलम्भः संस्कारत्वात् ।
४६. अभिधानेऽर्थवादः ।
४७. गुणादप्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।
४८. विद्यावचनमसंयोगात् ।
४९. सतः परमविज्ञानम् ।
५०. उक्तश्चाऽनित्यसंयोगः ।
५१. लिङ्गोपदेशश्च तदर्थत्वात् ।
५२. ऊहः ।
५३. विधिशब्दाश्च ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।।

तृतीयः पादः

१. धर्मस्य शब्दमूलत्वादशब्दमनपेक्ष्यं स्यात् ।
२. अपि वा कर्तृसामान्यात्प्रमाणमनुमानं स्यात् ।
३. विरोधे त्वनपेक्ष्यं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम् ।
४. हेतुदर्शनाच्च ।
५. शिष्टाकोपेऽविरुद्धमिति चेत् ।
६. न शास्त्रपरिमाणत्वात् ।
७. अपि वा कारणाग्रहणे प्रयुक्तानि प्रतीयेरन् ।
८. तेष्वदर्शनाद्विरोधस्य समा विप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् ।
९. शास्त्रस्था वा तन्निमित्तत्वात् ।
१०. चोदितं तु प्रतीयेताऽविरोधात्, प्रमाणेन ।
११. प्रयोगशास्त्रमिति चेत् ।
१२. नाऽसन्नियमात् ।
१३. अवाक्यशेषाच्च ।
१४. सर्वत्र च प्रयोगात्सन्निधानशास्त्राच्च ।
१५. अनुमानव्यवस्थानात् तत्संयुक्तं प्रमाणं स्यात् ।
१६. अपि वा सर्वधर्मः स्यात्तन्न्यायत्वाद्विधानस्य ।
१७. दर्शनाद्विनियोगः स्यात् ।
१८. लिङ्गाभावाच्च नित्यस्य ।
१९ आख्या हि देशसंयोगात् ।
२०. न स्याद्देशान्तरेष्विति चेत् ।
२१. स्याद्योगाख्या हि माथुरवत् ।
२२. कर्मधर्मो वा प्रवणवत् ।

२३. तुल्यं तु कर्तृधर्मेण ।

२४. प्रयोगोत्पत्त्यशास्त्रत्वाच्छब्देषु न व्यवस्था स्यात् ।

२५. शब्दे प्रयत्ननिष्पत्तेरपराधस्य भागित्वम् ।

२६. अन्यायश्चानेकशब्दत्वम् ।

२७. तत्र तत्त्वमभियोगविशेषात्स्यात् ।

२८. तदशक्तिश्चानुरूपत्वात् ।

२९. एकदेशत्वाच्च विभक्तिव्यत्यये स्यात् ।

३०. प्रयोगचोदनाभावादर्थैकत्वमविभागात् ।

३१. अद्रव्यशब्दत्वात् ।

३२. अन्यदर्शनाच्च ।

३३. आकृतिस्तु क्रियार्थत्वात् ।

३४. न क्रिया स्यादिति चेदर्थान्तिरे विधानं न; द्रव्यमिति चेत् ।

३५. तदर्थत्वात्प्रयोगस्याविभागः ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः ॥

चतुर्थः पादः

१. उक्तं समाम्नायैदमर्थ्यं; तस्मात्सर्वं तदर्थं स्यात् ।

२. अपि वा नामधेयं स्याद्यदुत्पत्तावपूर्वमविधायकत्वात् ।

३. यस्मिन् गुणोपदेशः प्रधानतोऽभिसम्बन्धः ।

४. तत्प्रख्यञ्चान्यशास्त्रम् ।

५. तद्व्यपदेशं च ।

६. नामधेये गुणश्रुतेः स्याद्विधानमिति चेत् ।

७. तुल्यत्वात् क्रिययोर्न ।

८. ऐकशब्द्ये परार्थवत् ।

९. तद्गुणास्तु विधीयेरन्नविभागाद्विधानार्थे; न चेदन्येन शिष्टाः ।

१०. बर्हिराज्ययोरसंस्कारे शब्दलाभादतच्छब्दः ।

११. प्रोक्षणीष्वर्थसंयोगात् ।

१२. तथानिर्मन्थ्ये ।

१३. वैश्वदेवे विकल्प इति चेत् ।

१४. न वा प्रकरणात्प्रत्यक्षविधानाच्च; नहि प्रकरणं द्रव्यस्य ।

१५. मिथश्चानर्थसम्बन्धः ।

१६. परार्थत्वाद् गुणानाम् ।

१७. पूर्ववन्तोऽविधानार्थास्तत्सामर्थ्यं समाम्नाये ।

१८. गुणस्य तु विधानार्थे; तद्गुणाः प्रयोगे स्युरनर्थका न हि; तं प्रत्यर्थवत्ताऽस्ति ।

१९. तच्छेषो नोपपद्यते ।

२०. अविभागाद्विधानार्थे स्तुत्यर्थेनोपपद्येरन् ।

२१. कारणं स्यादिति चेत् ।

२२. आनर्थक्यादकारणं; कर्तुर्हि कारणानि; गुणार्थो हि विधीयते ।

२३. तत्सिद्धिः ।

२४. जातिः ।
२५. सारूप्यात् ।
२६. प्रशंसा ।
२७. भूमा ।
२८. लिङ्गसमवायात् ।
२९. सन्दिग्धेषु वाक्यशेषात् ।
३०. अर्थाद्वा कल्पनैकदेशत्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

समाप्तः प्रथमोऽध्यायः ॥१॥

द्वितीयोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दास्तेभ्यः क्रिया प्रतीयेतैष ह्यर्थो विधीयते ।
२. सर्वेषां भावोऽर्थ इति चेत् ।
३. येषामुत्पत्तौ स्वे प्रयोगे रूपोपलब्धिस्तानि नामानि; तस्मात्तेभ्यः पराकांक्षाभूतत्वात्स्वे प्रयोगे ।
४. येषां तूत्पत्तावर्थे स्वे प्रयोगो न विद्यते, तान्याख्यातानि; तस्मात्तेभ्यः प्रतीयेताऽऽश्रितत्वात् प्रयोगस्य ।
५. चोदना, पुनरारम्भः ।
६. तानि द्वैधं गुणप्रधानभूतानि ।
७. यैर्द्रव्यं न चिकीर्ष्यते तानि प्रधानभूतानि, द्रव्यस्य गुणभूतत्वात् ।
८. यैस्तु द्रव्यं चिकीर्ष्यते, गुणस्तत्र प्रतीयेत, तस्य द्रव्यप्रधानत्वात् ।
९. धर्ममात्रे तु कर्म स्यादनिर्वृत्तेः प्रयाजवत् ।
१०. तुल्यश्रुतित्वाद्वेतरैः सधर्मः स्यात् ।
११. द्रव्योपदेश इति चेत् ।
१२. न तदर्थत्वाल्लोकवत्तस्य च शेषभूतत्वात् ।
१३. स्तुतशस्त्रयोस्तु संस्कारो, याज्यावद्देवताभिधानत्वात् ।
१४. अर्थेन त्वपकृष्येत, देवतानामचोदनार्थस्य गुणभूतत्वात् ।
१५. वशावद्वाऽगुणार्थं स्यात् ।
१६. न, श्रुतिसमवायित्वात् ।
१७. व्यपदेशभेदाच्च ।
१८. गुणश्चानर्थकः स्यात् ।
१९. तथा याज्यापुरोरुचोः ।
२०. वशायामर्थसमवायात् ।
२१. यत्रेति वाऽर्थवत्त्वात् स्यात् ।
२२. न त्वाम्नातेषु ।
२३. दृश्यते ।
२४. अपि वा श्रुतिसंयोगात्प्रकरणे स्तौतिशंसती क्रियोत्पत्तिं विदध्याताम् ।
२५. शब्दपृथक्त्वाच्च ।
२६. अनर्थकं च तद्वचनम् ।
२७. अन्यश्चार्थः प्रतीयते ।
२८. अभिधानं च कर्मवत् ।

२९. फलनिर्वृत्तिश्च ।

३०. विधिमन्त्रयोरैकार्थ्यमैकशब्द्यात् ।

३१. अपि वा प्रयोगसामर्थ्यान्मन्त्रोऽभिधानवाची स्यात् ।

३२. तच्चोदकेषु मन्त्राख्या ।

३३. शेषे ब्राह्मणशब्दः ।

३४. अनाम्नातेष्वमन्त्रत्वमाम्नातेषु विभागः ।

३५. तेषामृग्यत्रार्थवशेन पादव्यवस्था ।

३६. गीतिषु सामाख्या ।

३७. शेषे यजुःशब्दः ।

३८. निगदो वा चतुर्थं स्याद्धर्मविशेषात् ।

३९. व्यपदेशाच्च ।

४०. यजूंषि वा तद्रूपत्वात् ।

४१. वचनाद्धर्मविशेषः ।

४२. अर्थाच्च ।

४३. गुणार्थो व्यपदेशः ।

४४. सर्वेषामिति चेत् ।

४५. न ऋग्व्यपदेशात् ।

४६. अर्थैकत्वादेकं वाक्यं; साकांक्षं चेत्, विभागे स्यात् ।

४७. समेषु वाक्यभेदः स्यात् ।

४८. अनुषंगो वाक्यसमाप्तिः, सर्वेषु तुल्ययोगित्वात् ।

४९. व्यवायान्नानुषज्येत ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने द्वितीयस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

१. शब्दान्तरे कर्मभेदः, कृतानुबन्धत्वात् ।

२. एकस्यैवं पुनः श्रुतिरविशेषादनर्थकं हि स्यात् ।

३. प्रकरणं तु पौर्णमास्यां, रूपावचनात् ।

४. विशेषदर्शनाच्च सर्वेषां समेषु ह्यप्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ।

५. गुणस्तु श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।

६. चोदना वा गुणानां युगपच्छास्त्रात्, चोदिते हि तदर्थत्वात्तस्य तस्योपदिश्येत ।

७. व्यपदेशश्च तद्वत् ।

८. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

९. पौर्णमासीवदुपांशुयाजः स्यात् ।

१०. चोदना वाऽप्रकृतत्वात् ।

११. गुणोपबन्धात् ।

१२. प्राये वचनाच्च ।

१३. आघाराग्निहोत्रमरूपत्वात् ।

१४. संज्ञोपबन्धात् ।

१५. अप्रकृतत्वाच्च ।

१६. चोदना वा शब्दार्थस्य प्रयोगभूतत्वात्तत्सन्निधेर्गुणार्थेन पुनः श्रुतिः ।

१७. द्रव्यसंयोगाच्चोदना पशुसोमयोः प्रकरणे ह्यनर्थको द्रव्यसंयोगो न हि तस्य गुणार्थेन ।

१८. अचोदकाश्च संस्काराः ।

१९. तद्भेदात्कर्मणोऽभ्यासो द्रव्य-

पृथक्त्वादनर्थकं हि स्याद्भेदो द्रव्यगुणीभावात् ।

२०. संस्कारस्तु न भिद्येत परार्थत्वाद्, द्रव्यस्य गुणभूतत्वात् ।

२१. पृथक्त्वनिवेशात्संख्यया कर्मभेदः स्यात् ।

२२. संज्ञा चोत्पत्तिसंयोगात् ।

२३. गुणश्चाऽपूर्वसंयोगे, वाक्ययोः समत्वात् ।

२४. अगुणे तु कर्मशब्दे गुणस्तत्र प्रतीयेत ।

२५. फलश्रुतेस्तु कर्म स्यात्, फलस्य कर्मयोगित्वात् ।

२६. अतुल्यत्वात्तु वाक्ययोर्गुणे तस्य प्रतीयेत ।

२७. समेषु कर्मयुक्तं स्यात् ।

२८. सौभरे, पुरुषश्रुतेर्निधनं, कामसंयोगः ।

२९. सर्वस्य वोक्तकामत्वात्तस्मिन्कामश्रुतिः स्यान्निधानार्था पुनः श्रुतिः ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने द्वितीयस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।

तृतीयः पादः

१. गुणस्तु क्रतुसंयोगात्कर्मान्तरं प्रयोजयेत्संयोगस्याशेषभूतत्वात् ।

२. एकस्य तु लिङ्गभेदात् प्रयोजनार्थमुच्येतैकत्वं गुणवाक्यत्वात् ।

३. अवेष्टौ यज्ञसंयोगात्क्रतुप्रधानमुच्यते ।

४. आधाने सर्वशेषत्वात् ।

५. अयनेषु चोदनान्तरं संज्ञोपबन्धात् ।

६. अगुणा च कर्मचोदना ।

७. समाप्तं च फले वाक्यम् ।

८. विकारो वा प्रकरणात् ।

९. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

१०. गुणात्संज्ञोपबन्धः ।

११. समाप्तिरविशिष्टा ।

१२. संस्कारश्चाप्रकरणेऽकर्मशब्दत्वात् ।

१३. यावदुक्तं वा कर्मणः श्रुतिमूलत्वात् ।

१४. यजतिस्तु द्रव्यफलभोक्तृसंयोगादेतेषां कर्मसम्बन्धात् ।

१५. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

१६. विशये प्रायदर्शनात् ।

१७. अर्थवादोपपत्तेश्च ।

१८. संयुक्तस्त्वर्थशब्देन तदर्थः श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।

१९. पात्नीवते तु पूर्वत्वादवच्छेदः ।

२०. अद्रव्यत्वात्केवले कर्मशेषः स्यात् ।

२१. अग्निस्तु लिङ्गदर्शनात्क्रतुशब्दः प्रतीयेत ।

२२. द्रव्यं वा स्याच्चोदनायास्तदर्थत्वात् ।

२३. तत्संयोगात्क्रतुस्तदाख्यः स्यात्तेन धर्मविधानानि ।

२४. प्रकरणान्तरे प्रयोजनान्यत्वम् ।

२५. फलं चाकर्मसन्निधौ।

२६. सन्निधौ त्वविभागात्फलार्थेन पुनः श्रुतिः।

२७. आग्नेयसूक्तहेतुत्वादभ्यासेन प्रतीयेत।

२८. अविभागात्तु कर्मणो द्विरुक्तेन विधीयते।

२९. अन्यार्था वा पुनः श्रुतिः।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने द्वितीयस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः॥

चतुर्थः पादः

१. यावज्जीविकोऽभ्यासः कर्मधर्मः प्रकरणात्।

२. कर्तुर्वा श्रुतिसंयोगात्।

३. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च कर्मधर्म्मे हि प्रक्रमेण नियम्येत; तत्रानर्थकमन्यत् स्यात्।

४. व्यपवर्गं च दर्शयति; कालश्चेत्, कर्मभेदः स्यात्।

५. अनित्यत्वात्तु नैवं स्यात्।

६. विरोधश्चापि पूर्ववत्।

७. कर्तुस्तु ,धर्मनियमात्, कालशास्त्रं निमित्तं स्यात्।

८. नामरूपधर्मविशेषपुनरुक्तिनिन्दाऽशक्तिसमाप्तिवचनप्रायश्चित्ताऽन्यार्थदर्शनाच्छाखान्तरेषु कर्मभेदः स्यात्।

९. एकं वा संयोगरूपचोदनाख्याविशेषात्।

१०. न नाम्ना स्यादचोदनाभिधानत्वात्।

११. सर्वेषां चैककर्म्यं स्यात्।

१२. कृतकं चाभिधानम्।

१३. एकत्वेऽपि परम्।

१४. विद्यायां धर्मशास्त्रम्।

१५. आग्नेयवत्पुनर्वचनम्।

१६. अद्विर्वचनं वा श्रुतिसंयोगाविशेषात्।

१७. वाक्यासमवायात्; अर्थासन्निधेश्च।

१८. न चैकं प्रति शिष्यते।

१९. समाप्तिवच्च संप्रेक्षा।

२०. एकत्वेऽपि पराणि निन्दाशक्तिसमाप्तिवचनानि।

२१. प्रायश्चित्तं निमित्तेन।

२२. प्रक्रमाद्वा नियोगेन।

२३. समाप्तिः पूर्ववत्त्वाद्यथाज्ञाते प्रतीयेत।

२४. लिङ्गमविशिष्टं सर्वशेषत्वान्न हि तत्र कर्मचोदना तस्माद् द्वादशाहस्याहारव्यपदेशः स्यात्।

२५. द्रव्ये चाचोदितत्वाद्विधीनामव्यवस्था स्यान्निर्देशाद्व्यवतिष्ठेत; तस्मान्नित्यानुवादः स्यात्।

२६. विहितप्रतिषेधात् पक्षेऽतिरेकः स्यात्।

२७. सारस्वते विप्रतिषेधाद्यदेति स्यात्।

२८. उपहव्येऽप्रतिप्रसवः।
२९. गुणार्था वा पुनः श्रुतिः।
३०. प्रत्ययं चापि दर्शयति।
३१. अपि वा क्रमसंयोगाद्विधिपृथक्त्वमेकस्यां व्यवतिष्ठेत।
३२. विरोधिना त्वसंयोगादैककर्म्ये; तत्संयोगाद्विधीनां सर्वकर्मप्रत्ययः स्यात्।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने द्वितीयस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ॥

समाप्तो द्वितीयोऽध्यायः ॥२॥

तृतीयोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. अथातः शेषलक्षणम्।
२. शेषः परार्थत्वात्।
३. द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारेषु बादरिः।
४. कर्माण्यपि जैमिनिः फलार्थत्वात्।
५. फलं च पुरुषार्थत्वात्।
६. पुरुषश्च कर्मार्थत्वात्।
७. तेषामर्थेन संबन्धः।
८. विहितस्तु सर्वधर्मः स्यात्, संयोगतोऽविशेषात्प्रकरणाविशेषाच्च।
९. अर्थलोपादकर्म स्यात्।
१०. फलं तु सह चेष्टया; शब्दार्थोऽभावाद्विप्रयोगे स्यात्।
११. द्रव्यं चोत्पत्तिसंयोगात्तदर्थमेव चोद्येत।
१२. अर्थैकत्वे द्रव्यगुणयोरैककर्म्यान्नियमः स्यात्।
१३. एकत्वयुक्तमेकस्य श्रुतिसंयोगात्।
१४. सर्वेषां वा लक्षणत्वादविशिष्टं हि लक्षणम्।
१५. चोदिते तु परार्थत्वाद्यथाश्रुति प्रतीयेत।
१६. संस्काराद्वा गुणानामव्यवस्था स्यात्।
१७. व्यवस्था वाऽर्थस्य श्रुतिसंयोगात्, तस्य शब्दप्रमाणत्वात्।
१८. आनर्थक्यात्तदङ्गेषु।
१९. कर्तृगुणे तु कर्मासमवायाद्वाक्यभेदः स्यात्।
२०. साकांक्षं त्वेकवाक्यं स्यादसमाप्तं हि पूर्वेण।
२१. सन्दिग्धे तु व्यवायाद्वाक्यभेदः स्यात्।
२२. गुणानां च परार्थत्वादसम्बन्धः समत्वात्स्यात्।
२३. मिथश्चानर्थसम्बन्धात्।
२४. आनन्तर्यमचोदना।
२५. वाक्यानां च समाप्तत्वात्।
२६. शेषस्तु गुणसंयुक्तः साधारणः प्रतीयेत, मिथस्तेषामसम्बन्धात्।
२७. व्यवस्था वाऽर्थसंयोगाल्लिङ्गस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धाल्लक्षणार्था गुणश्रुतिः।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने तृतीयस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ॥

द्वितीयः पादः

१. अर्थाभिधानसामर्थ्यान्मन्त्रेषु शेषभावः स्यात्तस्मादुत्पत्तिसम्बन्धोऽर्थेन नित्यसंयोगात् ।
२. संस्कारकत्वादचोदितेन स्यात् ।
३. वचनात्त्वयथार्थमैन्द्री स्यात् ।
४. गुणाद्वाऽप्यभिधानं स्यात्सम्बन्धस्याशास्त्रहेतुत्वात् ।
५. तथाह्वानमपीति चेत् ।
६. न कालविधिश्चोदितत्वात् ।
७. गुणाभावात् ।
८. लिङ्गाच्च ।
९. विधिकोपश्चोपदेशे स्यात् ।
१०. तथोत्थानविसर्जने ।
११. सूक्तवाके च कालविधिः परार्थत्वात् ।
१२. उपदेशो वा याज्याशब्दो हि नाकस्मात् ।
१३. स देवतार्थस्तत्संयोगात् ।
१४. प्रतिपत्तिरिति चेत्स्विष्टकृद्वदुभयसंस्कारः स्यात् ।
१५. कृत्स्नोपदेशादुभयत्र सर्ववचनम् ।
१६. यथार्थं वा शेषभूतसंस्कारात् ।
१७. वचनादिति चेत् ।
१८. प्रकरणाविभागादुभे प्रति कृत्स्नशब्दः ।
१९. लिङ्गक्रमसमाख्यानात्काम्ययुक्तं समाम्नानम् ।
२०. अधिकारे च मन्त्रविधिस्तदाख्येषु, शिष्टत्वात् ।
२१. तदाख्यो वा प्रकरणोपपत्तिभ्याम् ।
२२. अनर्थकश्चोपदेशः स्यादसम्बन्धात्फलवता[1] ।
२३. सर्वेषां चोपदिष्टत्वात् ।
२४. लिङ्गसमाख्यानाभ्यां भक्षार्थताऽनुवाकस्य ।
२५. तस्य रूपोपदेशाभ्यामपकर्षोऽर्थस्य, चोदितत्वात् ।
२६. गुणाभिधानान्मन्द्रादिरेकमन्त्रः स्यात्तयोरेकार्थसंयोगात् ।
२७. लिङ्गविशेषनिर्देशात्समानविधानेष्वनैन्द्राणाममन्त्रत्वम् ।
२८. यथादेवतं वा तत्प्रकृतित्वं हि दर्शयति ।
२९. पुनरभ्युन्नीतेषु सर्वेषामुपलक्षणं, द्विशेषत्वात् ।
३०. अपनयाद्वा पूर्वस्याऽनुपलक्षणम् ।
३१. ग्रहणाद्वाऽनपायः स्यात् ।
३२. पात्नीवते तु पूर्ववत् ।
३३. ग्रहणाद्वाऽपनीतं स्यात् ।
३४. त्वष्टारं तूपलक्षयेत्पानात् ।
३५. अतुल्यत्वात्तु नैवं स्यात् ।
३६. त्रिंशच्च परार्थत्वात् ।

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१ न ह्युपस्थानं फलवत् ।

३७. वषट्कारश्च कर्तृवत् ।
३८. छन्दः प्रतिषेधस्तु सर्वगामित्वात् ।
३९. ऐन्द्राग्ने तु लिङ्गभावात्स्यात् ।
४०. एकस्मिन्वा देवतान्तराद्विभागवत् ।
४१. छन्दश्च देवतावत् ।
४२. सर्वेषु वाऽभावादेकच्छन्दसः ।
४३. सर्वेषां वैकमंत्र्यमैतिशायनस्य भक्तिपानत्वात्सवनाधिकारो हि ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने तृतीयस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।

तृतीयः पादः

१. श्रुतेर्जाताधिकारः स्यात् ।
२. वेदो वा प्रायदर्शनात् ।
३. लिङ्गाच्च ।
४. धर्मोपदेशाच्च न हि द्रव्येण सम्बन्धः ।
५. त्रयीविद्याख्या च तद्विदि ।
६. व्यतिक्रमे यथाश्रुतीति चेत् ।
७. न सर्वस्मिन्निवेशात् ।
८. वेदसंयोगान्न प्रकरणेन बाध्येत ।
९. गुणमुख्यव्यतिक्रमे तदर्थत्वान्मुख्येन वेदसंयोगः ।
१०. भूयस्त्वेनोभयश्रुति ।
११. असंयुक्तं प्रकरणादितिकर्त्तव्यतार्थित्वात् ।
१२. क्रमश्च देशसामान्यात् ।
१३. आख्या चैवं तदर्थत्वात् ।
१४. श्रुति-लिङ्ग-वाक्य-प्रकरण-स्थान-समाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात् ।
१५. अहीनो वा प्रकरणाद् गौणः ।
१६. असंयोगात्तु मुख्यस्य तस्मादपकृष्यते ।
१७. द्वित्वबहुत्वयुक्तं वा चोदनात्तस्य
१८. पक्षेणार्थकृतस्येति चेत् ।
१९. न प्रकृतेरेकसंयोगात् ।
२०. जाघनी चैकदेशत्वात् ।
२१. चोदना वाऽपूर्वत्वात् ।
२२. एकदेश इति चेत् ।
२३. न प्रकृतेरशास्त्रनिष्पत्तेः ।
४. सन्तर्दनं प्रकृतौ, क्रयणवदनर्थलोपात् स्यात् ।
२५. उत्कर्षो वा ग्रहणाद्विशेषस्य ।
२६. कर्तृतो वा विशेषस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ।
२७. क्रतुतो वाऽर्थवादानुपपत्तेः स्यात् ।
२८. संस्थाश्च कर्तृवद्धारणार्थाविशेषात् ।
२९. उक्थ्यादिषु वाऽर्थस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।
३०. अविशेषात्स्तुतिर्व्यर्थेति चेत् ।
३१. स्यादनित्यत्वात् ।
३२. सङ्ख्यायुक्तं क्रतोः प्रकरणात् स्यात् ।
३३. नैमित्तिकं वा कर्तृसंयोगाल्लिंगस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ।

३४. पौष्णं पेषणं विकृतौ प्रतीयेताऽचोदनात्प्रकृतौ ।
३५. तत्सर्वार्थमविशेषात् ।
३६. चरौ वाऽर्थोक्तं; पुरोडाशेऽर्थविप्रतिषेधात् पशौ न स्यात् ।
३७. चरावपीति चेत् ।
३८. न पक्तिनामत्वात् ।
३९. एकस्मिन्नेकसंयोगात् ।
४०. धर्मविप्रतिषेधाच्च ।
४१. अपि वा सद्वितीये स्याद्देवतानिमित्तत्वात् ।
४२. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
४३. वचनात्सर्वपेषणं; तं प्रति शास्त्रवत्त्वादर्थाभावाद्धि चरावपेषणं भवति ।
४४. एकस्मिन्वाऽर्थधर्मत्वादैन्द्राग्नवदुभयोर्न स्यादचोदितत्वात् ।
४५. हेतुमात्रमदन्तत्वम् ।
४६. वचनं परम् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने तृतीयस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः ।

चतुर्थः पादः

१. निवीतमिति मनुष्यधर्मः शब्दस्य तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।
२. अपदेशो वाऽर्थस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।
३. विधिस्त्वपूर्वत्वात्स्यात् ।
४. स प्रायात्कर्मधर्मः स्यात् ।
५. वाक्यशेषत्वात् ।
६. तत्प्रकरणे यत्तत्संयुक्तमविप्रतिषेधात् ।
७. तत्प्रधाने वा तुल्यवत्प्रसंख्यानादितरस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।
८. अर्थवादो वा प्रकरणात् ।
९. विधिना चैकवाक्यत्वात् ।
१०. उपवीतं लिङ्गदर्शनात्सर्वधर्मः स्यात् ।
११. न वा प्रकरणात्तस्य दर्शनम् ।
१२. विधिर्वा स्यादपूर्वत्वात् ।
१३. उदक्त्वं चापूर्वत्वात् ।
१४. सतो वा लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।
१५. विधिस्तु धारणेऽपूर्वत्वात् ।
१६. दिग्विभागश्च तद्वत्सम्बन्धस्यार्थहेतुत्वात् ।
१७. परुषि दितपूर्णघृतविदग्धं च तद्वत् ।
१८. अकर्म क्रतुसंयुक्तं संयोगान्नित्यानुवादः स्यात् ।
१९. विधिर्वा संयोगान्तरात् ।
२०. अहीनवत्पुरुषस्तदर्थत्वात् ।
२१. प्रकरणविशेषाद्वा तद्युक्तस्य संस्कारो द्रव्यवत् ।
२२. व्यपदेशादपकृष्येत ।
२३. शंयौ च सर्वपरिदानात् ।
२४. प्रागपरोधान्मलवद्वाससः ।

२५. अन्नप्रतिषेधाच्च ।
२६. अप्रकरणे तु तद्धर्मस्ततो विशेषात् ।
२७. अद्रव्यत्वात्तु शेषः स्यात् ।
२८. वेदसंयोगात् ।
२९. द्रव्यसंयोगाच्च ।

३०. स्याद्वाऽस्यसंयोगवत्फलेन; सम्बन्धस्तस्मात्कर्मैतिशायनः ।
३१. शेषाः प्रकरणेऽविशेषात्सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
३२. होमास्तु व्यवतिष्ठेरन्नाहवनीयसंयोगात् ।
३३. शेषश्च समाख्यानात् ।

३४. दोषात्त्विष्टिर्लौकिके स्यात् शास्त्राद्धि वैदिके न दोषः स्यात् ।
३५. अर्थवादो वाऽनुपपातात्तस्माद्यज्ञे प्रतीयेत ।
३६. अचोदितं च कर्मभेदात् ।
३७. सा लिङ्गादार्त्विजे स्यात् ।
३८. पानव्यापच्च तद्वत् ।

३९. दोषात्तु वैदिके स्यादर्थाद्धि लौकिके न दोषः स्यात् ।
४०. तत्सर्वत्राविशेषात् ।
४१. स्वामिनो वा तदर्थत्वात् ।
४२. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
४३. सर्वप्रदानं हविषस्तदर्थत्वात् ।
४४. निरवदानात्तु शेषः स्यात् ।
४५. उपायो वा तदर्थत्वात् ।
४६. कृतत्वात्तु कर्मणः सकृत्स्याद्द्रव्यस्य गुणभूतत्वात् ।
४७. शेषदर्शनाच्च ।
४८. अप्रयोजकत्वादेकस्मात्क्रियेरञ्छेषस्य गुणभूतत्वात् ।
४९. संस्कृतत्वाच्च ।
५०. सर्वेभ्यो वा कारणाविशेषात् संस्कारस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।
५१. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
५२. एकस्माच्चेद्याथाकाम्यमविशेषात् ।

५३. मुख्याद्वापूर्वकालत्वात् ।
५४. भक्षाश्रवणाद्दानशब्दः परिक्रये ।
५५. तत्संस्तवाच्च ।
५६. भक्षार्थौ वा द्रव्ये समत्वात् ।
५७. व्यादेशाद्दानसंस्तुतिः[1] ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने तृतीयस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

पञ्चमः पादः

१. आज्याच्च सर्वसंयोगात् ।
२. कारणाच्च ।

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१. अत्र पादे रामेश्वरपादविरचितसुबोधिन्याख्यवृत्त्या सह काश्यां संवत् १९५६ तमे मुद्रितपुस्तके दशमसूत्रमारभ्य पञ्चदशसंख्याकसूत्रपर्यन्तं सूत्रषट्कं भाष्ये नास्तीत्युक्तम् । अत्र त्वस्तीति तदपेक्षया संख्याधिक्यं सूत्रगणनायाम् ॥

३. एकस्मिन्समवत्तशब्दात् ।
४. आज्ये च दर्शनात् स्विष्टकृदर्थवादस्य ।

५. अशेषत्वात्तु नैवं स्यात्सर्वादानादशेषता ।
६. साधारण्यान्न ध्रुवायां स्यात् ।
७. अक्तत्वाच्च[1] जुह्वां तस्य च होमसंयोगात् ।
८. चमसवदिति चेत् ।
९. न चोदनाविरोधाद्धविः प्रकल्पनाच्च ।

१०. उत्पन्नाधिकारात्सति सर्ववचनम् ।
११. जातिविशेषात्परम् ।
१२. अन्त्यमरेकार्थे ।
१३. साकम्प्रस्थाय्ये स्विष्टकृदिडञ्च तद्वत् ।
१४. सौत्रामण्यां च ग्रहेषु ।
१५. तद्वच्च शेषवचनम् ।

१६. द्रव्यैकत्वे कर्मभेदात्प्रतिकर्म क्रियेरन् ।
१७. अविभागाच्च शेषस्य सर्वान्प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात् ।

१८. ऐन्द्रवायवे तु वचनात्प्रतिकर्म भक्षः स्यात् ।
१९. सोमेऽवचनाद् भक्षो न विद्यते ।
२०. स्याद्वाऽन्यार्थदर्शनात् ।

२१. वचनानि त्वपूर्वत्वात्तस्माद्यथोपदेशं स्युः ।

२२. चमसेषु समाख्यानात्संयोगस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ।
२३. उद्गातृचमसमेकः श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।
२४. सर्वे वा सर्वसंयोगात् ।
२५. स्तोत्रकारिणां वा तत्संयोगाद्बहुश्रुतेः ।
२६. सर्वे तु वेदसंयोगात्कारणादेकदेशे स्यात् ।

२७. ग्रावस्तुतो भक्षो न विद्यतेऽनाम्नानात् ।
२८. हारियोजने वा सर्वसंयोगात् ।

२९. चमसिनां वा सन्निधानात् ।
३०. सर्वेषां तु विधित्वात्तदर्था चमसिश्रुतिः ।
३१. वषट्काराच्च भक्षयेत् ।
३२. होमाऽभिषवाभ्यां च ।
३३. प्रत्यक्षोपदेशाच्चमसानामव्यक्तः शेषे ।

३४. स्याद्वा कारणभावादनिर्देशश्चमसानां कर्तुस्तद्वचनत्वात् ।
३५. चमसे चान्यदर्शनात् ।

३६. एकपात्रे क्रमादध्वर्युः पूर्वो भक्षयेत् ।
३७. होता वा मन्त्रवर्णात् ।
३८. वचनाच्च ।
३९. कारणानुपूर्व्याच्च ।

४०. वचनादनुज्ञातभक्षणम् ।

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[1] अवत्तत्वाच्चेति क्वचित्पाठः ।

४१. तद्रुपहूत उपह्व[1]यस्वेत्यनेनानुज्ञापयेल्लिङ्गात् ।
४२. तत्रार्थात्प्रतिवचनम् ।
४३. तदेकपात्राणां समवायात् ।
४४. याज्यापनयेनापनीतो भक्षः प्रवरवत् ।
४५. यष्टुर्वा कारणागमात् ।

४६. प्रवृत्तत्वात्प्रवरस्यानपायः ।
४७. फलचमसो नैमित्तिको भक्षविकारः श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।
४८. इज्याविकारो वा संस्कारस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।
४९. होमात् ।
५०. चमसैश्च तुल्यकालत्वात् ।
५१. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
५२. अनुप्रसर्पिषु सामान्यात् ।
५३. ब्राह्मणा वा तुल्यशब्दत्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने तृतीयस्याध्यायस्य पञ्चमः पादः ।

षष्ठः पादः

१. सर्वार्थमप्रकरणात् ।
२. प्रकृतौ वाऽद्विरुक्तत्वात् ।
३. तद्वर्जं तु वचनप्राप्ते ।

४. दर्शनादिति चेत् ।
५. न चोदनैकार्थ्यात् ।

(१) उपहूयस्वेति क्वचित्पाठः ।

६. उत्पत्तिरिति चेत् ।
७. न तुल्यत्वात् ।

८. चोदनार्थकात्स्न्र्यात्तु मुख्यविप्रतिषेधात्प्रकृत्यर्थः ।
९. प्रकरणविशेषात्तु विकृतौ विरोधि स्यात् ।
१०. नैमित्तिकं तु; प्रकृतौ तद्विकारः, संयोगविशेषात् ।
११. इष्ट्यर्थमग्न्याधेयं प्रकरणात् ।
१२. न वा तासां तदर्थत्वात् ।
१३. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

१४. तत्प्रकृत्यर्थं यथान्येऽनारभ्यवादाः ।
१५. सर्वार्थं वाऽऽधानस्य स्वकालत्वात् ।
१६. तासामग्निः प्रकृतितः प्रयाजवत् स्यात् ।
१७. न वा तासां तदर्थत्वात् ।

१८. तुल्यः सर्वेषां पशुविधिः प्रकरणाविशेषात् ।
१९. स्थानाच्च पूर्वस्य ।
२०. श्वस्त्वेकेषां तत्र प्राक्श्रुतिर्गुणार्था ।
२१. तेनोत्कृष्टस्य कालविधिरिति चेत् ।
२२. नैकदेशत्वात् ।
२३. अर्थेनेति चेत् ।
२४. न श्रुतिविप्रतिषेधात् ।

२५. स्थानात्तु पूर्वस्य संस्कारस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।

२६. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
२७. अचोदना गुणार्थेन ।
२८. दोहयोः कालभेदादसंयुक्तं शृतं स्यात् ।
२९. प्रकरणाविभागाद्वा तत्संयुक्तस्य कालशास्त्रम् ।

३०. तद्वत्सवनान्तरे ग्रहाम्नानम् ।
३१. रशना च लिङ्गदर्शनात् ।
३२. आराच्छिष्टमसंयुक्तमितरैः सन्निधानात् ।
३३. संयुक्तं वा तदर्थत्वाच्छेषस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ।
३४. निर्देशाद् व्यवतिष्ठेत ।

३५. अग्न्यङ्गमप्रकरणे तद्वत् ।
३६. नैमित्तिकमतुल्यत्वादसमान विधानं स्यात् ।
३७. प्रतिनिधिश्च तद्वत् ।

३८. न तद्वत् प्रयोजनैकत्वात् ।
३९. अशास्त्रलक्षणत्वाच्च ।
४०. नियमार्था गुणश्रुतिः ।
४१. संस्थास्तु समानविधानाः प्रकरणाविशेषात् ।
४२. व्यपदेशश्च तुल्यवत् ।
४३. विकारास्तु कामसंयोगे नित्यस्य समत्वात् ।
४४. अपि वा द्विरुक्तत्वात्प्रकृतेर्भविष्यन्तीति ।
४५. वचनात्तु समुच्चयः ।
४६. प्रतिषेधाच्च पूर्वलिङ्गानाम् ।
४७. गुणविशेषादेकस्य व्यपदेशः ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने तृतीयस्याध्यायस्य षष्ठः पादः ।

सप्तमः पादः

१. प्रकरणविशेषादसंयुक्तं प्रधानस्य ।
२. सर्वेषां वा शेषत्वस्यातत्प्रयुक्तत्वात् ।
३. आरादपीति चेत् ।
४. न तद्वाक्यं हि तदर्थत्वात् ।
५. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

६. फलसंयोगात्तु स्वामियुक्तं प्रधानस्य ।
७. चिकीर्षया च संयोगात् ।
८. तथाऽभिधानेन[1] ।
९. तद्युक्ते तु फलश्रुतिस्तस्मात्सर्वचिकीर्षा स्यात् ।

१०. गुणाऽभिधानात्सर्वार्थमभिधानम् ।
११. दीक्षादक्षिणं तु वचनात्प्रधानस्य ।
१२. निवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च ।
१३. तथा यूपस्य वेदिः ।

१४. देशमात्रं वाऽशिष्टेनैकवाक्यत्वात् ।
१५. सामिधेनीस्तदन्वाहूरिति हविर्द्धानयोर्वचनात्सामिधेनीनाम् ।
१६. देशमात्रं वा प्रत्यक्षं ह्यर्थकर्म सोमस्य ।

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१. तद्युक्ते इत्याद्यग्रिमं नवमं सूत्रमेतत्सूत्रोत्तरमेतदधिकरणे रत्नमालायाम्, भाष्ये तु नैवम् ।

१७. समाख्यानं च तद्वत् ।

१८. शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि तल्लक्षणत्वात्तस्मात् स्वयं प्रयोगे स्यात् ।

१९. उत्सर्गे तु प्रधानत्वाच्छेषकारी प्रधानस्य तस्मादन्यः स्वयं वा स्यात् ।

२०. अन्यो वा स्यात्परिक्रयाम्नानाद्विप्रतिषेधात्प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

२१. तत्रार्थात्कर्तृपरिमाणं स्यादनियमोऽविशेषात् ।

२२. अपि वा श्रुतिभेदात्प्रतिनामधेयं स्युः ।

२३. एकस्य कर्मभेदादिति चेत् ।

२४. नोत्पत्तौ हि ।

२५. चमसाध्वर्यवश्च तैर्व्यपदेशात् ।

२६. उत्पत्तौ तु बहुश्रुतेः ।

२७. दशत्वं लिङ्गदर्शनात् ।

२८. शमिता च शब्दभेदात् ।

२९. प्रकरणाद्वोत्पत्त्यसंयोगात् ।

३०. उपगाश्च लिङ्गदर्शनात् ।

३१. विक्रयी त्वन्यः कर्मणोऽचोदितत्वात् ।

३२. कर्मकार्यात्सर्वेषामृत्विक्त्वमविशेषात् ।

३३. न वा परिसङ्ख्यानात् ।

३४. पक्षेणेति चेत् ।

३५. न सर्वेषामधिकारः ।

३६. नियमस्तु दक्षिणाभिः श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।

३७. उक्त्वा च यजमानत्वं तेषां दीक्षाविधानात् ।

३८. स्वामिसप्तदशाः कर्मसामान्यात् ।

३९. ते सर्वार्थाः प्रयुक्तत्वादग्नयश्च स्वकालत्वात् ।

४०. तत्संयोगात् कर्मणो व्यवस्था स्यात्, संयोगस्यार्थवत्त्वात् ।

४१. तस्योपदेशसमाख्यानेन निर्देशः ।

४२. तद्वच्च लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।

४३. प्रैषानुवचनं मैत्रावरुणस्योपदेशात् ।

४४. पुरोऽनुवाक्याधिकारो वा प्रैषसन्निधानात् ।

४५. प्रातरनुवाके च होतृदर्शनात् ।

४६. चमसांश्चमसाध्वर्यवः समाख्यानात् ।

४७. अध्वर्युर्वा तन्न्यायत्वात् ।

४८. चमसे चान्यदर्शनात् ।

४९. अशक्तौ ते प्रतीयेरन् ।

५०. वेदोपदेशात्पूर्ववद्वेदान्यत्वे यथोपदेशं स्युः ।

५१. तद्गुणाद्वा स्वधर्मः स्यादधिकारसामर्थ्यात्सहाङ्गैरव्यक्तः शेषे ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने तृतीयस्याध्यायस्य सप्तमः पादः ।

अष्टमः पादः

१. स्वामिकर्मपरिक्रयः कर्मणस्तदर्थत्वात्।

२. वचनादितरेषां स्यात्।

३. संस्कारास्तु पुरुषसामर्थ्ये यथावेदं कर्मवद्व्यतिष्ठेरन्।

४. याजमानास्तु तत्प्रधानत्वात्कर्मवत्।

५. व्यपदेशाच्च।

६. गुणत्वेन तस्य निर्देशः।

७. चोदनां प्रति भावाच्च।

८. अतुल्यत्वादसमानविधानाः स्युः।

९. तपश्च फलसिद्धित्वाल्लोकवत्।

१०. वाक्यशेषश्च तद्वत्।

११. वचनादितरेषां स्यात्।

१२. गुणत्वाच्च वेदेन न व्यवस्था स्यात्।

१३. तथा कामोऽर्थसंयोगात्।

१४. व्यपदेशादितरेषां स्यात्।

१५. मन्त्राश्चाऽकर्मकरणास्तद्वत्।

१६. विप्रयोगे च दर्शनात्।

१७. द्व्याम्नातेषूभौ द्व्याम्नानस्याऽर्थवत्त्वात्।

१८. ज्ञाते च वाचनं; न ह्यविद्वान् विहितोऽस्ति।

१९. याजमाने समाख्यानात्कर्माणि याजमानं स्युः।

२०. अध्वर्युर्वा तदर्थो हि; न्यायपूर्वं समाख्यानम्।

२१. विप्रतिषेधे करणः; समवायविशेषादितरमन्यस्तेषां, यतो विशेषः स्यात्।

२२. प्रैषेषु च पराधिकारात्।

२३. अध्वर्युस्तु दर्शनात्।

२४. गौणो वा कर्मसामान्यात्।

२५. ऋत्विक्फलं करणेष्वर्थवत्त्वात्।

२६. स्वामिनो वा तदर्थत्वात्।

२७. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च।

२८. कर्मार्थं तु फलं; तेषां स्वामिनं प्रत्यर्थवत्त्वात्।

२९. व्यपदेशाच्च।

३०. द्रव्यसंस्कारः प्रकरणाऽविशेषात् सर्वकर्मणाम्।

३१. निर्देशात्तु विकृतापूर्वस्याऽनधिकारः।

३२. विरोधे च श्रुति[1]विशेषादव्यक्तः शेषे[2]।

३३. अपनयस्त्वेकदेशस्य विद्यमानसंयोगात्।

३४. विकृतौ सर्वार्थः शेषः प्रकृतिवत्।

३५. मुख्यार्थो वाऽङ्गस्याचोदितत्वात्।

३६. सन्निधानविशेषादसम्भवे तदङ्गानाम्।

३७. आधानेऽपि तथेति चेत्।

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१. विरोधादिति वृत्तौ पाठः।

२. क्तः शेष इति च।

३८. नाऽप्रकरणत्वादङ्गस्यातन्निमित्तत्वात् ।
३९. तत्काले वा[1] लिङ्गदर्शनात् ।
४०. सर्वेषां वाऽविशेषात् ।
४१. न्यायोक्ते लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।
४२. मांसं तु सवनीयानां चोदनाविशेषात् ।
४३. भक्तिरसन्निधावन्याय्येति चेत् ।
४४. स्यात्प्रकृतिलिङ्गाद्वैराजवत् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने तृतीयस्याध्यायस्य अष्टमः पादः ।

समाप्तस्तृतीयोऽध्यायः ।

चतुर्थोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. अथातः क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थयोर्जिज्ञासा ।
२. यस्मिन्प्रीतिः पुरुषस्य तस्य लिप्सा, ऽर्थलक्षणाऽविभक्तत्वात् ।
३. तदुत्सर्गे कर्माणि[2] पुरुषार्थाय; शास्त्रस्यानतिशङ्क्यत्वान्न च द्रव्यं चिकीर्ष्यते; तेनार्थेनाभिसम्बन्धात् क्रियायां पुरुषश्रुतिः ।

१. वेति वृत्तौ नास्ति ।
२. कर्मणीति वृत्तौ पाठः ।

४. अविशेषात्तु शास्त्रस्य यथाश्रुति फलानि स्युः ।
५. अपि वा कारणाऽग्रहणे तदर्थमर्थस्याऽनभिसम्बन्धात् ।
६. तथा च लोकभूतेषु ।
७. द्रव्याणि त्वविशेषेणाऽऽनर्थक्यात् प्रदीयरेन् ।
८. स्वेन त्वर्थेन सम्बन्धो द्रव्याणां पृथगर्थत्वात्तस्माद्यथाश्रुति स्युः ।
९. चोद्यन्ते चार्थकर्मसु[1] ।
१०. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
११. तत्रैकत्वमयज्ञाङ्गमर्थस्य गुणभूतत्वात् ।
१२. एकश्रुतित्वाच्च ।
१३. प्रतीयत इति चेत् ।
१४. नाऽशब्दं तत्प्रमाणत्वात्पूर्ववत् ।
१५. शब्दवत्तूपलभ्यते तदागमे हि दृश्यते तस्य ज्ञानं[2] हि यथाऽन्येषाम् ।
१६. तद्वच्च लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।
१७. तथा च लिङ्गम् ।
१८. आश्रयिष्वविशेषेण भावोऽर्थः प्रतीयेत ।
१९. चोदनायां त्वनारम्भो विभक्तत्वान्न ह्यन्येन[3] विधीयते ।
२०. स्याद्वा द्रव्यचिकीर्षायां भावोऽर्थे च

१. चार्थकथास्विति वृत्तौ पाठभेदः ।
२. तं यथेति वृत्तौ पाठः ।
३. ह्यनेनेति वृत्तौ पाठः ।

गुणभूतत्वाऽऽश्रया[1]द्धिगुणीभावः ।

२१. अर्थे[2] समवैषम्यमतो द्रव्यकर्मणाम् ।

२२. एकनिष्पत्तेः सर्वं समं स्यात् ।

२३. संसर्गरसनिष्पत्तेरामिक्षा वा प्रधानं स्यात् ।

२४. मुख्यशब्दा[3]भिसंस्तवाच्च ।

२५. पदकर्माप्रयोजकं नयनस्य परार्थत्वात् ।

२६. अर्थाभिधानकर्म च भविष्यता संयोगस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात्तदर्थो हि विधीयते ।

२७. पशावनालम्भाल्लोहितशकृतोरकर्मत्वम् ।

२८. एकदेशद्रव्यश्चोत्पत्तौ विद्यमानसंयोगात् ।

२९. निर्देशात्तस्यान्यदर्थादिति चेत् ।

३०. न शेषसन्निधानात् ।

३१. कर्म कार्यात् ।

३२. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

३३. अभिघारणे विप्रकर्षादनुयाजवत् पात्रभेदः स्यात् ।

३४. न वा पात्रत्वादपात्रत्वं त्वेकदेशत्वात् ।

१. याद्धीति वृत्तौ पाठः । क्वचिदन्यत्र यादृद्धीति पाठः ।

२. अर्थेनेति वृत्तौ पाठः ।

३. शब्दसंस्तवेति वृत्तौ पाठः ।

३५. हेतुत्वाच्च सहप्रयोगस्य ।

३६. अभावदर्शनाच्च ।

३७. सति सव्यवचनम् ।

३८. न तस्येति चेत् ।

३९. स्यात्तस्य मुख्यत्वात् ।

४०. समानयनं तु मुख्यं स्याल्लिङ्गदर्शनात् ।

४१. वचने हि हेत्वसामर्थ्यम्[1] ।

४२. तत्रोत्पत्तिरविभक्ता स्यात् ।

४३. तत्र जौहवमनुयाजप्रतिषेधार्थम् ।

४४. औपभृतं तथेति चेत् ।

४५. स्याज्जुहूप्रतिषेधान्नित्यानुवादः ।

४६. तदष्टसङ्ख्यं श्रवणात् ।

४७. अनुग्रहाच्च जौहवस्य ।

४८. द्वयोस्तु हेतुसामर्थ्यं श्रवणं च समानयने ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने चतुर्थस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

१. स्वरुस्त्वनेकनिष्पत्तिः स्वकर्मशब्दत्वात् ।

२. जात्यन्तराच्च शङ्कते ।

३. तदेकदेशो वा स्वरुत्वस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ।

१. सामर्थ्ये इति न्यायमालायां पाठः ।

४. शकलश्रुतेश्च[1]।
५. प्रतियूपं च दर्शनात्।
६. आदाने करोति[2]शब्दः।
७. शाखायां तत्प्रधानत्वात्।
८. शाखायां तत्प्रधानत्वादुपवेषेण विभागः स्या[3]द्वैषम्यात्।
९. श्रुत्यपायाच्च।
१०. हरणे[4] जुहोतिर्योगसामान्याद् द्रव्याणां चार्थशेषत्वात्।
११. प्रतिपत्तिर्वा शब्दस्य तत्प्रधानत्वात्।
१२. अर्थेऽपीति चेत्।
१३. न तस्यानधिकारादर्थस्य च कृतत्वात्।
१४. उत्पत्त्यसंयोगात्प्रणीतानामाज्यवद्विभागः स्यात्।
१५. संयवनार्थानां या[5] प्रतिपत्तिरितरासां तत्प्रधानत्वात्।
१६. प्रासनवन्मैत्रावरुणस्य[6] दण्डप्रदानं कृतार्थत्वात्।
१७. अर्थकर्म वा कर्तृसंयोगात्स्रग्वत्।

१. चशब्दरहितः पाठो वृत्तौ।
२. कर्मशब्द इति वृत्तौ पाठः।
३. वैषम्यं तदिति न्यायमालायां पाठः।
४. तु इति न्यायमालायां अधिकः पाठः।
५. 'वा' इति न्यायमालायां पाठः।
६. वरुणायेति न्यायमालायां पाठः।

१८. कर्मयुक्ते च दर्शनात्।
१९. उत्पत्तौ येन संयुक्तं तदर्थं तच्छ्रुतिहेतुत्वात्तस्यार्थान्तरगमने शेषत्वात् प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्।
२०. सौमिके च कृतार्थत्वात्।
२१. अर्थकर्म वाऽभिधानसंयोगात्।
२२. प्रतिपत्तिर्वा तन्न्यायत्वाद्देशार्थाऽवभृथश्रुतिः।
२३. कर्तृदेशकालानामचोदनं प्रयोगे नित्यसमवायात्।
२४. नियमार्था वा पुनः[1] श्रुतिः।
२५. तथा द्रव्येषु; गुणश्रुतिरुत्पत्तिसंयोगात्।
२६. संस्कारे च तत्प्रधानत्वात्।
२७. यजति, चोदनाद्रव्यदेवताक्रियं, समुदाये कृतार्थत्वात्।
२८. तदुक्ते श्रवणाज्जुहोतिरासेचनाधिकः स्यात्।
२९. ददातिरुत्सर्गपूर्वकः[2] परस्वत्वेन सम्बन्धः।
३० विधेः कर्मापवर्गित्वादर्थान्तरे विधिप्रदेशः स्यात्।
३१. अपि वोत्पत्तिसंयोगादर्थसम्बन्धोऽविशिष्टानां प्रयोगैकत्वहेतुः स्यात्।

१. पुनश्शब्दरहितः पाठो न्यायमालायाम्।
२. इदं सूत्रं भाष्ये न्यायमालायां च नास्ति।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने चतुर्थस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।

तृतीयः पादः

१. द्रव्यसंस्कारकर्मसु परार्थत्वात्फलश्रुतिरर्थवादः स्यात् ।

२. उत्पत्तेश्चातत्प्रधानत्वात् ।
३. फलं[1] तु तत्प्रधानायाम् ।
४. नैमित्तिके विकारत्वात्क्रतुप्रधानमन्यत्स्यात् ।
५. एकस्य तूभयत्वे संयोगपृथक्त्वम् ।
६. शेष इति चेत् ।
७. नार्थपृथक्त्वात् ।

८. द्रव्याणां तु क्रियार्थानां संस्कारः क्रतुधर्म[2]त्वात् ।
९. पृथक्त्वाद्व्यवतिष्ठेत ।

१०. चोदनायां फलाश्रुतेः; कर्ममात्रं विधीयेत; न ह्यशब्दं प्रतीयते ।
११. अपि वाऽऽम्नानसामर्थ्याच्चोदनार्थेन गम्ये[3]तार्थानामर्थवत्त्वेन वचनानि प्रतीयन्तेऽर्थतोप्य[1]समर्थानामानन्तर्यें[2]प्यसम्बन्धस्तस्माच्छ्रुत्येकदेश[3]स्सः ।
१२. वाक्यार्थश्च गुणार्थवत् ।
१३. तत्सर्वार्थमनादेशात् ।
१४. एकं वा चोदनैकत्वात् ।
१५. स स्वर्गः स्यात्सर्वान्प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात् ।
१६. प्रत्ययाच्च ।

१७. क्रतौ फलार्थवादमङ्गवत्कार्ष्णाजिनिः ।
१८. फलमात्रेयो निर्देशादश्रुतौ ह्यनुमानं स्यात् ।
१९. अङ्गेषु स्तुतिः परार्थत्वात् ।
२०. काम्ये कर्मणि नित्यः स्वर्गो, यथा यज्ञाङ्गे क्रत्वर्थः ।
२१. वीते च कारणे नियमात् ।
२२. कामो वा तत्संयोगेन चोद्यते ।
२३. अङ्गे गुणत्वात् ।
२४. वीते च[4] नियमस्तदर्थम् ।
२५. सार्वकाम्यमङ्गकामैः प्रकरणात् ।
२६. फलोपदेशो वा प्रधानशब्दसंयोगात् ।
२७. तत्र सर्वेऽविशेषात् ।

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१. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तौ नास्ति ।
२. धर्मः स्यादिति न्यायमालायां पाठः ।
३. गम्यते अर्थानां ह्यर्थेति न्यायमालायां पाठः ।

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१. अपिपदं वृत्तौ नास्ति ।
२. न्तर्येण समिति वृत्तौ पाठः ।
३. स इत्येतद्रहितः पाठो न्यायमालायाम् ।
४. चशब्दरहितः पाठो वृत्तौ ।

२८. योगसिद्धिर्वाऽर्थस्योत्पत्त्यसंयोगात्[1]।

२९. समवाये चोदनासंयोगस्यार्थवत्त्वात्।

३०. कालश्रुतौ काल इति चेत्।

३१. नासमवायात्प्रयोजनेन[2]।

३२. उभयार्थमिति चेत्।

३३. न शब्दैकत्वात्।

३४. प्रकरणादिति चेत्।

३५. नोत्पत्तिसंयोगात्।

३६. अनुत्पत्तौ तु कालः स्यात्प्रयोजनेन सम्बन्धात्।

३७. उत्पत्तिकालविशये कालः स्याद्वाक्यस्य तत्प्रधानत्वात्।

३८. फलसंयोगस्त्वचोदिते, न स्यादशेषभूतत्वात्।

३९. अङ्गानां तूपघातसंयोगे निमित्तार्थः।

४०. प्रधानेनाभिसंयोगादङ्गानां मुख्यकालत्वम्।

४१. अपवृत्ते तु चोदना तत्सामान्यात्स्वकाले स्यात्।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने चतुर्थस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः।

१. संयोगित्वादिति न्यायमालायां पाठः।

२. स्यादित्यधिको न्यायमालायां पाठः।

चतुर्थः पादः

१. प्रकरणशब्दसामान्याच्चोदनानामनङ्गत्वम्।

२. अपि वाऽङ्गमनिज्याः स्युस्ततोविशिष्टत्वात्।

३. मध्यस्थं यस्य तन्मध्ये।

४. सर्वासां वा समत्वाच्चोदनातः स्यान्न हि तस्य प्रकरणं देशार्थमुच्यते मध्ये।

५. प्रकरणाविभागे च विप्रतिषिद्धं ह्युभयम्।

६. अपि वा कालमात्रं स्याददर्शनाद्विशेषस्य।

७. फलवद्वोक्तहेतुत्वादितरस्य प्रधानं स्यात्।

८. दधिग्रहो नैमित्तिकः श्रुतिसंयोगात्।

९. नित्यश्च ज्येष्ठशब्द[1]त्वात्।

१०. सार्वरूप्याच्च।

११. नित्यो वा स्यादर्थवादस्तयोः कर्मण्यसम्बन्धाद्भङ्गित्वाच्चान्तरायस्य।

१२. वैश्वानरश्च नित्यः स्यान्नित्यैः समानसङ्ख्यत्वात्।

१३. पक्षे वोत्पन्नसंयोगात्।

१४. षट्चितिः पूर्वव[2]त्स्यात्।

१. ज्येष्ठशब्दादिति न्यायमालायां पाठः।

२. पूर्वत्वादिति न्यायमालायां पाठः।

१५. ताभिश्च तुल्यसंख्यानात् ।
१६. अर्थवादोपपत्तेश्च ।
१७. एकचितिर्वा स्यादपवृक्ते हि चोद्यते निमित्तेन ।
१८. विप्रतिषेधात्ताभिः समानसङ्ख्य[1]त्वम् ।
१९. पितृयज्ञः स्वकालत्वानङ्गं स्यात् ।
२०. तुल्यवच्च[2] प्रसंख्यानात् ।
२१. विप्रति[3]षिद्धे च दर्शनात् ।
२२. पश्वङ्गं रशना स्यात्तदागमे विधानात् ।
२३. यूपाङ्गं वा तत्संस्कारात् ।
२४. अर्थवादश्च तदर्थवत् ।
२५. स्वरुश्चाप्येकदेशत्वात् ।
२६. निष्क्रयश्च तदङ्गवत् ।
२७. पश्वङ्गं वा[4]र्थकर्मत्वात् ।
२८. भक्त्या निष्क्रयवादः स्यात् ।
२९. दर्शपूर्णमासयोरिज्याः प्रधानान्यविशेषात् ।
३०. अपि वाङ्गानि कानिचिद्येष्वङ्गत्वेन संस्तुतिः सामा[5]न्यादभिसंस्तवः ।
३१. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

१. सङ्ख्यमिति न्यायमालायां पाठः ।
२. वकारस्तु न्यायमालायां नास्ति ।
३. विशब्दरहितः पाठो न्या० मा० ।
४. वास्यार्थत्वादिति न्यायमालायां पाठः ।
५. सामान्योभिसम्बन्ध इति न्यायमालायां पाठः ।

३२. अवशिष्टं तु कारणं प्रधानेषु गुणस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।
३३. नानुक्तेऽन्यार्थदर्शनं परार्थत्वात् ।
३४. पृथक्त्वे त्वभिधानयोर्निवेशः श्रुतितो व्यपदेशाच्च तत्पुनर्मुख्यलक्षणं यत्फलवत्त्वं तत्सन्निधावसंयुक्तं तदङ्गं स्याद्भागित्वात् कारणस्याश्रुते[1]श्चान्यसम्बन्धः ।
३५. गुणाश्च नामसंयुक्ता विधीयन्ते; नाङ्गेषूपपद्यन्ते ।
३६. तुल्या च कारणश्रुतिरन्यैरङ्गा[2]भिसम्बन्धैः ।
३७. उत्पत्तावभिसम्बन्धस्तस्मादङ्गोपदेशः स्यात् ।
३८. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
३९. ज्योतिष्टोमे तुल्यान्यविशिष्टं हि कारणम् ।
४०. गुणानां तूत्पत्तिवाक्येन सम्बन्धात्कारणश्रुतिस्तस्मात्सोमः प्रधानं स्यात् ।
४१. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने चतुर्थस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

॥ चतुर्थोऽध्यायः समाप्तः ॥

१. श्रुतश्चेति न्यायमालायां पाठः ।
२. ङ्गाङ्गिसम्बन्धैरिति न्यायमालायां पाठः ।

पञ्चमोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. श्रुतिलक्षणमानुपूर्व्यं तत्प्रमाणत्वात्[1]।
२. अर्थाच्च।
३. अनियमोऽन्यत्र।
४. क्रमेण वा नियम्येत, क्रत्वेकत्वे तद्गुणत्वात्।
५. अशाब्द[2] इति चेत्स्याद्वाक्य शब्दत्वात्।
६. अर्थकृते[3] चाऽनुमानं स्यात्क्रत्वेकत्वे; परार्थत्वात्स्वेन त्वर्थेन सम्बन्धस्तस्मात्स्वशब्दमुच्यते।
७. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम्।
८. प्रवृत्त्या तुल्यकालानां गुणानां तदुपक्रमात्।
९. सर्वमिति चेत्।
१०. नाकृतत्वात्।
११. क्रत्वन्तरवदिति चेत्।
१२. नासमवायात्।
१३. स्थानाच्चोत्पत्तिसंयोगात्।
१४. मुख्यक्रमेण वाङ्गानां[4] तदर्थत्वात्।
१५. प्रकृतौ तु स्वशब्दत्वाद्यथाक्रमं प्रतीयेत।
१६. मन्त्रतस्तु विरोधे स्यात्प्रयोगरूपसामर्थ्यात्तस्मादुत्पत्तिदेशः सः।
१७. तद्वचनाद्विकृतौ यथाप्रधानं स्यात्।
१८. विप्रतिपत्तौ वा प्रकृत्यन्वयाद्यथाप्रकृति।
१९. विकृतिः प्रकृतिधर्मत्वात्तत्काला स्याद्यथाशिष्टम्।
२०. अपि वा क्रमकालसंयुक्ता सद्यः क्रियेत तत्र विधेरनुमानात्प्रकृतिधर्मलोपः स्यात्।
२१. कालोत्कर्ष इति चेत्।
२२. न तत्सम्बन्धात्।
२३. अङ्गानां मुख्यकालत्वाद्यथोक्तम् उत्कर्षे स्यात्।
२४. तदादि वाऽभिसम्बन्धात्तदन्तमपकर्षे स्यात्।
२५. प्रवृत्त्या कृतकालानाम्।
२६. शब्दविप्रतिषेधाच्च।
२७. असंयोगात्तु वैकृतं तदेव प्रतिकृष्येत।
२८. प्रासङ्गिकं च नोत्कर्षेदसंयोगात्।
२९. तथाऽपूर्वम्।
३०. सान्तपनीया तूत्कर्षेदग्निहोत्रं सवनवद्वैगुण्यात्।
३१. अव्यवायाच्च।

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१. तत्प्रधानत्वेति न्यायमालायां पाठः।
२. अशाब्दमिति वृत्तिकृत्पाठः।
३. कृते वान्विति न्यायमालायां पाठः।
४. वाङ्गेति न्यायमालायां पाठः।

३२. असम्बन्धात्त् नोत्कर्षेत् ।
३३. प्रापणाच्च निमित्तस्य ।
३४. सम्बन्धात्सवनोत्कर्षः ।
३५. षोडशी चोक्थ्यसंयोगात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने पञ्चमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

१. सन्निपाते प्रधानानामेकैकस्य गुणानां सर्वकर्म स्यात् ।
२. सर्वेषां वैकजातीयं कृतानुपूर्व्य[1]-त्वात् ।
३. कारणादभ्यावृत्तिः ।
४. मुष्टिकपालावदानाञ्जनाभ्यञ्जन-वपनपावनेषु चैकेन ।
५. सर्वाणि[2] त्वेककार्यत्वादेषां तद्गुण-त्वात् ।
६. संयुक्ते तु प्रक्रमात्त[3]दङ्गं स्यादित-रस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।
७. वचनात्तु परिव्याणान्तमञ्जनादिः स्यात् ।
८. कारणाद्वा[4]ऽनवसर्गः स्याद्यथा पात्र-वृद्धिः ।

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१. पूर्वस्येति न्या. मा. पाठः ।
२. सर्वाणि वैकेति वृत्तिकृत्पाठः ।
३. तदन्तमिति वृत्तौ पाठः ।
४. द्वावसर्ग इति वृत्तौ पाठः ।

९. न वा शब्दकृतत्वान्न्यायमात्रमित-रदर्थात्पात्रविवृद्धिः[1] ।
१०. पशुगणे तस्य तस्यापवर्जयेत् पश्वेकत्वात् ।
११. दैवतैर्वैककर्म्यात् ।
१२. मन्त्रस्य चार्थवत्त्वात् ।
१३. नानाबीजे[2] एकमुलूखलं विभवात् ।
१४. विवृद्धिर्वा नियमानुपूर्व्यस्य तद-र्थत्वात् ।
१५. एकं वा तण्डुलभावाद्धन्तेस्तद-र्थत्वात् ।
१६. विकारे त्वनुयाजानां पात्रभेदो-ऽर्थभेदात् स्यात् ।
१७. प्रकृतेः पूर्वोक्तत्वादपूर्वमन्ते स्यान्न ह्यचोदितस्य शेषाम्नानम् ।
१८. मुख्यानन्तर्यमात्रेयस्तेन तुल्यश्रुति-त्वादशब्दत्वात्प्राकृतानां व्यवायः स्यात् ।
१९. अन्ते तु बादरायणस्तेषां प्रधान-शब्दत्वात् ।
२०. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
२१. कृतदेशात्तु पूर्वेषां स देशः स्यात्; तेनप्रत्यक्षसंयोगान्न्यायमात्रमित-रत् ।
२२. प्राकृताच्च पुरस्ताद्यत् ।
२३. सन्निपातश्चेद्यथोक्तमन्ते स्यात् ।

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१. प्रवृद्धिरिति वृत्तौ पाठः ।
२. बीजेष्विति न्या. मा. पाठः ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने पञ्चमस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः।

तृतीयः पादः

१. विवृद्धिः कर्मभेदात्पृषदाज्यवत्तस्य तस्योपदिश्येत।

२. अपि वा सर्वसङ्ख्यत्वाद्विकारः प्रतीयेत।

३. स्वस्थानात्तु विवृध्येरन्कृतानुपूर्व्यत्वात्।

४. समिध्यमानवतीं समिद्धवतीं चान्तरेण धाय्याः स्युर्द्यावापृथिव्योरन्तराले समर्हणात्।

५. तच्छब्दो वा।

६. उष्णिक्ककुभोरन्ते दर्शनात्।

७. स्तोम विवृद्धौ वहिष्पवमाने पुरस्तात्पर्यासादागन्तवः स्युस्तथा हि दृष्टं द्वादशाहे।

८. पर्यास इति चाऽन्ताख्या।

९. अन्ते वा तदुक्तम्।

१०. वचनात्तु द्वादशाहे।

११. अतद्विकारश्च।

१२. तद्विकारेऽप्यपूर्वत्वात्।

१३. अन्ते तूत्तरयोर्दध्यात्।

१४. अपि वा गायत्रीबृहत्यनुष्टुप्सु वचनात्।

१५. ग्रहेष्टकमौपानुवाक्यं सवनचितिशेषः स्यात्।

१६. क्रत्वग्निशेषो वा चोदितत्वादचोदनान्नपूर्वस्य[1]।

१७. अन्ते स्युरव्यवायात्।

१८. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च।

१९. मध्यमायां तु वचनाद् ब्राह्मणवत्यः।

२०. प्राग्लोकम्पृणायास्तस्याः सम्पूरणार्थत्वात्।

२१. संस्कृते कर्म संस्काराणां तदर्थत्वात्।

२२. अनन्तरं व्रतं तद्भूतत्वात्।

२३. पूर्वं च लिङ्गदर्शनात्।

२४. अर्थवादो वाऽर्थस्य विद्यमानत्वात्।

२५. न्यायविप्रतिषेधाच्च।

२६. सञ्चिते त्वग्नि चिद्युक्तं प्रापणान्निमित्तस्य।

२७. क्रत्वन्ते वा प्रयोगवचनाभावात्।

२८. अग्नेः कर्मत्वनिर्देशात्।

२९. परेणाऽवेदनाद्दीक्षितः स्यात्, सर्वैर्दीक्षाभिसम्बन्धात्।

३०. इष्टचन्तेवा तदर्था ह्यविशेषार्थसम्बन्धात्।

३१. समाख्यानं च तद्वत्।

३२. अङ्गवत्क्रतूनामानुपूर्व्यम्।

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१. चोदना तु पूर्वस्य—इति क्षेमराजीये। चोदना नु पूर्वस्य—इत्यानन्दाश्रमीये।

३३. न वाऽसम्बन्धात् ।

३४. काम्यत्वाच्च ।

३५. आनर्थक्यान्नेति चेत् ।

३६. स्याद्विद्यार्थत्वाद्यथा परेषु सर्वस्वारात् ।

३७. य एतेनेत्यग्निष्टोमः प्रकरणात् ।

३८. लिङ्गाच्च ।

३९. अथान्येनेति संस्थानां सन्निधानात् ।

४०. तत्प्रकृतेर्वाऽऽपत्तिविहारौ हि न तुल्येषूपपद्येते ।

४१. प्रशंसा च विहरणाभावात् ।

४२. विधिप्रत्ययाद्वा न ह्येकस्मात् प्रशंसा स्यात् ।

४३. एकस्तोमो वा क्रतुसंयोगात् ।

४४. सर्वेषां वा चोदना विशेषात्प्रशंसा स्तोमानाम् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने पञ्चमस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः ।

चतुर्थः पादः

१. क्रमकोपोऽर्थशब्दाभ्यां श्रुतिविशेषादर्थपरत्वाच्च ।

२. अवदानाभिघारणाऽऽसादनेष्वानुपूर्व्यं प्रवृत्त्या स्यात् ।

३. यथाप्रदानं वा तदर्थत्वात् ।

४. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

५. वचनादिष्टिपूर्वत्वम् ।

६. सोमश्चैकेषामग्न्याधेयस्यर्तुनक्षत्राऽतिक्रमवचनात् तदर्थे[1] नानर्थकं हि स्यात् ।

७. तदर्थवचनाच्च नाविशेषात्तदर्थत्वं ।

८. अयक्ष्यमाणस्य च पवमानहविषां कालविधाना[2] दानन्तर्याद्विशङ्का स्यात् ।

९. इष्टिरयक्ष्यमाणस्य तादर्थ्ये[3] सोमपूर्वत्वम् ।

१०. उत्कर्षाद् ब्राह्मणस्य सोमः स्यात् ।

११. पौर्णमासी वा श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।

१२. सर्वस्य चैककर्मत्वात् ।

१३. स्याद्वा विधिस्तदर्थेन ।

१४. प्रकरणात्तु कालः स्यात् ।

१५. स्वकाले स्यादविप्रतिषेधात् ।

१६. अपनयो वाऽऽधानस्य सर्वकालत्वात् ।

१७. पौर्णमास्यूर्ध्वं सोमाद्ब्राह्मणस्य वचनात् ।

१८. एकं वा शब्दसामर्थ्यात्प्राक् कृत्स्नविधानम् ।

१९. पुरोडाशस्त्वनिर्देशे तद्युक्ते देवताभावात् ।

२०. आज्यमपीति चेत् ।

२१. न मिश्रदेवतात्वादैन्द्राग्नवत् ।

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१. तदन्तेन इति आनन्दाश्रमपाठः ।

२. निर्देशा इति पाठभेदः ।

३. तादर्थ्ये न सोमेति क्षेमराजीयः पाठभेदः ।

२२. विकृतेः प्रकृतिकालत्वात्सद्यस्कालोत्तरा विकृतिस्तयोः प्रत्यक्षशिष्टत्वात् ।

२३. द्वैयहकाल्ये तु यथान्यायम् ।

२४. वचनाद्वैककाल्यं स्यात् ।

२५. सान्नाय्याग्नीषोमीयविकाराद्र्ध्वं सोमात्प्रकृतिवत् ।

२६. तथा सोमविकारा दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्याम् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने पञ्चमस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

।। पञ्चमोऽध्यायः सम्पूर्णः ।।

षष्ठोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. द्रव्याणां कर्मसंयोगे गुणत्वेनाऽभिसम्बन्धः ।

२. असाधकं तु तादर्थ्यात् ।

३. प्रत्यर्थं चाऽभिसंयोगात् कर्मतो ह्यभिसम्बन्धस्तस्मात्कर्मोपदेशः स्यात् ।

४. फलार्थत्वात्कर्मणः शास्त्रं सर्वाधिकारं स्यात् ।

५. कर्तुर्वा श्रुतिसंयोगाद्विधिः कार्त्स्न्येन गम्यते ।

६. लिङ्गविशेषनिर्देशात्पुंयुक्तमैतिशायनः ।

७. तदुक्तित्वाच्च दोषश्रुतिरविज्ञाते ।

८. जातिं तु बादरायणोऽविशेषात्; तस्मात् स्त्र्यपि प्रतीयेत; जात्यर्थस्याऽविशिष्टत्वात् ।

८अ. विभक्त्येति चेन्न ।

९. चोदितत्वाद्यथाश्रुति ।

१०. द्रव्यवत्त्वात्तु पुंसां स्याद्द्रव्यसंयुक्तं क्रयविक्रयाभ्यामद्रव्यत्वं स्त्रीणां द्रव्यैः समानयोगित्वात् ।

११. तथा चाऽन्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

१२. तादर्थ्यात्कर्मतादर्थ्यम् ।

१३. फलोत्साहाऽविशेषात्[1] ।

१४. अर्थेन च समवेतत्वात् ।

१५. क्रयस्य धर्ममात्रत्वम् ।

१६. स्ववत्तामपि दर्शयति ।

१७. स्ववतोस्तु वचनादैककर्म्यं स्यात्

१८. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

१९. क्रीतत्वात्तु भक्त्या स्वामित्वमुच्यते ।

२०. फलार्थित्वात्तु स्वामित्वेनाऽभिसम्बन्धः ।

२१. फलवत्तां च दर्शयति ।

२२. द्व्याधानं च द्वियज्ञवत् ।

२३. गुणस्य तु विधानत्वात्पत्न्या द्वितीयाशब्दः स्यात् ।

२४. तस्या यावदुक्तमाशीर्ब्रह्मचर्यमतुल्यत्वात् ।

२५. चातुर्वर्ण्यमविशेषात् ।

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१. भाष्ये अविशेषात्तु इति पाठः ।

२६. निर्देशाद्वा त्रयाणां स्यादग्न्याधेये ह्यसम्बन्धः, क्रतुषु ब्राह्मणश्रुति-रित्यात्रेयः ।

२७. निमित्तार्थे च बादरिस्तस्मात् सर्वाधिकारः[1] स्यात् ।

२८. अपि वाऽन्यार्थदर्शनाद्यथाश्रुति प्रतीयेत ।

२९. निर्देशात्तु पक्षे स्यात् ।

३०. वैगुण्यान्नेति चेत् ।

३१. न काम्यत्वात् ।

३२. संस्कारे च तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।

३३. अपि वा वेदनिर्देशादपशूद्राणां प्रतीयेत ।

३४. गुणार्थि[2]त्वान्नेति चेत् ।

३५. संस्कारस्य तदर्थत्वाद्विद्यायां पुरुषश्रुतिः ।

३६. विद्यानिर्देशान्नेति चेत् ।

३७. अवैद्यत्वादभावः कर्मणि स्यात् ।

३८. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

३९. त्रयाणां द्रव्यसम्पन्नः कर्मणो द्रव्य-सिद्धित्वात् ।

४०. अनित्यत्वात्तु नैवं स्यादर्थाद्धि द्रव्यसंयोगः ।

४१. अङ्गहीनश्च तद्धर्मा ।

४२. उत्पत्तौ नित्यसंयोगात् ।

४३. अत्र्यार्षेयस्य हानं स्यात् ।

४४. वचनाद्रथकारस्याधाने सर्वशेष-त्वात् ।

४५. न्यायो वा कर्मसंयोगाच्छूद्रस्य प्रतिषिद्धत्वात् ।

४६. अकर्मत्वात्तु नैवं स्यात् ।

४७. आनर्थक्यं च संयोगादत् ।

४८. गुणार्थं[1]मिति चेत् ।

४९. उक्तमनिमित्तत्वम् ।

५०. सौधन्वनास्तु हीनत्वान्मन्त्रवर्णात् प्रतीयेरन् ।

५१. स्थपतिर्निषादः स्याच्छब्दसाम-र्थ्यात् ।

५२. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने षष्ठस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

१. पुरुषार्थैकसिद्धित्वात्तस्य तस्याधि-कारः स्यात् ।

२. अपि वोत्पत्तिसंयोगाद्यथा स्यात् सर्व[2]दर्शनं तथाभावोऽविभागे स्यात् ।

३. प्रयोगे पुरुषश्रुतेर्यथाकामी प्रयोगे स्यात् ।

४. प्रत्यर्थं श्रुतिभाव इति चेत् ।

५. तादर्थ्ये न गुणार्थताऽनुक्तेऽर्थान्तर-

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१. सर्वाधिकारमित्यानन्दाश्रमपाठः ।

२. णार्थत्वेति वृत्तौ पाठः । गुणार्थेनेति च जीवानन्दपाठः ।

१. गुणार्थेनेति पाठान्तरम् ।

२. सत्त्वेति पाठान्तरम् ।

त्वात्कर्तुः प्रधानभूतत्वात् ।
५अ. चोदनैकत्वात्[१] ।
६. अपि वा कामसंयोगे सम्बन्धात् प्रयोगायोपदिश्येत प्रत्यर्थं हि विधिश्रुतिर्विषाणावत् ।
७. अन्य[२]स्यापीति चेत् ।
८. अन्यार्थेनाभिसम्बन्धः ।
९. फलकामो निमित्तमिति चेत् ।
१०. न नित्यत्वात् ।
११. कर्म तथेति चेत् ।
१२. न समवायात् ।
१३. प्रक्रमात्तु नियम्येतारम्भस्य क्रियानिमित्त[३]त्वात् ।
१४. फलार्थित्वाद्वाऽनियमो यथानुपक्रान्ते ।
१५. नियमो वा तन्निमित्तत्वात्कर्तुस्तत्कारणं स्यात् ।
१६. लोके कर्मणि वेदवत्ततोऽधिपुरुषज्ञानम् ।
१७. अपराधेऽपि च तैः शास्त्रम् ।
१८. अशास्त्रात्तूपसम्प्राप्तिः शास्त्रं स्यान्न प्रकल्पकं तस्मादर्थेन गम्येताप्राप्ते वा शास्त्रमर्थवत् ।

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१. अन्यस्यादिति चेदित्येवं नञं विहायापि पाठो जै. न्या. मा. ।
२. अन्यस्य स्यादिति चेत्—इति आ. पाठः ।
३. नियम्येति आ. पाठः ।

१८अ. देवता[१]श्रये च ।
१९. प्रतिषेधेष्वकर्मत्वात्क्रिया स्यात्प्रतिषिद्धानां विभक्तत्वादकर्मणाम् ।
२०. शास्त्राणां त्वर्थवत्त्वेन पुरुषार्थो विधीयते; तयोरसमवायित्वात्तादर्थ्ये विध्यतिक्रमः ।
२१. तस्मिंस्तु शिष्यमाणानि जननेन प्रवर्तेरन् ।
२२. अपि वा वेदतुल्यत्वादुपायेन प्रवर्तेरन् ।
२३. अभ्यासोऽकर्मशेषत्वात् पुरुषार्थो विधीयते ।
२४. एतस्मिन्नसंभवन्नर्थात् ।
२५. न कालेभ्य उपदिश्यन्ते ।
२६. दर्शनात्काललिङ्गानां कालविधानम् ।
२७. तेषामौत्पत्तिकत्वादागमेन प्रवर्त्तेत ।
२८. तथा हि लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।
२९. तथान्तःक्रतु युक्तानि ।
३०. आचाराद्गृह्यमाणेषु तथा स्यात् पुरुषार्थत्वात् ।
३१. ब्राह्मणस्य तु सोमविद्याप्रजमृणवाक्येन संयोगात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने षष्ठस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।

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१. इदं सूत्रमधिकं वृत्तिग्रन्थ पठ्यते, भाष्यग्रन्थे वार्तिकग्रन्थ न्यायमालायां च न दृश्यते ।

तृतीयः पादः

१. सर्वशक्तौ प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्तथाभूतोपदेशात् ।
२. अपि वाऽप्येकदेशे स्यात्प्रधाने ह्यर्थनिवृत्तिर्गुणमात्रमितरत्तदर्थत्वात् ।
३. तदकर्मणि च दोषस्तस्मात्ततो विशेषः स्यात्प्रधानेनाऽभिसम्बन्धात् ।
४. कर्माऽभेदं तु जैमिनिः प्रयोगवचनैकत्वात् सर्वेषामुपदेशः स्यात् ।
५. अर्थस्य व्यपवर्गित्वादेकस्यापि प्रयोगे स्याद्यथा क्रत्वन्तरेषु ।
६. विध्यपराधे च दर्शनात्समाप्तेः ।
७. प्रायश्चित्तविधानाच्च ।
८. काम्येषु चैवमर्थित्वात् ।
९. असंयोगात्तु नैवं स्याद्विधेः शब्दप्रमाणत्वात् ।
१०. अकर्मणि चाप्रत्यवायात् ।
११. क्रियाणामाश्रितत्वाद्द्रव्यान्तरे विभागः स्यात् ।
१२. अपि वाऽव्यतिरेकाद्रूपशब्दाविभागाच्च गोत्ववदैककर्म्यं स्यान्नामधेयं च सत्त्ववत् ।
१३. श्रुति प्रमाणत्वाच्छिष्टाभावेऽनागमोऽन्यस्याऽशिष्टत्वात् ।
१४. क्वचिद्विधानाच्च ।
१५. आगमो वा चोदनार्थाविशेषात् ।
१६. नियमार्थः क्वचिद्विधिः ।
१७. तन्नित्यं तच्चिकीर्षा हि ।
१८. न देवताग्निशब्दक्रियमन्यार्थसंयोगात् ।
१९. देवतायां च तदर्थत्वात् ।
२०. प्रतिषिद्धं चाविशेषेण हि तच्छ्रुतिः ।
२१. तथा स्वामिनः फलसमवायात् फलस्य कर्मयोगित्वात् ।
२२. बहूनां तु[1] प्रवृत्तावन्यमागमयेदवैगुण्यात् ।
२३. स स्वामी स्यात्संयोगात् ।
२४. कर्मकरो वा क्रीतत्वात् ।
२५. तस्मिश्च फलदर्शनात् ।
२६. स तद्धर्मा स्यात्त[2]त्कर्मसंयोगात् ।
२७. सामान्यं तच्चिकीर्षा हि ।
२८. निर्देशात्तु विकल्पे यत्प्रवृत्तम् ।
२९. अशब्दमिति चेत् ।
३०. नाऽनङ्गत्वात् ।
३०अ. संस्काराश्च[3] खादिरे कर्तव्याः ।
३१. वचनाच्चाऽन्याय्यमभावे तत्सामान्येन प्रतिनिधिरभावादितरस्य ।
३२. न प्रतिनिधौ समत्वात् ।
३३. स्याच्छ्रुतिलक्षणे नित्यत्वात् ।
३४. न तदीप्सा हि ।

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१. त्वित्यस्य स्थाने चेति पाठो वृत्तिग्रन्थे, प्रवृत्तेऽन्य०—इति पाठभेदः ।
२. क्वचित् तदिति न दृश्यते ।
३. इदं सूत्रं भाष्ये सूत्रत्वेन नोक्तम् । जै. न्या. वृत्तिग्रन्थे त्वस्ति ।

३५. मुख्याधिगमे मुख्यमागमो हि तदभावात् ।

३६. प्रवृत्तेऽपीति चेत् ।

३७. नानर्थकत्वात् ।

३८. द्रव्यसंस्कारविरोधे द्रव्यं तदर्थत्वात् ।

३९. अर्थद्रव्यविरोधेऽर्थो द्रव्याभावे तदुत्पत्तेर्द्रव्याणामर्थशेषत्वात् ।

४०. विधिरप्येकदेशे स्यात् ।

४१. अपि वाऽर्थस्य शक्यत्वादेकदेशेन निर्वर्तेतार्थानामविभक्तत्वाद्गुणमात्रमितरत्तदर्थत्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने षष्ठस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः ।

चतुर्थः पादः

१. शेषाद्द्व्यवदाननाशे स्यात्तदर्थत्वात् ।

२. निर्देशाद्वाऽन्यदागमयेत् ।

३. अपि वा शेषभाजां स्याद्विशिष्टकारणात् ।

४. निर्देशाच्छेषभक्षोऽन्यैः प्रधानवत् ।

५. सर्वैर्वा समवायात्स्यात् ।

६. निर्देशस्य गुणार्थत्वम् ।

७. प्रधाने श्रुतिलक्षणम् ।

८. अश्व[1]वदिति चेत् ।

९. न चोदनाविरोधात् ।

१. अर्थवदिति पाठो न्याः मा. ।

१०. अर्थसमवायात्प्रायश्चित्तमेकदेशेऽपि ।

११. न त्वशेषे वैगुण्यात्तदर्थं हि ।

१२. स्याद्वा प्राप्तनिमित्तत्वादतद्धर्मो नित्यसंयोगान्न हि तस्य गुणार्थत्वेनानित्यत्वात् ।

१३. गुणानां च परार्थत्वाद्वचनाद् व्यपाश्रयः स्यात् ।

१३अ. वचनाद्विकल्प इति चेन्न निमित्तार्थेन संभवात् ।

१४. भेदार्थमिति चेत् ।

१५. नाशेषभूतत्वात् ।

१६. अनर्थकश्च सर्वनाशे स्यात् ।

१७. क्षामे तु सर्वदाहे स्यादेकदेशस्याऽवर्जनीयत्वात् ।

१८. दर्शनाद्वैकदेशे स्यात् ।

१९. अन्येन वैतच्छास्त्राद्धि कारणप्राप्तिः ।

२०. तद्धविः शब्दान्नेति चेत् ।

२१. स्यादि[1]ज्यागामी हविः शब्दस्तल्लिंगसंयोगात् ।

२२. यथाश्रुतीति चेत् ।

२३. न तल्लक्षणत्वादुपपातो हि कारणम् ।

२४. होमाभिषवभक्षणं च तद्वत् ।

२५. उभाभ्यां वा न हि तयोर्धर्मशास्त्रम् ।

२६. पुनराधेयमोदनवत् ।

२७. द्रव्योत्पत्तेश्चोभयोः स्यात् ।

१. अन्यायत्वादित्यधिकः पाठः आ. जी. पुस्तकयोः ।

२८. पञ्चशरावस्तु द्रव्यश्रुतेः प्रतिनिधिः स्यात् ।

२९. चोदना वा द्रव्यदेवताविधिरवाच्ये हि ।

३०. स प्रत्यामनेत्स्थानात् ।

३१. अङ्गविधिर्वा निमित्तसंयोगात् ।

३२. विश्वजिद[1]प्रवृत्ते भावः कर्मणि स्यात् ।

३३. निष्क्रयवादाच्च ।

३४. वत्ससंयोगे व्रतचोदना स्यात् ।

३५. कालो वोत्पन्नसंयोगाद्यथोक्त[2]स्य ।

३६. अर्थापरिमाणाच्च ।

३७. वत्सस्तु श्रुतिसंयोगात् तदङ्गं स्यात् ।

३८. कालस्तु स्यादचोदनात् ।

३९. अनर्थकश्च कर्मसंयोगे ।

४०. अवचनाच्च स्वशब्दस्य ।

४१. कालश्चेत्सन्नयत्पक्षे तल्लिङ्गसंयोगात् ।

४२. कालार्थत्वाद्वोभयोः प्रतीयेत ।

४३. प्रस्तरे शाखाश्रयणवत् ।

४४. कालविधिर्वोभयोर्विद्यमानत्वात् ।

४५. अतत्संस्कारार्थत्वाच्च ।

४६. तस्माच्च विप्रयोगे स्यात् ।

४७. उपवेषश्च पक्षे स्यात् ।

१. 'जित्त्वप्रवृत्तेः' इति पाठभेदः ।

२. यथोक्तस्येति क्वचित्पुस्तके नास्ति ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने षष्ठस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

पञ्चमः पादः

१. अभ्युदये कालापराधादिज्याचोदना स्याद्यथा पञ्चशरावे ।

२. अपनयो वा विद्यमानत्वात् ।

३. तद्रूपत्वाच्च शब्दानाम् ।

४. आतञ्चनाभ्यासस्य च दर्शनात् ।

५. अपूर्वत्वाद्विधानं स्यात् ।

६. पयोदोषात्पञ्चशरावेऽदुष्टं हीतरत् ।

७. सान्नाय्येऽपि तथेति चेत् ।

८. न तस्यादुष्टत्वादविशिष्टं हि कारणम् ।

९. लक्षणार्था शृतश्रुतिः ।

१०. उपांशुया[1]ऽवचनाद्यथा प्रकृति वा ।

११. अपनयो वा प्रवृत्त्या यथेतरेषाम् ।

१२. निरुप्ते स्यात्तत्संयोगात् ।

१३. प्रवृत्ते प्रापणान्निमित्तस्य ।

१४. लक्षणमात्रमितरत् ।

१५. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

१६. अनिरुप्तेऽभ्युदिते प्राकृतीभ्यो निर्वपेदित्याश्मरथ्यस्तण्डुलभूतेष्वपनयात् ।

१७. व्यर्ध्वभाग्भ्यस्त्वालेखनस्तत्कारित्वाद्देवतापनयस्य ।

१. "याजे" इति पाठभेदः ।

१८. विनिरुप्ते न मुष्टीनामपनयस्तद्गुणत्वात् ।
१९. अपाकृतेन हि संयोगस्तत्स्थानीयत्वात् ।
२०. अभावाच्चेतरस्य स्तात् ।
२१. सान्नाय्यसंयोगात्सन्नयतः स्यात् ।
२२. औषधसंयोगाद्वोभयोः ।
२३. वैगुण्यान्नेति चेत् ।
२४. नातत्संस्कारत्वात् ।

२५. साम्युत्थाने विश्वजित्क्रीते विभागसंयोगात् ।
२६. प्रवृत्ते वा प्रापणान्निमित्तस्य ।
२७. आदेशार्थेतरा श्रुतिः ।
२८. दीक्षापरिमाणे यथाकाम्यविशेषात् ।
२९. द्वादशाहस्तु लिङ्गात्स्यात् ।
३०. पौर्णमास्यामनियमोऽविशेषात् ।
३१. आनन्तर्यात्तु चैत्री स्यात् ।
३२. माघी वैकाष्टकाश्रुतेः ।
३३. अन्या अपीति चेत् ।
३४. न भक्तित्वादेषा हि लोके ।
३५. दीक्षापराधे चानुग्रहात् ।
३६. उत्थाने चानुप्ररोहात् ।
३७. अस्यां च सर्वलिङ्गानि ।

३८. दीक्षाकालस्य शिष्टत्वादतिक्रमे नियतानामनुत्कर्षः प्राप्तकालत्वात् ।
३९. उत्कर्षो वा दीक्षितत्वादविशिष्टं हि कारणम् ।
४०. तत्र प्रतिहोमो न विद्यते यथा पूर्वेषाम् ।
४१. कालप्राधान्याच्च ।
४२. प्रतिषिद्धाच्चोर्ध्वमवभृथादिष्टेः ।

४३. प्रतिहोमश्चेत्सायमग्निहोत्रप्रभृतीनि हूयेरन् ।
४४. प्रातस्तु षोडशिनि ।
४५. प्रायश्चित्तमधिकारे सर्वत्र दोषसामान्यात् ।

४६. प्रकरणे वा शब्दहेतुत्वात् ।
४७. अतद्विकाराच्च ।
४८. व्यापन्नस्याप्सु गतौ यदभोज्यमार्याणां तत्प्रतीयेत ।
४९. विभागश्रुतेः प्रायश्चित्तं यौगपद्ये न विद्यते ।
५०. स्याद्वा प्राप्तनिमित्तत्वात्कालमात्रमेकम् ।
५१. तत्र विप्रतिषेधाद्विकल्पः स्यात् ।
५२. प्रयोगान्तरे वोभयानुग्रहः स्यात् ।
५३. न चैकसंयोगात् ।
५४. पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिवत् ।
५५. यद्युद्गाता जघन्यः स्यात्पुनर्यज्ञे सर्ववेदसंदद्याद्यथेतरस्मिन् ।
५६. अहर्गणे यस्मिन्नपच्छेदस्तदावर्त्तेत कर्मपृथक्त्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने षष्ठस्याध्यायस्य पञ्चमः पादः ।

षष्ठः पादः

१. सन्निपातेऽवैगुण्यात्प्रकृतिवत्तुल्यकल्पा यजेरन् ।

२. वचनाद्वा शिरोवत्स्यात् ।

३. न वाऽनारभ्यवादत्वात् ।

४. स्याद्वा यज्ञार्थत्वादौदुम्बरीवत् ।

५. न तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।

६. औदुम्बर्याः परार्थत्वात्कपालवत् ।

७. अन्येनापीति चेत् ।

८. नैकत्वात्तस्य चानधिकाराच्छब्दस्य चाविभक्तत्वात् ।

९. सन्निपातात्तु निमित्तविघातं[1] स्यात् बृहद्रथन्तरवद्विभक्तशिष्टत्वाद्वसिष्ठनिर्वर्त्ये ।

१०. अपि वा कृत्स्नसंयोगादविघातः प्रतीयेत स्वामित्वेनाभिसंबन्धः[2] ।

११. साम्नोः कर्मवृद्धचै[3]कदेशेन संयोगो; गुणत्वेनाभिसंबन्धस्तस्मात्तत्र विघातः स्यात् ।

१२. वचनात्तु द्विसंयोगस्तस्मादेकस्य पाणित्वम्[4] ।

१३. अर्थाभावात्तु नैवं स्यात् ।

१४. अर्थानां च विभक्तत्वान्न तच्छ्रुतेन संबन्धः ।

१५. पाणेः प्रत्यङ्गभावादसंबन्धः प्रतीयेत ।

१६. सत्राणि सर्ववर्णानामविशेषात् ।

१७. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

१८. ब्राह्मणानां वेतरयोरार्त्विज्याभावात् ।

१९. वचनादिति चेत् ।

२०. न स्वामित्वं हि विधीयते ।

२१. गार्हपते वा स्यान्नामाविप्रतिषेधात् ।

२२. न वा कल्पविरोधात् ।

२३. स्वामित्वादितरेषामहीने लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।

२४. वासिष्ठानां वा ब्रह्मत्वनियमात् ।

२५. सर्वेषां वा प्रतिप्रसवात् ।

२६. वैश्वामित्रस्य हौत्रनियमाद्भृगुशुनकवसिष्ठानामनधिकारः ।

२७. विहारस्य प्रभुत्वादनग्नीनामपि स्यात् ।

२८. सारस्वते च दर्शनात् ।

२९. प्रायश्चित्तविधानाच्च ।

३०. साग्नीनां वेष्टिपूर्वत्वात् ।

३१. स्वार्थेन च प्रयुक्तत्वात् ।

३२. सन्निवापं च दर्शयति ।

३३. जुह्वादीनामप्रयुक्तत्वात्संदेहे यथा कामी प्रतीयते ।

३४. अपि वाऽन्यानि पात्राणि साधारणानि कुर्वीरन्विप्रतिषेधाच्छास्त्रकृतत्वात् ।

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१. घाताद्बृहति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।
२. "संबन्धात्"–सूत्रमिदं संबन्धस्स्यात् आ० पाठे ।
३. कर्मवदेकेति क्षे० पाठः ।
४. वत्–क्षे. पाठः ।

३५. प्रायश्चित्तमापदि स्यात् ।

३६. पुरुषकल्पेन वा विकृतौ कर्तृनियमः स्याद्यज्ञस्य तद्गुणत्वादभावादितरान्प्रत्येकस्मिन्नधिकारः स्यात् ।

३७. लिङ्गाच्चेज्याविशेषवत् ।

३८. न वा संयोगपृथक्त्वाद् गुणस्येज्याप्रधानत्वादसंयुक्ता हि चोदना ।

३९. इज्यायां तद्गुणत्वाद्विशेषेण नियम्येत ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने षष्ठस्याध्यायस्य षष्ठः पादः ।

सप्तमः पादः

१. स्वदाने सर्वमविशेषात् ।

२. यस्य वा प्रभुः स्यादितरस्याऽशक्यत्वात् ।

३. न भूमिः स्यात्सर्वान्प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात् ।

४. अकार्यत्वाच्च ततः पुनर्विशेषः स्यात् ।

५. नित्यत्वाच्चानित्यैर्नास्ति संबन्धः ।

६. शूद्रश्च धर्मशास्त्रत्वात् ।

७. दक्षिणाकाले यत्स्वं तत्प्रतीयेत तद्दानसंयोगात् ।

८. अशेषत्वात्तदन्तः स्यात्कर्मणो द्रव्यसिद्धित्वात् ।

९. अपि वा शेषकर्म स्यात्क्रतोः प्रत्यक्षशिष्टत्वात् ।

१०. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

११. अशेषं तु समञ्जसमादाने[1] शेषकर्म स्यात् ।

१२. नादानस्यानित्यत्वात् ।

१३. दीक्षासु विनिर्देशादक्रत्वर्थेन संयोगस्तस्मादविरोधः स्यात् ।

१४. अहर्गणे च तद्धर्मः स्यात्सर्वेषामविशेषात् ।

१५. द्वादशशतं वा प्रकृतिवत् ।

१६. अतद्गुणत्वात्तु नैवं स्यात् ।

१७. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

१८. विकारः सन्नुभयतोऽविशेषात् ।

१९. अधिकं वा प्रतिप्रसवात् ।

२०. अनुग्रहाच्च पादवत् ।

२१. अपरिमिते शिष्टस्य[2] सङ्ख्याप्रतिषेधस्तच्छ्रुतित्वात् ।

२२. कल्पान्तरं वा तुल्यवत्प्रसङ्ख्यानात् ।

२३. अनियमोऽविशेषात् ।

२४. अधिकं वा स्याद्बह्वर्थत्वादितरैः सन्निधानात् ।

२५. अर्थवादश्च तदर्थव[3]त् ।

२६. परकृतिपुराकल्पं च मनुष्यधर्मः स्यादर्थाय ह्यनुकीर्तनम् ।

२७. तद्युक्ते च प्रतिषेधात् ।

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१. साऽऽदानेनेति भाष्ये पाठः ।

२. अत्र सूत्रे शिष्टस्येति पदं नास्ति वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

३. तद्वदिति आ० पाठः ।

२८. निर्देशाद्वा तद्धर्मः स्यात्पञ्चावत्तवत् ।
२९. विधौ तु वेदसंयोगादुपदेशः स्यात् ।
३०. अर्थवादो वा विधिशेषत्वात्तस्मान्नित्यानुवादः स्यात् ।

३१. सहस्रसंवत्सरं तदायुषामसंभवान्मनुष्येषु ।
३१अ. उपचारोन्यार्थदर्शनम्[1] ।
३२. अपि वा तदधिकारान्मनुष्यधर्मः स्यात् ।
३३. नासामर्थ्यात् ।
३४. सम्बन्धादर्शनात् ।
३५. स कुल्यः[2] स्यादिति कार्ष्णाजिनिरेकस्मिन्नसंभवात् ।
३६. अपि वा कृत्स्नसंयोगादेकस्यैव प्रयोगः स्यात् ।

३७. विप्रतिषेधात्तु गुण्यन्यतरः स्यादिति लावुकायनः ।
३८. संवत्सरो वा विचालित्वात् ।
३९. सा प्रकृतिः[3] स्यादाधिकारात् ।
४०. अहानि वाऽभिसङ्ख्यात्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने षष्ठस्याध्यायस्य सप्तमः पादः ।

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१. वृत्तिग्रन्थे इदं सूत्रमधिकम् ।
२. स कुलकल्पः इति आ. पाठः ।
३. स प्रकृतिरिति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

अष्टमः पादः

१. इष्टिपूर्वत्वादक्रतुशेषो होमः संस्कृतेष्वग्निषु स्यादपूर्वोऽप्याधानस्य सर्वशेषत्वात् ।
२. इष्टित्वेन तु संस्तवश्चतुर्होतॄनसंस्कृतेषु दर्शयति ।
३. उपदेशस्त्वपूर्वत्वात् ।
४. स सर्वेषामविशेषात् ।
५. अपि वा क्रत्वभावादनाहिताग्नेरशेषभूतनिर्देशः ।
६. जपो वाऽनग्निसंयोगात् ।
७. इष्टित्वेन संस्तुते होमः स्यादनारभ्याग्निसंयोगादितरेषामवाच्यत्वात् ।
८. उभयोः पितृयज्ञवत् ।
९. निदशो वाऽनाहिताग्नेरनारभ्याग्निसंयोगात् ।
१०. पितृयज्ञे संयुक्तस्य पुनर्वचनम् ।
११. उपनयन्नाधीत होमसंयोगात् ।
१२. स्थपति[1]वल्लौकिके वा विद्याकर्मानुपूर्वत्वात् ।
१३. आधानं च भार्यासंयुक्तम् ।

१४. अकर्म चोर्ध्वमाधानात्तत्समवायो हि कर्मभिः ।
१४अ. अकर्म च दारक्रियाधानोत्तरः काले ।
१५. श्राद्धवदिति चेत् ।
१६. न श्रुतिविप्रतिषेधात् ।

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१. स्थपतीष्टिवल्लौ–आ. पाठः ।

१६अ. अर्था[1]दन्यदेवेति चेत् ।

१७. सर्वार्थत्वाच्च[2] पुत्रार्थो न प्रयोजयेत् ।

१८. सोमपानात्तु प्रापणं द्वितीयस्य तस्मादुपयच्छेत् ।

१९. पितृयज्ञे तु दर्शनात्प्र[3]गाधानात्प्रतीयेत ।

२०. स्थपतीष्टिः प्रजावदग्न्याधेयं प्रयोजयेत्तादर्थ्याच्चापवृज्येत ।

२१. अपि वा लौकिकेऽग्नौ स्यादाधानस्यासर्वशेषत्वात् ।

२२. अवकीर्णि[4]पशुश्च तद्वदाधानस्याप्राप्तकालत्वात् ।

२३. उदगयनपूर्वपक्षाहः पुण्याहेषु दैवानि स्मृतिरूपान्यार्थदर्शनात् ।

२४. अहनि च कर्मसाकल्यम् ।

२५. इतरेषु तु पित्र्याणि ।

२६. याच्ञाक्रयणमविद्यमाने लोकवत् ।

२७. नियतं वार्थवत्त्वात्स्यात् ।

२८. तथा भक्षप्रैषाच्छादनसंज्ञप्तहोमद्वेषम् ।

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१. इदं सूत्रमधिकं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

२. त्वादपुत्रेति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

३. दर्शनात्प्रतीति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

४. कीर्णी इति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे

२९. अनर्थकं त्वनित्यं स्यात् ।

३०. पशुचोदनायामनियमोऽविशेषात् ।

३१. छागो वा मन्त्रवर्णात् ।

३२. न चोदनाविरोधात् ।

३३. आर्षेयवदिति चेत् ।

३४. न तत्र ह्यचोदितत्वात् ।

३५. नियमो वैकार्थ्यं ह्यर्थभेदाद्भेदः पृथक्त्वेनाभिधानात् ।

३६. अनियमो वार्थान्तरत्वादन्यत्वं व्यतिरेकशब्दभेदाभ्याम् ।

३७. न वा प्रयोगसमवायित्वात् ।

३८. रूपा[1]लिङ्गाच्च ।

३९. छागेन कर्माख्या रूपलिङ्गाभ्याम् ।

४०. रूपान्यत्वान्न जातिशब्दः स्यात् ।

४१. विकारो[2] नौत्पत्तिकत्वात् ।

४२. स नैमित्तिकः पशोर्गुणस्याचोदितत्वात् ।

४३. जातेर्वा तत्प्रायवचनार्थवत्त्वाभ्याम् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने षष्ठस्याध्यायस्याष्टमः पादः ।

॥ समाप्तश्च षष्ठोऽध्यायः ॥

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१. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिग्रन्थे नास्ति ।

२. विकार इति चेदिति चेत्पदं संयोज्य तदन्तं पृथक् सूत्रं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

सप्तमोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. श्रुतिप्रमाणत्वाच्छेषाणां मुख[1]भेदे यथाधिकारं भावः स्यात्।
२. उत्पत्त्यर्थाविभागाद्वा सत्त्ववदैकधर्म्यं स्यात्।
३. चोदना शेषभावाद्वा ताद्वा तद्भेदाद्व्यवतिष्ठेरन्नुत्पत्तेर्गुणभूतत्वात्।
४. सत्त्वे लक्षणसंयोगात्सार्वत्रिकं प्रतीयेत।
५. अविभागात्तु नैवं स्यात्।
६. द्व्यर्थत्वं च विप्रतिषिद्धम्।
७. उत्पत्तौ विध्यभावाद्वा चोदनायां प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्ततश्च कर्मभेदः स्यात्।
८. यदि वाऽप्यभिधानवत्सामान्यात् सर्वधर्मः[2] स्यात्।
९. अर्थस्य त्वविभक्तत्वात्तथा स्यादभिधानेषु पूर्ववत्त्वात्प्रयोगस्य; कर्मणः शब्दभाव्यत्वाद्विभागाच्छेषाणामप्रवृत्तिः स्यात्।
१०. स्मृतिरिति चेत्[3]

१. मुख्यभेदे इति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे
२. सर्वसिद्धिः स्यादिति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम्।
३. अग्रिमसूत्रस्थं नञ्पदमत्रैव सूत्रान्त्ये वृत्तिग्रन्थे पठ्यते।

११. न पूर्ववत्त्वात्।
१२. अर्थस्य शब्दभाव्यत्वात्प्रकरणनिबन्धनाच्छब्दादेवान्यत्र भावः स्यात्।
१३. समाने पूर्ववत्त्वादुत्पन्नाधिकारः स्यात्।
१४. श्येनस्येति चेत्।
१५. नासन्निधानात्।
१६. अपि वा यद्यपूर्वत्वादितरदधिकार्थे ज्यौतिष्टोमिकाद्विधेस्तद्वाचकं समानं स्यात्।
१७. पञ्चसञ्चरेष्वर्थवादातिदेशः सन्निधानात्।
१८. सर्वस्य वैक[1]शब्द्यात्।
१९. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
२०. विहिताम्नानान्नेति चेत्।
२१. नेतरार्थत्वात्।
२२. एककपालैन्द्राग्नौ च तद्वत्।
२३. एककपालानां वैश्वदेविकः प्रकृतिराग्रयणे सर्वहोमापरिवृत्तिदर्शनादवभृथे च सकृद् द्व्यवदानस्य वचनात्।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने सप्तमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः।

१. स्य चैकेति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम्।

द्वितीयः पादः

१. साम्नोऽभिधानशब्देन प्रवृत्तिः स्याद्यथाशिष्टम् ।
२. शब्दैस्त्वर्थविधित्वादर्थान्तरेऽप्रवृत्तिः स्यात्पृथग्भावात्क्रियाया ह्यभिसम्बन्धः ।
३. स्वार्थे वा स्यात्प्रयोजनं क्रियायास्तदङ्गभावेनोपदिश्येरन् ।
४. शब्दमात्रमिति चेत् ।
५. तेनोत्पत्तिकत्वात् ।
६. शास्त्रं चैवमनर्थकं स्यात् ।
७. स्वरस्येति चेत् ।
८. नार्थाभावाच्छ्रुतेरसम्बन्धः ।
९. स्वरस्तूत्पत्तिषु स्यान्मात्रावर्णाविभक्तत्वात् ।
१०. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
११. अश्रुतेस्तु विकारस्योत्तरासु यथाश्रुति ।
१२. शब्दानां चासामञ्जस्यम् ।
१३. अपि तु कर्मशब्दः स्याद्भावोऽर्थः प्रसिद्धग्रहणत्वाद्विकारो ह्यविशिष्टोऽन्यैः ।
१४. अद्रव्यं चापि दृश्यते ।
१५. तस्य च क्रिया ग्रहणार्था नानार्थेषु विरूपित्वादर्थो ह्यासामलौकिको विधानात् ।
१६. तस्मिन्संज्ञाविशेषाः स्युर्विकारपृथक्त्वात् ।
१७. योनिशस्याश्च तुल्यवदितराभिर्विधीयन्ते ।
१८. अयोनौ चापि दृश्यतेऽतथायोनिः ।
१९. ऐकार्थ्ये[1] नास्ति वैरूप्यमिति चेत् ।
२०. स्यादर्थान्तरेष्वनिष्पत्तेर्यथालोके[2] ।
२१. शब्दानाञ्च सामञ्जस्यम् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने सप्तमस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।

तृतीयः पादः

१. उक्तं क्रियाभिधानं तच्छ्रुतावन्यत्र विधिप्रदेशः स्यात् ।
२. अपूर्वे वापि भागित्वात् ।
३. नाम्नस्त्वौत्पत्तिकत्वात् ।
४. प्रत्यक्षाद्गुणसंयोगात्क्रियाभिधानं स्यात्तदभावेऽप्रसिद्धं स्यात् ।
५. अपि वा सर्वत्र कर्मणि गुणार्थैषा श्रुतिः स्यात् ।
६. विश्वजिति सर्वपृष्ठे तत्पूर्वकत्वाज्ज्यौतिष्टोमिकानि पृष्ठान्यस्ति च पृष्ठशब्दः ।
७. षडहाद्वा तत्र हि चोदनाः ।
८. लिङ्गाच्च[3] ।

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१. एकार्थे इति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।
२. यथा पाके इति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।
३. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्चेति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

९. उत्पन्नाधिकारो ज्योतिष्टोमः ।
१०. द्वयोर्विधिरिति चेत् ।
११. न व्यर्थत्वात्सर्वशब्दस्य ।
१२. तथावभृथः सोमात् ।
१३. प्रकृतेरिति चेत् ।
१४. न भक्तित्वात् ।
१५. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
१६. द्रव्यादेशे तद्द्रव्यः श्रुतिसंयोगात् पुरोडाशस्त्वनादेशे तत्प्रकृतित्वात् ।
१७. गुणविधिस्तु न गृह्णीयात्समत्वात् ।
१८. निर्मन्थ्यादिषु चैवम् ।
१९. प्रणयनन्तु सौमिकमवाच्यं ह्रीतरत् ।
२०. उत्तरवेदिप्रतिषेधश्च तद्वत् ।
२१. प्राकृतं वाऽनामत्वात् ।
२२. परिसङ्ख्यार्थं श्रवणं गुणार्थमर्थवादो वा ।
२३. प्रथमोत्तमयोः प्रणयनमुत्तरवेदिप्रतिषेधात् ।
२४. मध्यमयोर्वा गत्यर्थवादात् ।
२५. औत्तरवेदिकोऽनारभ्यवादप्रतिषेधः ।
२६. स्वरसामैककपालामिक्षं च लिङ्गदर्शनात् ।
२७. चोदनासामान्याद्वा[1] ।
२८. कर्मजे कर्म यूपवत् ।
२९. रूपं वाऽशेषभूतत्वात् ।
३०. विशये लौकिकः स्यात्सर्वार्थत्वात् ।

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१. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिग्रन्थे नास्ति

३१. न वैदिकमर्थनिर्देशात् ।
३२. तथोत्पत्तिरितरेषां समत्वात् ।
३३. संस्कृतं स्यात्तच्छब्दत्वात् ।
३४. भक्त्या वाऽयज्ञशेषत्वाद्गुणानामभिधानत्वात्[1] ।
३५. कर्मणः पृष्ठशब्दः स्यात्तथाभूतोपदेशात् ।
३६. अभिधानोपदेशाद्वा विप्रतिषेधाद् द्रव्येषु पृष्ठशब्दः स्यात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने सप्तमस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः ।

चतुर्थः पादः

१. इतिकर्तव्यताविधेर्यजतेः पूर्ववत्त्वम् ।
२. स लौकिकः स्याद्दृष्टप्रवृत्तित्वात् ।
३. वचनात्तु ततोऽन्यत्वम् ।
४. लिङ्गेन निवा यम्येत लिङ्गस्य[2] तद्गुणत्वात् ।
५. अपिवाऽन्यायपूर्वत्वाद्यत्र नित्यानुवादवचनानि स्युः ।
६. मिथो विप्रतिषेधाच्च गुणानां यथार्थकल्पना स्यात् ।
७. भागित्वात्तु नियम्येत गुणानामभिधानत्वात्सम्बन्धादभिधानवद्यथा धेनुः किशोरेण ।

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१. धानादिति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।
२. लिङ्गस्येति पदं वृत्तिग्रन्थे नास्ति ।

८. उत्पत्तीनां समत्वाद्वा यथाधिकारं भावः स्यात् ।

९. उत्पत्तिशेषवचनं च विप्रतिषिद्धमेकस्मिन् ।

१०. विध्यन्तो वा प्रकृतिवच्चोदनायां प्रवर्त्तेत[1] तथा हि लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।

११. लिङ्गहेतु[2]त्वादलिङ्गे लौकिकं स्यात् ।

१२. लिङ्गस्य पूर्ववत्त्वाच्चोदनाशब्दसामान्यादेकेनापि निरूप्येत, यथा स्थालीपुलाकेन ।

१३. द्वादशाहिकमहर्गणे तत्प्रकृतित्वादैकाहिकमधिकागमात्तदाख्यं स्यादेकाहवत् ।

१४. लिङ्गाच्च ।

१५. न वा क्रत्वभिधानादधिकानामशब्दत्वम् ।

१६. लिङ्गं सङ्घातधर्मः स्यात्तदर्थापत्तेर्द्रव्यवत् ।

१७. न वार्थध[3]र्मत्वात् सङ्घातस्य गुणत्वात् ।

१८. अर्थापत्तेर्द्रव्येषु धर्मलाभः स्यात् ।

१९. प्रवृत्त्या नियतस्य लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।

१. प्रवर्तते इति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।
२. लिङ्गस्य हेत्विति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।
३. धर्मः स्यात्सेति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

२०. विहारदर्शनं[1] विशिष्टस्यानारभ्यवादानां प्रकृत्यर्थत्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने सप्तमस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

॥ समाप्तः सप्तमोऽध्यायः ॥

अष्टमोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. अथ विशेषलक्षणम् ।

२. यस्य लिङ्गमर्थसंयोगादभिधानवत् ।

३. प्र[2]वृत्तित्वादिष्टेः सोमे प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ।

४. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

५. कृत्स्नविधानाद्वाऽपूर्वत्वम् ।

६. स्रुगभिधारणाभावस्य च नित्यानुवादात् ।

७. विधिरिति चेत् ।

८. न वाक्यशेषत्वात् ।

९. शङ्कते चानुपोषणात् ।

१०. दर्शनमैष्टिकानां स्यात् ।

११. इष्टिषु दर्शपूर्णमासयोः प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ।

१. दर्शनं चेति चकाराधिको वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।
२. वृत्तत्वेति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

१२. पशौ च लिङ्गदर्शनात् ।
१३. दैक्षस्य चेतरेषु ।
१४. ऐकादशिनेषु सौत्यस्य द्वैर[1]शन्यस्य दर्शनात् ।
१५. तत्प्रवृत्तिर्गणेषु स्यात्प्रतिपशु यूपदर्शनात् ।
१६. अव्यक्तासु तु सोमस्य ।
१७. गणेषु द्वादशस्य ।
१८. गव्यस्य च[2] तदादिषु ।
१९. निकायिनां च पूर्वस्योत्तरेषु प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ।
२०. कर्मणस्त्वप्रवृत्तित्वात्फलनियमकर्तृसमुदायस्यानन्वयस्तद्बन्धनत्वात् ।
२१. प्रवृत्तौ[3] चापि तादर्थ्यात् ।
२२. अश्रुतित्वाच्च ।
२३. गुणकामेष्वाश्रितत्वात्प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ।
२४. निवृत्तिर्वा कर्मभेदात् ।
२५. अपि वाऽतद्विकारत्वात्क्रत्वर्थत्वात्प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ।
२६. एककर्मणि विकल्पोऽविभागो हि चोदनैकत्वात् ।
२७. लिङ्गसाधारण्याद्विकल्पः स्यात् ।
२८. ऐकार्थ्याद्वा नियम्येत पूर्ववत्त्वाद्विकारो हि ।

१. शन्यदर्शेति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।
२. स्य चैतदेति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।
३. त्तावपि इति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

२९. अश्रुति[1]त्वान्नेति चेत् ।
३०. स्याल्लिङ्गभावात् ।
३१. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
३२. विप्रतिपत्तौ हविषा नियम्येत कर्मणस्तदुपा[2]स्यत्वात् ।
३३. तेन च कर्मसंयोगात् ।
३४. गुणत्वेन देवताश्रुतिः ।
३५. हिरण्यमाज्यधर्मस्तेजस्त्वात् ।
३६. धर्मानुग्रहाच्च ।
३७. औषधं वा विशदत्वात् ।
३८. चरुशब्दाच्च ।
३९. तस्मिंश्च श्रपणश्रुतेः ।
४०. मधूदके द्रव्यसामान्यात्पयोविकारः स्यात् ।
४१. आज्यं वा वर्णसामान्यात् ।
४२. धर्मानुग्रहाच्च ।
४३. पूर्वस्य चा[3]विशिष्टत्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने अष्टमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

१. वाजिने सोमपूर्वत्वं सौत्रामण्यां च ग्रहेषु ताच्छब्द्यात् ।

१. अ तत्वेति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।
२. पाख्यत्वेति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।
३. चकाररहितः पाठो वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

२. अनुवषट्काराच्च ।
३. समुपहूय भक्षणाच्च ।
४. क्रयणश्रपणपुरोरुगुपयामग्रहणासादनवासोपनहनञ्च तद्वत् ।
५. हविषा वा नियम्येत तद्विकारत्वात् ।
६. प्रशंसा सोमशब्दः ।
७. वचनानीतराणि ।
८. व्यपदेशश्च तद्वत् ।

९. पशुपुरोडाशस्य च लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।
१०. पशुः पुरोडाशविकारः स्याद्देवतासामान्यात् ।
११. प्रोक्षणाच्च ।
१२. पर्यग्निकरणाच्च ।
१३. सान्नाय्यं वा तत्प्रभवत्वात् ।
१४. तस्य च पात्रदर्शनात् ।

१५. दध्नः स्यान्मूर्तिसामान्यात् ।
१६. पयो वा कालसामान्यात् ।
१७. पश्वानन्तर्यात्[1] ।
१८. द्रवत्वं चाविशिष्टम् ।
१९. आमिक्षोभयभाव्यत्वादुभयविकारः स्यात् ।
२०. एकं वा चोदनैकत्वात् ।
२१. दधिसङ्घातसामान्यात् ।
२२. पयो वा तत्प्रधानत्वाल्लोकवद्दध्नस्तदर्थत्वात् ।
२३. धर्मानुग्रहाच्च ।

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१. र्याच्चेति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

२३अ. सद्योभावं[2] च दर्शयति ।

२४. सत्रमहीनश्च द्वादशाहस्तस्योभयथा प्रवृत्तिरैककर्म्यात् ।

२५. अपि वा यजति श्रुतेरहीनभूतप्रवृत्तिः स्यात्प्रकृत्या तुल्यशब्दत्वात् ।

२६. द्विरात्रादीनामैकादशरात्रादहीनत्वं यजतिचोदनात् ।

२७. त्रयो[3]दशरात्रादिषु सत्रभूतस्तेष्वासनोपायि चोदनात् ।
२८. लिङ्गाच्च ।

२९. अन्यतरतोऽतिरात्रत्वात्पञ्चदशरात्रस्याहीनत्वं; कुण्डपायिनामयनस्य च; तद्भूतेष्वहीनत्व[3]स्य दर्शनात् ।

३०. अहीनवचनाच्च ।
३१. सत्रे[4] वोपायिचोदनात् ।
३२. सत्रलिङ्गं च दर्शयति ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने अष्टमस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।

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१. इदं सूत्रमधिकं वृत्तिग्रन्थे पठचते ।
२. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिग्रन्थे नास्ति ।
३. त्वदर्शेति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।
४. सत्रे चोपेयीति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

तृतीयः पादः

१. हविर्गणे परमुत्तरस्य देशसामान्यात् ।

२. देवतया वा नियम्येत शब्दवत्त्वादितरस्याश्रुतित्वात् ।

३. गणचोदनायां यस्य लिङ्गं तदावृत्तिः प्रतीयेताग्नेयवत् ।

४. नानाहानि वा सङ्घातत्वात्प्रवृत्तिलिङ्गे, न चोदनात् ।

५. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

६. कालाभ्यासेऽपि बादरिः कर्मभेदात् ।

७. तदावृत्तिं तु जैमिनिरह्नामप्रत्यक्षसङ्ख्यत्वात् ।

७अ. तस्मात्ष[1]डहाभ्यासः ।

८. संस्थागणेषु तदभ्यासः प्रतीयेत, कृतलक्षणग्रहणात् ।

९. अधिकाराद्वा प्रकृतिस्तद्विशिष्टा स्यादभिधानस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ।

१०. गणादुपचयस्तत्प्रकृतित्वात् ।

११. एकाहाद्वा तेषां समत्वात्स्यात् ।

१२. गायत्रीषु प्राकृतीनामवच्छेदः; प्रवृ[2]त्त्यधिकारात्सङ्ख्यात्वादग्निष्टोमवदव्यतिरेकात्तदाख्यत्वम् ।

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१. इदं सूत्रमधिकं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

२. प्रकृत्य इति पाठभेदः ।

१३. तन्नि[1]त्यवच्च पृथक्सतीषु तद्वचनम् ।

१४. न विंशतौ दशेति चेत् ।

१५. एकसंख्यमेव स्यात् ।

१६. गुणाद्वा द्रव्यशब्दः स्यादसर्वविषयत्वात् ।

१७. गोत्ववच्च समन्वयः ।

१८. संख्यायाश्च शब्दवत्त्वात् ।

१९. इतरस्याश्रुतत्वाच्च ।

२०. द्रव्यान्तरेऽनिवेशादुक्थ्य[2]लोपैर्विशिष्टं स्यात् ।

२१. अशास्त्रलक्षणत्वा[3]च्च ।

२२. उत्पत्ति नामधेयत्वाद्; भक्त्या पृथक्सतीषु स्यात्[4] ।

२३. वचनमिति चेत् ।

२४. यावदुक्तम् ।

२५. अपूर्वे च विकल्पः स्याद्यदि सङ्ख्याविधानम् ।

२६. ऋग्गुणत्वान्नेति चेत् ।

२७. तथा पूर्ववति स्यात् ।

२८. गुणावेशश्च सर्वत्र ।

२९. निष्पन्नग्रहणान्ने[5]ति चेत् ।

३०. तथेहापि स्यात् ।

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१. तन्नीत्यत्र तदिति पदरहितः पाठो वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

२. लोपे वीति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

३. त्वादिति चरहितः पाठो वृत्तिग्रंथे ।

४. स्यादिति पदरहितं पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

५. ग्रहान्नेतीति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

३१. यदि वाऽविशये नियमः प्रकृत्युपबन्धा[1]च्छब्देष्वपि प्रसिद्धः स्यात् ।
३२. दृष्टः प्रयोग इति चेत् ।
३३. तथा शरेष्वपि ।
३४. भक्त्येति चेत् ।
३५. तथेतरस्मिन् ।
३६. अर्थस्य चासमाप्तत्वान्न तासामेकदेशे स्यात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने अष्टमस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः ।

चतुर्थः पादः

१. दर्विहोमो यज्ञाभिधानं होमसंयोगात् ।
२. स लौकिकानां स्यात्कर्त्तुस्तदाख्यत्वात् ।
३. सर्वेषां वा दर्शनाद्वास्तुहोमे ।
४. जुहोतिचोदनानां वा तत्संयोगात् ।
५. द्रव्योपदेशाद्वा गुणाभिधानं स्यात् ।
६. न लौकिकानामाचारग्रहणत्वाच्छब्दवतां चान्यार्थविधानात् ।
७. दर्शनाच्चान्यपात्रस्य ।
८. तथाग्निहविषोः ।
९. उक्तश्चार्थेऽसम्बन्धः ।
१०. तस्मिन्सोमः प्रवर्त्तेताव्यक्तत्वात् ।
११. न वा स्वाहाकारेण संयोगाद् वषट्कारस्य च, निर्देशात्तन्त्रेन, विप्रतिषेधात् ।
१२. शब्दान्तरत्वात् ।
१३. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
१४. उत्तरार्थस्तु, स्वाहाकारो, यथा साप्तदश्यं, तत्राविप्रतिषिद्धा पुनः प्रवृत्तिर्लिङ्गदर्शनात्पशुवत् ।
१५. अनुत्तरार्थो वाऽर्थवत्त्वादानर्थक्याद्धि प्रा[1]थम्यस्योपरोधः स्यात् ।
१६. न प्रकृतावपीति चेत् ।
१७. उक्तं समवाये पारदौर्बल्यम् ।
१८. तच्चोदना वेष्टेः प्रवृत्तित्वाद्विधिः स्यात् ।
१९. शब्दसामर्थ्याच्च ।
२०. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
२१. तत्राभावस्य हेतुत्वाद्गुणार्थे स्याददर्शनम् ।
२२. विधिरिति चेत् ।
२३. न वाक्यशेषत्वाद्गुणार्थे च समाधानं नानात्वेनोपपद्यते ।
२४. येषां वाऽपरयोर्होमस्तेषां स्यादविरोधात् ।
२४अ. लिङ्गाद्वा शेषहोमयोः ।
२५. तत्रौषधानि चोद्यन्ते, तानि स्थानेन गम्येरन् ।

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१. बन्धनाच्छरेष्वपीति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

१. प्राकृतस्यो इति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

२६. लिङ्गाद्वा शेषहोमयोः ।

२७. सन्निपाते विरोधिनामप्रवृत्तिः प्रतीयेत, विध्युत्पत्तिव्यवस्थानादर्थ-स्यापरिणेयत्वाद् वचनादतिदेशः स्यात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्व-मीमांसादर्शने अष्टमस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

।। अष्टमोऽध्यायः समाप्तः ।।

नवमोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. यज्ञकर्म प्रधानं; तद्धि चोदनाभूतं; तस्य द्रव्येषु संस्कारस्तत्प्रयुक्तस्त-दर्थत्वात् ।

२. संस्कारे युज्यमानानां; तादर्थ्यात्त-त्प्रयुक्तं स्यात् ।

३. तेन त्वर्थेन यज्ञस्य संयोगाद्धर्मसं-न्धस्तस्माद्यज्ञप्रयुक्तं स्यात्संस्का-रस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।

४. फलदेवतयोश्च ।

५. न चोदनातो हि ताद्गुण्यम् ।

६. देवता वा प्रयोजयेदतिथिवद्भोज-नस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।

७. आर्थपत्याच्च[1] ।

८. ततश्च तेन सम्बन्धः ।

९. अपि वा शब्दपूर्वत्वाद्यज्ञकर्मप्रधानं स्याद् गुणत्वे देवताश्रुतिः ।

१०. अतिथौ तत्प्रधानत्वमभावः कर्मणि स्यात्तस्य प्रीतिप्रधानत्वात् ।

११. द्रव्यसङ्ख्याहेतुसमुदायं वा श्रुति-संयोगात् ।

१२. अर्थकारिते च द्रव्येण न व्यव-स्था स्यात् ।

१३. अर्थो वा स्यात्प्रयोजनमितरेषा-मचोदनात्तस्य[1] च गुणभूतत्वात् ।

१४. अपूर्वत्वाद्व्यवस्था स्यात् ।

१५. तत्प्रयुक्तत्वे च धर्मस्य सर्व-विषयत्वम् ।

१६. तद्युक्तस्येति चेत् ।

१७. नाश्रुतित्वात् ।

१८. अधिकारादिति चेत् ।

१९. तुल्येषु नाधिकारः स्यादचोदि-तश्च सम्बन्धः; पृथक् सतां यज्ञार्थेनाभिसम्बन्धस्तस्माद्यज्ञप्रयो-जनम् ।

२०. देशबद्धमुपांशुत्वं तेषां स्याच्छ्-रुतिनिदेशात्त[2]स्य च तत्र भावात् ।

२१. यज्ञस्य वा तत्संयोगात् ।

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१. अर्थपतेति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

१. तस्य गुणेतिशब्दरहितं पाठा-न्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

२. निर्देशेति पाठान्तरं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।

२२. अनुवादश्च तदर्थवत् ।
२३. प्रणीतादि तथेति चेत् ।
२४. न यज्ञस्याश्रुतित्वात् ।
२५. तद्देशानां वा सङ्घातस्याचोदितत्वात् ।

२६. अग्निधर्मः प्रतीष्टकं सङ्घातात्पौर्णमासीवत् ।
२७. अग्नेर्वा स्याद्द्रव्यैकत्वादितरासां तदर्थत्वात् ।
२८. चोदनासमुदायात्तु पौर्णमास्यां तथात्वं स्यात् ।

२९. पत्नीसंजायान्तत्वं सर्वेषामविशेषात् ।
३०. लिङ्गाद्वा प्रागुत्तमात् ।
३१. अनुवादो वा दीक्षा यथा नक्तं संस्थापनस्य ।
३२. स्याद्वाऽनारभ्य विधानादन्ते लिङ्गविरोधात् ।
३३. अभ्यासः सामिधेनीनां प्राथम्यात्स्थानधर्मः स्यात् ।

३४. इष्ट्यावृत्तौ प्रयाजवदावर्त्तताऽऽरम्भणीया ।
३५. सकृद्वाऽऽरम्भसंयोगादेकः; पुनरारम्भो यावज्जीवप्रयोगात् ।

३६. अर्थाभिधानसंयोगान्मन्त्रेषु शेषभावः स्यात्तत्राचोदितमप्राप्तं चोदिताभिधानात् ।
३७. ततश्चावचनं[1] तेषामितरार्थं प्रयुज्यते ।
३८. गुणशब्दस्तथेति चेत् ।
३९. न समवायात् ।
४०. चोदिते तु परार्थत्वाद्विधिवद्विकारः स्यात् ।
४१. विकारस्तत्प्रधाने स्यात् ।
४२. असंयोगात्तदर्थेषु तद्विशिष्टं प्रतीयेत ।
४३. कर्माभावादेवमिति चेत् ।
४४. न परार्थत्वात् ।

४५. लिङ्गविशेषनिर्देशात्समानविधानेष्वप्राप्ता; सारस्वती स्त्रीत्वात् ।
४६. पश्वभिधानाद्वा; तद्धि चोदनाभूतं; पुंविषयं; पुनः पशुत्वम् ।
४७. विशेषो वा तदर्थनिर्देशात् ।
४८. पशुत्वं चैक[2]शब्द्यात् ।
४९. यथोक्तं वा सन्निधानात् ।
५०. आम्नातादन्यदधिकारे, वचनाद्विकारः स्यात् ।
५१. द्वैधं वा तुल्यहेतुत्वात्सामान्याद्विकल्पः स्यात् ।

५२. उपदेशाच्च साम्नः ।
५३. नियमो वा श्रुतिविशेषादितरत्साप्तदश्यवत् ।

५४. अप्रगाणाच्छब्दान्यत्वे तथाभूतोपदेशः स्यात् ।

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१. वृत्तिग्रन्थे इदं सूत्रं नास्ति ।
२. एकशब्दादिति पाठान्तरम् ।

५५. यत्स्थाने वा तद्गीतिः स्यात्पदान्यत्वप्रधानत्वात् ।
५६. गानसंयोगाच्च ।
५७. वचनमिति चेत् ।
५८. न तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने नवमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

१. सामानि मन्त्रमेके स्मृत्युपदेशाभ्याम् ।
२. तदुक्तदोषम् ।
३. कर्म वा विधिलक्षणम् ।
४. तद्गद्रव्यं वचनात्पाकयज्ञवत् ।
५. तत्राविप्रतिषिद्धो द्रव्यान्तरे व्यतिरेकः प्रदेशश्च ।
६. शब्दार्थत्वात्तु नैवं स्यात् ।
७. परार्थत्वाच्च शब्दानाम् ।
८. असम्बन्धश्च कर्मणा शब्दयोः पृथगर्थत्वात् ।
९. संस्कारश्च प्रकरणेऽग्निवत्स्यात् प्रयुक्तत्वात् ।
१०. अकार्यत्वाच्च शब्दानामप्रयोगः प्रतीयेत ।
११. आश्रि[1]तत्वाच्च ।
१२. प्रयुज्यत इति चेत् ।

१. अश्रुतत्वाच्चेति क्वचित् पाठः ।

१३. ग्रहणार्थं प्रतीयेत ।
१४. तृचे स्याच्छ्रुतिनिर्देशात् ।
१५. शब्दार्थत्वाद्विकारस्य ।
१६. दर्शयति च ।
१७. वाक्यानां तु विभक्तत्वात्प्रतिशब्दं समाप्तिः स्यात्संस्कारस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।
१८. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
१९. अनवानोपदेशश्च तद्वत् ।
२०. अभ्यासेनेतराः श्रुतिः ।
२१. तदभ्यासः समासः स्यात् ।
२२. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
२३. नैमित्तिकं तूत्तरात्वमानन्तर्यात्प्रतीयेत ।
२४. ऐकार्थ्याच्च तदभ्यासः ।
२५. प्रागाथिकं तु ।
२६. स्वे च ।
२७. प्रगाथे च ।
२८. लिङ्गदर्शनाव्यतिरेकाच्च ।
२९. अर्थैकत्वाद्विकल्पः स्यात् ।
३०. अर्थैकत्वाद्विकल्पः स्यादृक्सामयोस्तदर्थत्वात् ।
३१. वचनाद्विनियोगः स्यात् ।
३२. समप्रदेशे विकारस्तदपेक्षः स्याच्छास्त्रकृतत्वात् ।
३३. वर्णे तु बादरिर्यथाद्रव्यं द्रव्यव्यतिरेकात् ।
३४. स्तोभस्यैके द्रव्यान्तरे निवृत्तिमृग्वत् ।

३५. सर्वातिदेशस्तु सामान्याल्लोकवद्विकारः स्यात् ।
३६. अन्वयं चापि दर्शयति ।
३७. निवृत्तिर्वाऽर्थलोपात् ।
३८. अन्वयो वार्थवादः स्यात् ।
३९. अधिकं च विवर्णं च जैमिनिः स्तोभशब्दत्वात् ।
४० धर्मस्यार्थकृतत्वाद्, द्रव्यगुणविकारव्यतिक्रमप्रतिषेधे, चोदनानुबन्धः, समवायात् ।
४१. तदुत्पत्तेस्तु निवृत्तिस्तत्कृतत्वात् स्यात् ।
४२. आवेश्येरन् वाऽर्थवत्त्वात्संकारस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।
४३. आख्या चैवं तदावेशाद्विकृतौ स्यादपूर्वत्वात् ।
४४. परार्थे न त्वर्थसामान्यं संस्कारस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।
४५. क्रियेरन् वाऽर्थनिवृत्तेः ।
४६. एकार्थत्वादविभागः स्यात् ।
४७. निर्देशाद्वा व्यवतिष्ठेरन् ।
४८. अपाकृते तद्विकाराद्विरोधाद्व्यवतिष्ठेरन् ।
४९. उभयसाम्नि चैवमेकार्थापत्तेः ।
५०. स्वार्थत्वाद्वा व्यवस्था स्यात्प्रकृतिवत् ।
५१. पार्वणहोमयोस्त्वप्रवृत्तिः; समुदायार्थसंयोगात्तदभीज्या हि ।
५२. कालस्येति चेत् ।
५३. नाप्रकरणत्वात् ।
५४. मन्त्रवर्णाच्च ।
५५. तदभावेऽग्निवदिति चेत ।
५६. नाधिकारिकत्वात् ।
५७. उभयोरविशेषात् ।
५८. यदभीज्या वा तद्विषयौ ।
५९. प्रयाजेऽपीति चेत् ।
६०. नाचोदितत्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने नवमस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।

तृतीयः पादः

१. प्रकृतौ यथोत्पत्ति वचनमर्था[१]नां-तथोत्तरस्यां; ततौ[२] तत्प्रकृतित्वादर्थे चाकार्यत्वात् ।
२. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
३. जातिनैमित्तिकं यथास्थानम् ।
३अ. लिङ्[३]गदर्शनाच्च ।
४. अविकारमेकेऽनार्षत्वात् ।
५. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
६. विकारो वा तदुक्ते हेतुः ।
७. लिङ्गं मन्त्रचिकीर्षार्थम् ।
८. नियमो वोभयभागित्वात् ।

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१. र्थानामुत्तेति पाठः ।
२. तताविति नास्ति क्वचित् ।
३. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिग्रन्थेधिकं दृश्यते ।

९. लौकिके दोष[1]संयोगादपवृक्ते हि चोद्यते; निमित्तेन प्रकृतौ स्याद-भागित्वात् ।

१०. अन्यायस्त्व विकारेण, दृष्ट[2]प्रतिघा-तित्वादविशेषाच्च तेनास्य ।

११. विकारो वा तदर्थत्वात् ।

१२. अपि त्वन्याय[3]सम्बन्धात्प्रकृति-वत्परेष्वपि यथार्थं स्यात् ।

१३. यथार्थं त्वन्या[4]यस्याचोदितत्वात् ।

१४. छन्दसि तु यथादृष्टम् ।

१४अ. अन्याय[5]स्याचोदितत्वात् ।

१५. विप्रतिपत्तौ विकल्पः स्यात्तत्स-मत्वाद् गुणे त्वन्यायकल्पनैकदेश-त्वात् ।

१६. प्रकरणविशेषाच्च ।

१६अ. उत्कर्षो[6] वा द्वियज्ञवत् ।

१७. अर्थाभावात्तु नैवं स्याद्, गुण-मात्रमितरत् ।

१८. द्यावोस्तथेति चेत् ।

१९. नोत्पत्तिशब्दत्वात् ।

२०. अपूर्वे त्वविकारोऽप्रदेशात्प्रतीयेत ।

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१. सप्रसंगादिति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम्

२. अदृष्टेति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

३. न्यायसेति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

४. थं चान्यायस्येति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

५. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिग्रन्थेधिकं दृश्यते ।

६. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिग्रन्थेधिकं दृश्यते ।

२१. विकृतौ चापि तद्वचनात् ।

२२. अध्रिगुः[1] सवनीयेषु तद्वत्समान-विधानाश्चेत् ।

२३. प्रतिनिधौ चाविकारात् ।

२४. अनाम्नानादशब्दत्वमभावाच्चेतर-स्य स्यात् ।

२५. तादर्थ्याद्वा तदाख्यं स्यात्संस्का-रैरविशिष्टत्वात् ।

२६. उक्तं च तत्त्वमस्य ।

२७. संसर्गिषु चार्थस्यास्थित परि-माणत्वात् ।

२८. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

२९. एकधेत्येकसंयोगादभ्यासेनाभिधानं स्यादसर्वविषयत्वात् ।

३०. अविकारो वा बहूनामेकाकर्म-वत् ।

३१. सकृत्त्वं[2] चैकध्यं स्यादेकत्वात्त्वचोऽ-नभिप्रेतं तत्प्रकृतित्वात्परेष्वभ्यासे-नैवं[3] विवृद्धावभिधानं स्यात् ।

३२. मेधपतित्वं स्वामिदेवतस्य समवाया-त्सर्वत्र च प्रयुक्तत्वात्तस्यान्याय-निगदत्वात्सर्वत्रैवाविकारः स्यात् ।

३३. अपि वा द्विसमवायोऽर्थान्यत्वे यथासङ्ख्यं प्रयोगः स्यात् ।

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१. अध्रिगाविति न्यायमालायां पाठा-न्तरम् ।

२. त्वं वैकेति. न्या. मा. पाठान्तरम् ।

३. सेन विव्रिति. न्या. मा. पाठान्तरम् ।

३४. स्वामिनो वैकशब्द्याद्युत्कर्षो देवतायां स्यात्; पत्न्यां द्वितीयशब्दः स्यात्।

३५. देवता तु तदाशीष्ट्वात्सम्प्राप्तत्वात्स्वामिन्यनर्थिका स्यात्।

३६. उत्सर्गाच्च भक्त्या तस्मिन्पतित्वं स्यात्।

३७. उत्कृ[1]ष्येतैकसंयुक्तौ द्विदेवते संभवात्।

३८. एकस्तु समवायात्तस्य तल्लक्षणत्वात्।

३९. संसर्गित्वाच्च तस्मात्तेन विकल्पः स्यात्।

४०. एकत्वेपि न गुणाऽपायात्।

४१. नियमो बहुदेवते विकारः स्यात्।

४२. विकल्पो वा प्रकृतिवत्।

४३. र्थान्तरे विकारः स्याद्देवतापृथक्त्वादेकाभिसमवायात्स्यात्।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने नवमस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः।

चतुर्थः पादः

१. षड्विंशतिरभ्यासेन पशुगणे; तत्प्रकृतित्वाद्गुणस्य; प्रविभक्तत्वादविकारे हि; तासामकार्त्स्न्येनाभिसम्बन्धो; विकारान्न समासः स्यादसंयोगाच्च सर्वाभिः।

१. इदं सूत्रमधिकं न्यायमालायाम्।

२. अभ्यासेऽपि तथेति चेत्।

३. न गुणादर्थकृतत्वाच्च।

४. समासेऽपि तथेति चेत्।

५. नासम्भवात्।

६. स्वाभिश्च वचनं; प्रकृतौ तथेह स्यात्।

७. वङ्क्रीणान्तु प्रधानत्वात्समासेनाभिधानं स्यात्; प्राधान्यमध्रिगोस्तदर्थत्वात्।

८. तासां च कृत्स्नवचनात्।

९. अपि त्वसन्निपातित्वात्पत्नीवदाम्नातेनाभिधानं स्यात्।

१०. विकारस्तु प्रदेशत्वाद्यजमानवत्।

११. अपूर्वत्वात्तथा पत्न्याम्।

१२. आम्नातस्त्वविकारात्सङ्ख्यासु सर्वगामित्वात्।

१३. सङ्ख्या त्वेवं प्रधानं स्याद्वङ्क्रयः पुनः प्रधानम्।

१४. अभ्यासो वाऽविकारात् स्यात्।

१५. अना[1]म्नातवचनमवचनेन हि वङ्क्रीणां स्यान्निर्देशः।

१६. पशुस्त्वेवं प्रधानं स्यादभ्यासस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् तस्मात्समासशब्दः स्यात्।

१७. अश्वस्य चतुस्त्रिंशत्तस्य वचनाद्वैशेषिकम्।

१. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिग्रन्थे नास्ति, भाष्यकृन्मते न्या. मा. चास्ति।

१८. तत्प्रतिषिध्य प्रकृतिर्नियुज्यते सा चतुस्त्रिशद्वाच्यत्वात् ।
१९. ऋग्वा स्यादाम्नातत्वादविकल्पश्च न्यायः ।
२०. तस्यां तु वचनादेरेवत्पदविकारः स्यात् ।
२१. सर्वप्रतिषेधो वाऽसंयोगात्पदेन स्यात् ।
२२. वनिष्ठुसन्निधानादुरूकेण वपाभिधानम् ।
२३. प्रशंसा[1]ऽस्यभिधानम् ।
२४. बाहुप्रशंसा वा ।

२५. श्येन-शला-कश्यप-कवयोषो[2]रुस्रेक-पर्णेष्वाकृतिवचनं प्रसिद्धसन्निधानात् ।
२६. का[3]त्स्न्यं वा स्यात्तथाभावात् ।
२७. अध्रिगोश्च तदर्थत्वात् ।
२८. प्रासङ्गिके प्रायश्चित्तं न विद्यते; परार्थत्वात्तदर्थो हि विधीयते ।
२९. धारणे च परार्थत्वात् ।
३०. क्रियार्थत्वादितरेषु कर्म स्यात् ।
३१. न तूत्पन्ने यस्यचोदनाऽप्राप्तकालत्वात् ।
३२. प्रदान[4]दर्शनं श्रपणे तद्धर्मभोजनार्थत्वात्संसर्गाच्च मधूदकवत् ।
३३. संस्कारप्रतिषेधश्च तद्वत् ।
३४. तत्प्रतिषेधे च तथाभूतस्य वर्जनात् ।
३५. अधर्मत्वमप्रदानात्प्रणीतार्थे; विधानादतुल्यत्वादसंसर्गः ।
३६. परो नित्याऽनुवादः स्यात् ।
३७. विहितप्रतिषेधो वा ।
३८. वर्जने गुणभावित्वात्तदुक्तप्रतिषेधात्स्यात्कारणात्केवलाशनम् ।
३९. व्रतधर्माच्च लेपवत् ।

४०. रसप्रतिषेधो वा पुरुषधर्मत्वात् ।
४१. अभ्युदये दोहापनयः स्वधर्मा स्यात्प्रवृत्तत्वात् ।
४२. शृतोपदेशाच्च ।
४३. अपनयो वार्थान्तरे विधानाच्चरुपयोवत् ।
४४. लक्षणार्था[1] शृतश्रुतिः ।

४५. श्रयणानां ।वपूर्वत्वात्प्रदानार्थे विधानं स्यात् ।
४६. गुणो वा श्रयणार्थत्वात् ।
४७. अनिर्देशाच्च ।
४८. श्रुतेश्च तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।
४९. अर्थवादश्च तदर्थवत् ।
५०. संस्कारं प्रति भावाच्च तस्मादन्यप्रधानम् ।
५१. पर्यग्निकृतानामुत्सर्गे तादर्थ्यमुपधानवत् ।

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१. प्रशंसात् वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।
२. वषस्रेकेति न्या. मा. पाठान्तरम् ।
३. उत्तरसूत्रेण सहैकमेव सूत्रमिदं वृत्तिग्रन्थे ।
४. वृत्तिग्रन्थे प्रधानेत्यपपाठो दृश्यते ।

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१. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिग्रन्थ नास्ति, भाष्ये त्वस्ति ।

५२. शेषप्रतिषेधो वाऽर्थाभावादिडान्तवत् ।
५३. पूर्ववत्त्वाच्च शब्दस्य संस्थापयतीति चाप्रवृत्ते नोपपद्यते ।

५४. प्रवृत्ते[1]ऽर्यज्ञहेतुत्वात्प्रतिषेधे संस्काराणामकर्म स्यात्तत्कारितत्वाद्यथा प्रयाजप्रतिषेधे ग्रहणमाज्यस्य ।
५५. क्रिया वा स्यादवच्छेदादकर्म सर्वहानं स्यात् ।

५६. आज्यसंस्था प्रतिनिधिः स्याद् द्रव्योत्सर्गात् ।
५७. समाप्तिवचनात् ।

५८. चोदना वा कर्मोत्सर्गादन्यैः स्यादविशिष्टत्वात् ।
५९. अनिज्यां च वनस्पतेः; प्रसिद्धाऽन्तेन दर्शयति ।
६०. संस्था तद्देवतात्वात् स्यात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने नवमस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

॥ समाप्तो नवमोऽध्यायः ॥

1. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिग्रन्थे नास्ति ।

दशमोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. विधेः प्रकरणान्तरेऽतिदेशात्सर्वकर्म स्यात् ।
२. अपि वाऽभिधानसंस्कारद्रव्यमर्थे क्रियते तादर्थ्यात् ।
३. तेषामप्रत्यक्षशिष्टत्वात ।

४. इष्टिरारम्भसंयोगादङ्गभतान्निवर्तेतारम्भस्य प्रधानसंयोगात् ।
५. प्रधानाच्चान्यसंयुक्तात्सर्वारम्भान्निवर्तेतानङ्गत्वात् ।
६. तस्यां तु स्यात्प्रयाजवत् ।
७. न वाऽङ्गभूतत्वात् ।
८. एकवाक्यत्वाच्च ।

९. कर्म च द्रव्यसंयोगार्थमर्थाभावान्निवर्तेत; तादर्थ्यं श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।
१०. स्थाणौ तु देशमात्रत्वादनिवृत्तिः प्रतीयेत ।

११. अपि वा शेषभूतत्वात्संस्कारः प्रतीयेत ।
१२. समाख्यानं च तद्वत् ।
१३. मन्त्रवर्णश्च तद्वत् ।
१४. प्रयाजे च तन्न्यायत्वात् ।
१५. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
१६. तथाऽऽज्यभागाग्निरपीति चेत् ।
१७. व्यपदेशाद्देवतान्तरम् ।
१८. समत्वाच्च ।

१९. पशावपीति चेत् ।
२०. न तद्भूतवचनात् ।
२१. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
२२. गुणो वा स्यात्कपालवद्गुणभूतविकाराच्च ।
२३. अपि वा शेषभूतत्वात्तत्संस्कारः प्रतीयेत; स्वाहाकारवदङ्गानामर्थसंयोगात् ।
२४. व्यूद्धवचनं च विप्रतिपत्तौ तदर्थत्वात् ।
२५. गुणेपीति चेत् ।
२६. नासंहानात्कपालवत् ।
२७. ग्रहाणां च सम्प्रतिपत्तौ तद्वचनं तदर्थत्वात् ।
२८. ग्रहाभावे तद्वचनम् ।
२९. देवतायाश्च हेतुत्वे प्रसिद्धं तेन दर्शयति ।
३०. अविरुद्धोपपत्तिरर्थापत्तेः; श्रुतवद् गुणभूतविकारः स्यात् ।
३१. स द्व्यर्थः स्यादुभयोः श्रुतिभूतत्वाद्विप्रतिपत्तौ; तादर्थ्याद्विकारत्वमुक्तं; तस्यार्थवादत्वम् ।
३२. विप्रतिपत्तौ तासामाख्याविकारः स्यात् ।
३३. अभ्यासो वा प्रयाजवदेकदेशोऽन्यदेवत्यः ।
३४. चरुर्हविर्विकारः स्यादिज्यासंयोगात् ।
३५. प्रसिद्धग्रहणत्वाच्च ।
३६. ओदनो वाऽन्नसंयोगात् ।
३७. न द्व्यर्थत्वात् ।
३८. कपालविकारो वा विशयेऽर्थोपपत्तिभ्याम् ।
३९. गुणमुख्यविशेषाच्च ।
४०. तच्छ्रुतौ चान्यहविष्ट्वात् ।
४१. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
४२. ओदनो वा प्रयुक्तत्वात् ।
४३. अपूर्वव्यपदेशाच्च ।
४४. तथा च लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।
४५. स कपाले प्रकृत्या स्यादन्यस्य चाश्रुतिवात् ।
४६. एकस्मिन्वा विप्रतिषेधात् ।
४७. न वाऽर्थान्तरसंयोगादपूपे; पाकसंयुक्तं धारणार्थं चरौ भवति; तत्रार्थात्पात्रलाभः स्यादनियमोऽविशेषात् ।
४८. चरौ वा लिङ्गदर्शनात् ।
४९. तस्मिन्पेषणमनर्थलोपात्स्यात् ।
५०. अक्रिया वा अपूपहेतुत्वात् ।
५१. पिण्डार्थत्वाच्च संयवनम् ।
५२. संवपनं च तादर्थ्यात् ।
५३. सन्तापनमधः श्रपणात् ।
५४. उपधानं च तादर्थ्यात् ।
५५. पृथुश्लक्ष्णे चाऽनपूपत्वात् ।
५६. अभ्यूहश्चोपरिपाकार्थत्वात् ।
५७. तथा च ज्वलनम् ।

५८. व्युद्धृत्याऽऽसादनं च प्रकृतावश्रुतित्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने दशमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

१. कृष्णलेष्वर्थलोपादपाकः स्यात् ।
२. स्याद्वा प्रत्यक्षशिष्टत्वात्प्रदानवत् ।
३. उपस्तरणाभिधारणयोरमृतार्थत्वादकर्म स्यात् ।
४. क्रियेत वाऽर्थवादत्वात्तयोः संसर्गहेतुत्वात् ।
५. अकर्म वा चतुर्भिराप्तिवचनात्सह पूर्णं; पुनश्चतुरवत्तम् ।
६. क्रिया वा मुख्यावदानपरिमाणात्; सामान्यात्तद्गुणत्वम् ।
७. तेषां चैकावदानत्वात् ।
८. आप्तिः संख्या समानत्वात् ।
९. सतोस्त्वाप्तिवचनं व्यर्थम् ।
१०. विल्पकस्त्वेकावदानत्वात् ।
११. सर्वविकारे त्वभ्यासानर्थक्यं; हविषो ह्यीतरस्य स्यादपि वा स्विष्टकृतः स्यादितरस्यान्यायत्वात् ।
१२. अकर्मा वा संसर्गार्थनिवृत्तित्वात्, तस्मादाप्तिसमर्थत्वम् ।
१३. भक्षाणां तु प्रीत्यर्थत्वादकर्म स्यात् ।
१४. स्याद्वा निर्धानदर्शनात् ।
१५. वचनं त्वाज्यभक्षस्य प्रकृतौ स्यादभागित्वात् ।
१६. वचनं वा हिरण्यस्य प्रदानवदाज्यस्य गुणभूतत्वात् ।
१७. एकधोपहारे सहत्वं ब्रह्मभक्षाणां, प्रकृतौ विहितत्वात् ।
१८. सर्वत्वं च तेषामधिकारात्स्यात् ।
१९. पुरुषापनयो वा तेषामवाच्यत्वात् ।
२०. पुरुषापनयात्स्वकालत्वम् ।
२१. एकार्थत्वादविभागः स्यात् ।
२२. ऋत्विग्दानं धर्ममात्रार्थं स्याद्ददातिसामर्थ्यात् ।
२३. परिक्रयार्थं वा कर्मसंयोगाल्लोकवत् ।
२४. दक्षिणायुक्तवचनाच्च ।
२५. न[1] चाऽन्येनाऽऽनम्येत परिक्रयात्, कर्मणः परार्थत्वात् ।
२६. परिक्रीतवचनाच्च ।
२७. सनिवन्ये च भृति वचनात् ।
२८. नैष्कर्तृकेण संस्तवात् ।
२९. शेषभक्षाश्च तद्वत् ।
३०. संस्कारो वा द्रव्यस्य परार्थत्वात् ।
३१. शेषे च समत्वात् ।

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१. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिकृन्मते नास्ति ।

३२. स्वामिनि च दर्शनात्तत्सामान्यादितरेषां तथात्वम्।
३३. तथा[1] चान्यार्थदर्शनम्।
३४. वरणमृत्विजामानमनार्थत्वात्सत्रे न स्यात्स्वकर्मत्वात्।
३५. परिक्रयश्च तादर्थ्यात्।
३६. प्रतिषेधश्च कर्मवत्।
३७. स्याद्वाप्रसर्पिकस्य धर्ममात्रत्वात्।
३८. न दक्षिणा शब्दात्तस्मान्नित्यानुवादः स्यात्।
३९. उदवसानीयाः सत्रधर्मा स्यात्तदङ्गत्वात्तत्र दानं धर्ममात्रं स्यात्।
४०. न त्वेतत्प्रकृतित्वाद्विभक्तचोदितत्वात्।
४१. तेषां तु वचनाद्द्वियज्ञवत्सहप्रयोगः स्यात्।
४२. तत्रान्यानृत्विजो वृणीरन्।
४३. एकैकशस्त्वविप्रतिषेधात्प्रकृतेश्चैकसंयोगात्।
४४. कामेष्टौ च दानशब्दात्।
४५. वचनं वा सत्रत्वात्।
४६. द्वेष्ये[2] वा चोदनाद्दक्षिणापनयात्।

१. न्यायमालायां इदमधिकं सूत्रम्।
२. द्वेष्ये चाचोदेति न्या. मा. पाठान्तरम्।

४७. अस्थियज्ञोऽविप्रतिषेधादितरेषां स्याद्विप्रतिषेधादस्थ्नाम्।
४८. यावदुक्तमुपयोगः स्यात्।
४९. यदि तु वचनात्तेषां जपसंस्कारमर्थलुप्तं; सेष्टि तदर्थत्वात्।
५०. क्रत्वर्थं तु क्रियेत गुणभूतत्वात्।
५१. काम्यानि तु न विद्यन्ते कामाज्ञानाद्यथेतरस्यानुच्यमानानि।
५२. ईहार्थाश्चाभावात्सूक्तवाकवत्।
५३. स्युर्वाऽर्थवादत्वात्।
५४. नेच्छाभिधानात्तदभावादितरस्मिन्।
५५. स्युर्वा होतृकामाः।
५६. न तदाशीष्ट्वात्।
५७. सर्वस्वारस्य दिष्टगतौ, समापनं न विद्यते, कर्मणो जीवसंयोगात्।
५८. स्याद्वोभयोः प्रत्यक्षशिष्टत्वात्।
५९. गते कर्मास्थियज्ञवत्।
६०. जीवत्यवचनमायुराशिषस्तदर्थत्वात्।
६१. वचनं वा भागित्वात्प्राग्यथोक्तात्।
६२. क्रिया स्याद्धर्ममात्राणाम्।
६३. गुणलोपे तु[1] मुख्यस्य।

१. पे च मुख्येति न्यायमालापाठः।

६४. मुष्टिलोपात्तु सङ्ख्यालोपस्तद्गुणत्वात्स्यात् ।

६५. न निर्वापशेषत्वात् ।

६६. सङ्ख्या तु चोदनां प्रति सामान्यात्तद्विकारः; संयोगाच्च परं मुष्टेः ।

६७. न चोदनाभिसम्बन्धात्प्रकृतौ संस्कारयोगात् ।

६८. औत्पत्तिके तु द्रव्यतो विकारः स्यादकार्यत्वात् ।

६९. नैमित्तिके तु कार्यत्वात्प्रकृतेः स्यात्तदापत्तेः ।

७०. विप्रतिषेधे तद्वचनात्प्राकृतगुणलोपः स्यात्तेन[1] कर्मसंयोगात् ।

७१. परेषां प्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।

७२. [2]प्रतिषेधाच्च ।

७३. अर्थाभावे संस्कारत्वं स्यात् ।

७४. अर्थेन च; विपर्यासे तादर्थ्यात्तत्त्वमेव स्यात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने दशमस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।

तृतीयः पादः

१. विकृतौ शब्दवत्त्वात्प्रधानस्य; गुणानामधिकोत्पत्तिः सन्निधानात् ।

१. त्तन च केति न्या. मा. पाठः ।
२. विप्रेति वृत्तिकृत्पाठः ।

२. प्रकृतिवत्त्वस्य चानुपरोधः ।

३. चोदनाप्रभुत्वाच्च ।

४. प्रधानं त्वङ्गसंयुक्तं; तथाभूतमपूर्वं स्यात्तस्य विध्युपलक्षणात्सर्वो हि पूर्ववान्विधिरविशेषात्प्रवर्तितः ।

५. न चाङ्गविधिरनङ्गे स्यात् ।

६. कर्मणश्चैकशब्द्यात् सन्निधाने विधेराख्या संयोगो; गुणेन तद्विकारः स्याच्छब्दस्य विधिगामित्वाद्गुणस्य चोपदेश्यत्वात् ।

७. अकार्यत्वाच्च नाम्नः ।

८. तुल्या च प्रभुता गुणे ।

९. सर्वमेवं प्रधानमिति चेत् ।

१०. तथाभूतेन संयोगाद्यथार्थविधयः स्युः ।

११. विधित्वं चाविशिष्टं[1] वैकृतैः कर्मणा योगात्तस्मात्सर्वं प्रधानार्थम् ।

१२. समत्वाच्च तदुत्पत्तेः संस्कारैरधिकारः स्यात् ।

१३. हिरण्यगर्भः पूर्वस्य मंत्रलिङ्गात् ।

१४. प्रकृत्यनुपरोधाच्च ।

१५. उत्तरस्य वा मंत्रार्थित्वात् ।

१६. विध्यतिदेशात्तच्छ्रुतौ विकारः स्याद्गुणानामुपदेश्यत्वात् ।

१७. पूर्वस्मिंश्चामन्त्रदर्शनात् ।

१. विशिष्टमेवं प्राकृतानां वैक्रिति न्यायमालापाठः ।

१८. संस्कारे तु क्रियांतरं तस्य विधायकत्वात् ।
१९. प्रकृत्यनुपरोधाच्च ।

२०. विधेस्तु तत्र भावात्सन्देहे यस्य शब्दस्तदर्थं स्यात् ।
२१. संस्कारसामर्थ्याद् गुणसंयोगाच्च ।
२२. विप्रतिषेधात्क्रिया प्रकरणे स्यात् ।

२३. षड्भिर्दीक्षयतीति; तासां मन्त्रविकारः श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।

२४. अभ्यासात्तु प्रधानस्य ।
२५. आवृत्त्या मन्त्रकर्म स्यात् ।
२६. अपि वा प्रतिमन्त्रत्वात्प्राकृतानामहानिः स्यादन्यायश्च कृतेऽभ्यासः ।
२७. पौर्वापर्यञ्चाभ्यासे नोपपद्यते नैमित्तिकत्वात् ।
२८. तत्पृथकत्वं च दर्शयति ।
२९. न चाविशेषाद्वचपदेशः स्यात् ।

३०. अग्न्याधेयस्य नैमित्तिके गुणविकारे दक्षिणादानमधिकं स्याद् वाक्यसंयोगात् ।
३१. शिष्टत्वाच्चेतरासां यथास्थानम् ।
३२. विकारस्त्वप्रकरणे हि काम्यानि ।
३३. शङ्कते च निवृत्तेरुभयत्वं हि श्रूयते ।
३४. वासो वत्सञ्च सामान्यात् ।
३५. अर्थापत्तेस्तद्धर्मः स्यान्निमित्ताख्याभिसंयोगात् ।

३६. दाने पाकोऽर्थलक्षणः ।
३७. पाकस्य चान्नकारितत्त्वात् ।
३८. तथाभिधारणस्य ।
३९. द्रव्य[1]विधिसन्निधौ सङ्ख्या तेषां गुणत्वात्स्यात् ।
४०. समत्वात्तु गुणानामेकस्य श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।

४१. यस्य वा सन्निधाने स्याद्वाक्यतो ह्यभिसम्बन्धः ।
४२. असंयुक्तास्तु तुल्यवदितराभिर्विधीयन्ते; तस्मात्सर्वाधिकारः स्यात् ।
४३. असंयोगाद्विधिश्रुतावेकजाताधिकारः स्याच्छ्रुत्याकोपात्क्रतोः ।
४४. शब्दार्थश्चापि लोकवत् ।
४५. सा पशूनामुत्पत्तितो विभागात् ।
४६. अनियमोऽविशेषात् ।

४७. भागित्वाद्वा गवां स्यात् ।
४८. प्रत्ययात् ।
४९. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
५०. तत्र दानं विभागेन प्रदानानां पृथक्त्वात् ।

५१. परिक्रयाच्च लोकवत् ।
५२. विभागं चापि दर्शयति ।
५३. समं स्यादश्रुतित्वात् ।

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१. द्रव्यविधीति सूत्रमारभ्य लिङ्गदर्शनाच्चेत्यन्तेमकमधिकरणं न्यायमालानुसाराद् भवति ।

५४. अपि वा कर्मवैषम्यात् ।

५५. अतुल्याः स्युः परिक्रये विषमाख्या; विधिश्रुतौ परिक्रयान्न कर्मण्युपपद्यते; दर्शनाद्विशेषस्य तथाभ्युदये ।

५६. तस्य धेनुरिति गवां प्रकृतौ विभक्तं चोदितत्वात्तत्सामान्यात्तद्विकारः स्याद्यथेष्टिर्गुणशब्देन ।

५७. सर्वस्य वा; क्रतुसंयोगादेकत्वं दक्षिणार्थस्य; गुणानां कार्यैकत्वादर्थे विकृतौ श्रुतिभूतं स्यात्त[1]या समवायाद्धि कर्मभिः ।

५८. चोदनानामनाश्रयाल्लिङ्गेन नियमः स्यात् ।

५९. एका[2] पञ्चेति धेनुवत् ।

६०. त्रिवत्सश्च ।

६१. तथा[3] लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।

६२. एके तु श्रुतिभूतत्वात्सङ्ख्यया गवां लिङ्गविशेषेण ।

६३. प्राकाशौ च[4] तथेति चेत् ।

६४. अपि त्ववयवार्थत्वाद्विभक्तप्रकृतित्वाद्गुणेदन्ताविकारः स्यात् ।

६५. धेनुवच्चाश्वदक्षिणा; स ब्रह्मण इति; पुरुषापनयो यथा हिरण्यस्य ।

६६. एके तु कर्तृसंयोगात्स्रग्वत्तस्य लिङ्गविशेषेण ।

६७. अपिवा तदधिकाराद्धिरण्यवद्विकारः स्यात् ।

६८. तथा च सोमचमसः ।

६९. सर्वविकारो वा क्रत्वर्थे पशूनां[1] प्रतिषेधात् ।

७०. ब्रह्मदानेऽविशिष्टमिति चेत् ।

७१. उत्सर्गस्य क्रत्वर्थत्वात्प्रतिषिद्धस्य कर्मत्वान्न[2] च गौणः प्रयोजनमर्थः स दक्षिणानां स्यात् ।

७२. यदि तु ब्रह्मस्तदूनं तद्विकारः स्यात् ।

७३. सर्वं वा पुरुषापनयात्तासां क्रतुप्रधानत्वात् ।

७४. यजुर्युक्तेऽध्वर्योर्दक्षिणा विकारः स्यात् ।

७५. अपि वा श्रुतिभूतत्वात्सर्वासां तस्य भागो नियम्यते ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने दशमस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः ।

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१. त्तस्मात्सेति न्या. मा. संमतः पाठः ।

२. एकां पेति न्या. मा. संमतः पाठः ।

३. तथा चेति चशब्दोधिकः न्या. मा. मते पाठः ।

४. चशब्दोधिको वृत्तिकृन्मते ।

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१. र्थं प्रतिषेधात्पशूनामिति न्यायमालाकृत्संमतः पाठः ।

२. मंस्यान्नेति न्यायमालासंमतः पाठः ।

चतुर्थः पादः

१. प्रकृतिलिङ्गासंयोगात्कर्मसंस्कारं विकृतावधिकं स्यात्।

२. चोदनालिङ्गसंयोगे तद्विकारः प्रतीयेत प्रकृतिसन्निधानात्।

३. सर्वत्र तु ग्रहाम्नातमधिकं स्यात्प्रकृतिवत्।

४. अधिकश्चैकवाक्यत्वात्।

५. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च।

६. प्राजापत्येषु चाम्नानात्।

७. आमने लिङ्गदर्शनात्।

८. उपगेषु शरवत्स्यात्प्रकृति लिङ्गसंयोगात्।

९. आनर्थक्यात्त्वधिकं स्यात्।

१०. संस्कारे चान्यसंयोगात्।

११–१२. प्रयाजवदिति[1] चेन्नार्थान्यत्वात्।

१३. आच्छादने त्वैकार्थ्यात्प्राकृतस्य विकारः स्यात्।

१४. अधिकं वाऽन्यार्थत्वात्।

१५. समुच्चयं[2] च दर्शयति।

१६. सामस्वर्थान्तरश्रुतेरविकारः प्रतीयेत।

१७. अर्थे त्वश्रूयमाणे शेषत्वात्प्राकृतस्य विकारः स्यात्।

१८. सर्वेषामविशेषात्।

१९. एकस्य वा श्रुतिसामर्थ्यात्प्रकृतेश्चाविकारात्।

२०. स्तोमविवृद्धौ त्वधिकं स्यादविवृद्धौ द्रव्यविकारः स्यादितरस्याश्रुतित्वात्।

२१. पावमाने स्यातां तस्मिन्नावापोद्वापदर्शनात्।

२२. वचनानि त्वपूर्वत्वात्।

२३. विधिशब्दस्य मन्त्रत्वे भावः स्यात्तेन चोदना।

२४. शेषाणां वा चोदनैकत्वात्तस्मात् सर्वत्र श्रूयते।

२५. तथोत्तरस्यां ततौ तत्प्रकृतित्वात्।

२६. प्राकृतस्य गुणश्रुतौ सगुणेनाभिधानं स्यात्।

२७. अविकारो वाऽर्थशब्दानपायात् स्याद् द्रव्यवत्।

२८. आरम्भा[1]समवायाद्वा चोदितेनाभिधानं स्यादर्थस्य श्रुतिसमवायित्वादवचने च गुणशासनमनर्थकं स्यात्।

२९. द्रव्येष्वारम्भगामित्वादर्थे विकारः[2] सामर्थ्यात्।

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१. दिति चेदित्यन्तमंके तत उत्तरमेकमिति सूत्रद्वयमिति न्या. मा. मते।

२. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिकृन्मते नास्ति। भाष्ये न्यायमालाकृन्मते चास्ति।

१. तथारेति न्या. मा. संमतः पाठः।

२. कारे सति वृत्तिकृत्सम्मतः पाठः।

३०. वृध[1]न्वान्पवमानवद्विशेषनिर्देशात् ।

३१. मन्त्रविशेषनिर्देशान्न देवताविकारः स्यात् ।

३२. विधिनिगमभेदात्प्रकृतौ तत्प्रकृतित्वाद्विकृतावपिभेदः स्यात् ।

३३. यथोक्तं वा विप्रतिपत्तेर्न चोदना ।

३४. स्विष्टकृद्देवतान्यत्वे तच्छब्दत्वान्निवर्त्तेत ।

३५. संयोगे वाऽर्थापत्तेरभिधानस्य कर्मजत्वात् ।

३६. सगुणस्य गुणलोपे निगमेषु गुणा[2]-स्थाने यावदुक्तं स्यात् ।

३७. सर्वस्य वैककर्म्यात् ।

३८. स्विष्टकृदावापिकोऽनुयाजे स्यात्; प्रयोजनवदङ्गानामर्थसंयोगात् ।

३९. अन्वाहेति च शस्त्रवत् कर्म स्याच्चोदनान्तरात् ।

४०. संस्कारो वा चोदितस्य शब्दस्य वचनार्थत्वात् ।

४०अ. अवाच्य[3]त्वान्नेति चेत् ।

४१. स्याद् गुणार्थत्वात् ।

४२. मनोतायां तु वचनादविकारः स्यात् ।

४३. पृष्ठार्थेऽन्यद्रथन्तरात्तद्योनिपूर्वत्वात् स्यादृचां प्रविभक्तत्वात् ।

४४. स्वयोनौ वा सर्वाख्यत्वात् ।

४५. यूपवदिति चेत् ।

४६. न कर्मसंयोगात् ।

४७. कार्यत्वादुत्तरयोर्यथाप्रकृति ।

४८. समानदेवते वा तृचस्याविभागात् ।

४९. ग्रहाणां देवतान्यत्वे स्तुतशस्त्रयोः कर्मत्वादविकारः स्यात् ।

५०. उभयपानात्पृषदाज्ये दध्नोप्युपलक्षणं निगमेषु पातव्यस्योपलक्ष[1]-णत्वात् ।

५१. न वा परार्थत्वाद्यज्ञपतिवत् ।

५२. स्याद्वा आवाहनस्य तादर्थ्यात् ।

५३. न वा संस्कारशब्दत्वात् ।

५४. स्याद्वा द्रव्याभिधानात् ।

५५. दध्नस्तु गुणभूतत्वादाज्यपानिगमाः स्युर्गुणत्वं श्रुतेराज्यप्रधानत्वात् ।

५६. दधि वा स्यात्प्रधानमाज्ये प्रथमान्त्यसंयोगात् ।

५७. अपि वाऽऽज्यप्रधानत्वाद्गुणार्थे व्यपदेशो भक्त्या संस्कारशब्दः स्यात् ।

५८. अपि वाऽऽख्याविकारत्वात्तेन स्यादुपलक्षणम् ।

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१. बुधेति न्यायमालाकृतः भाष्यकृतः शास्त्रदीपिकाकृतश्च सम्मतः पाठः ।

२. गुणस्थाने इति पदं वृत्तिकृन्मते एवाधिकम् ।

३. इदं सूत्रमधिकं वृत्तिकृन्मते ।

१. क्षणादिति न्या. मा. मते पाठः ।

५९. न वा स्याद्गुणशास्त्रत्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने दशमस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

पञ्चमः पादः

१. आनुपूर्व्यवतामेकदेशग्रहणेष्वागमवदन्त्यलोपः स्यात् ।
२. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
३. विकल्पो वा समत्वात् ।
४. क्रमादुपसर्जनोऽन्ते स्यात् ।
५. लिङ्गमविशिष्टं सङ्ख्याया हि तद्वचनम् ।
६. आदितो वा प्रवृत्तिः स्यादारम्भस्य तदादित्वाद्वचनादन्त्यविधिः स्यात् ।
७. एकत्रिके तृचादिषु माध्यंदिन[1]-छन्दसां श्रुतिभूतत्वात् ।
८. आदितो वा तन्न्यायत्वादितरस्यानुमानिकत्वात् ।
९. यथानिवेशञ्च प्रकृतिवत्संख्यामात्रविकारत्वात् ।
१०. त्रिकस्तृचे धुर्ये स्यात् ।
११. एकस्यां वा स्तोमस्यावृत्तिधर्मत्वात् ।
१२. चोदनासु त्वपूर्वत्वाल्लिङ्गेन धर्मनियमः स्यात् ।

१. न्दिने छन्देति न्या. मा. संमतः पाठः ।

१३. प्राप्तिस्तु रात्रिशब्दसम्बन्धात् ।
१४. अपूर्वासु तु संख्यासु विकल्पः स्यात्सर्वासामर्थवत्त्वात् ।
१५. स्तोमविवृद्धौ प्राकृतानामभ्यासेन सङ्ख्यापूरणमविकारात्सङ्ख्यायां गुणशब्दत्वादन्यस्य चाश्रुतित्वात् ।
१६. आगमेन वाऽभ्यासस्याश्रुतित्वात् ।
१७. सङ्ख्यायाश्च पृथक्त्व निवेशात् ।
१८. पराक्छब्दत्वात् ।
१९. उक्ताविकाराच्च ।
२०. अश्रुतित्वादिति चेत् ।
२१. स्यादर्थचोदितानां परिमाणशास्त्रम् ।
२२. आवापवचनं वा[1]ऽभ्यासे नोपपद्यते ।
२३. साम्ना चोत्पत्तिसामर्थ्यात् ।
२४. धुर्येष्वपीति चेत् ।
२५. नावृत्तिधर्मत्वात् ।
२६. बहिष्पवमाने तु ऋगागमः सामैकत्वात् ।
२७. अभ्यासेन तु सङ्ख्यापूरणं; सामिधेनीष्वभ्यासप्रकृतित्वात् ।
२८. अविशेषान्नेति चेत् ।
२९. स्यात्तद्धर्मत्वात् प्रकृतिवदभ्यस्येताऽऽसङ्ख्यापूरणात् ।
३०. यावदुक्तं वा कृतपरिमाणत्वात् ।

१. नं चेति न्या. मा. संमतः पाठः ।

३१. अधिकानाञ्च दर्शनात् ।
३२. कर्म[1] स्वपीति चेत् ।
३३. न चोदितत्वात् ।
३४. षोडशिनो वैकृतत्वं तत्र कृत्स्न-विधानात् ।
३५. प्रकृतौ चाऽभावदर्शनात् ।
३६. अयज्ञवचनाच्च ।
३७. प्रकृतौ वा शिष्टत्वात् ।
३८. प्रकृतिदर्शनाच्च ।
३९. आम्ना[2] नं परिसङ्ख्यार्थम् ।
४०. उक्तमभावदर्शनम् ।
४१. गुणादयज्ञत्वम् ।
४२. तस्याग्रयणाद्ग्रहणम् ।
४३. उक्थ्याच्च वचनात् ।
४४. तृतीयसवने वचनात्स्यात् ।
४५. अनभ्यासे पराक्छब्दस्य ताद-र्थ्यात् ।
४६. उक्थ्यविच्छेदवचनाच्च[3] ।
४७. आग्रयणाद्वा पराक्छब्दस्य देश-वाचित्वात्पुनराधेयवत् ।
४८. विच्छेदः स्तोमसामान्यात् ।
४९. उक्थ्याऽग्निष्टोमसंयोगादस्तुतशस्त्रः स्यात्सति हि संस्थान्यत्वम् ।
५०. सस्तुतशस्त्रो वा तदङ्गत्वात् ।

१. न कर्मेति न्या. मा. पाठः ।
२. म्नातं पेति न्या. मा. संमतः पाठः ।
३. चनत्वादिति चशब्दशून्यः पाठो न्या. मा. संमतः ।

५१. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
५२. वचनात्संस्थान्यत्वम् ।
५३. अभावादतिरात्रेषु गृह्यते ।
५४. अन्वयो वाऽनारभ्य विधानात् ।
५५. चतुर्थे चतुर्थेऽहन्यहीनस्य गृह्यते; इत्यभ्यासेन प्रतीयेत भोजनवत् ।
५६. अपि वा सङ्ख्यावत्त्वान्नाहीनेषु गृह्यते; पक्षवदेकस्मिन्सङ्ख्यार्थ-भावात् ।
५७. भोजने चः तत्सङ्ख्यं स्यात् ।
५८. जगत्साम्नि; सामाभावादृक्तः; साम तदाख्यं स्यात् ।
५९. उभयसाम्नि; नैमित्तिकं विक-ल्पेन समत्वात्स्यात् ।
६०. मुख्येन वा नियम्यते ।
६१. निमित्त विघाताद्वा क्रतुयुक्तस्य कर्म स्यात् ।
६२. ऐन्द्रावायवस्याग्रवचनादादितः प्र-तिकर्षः स्यात् ।
६३. अपि वा धर्मविशेषात्तद्धर्माणां स्वस्थाने प्रतिकरणादग्रत्वमुच्यते ।
६४. धारासंयोगाच्च ।
६५. कामसंयोगे तु वचनादादितः प्रतिकर्षः स्यात् ।
६६. तद्देशानां वाऽग्रसंयोगात्तद्युक्ते[2] कामशास्त्रं स्यान्नित्यसंयोगात् ।

१. चशब्दो नास्ति न्या. मा. मते ।
२. द्युक्तं केति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।

६७. परेषु[1] चाग्रशब्दः पूर्ववत् स्यात्-तदादिषु ।

६८. प्रतिकर्षो वा नित्यार्थेनाग्रस्य[2] तदसंयोगात् ।

६९. प्रतिकर्षञ्च दर्शयति ।

७०. पुरस्तादैन्द्रवाय[3]वादग्रस्य कृत-देशत्वात् ।

७१. तुल्यधर्मत्वाच्च ।

७२. तथा च लिङ्गदर्शनम् ।

७३. सादनं चापि शेषत्वात् ।

७४. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

७५. प्रदानं चापि सादनवत् ।

७६. न वा प्रधानत्वाच्छेषत्वात्सा-दनं तथा ।

७७. त्र्यनीकायां न्यायोक्तेष्वाम्नानं गुणार्थं स्यात् ।

७८. अपि वाऽहर्गणेष्वग्निवत्समा[4]नं विधानं स्यात् ।

७९. द्वादशाहस्य व्यूढसमूढत्वं पृष्ठ-वत्समानविधानं स्यात् ।

८०. व्यूढो वा लिङ्गदर्शनात्समूढ-विकारः स्यात्[5] ।

८१. कामसंयोगात् ।

८२. तस्योभयथा प्रवृत्तिरैककर्म्यात् ।

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१. षु चाग्रेति न्या. मा. पाठः ।

२. त्याग्रस्येति क्वचित्पाठः ।

३. यवस्याग्रेति न्या. मा. पाठः ।

४. मानवीति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।

५. न्यायमालायां स्यादिति नास्ति ।

८३. एकादशि[1]नीवत् त्र्यनीका प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ।

८४. स्वस्थानविवृद्धिर्वाऽह्नामप्रत्यक्ष-सङ्ख्यत्वात् ।

८५. पृष्ठ्यावृत्तौ चाग्रयणस्य दर्शनात् त्रयस्त्रिंशे परिवृत्तौ पुनरैन्द्रवायवः स्यात् ।

८६. वचनात्परिवृत्तिरैकादशिनेषु ।

८७. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

८८. छन्दोव्यतिक्रमाद् व्यूढे; भक्षपव-मानपरिधिकपालमन्त्राणां यथो-त्पत्तिवचनमूहवत्स्यात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने दशमस्याध्यायस्य पञ्चमः पादः ।

षष्ठः पादः

१. एकर्चस्थानानि यज्ञे स्युः स्वा-ध्यायवत् ।

२. तृचे वा लिङ्गदर्शनात् ।

३. स्वर्दृशं प्रति वीक्षणं कालमात्रं परार्थत्वात् ।

४. पृष्ठ्यस्य त्वयुगपद्विधेरेकाद्वि-सामत्वम् ।

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१. शिवनवत्त्र्यनीका परिवृत्तिरिति न्या. मा. पाठभेदः ।

५. विभक्ते वाऽसमस्त विधानात् तद्विभागेऽप्रतिषिद्धम् ।

६. समासस्त्वेकादशिनेषु तत्प्रकृतित्वात् ।

७. विहारप्रतिषेधाच्च ।

८. श्रुतितो वा लोकवद्विभागः स्यात् ।

९. विहारप्रकृतित्वाच्च ।

१०. यावच्छक्यं तावद्विहारस्यानुग्रहीतव्यं; विशये च तदासत्तेः ।

११. त्रयस्तथेति चेत् ।

१२. न समत्वात्प्रयाजवत् ।

१३. सर्वपृष्ठे पृष्ठशब्दात्तेषां स्यादेकदेशत्वं पृष्ठस्य कृतदेशत्वात् ।

१४. विधेस्तु विप्रकर्षः स्यात् ।

१५. वैरूपसामा क्रतुसंयोगात्त्रिवृद्वदेकसामा स्यात् ।

१६. पृष्ठार्थे वा प्रकृतिलिङ्गसंयोगात् ।

१७. त्रिवृद्वदिति चेत् ।

१८. न प्रकृतावकृत्स्नसंयोगात् ।

१९. विधित्वान्नेति चेत् ।

२०. न स्याद्विशये तन्न्यायत्वात्कर्माविभागात् ।

२१. प्रकृतेश्चाविकारात् ।

२२. त्रिवृति सङ्ख्यात्वेन सर्वसङ्ख्याविकारः स्यात् ।

२३. स्तोमस्य वा तल्लिङ्गत्वात् ।

२४. उभयसाम्नि विश्वजिद्वद्विभागः स्यात् ।

२५. पृष्ठार्थे वाऽतदर्थत्वात् ।

२६. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

२७. पृष्ठे रसभोजनमावृत्तेसंस्थिते त्रयस्त्रिंशेऽहनि स्यात्तदानन्तर्यात् प्रकृतिवत् ।

२८. अन्ते वा कृतकालत्वात् ।

२९. अभ्यासे च तदभ्यासः कर्मणः पुनः प्रयोगात् ।

३०. अन्ते वा कृतकालत्वात् ।

३१. आवृत्तिस्तु व्यवाये कालभेदात् ।

३२. मधु न दीक्षिता ब्रह्मचारित्वात् ।

३३. प्राश्येतवायज्ञार्थत्वात् ।

३४. मानसमहरन्तरं स्या[1]द् द्वादशाहे व्यपदेशात् ।

३५. तेन च संस्तवात् ।

३६. अहरन्ताच्च परेण चोदना ।

३७. पक्षे सङ्ख्या सहस्रवत् ।

३८. अहरङ्गवांशुवच्चोदनाभावात् ।

३९. दशमविसर्गवचनाच्च ।

४०. दशमेऽहनीति च तद्गुणशास्त्रात् ।

४१. सङ्ख्यासामञ्जस्यात् ।

४२. पश्वतिरेके चैकस्य भावात् ।

४३. स्तुतिव्यपदेशमङ्गेनाविप्रतिषिद्धं व्रतवत् ।

४४. वचनादतदन्तत्वम् ।

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१. स्याद् भेदेन द्वयेति न्या. मा. पाठः ।

४५. सत्रमेकः प्रकृतिवत् ।

४६. बहु[1]वचनात्तु बहूनां स्यात् ।

४७. अपदेशः स्यादिति चेत् ।

४८. नैकव्यपदेशात् ।

४९. सन्निवापं च दर्शयति ।

५०. बहूनामिति चैकस्मिन्विशेष-वचने[2] व्यर्थम् ।

५१. अन्ये स्युर्ऋत्विजः प्रकृतिवत् ।

५२. अपि वा यजमानाः स्युर्ऋत्वि-जामभिधानसंयोगात्तेषां स्याद्यज-मानत्वम् ।

५३. कर्तृसंस्कारो वचनादाधातृवदिति चेत् ।

५४. स्याद्विशये तन्न्यायत्वात्प्रकृति-वत् ।

५५. स्वाम्याख्याः स्युर्गृहपतिवदिति चेत् ।

५६. न प्रसिद्धग्रहणत्वादसंयुक्तस्य तद्धर्मेण ।

५७. बहू[3]नामिति तुल्येषु विशेषवचनं नोपपद्यते ।

५८. दीक्षिताऽदीक्षित व्यपदेशश्च नोपपद्यतेऽर्थयोर्नित्यभावित्वात् ।

१. बहुवेत्यत्र बहुशब्दरहितः पाठो न्या. मा. संमतः ।

२. चनं व्येति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।

३. इदं सूत्रमधिकं वृत्तिकृन्मते ।

५९. अदक्षिणत्वाच्च

६०. द्वादशाहस्य सत्रत्वमासनोपायि-चोदनेन यजमानबहुत्वेन च; सत्रशब्दाभिसंयोगात् ।

६१. यजतिचोदनादहीनत्वं; स्वामिनां चाऽस्थितपरिमाणत्वात् ।

६२. अहीने दक्षिणाशास्त्रं गुणत्वात् प्रत्यहं कर्मभेदः स्यात् ।

६३. सर्वस्य वैककर्म्यात् ।

६४. पृषदाज्यवद्वाऽह्नां गुणशास्त्रं स्यात् ।

६५. ज्यौतिष्टोम्यस्तु दक्षिणाः; सर्वा-सामेककर्मत्वात्प्रकृतिवत्; तस्मात् तासां विकारः स्यात् ।

६६. द्वादशाहे तु वचनात्प्रत्यहं दक्षि-णाभेदस्तत्प्रकृतित्वात्परेषु; तासां सङ्ख्याविकारः स्यात् ।

६७. परिक्रयाविभागाद्वा समस्तस्य विकारः स्यात् ।

६८. भेदस्तु गुणसंयोगात् ।

६९. प्रत्यहं सर्वसंस्कारः प्रकृतिवत्; सर्वासां सर्वशेषत्वात् ।

७०. एकार्थत्वान्नेति चेत् ।

७१. उत्प[1]त्तौ कालभेदात् ।

१. स्यादुत्पेति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।

७२. विभज्य तु संस्कारवचनाद्द्वादशाहवत् ।

७३. लिङ्गेन द्रव्यनिर्देशे सर्वत्र प्रत्ययः स्याल्लिङ्गस्य सर्वगामित्वात् ।

७४. यावदर्थं वाऽर्थशेषत्वादतोऽर्थेन परिमाणं स्यात्तस्मिंश्च लिङ्गसामर्थ्यम् ।

७५. आग्नेये कृत्स्नविधिः ।

७६. ऋजीषस्य प्रधानत्वादहर्गणे सर्वस्य प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् ।

७७. वाससि मानोपावहरणे प्रकृतौ सोमस्य वचनात् ।

७८. तत्राहर्गणेऽर्थाद्वासः प्रकृतिः स्यात् ।

७९. मानं प्रत्युत्पादयेत्प्रकृतौ तेन दर्शनादुपावहरणस्य ।

८०. हरणे वा श्रुत्यसंयोगादर्थाद्विकृतौ तेन ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने दशमस्याध्यायस्य षष्ठः पादः ।

सप्तमः पादः

१. पशावेकहविष्ट्वं समस्तचोदितत्वात् ।

२. प्रत्यङ्गं वा ग्रहवदङ्गानां पृथक्कल्पनत्वात् ।

३. हविर्भेदात् कर्मणोऽभ्यासस्तस्मात् तेभ्योऽवदानं स्यात् ।

४. आज्यभागवद्वा निर्देशात्परिसङ्ख्या स्यात् ।

५. तेषां वा द्व्यवदानत्वं विवक्षन्नभिर्निर्दिशेत्पशोः पञ्चावदानत्वात् ।

६. अंसशिरोनूकसक्थिप्रतिषेधश्च; तदन्यपरिसङ्ख्यानेऽनर्थकः स्यात् प्रदानत्वात्तेषां निरवदानप्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।

७. अपि वा परिसंख्या स्यादनवदानीयशब्दत्वात् ।

८. अब्राह्मणे च दर्शनात् ।

९. शृताशृतोपदेशाच्चतेषामुत्सर्गवदयज्ञशेषत्वं सर्वेषां न[1] श्रपणं स्यात् ।

१०. इज्याशेषात्स्विष्टकृदिज्येत प्रकृतिवत् ।

११. त्र्यङ्गैर्वा शरवद्विकारः स्यात् ।

१२. अध्व्यू[2]र्ध्नी होतुस्त्र्यङ्गवदिडादर्विकारः स्यात् ।

१३. शेषे वा समवैति; तस्माद्रथवन्नियमः स्यात् ।

१४. अशास्त्रत्वात्तु नैवं स्यात् ।

१५. अपि वा दानमात्रं स्याद्भक्षशब्दानभिसम्बन्धात् ।

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१. न श्रपणं स्यादिति न्या. मालाकृन्मते नास्ति ।

२. ध्नी त्विति तुशब्दोधिको न्या. मालामते ।

१६. दातुस्त्वविद्यमानत्वादिडाभक्ष-विकारः स्याच्छेषं प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात् ।

१७. अग्नीधश्च वनिष्ठरध्यूध्नीवत् ।

१८. अप्राकृतत्वान्मैत्रावरुणस्याभक्षत्वम् ।

१९. स्याद्वा होत्रध्वर्य्युविकारत्वात्तयोः कर्माभिसम्बन्धात् ।

२०. द्विभागः स्याद् द्विकर्मत्वात् ।

२१. एकत्वाद्वैकभागः स्याद् भागस्याश्रुतिभूतत्वात् ।

२२. प्रतिप्रस्थातुश्च वपाश्रपणात् ।

२३. अभक्षो वा कर्मभेदात्तस्याः सर्वप्रदानत्वात् ।

२४. विकृतौ प्राकृतस्य विधेर्ग्रहणात्पुनः श्रुतिरनर्थकं[1] स्यात् ।

२५. अपि वाऽऽग्नेयवद्द्विशब्दत्वं स्यात् ।

२६. न वा शब्दपृथक्त्वात् ।

२७. अधिकं वाऽर्थवत्त्वात् स्यादर्थवादगुणाभावे वचनादविकारे; तेषु हि तादर्थ्यं स्यादपूर्वत्वात् ।

२८. प्रतिषेधः स्यादिति चेत् ।

२९. नाश्रुतत्वात् ।

३०. अग्रहणादिति चेत् ।

१. नर्थिका स्येति न्या. मालाकृतसम्मतः पाठः । नर्थकः स्येति वृत्तिपुस्तके मूले पाठः । वृत्त्यनुसारेण नर्थकं स्येति पाठः ।

३१. न तुल्यत्वात् ।

३२. तथा तद्ग्रहणे स्यात् ।

३३. अपूर्वतां तु दर्शयेद्ग्रहणस्यार्थवत्त्वात् ।

३४. ततोऽपि यावदुक्तं स्यात् ।

३५. स्विष्टकृति भक्षप्रतिषेधः स्यात् तुल्यकारणत्वात् ।

३६. अप्रतिषेधो वा; दर्शनादिडायां स्यात् ।

३७. प्रतिषेधो वा विधिपूर्वस्य दर्शनात् ।

३८. शंय्विडान्तत्वे विकल्पः स्यात्; परेषु पत्न्यनुयाजप्रतिषेधोऽनर्थकः स्यात् ।

३९. नित्यानुवादो वा कर्मणः स्यादशब्दत्वात् ।

४०. प्रतिषेध[1]वच्चोत्तरस्य परस्तात्प्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।

४१. प्राप्तेर्वा पूर्वस्य वचनादतिक्रमः स्यात् ।

४२. प्रतिषेधस्य त्वरायुक्तत्वात्तस्य च नान्यदेशत्वम् ।

४३. उपसत्सु यावदुक्तमकर्म स्यात् ।

४४. स्रौवेण वाऽगुणत्वाच्छेषप्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।

४५. अप्रतिषेधो वा प्रतिषिध्य प्रतिप्रसव[2]वत् ।

१. षेधार्थवेति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।

२. सवादिति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।

४६. अनिज्या वा शेषस्य मुख्य-देवतानभीज्यत्वात् ।
४७. अवभृथे बर्हिषः प्रतिषेधाच्छेष-कर्म स्यात् ।
४८. आज्यभागयोर्वागुणत्वाच्छेषप्रति-षेधः स्यात् ।
४९. प्रयाजानां त्वेकदेशप्रतिषेधा-दवाक्यशेषत्वं तस्मान्नित्यानुवादः स्यात् ।
५०. आज्यभागयोर्ग्रहणं नित्यानु-वादो वा गृहमेधीयवत्स्यात् ।
५१. विरोधिनामेकश्रुतौ नियमः स्याद्ग्रहणस्यार्थवत्त्वाच्छरवच्च श्रुतितो विशिष्टत्वात् ।
५२. उभयप्रदेशा[1]दिति चेत् ।
५३. शरेष्वपीति चेत् ।
५४. विरोध्यग्रहणात्तथा शरेष्विति चेत् ।
५५. तथे[2]तरस्मिन् ।
५६. श्रुत्यानर्थक्यमिति चेत् ।
५७. ग्रहणस्यार्थवत्त्वादुभयोरप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् ।
५८. सर्वासाञ्च गुणानामर्थवत्त्वाद् ग्रहणप्रवृत्ते स्यात् ।
५९. अधिकं स्यादिति चेत् ।

१. शाम्रेतीति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।
२. तथोत्तरस्मिन्निति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।

६०. नार्थाभावात् ।
६१. तथैकार्थविकारे प्राकृतस्याप्रवृत्तिः प्रवृत्तौ हि विकल्पः स्यात् ।
६२. यावच्छ्रुतीति चेत् ।
६३. न प्रकृतावशब्दत्वात् ।
६४. विकृतौ त्वनियमः स्यात्पृषदा-ज्यवद्ग्रहणस्य गुणार्थत्वादुभयो-श्च प्रदिष्टत्वाद्गुणशास्त्रं यदेति स्यात् ।
६५. ऐकार्थ्याद्वा नियम्येत श्रुतितो विशिष्टत्वात् ।
६६. विरोधित्वाच्च लोकवत् ।
६७. क्रतोश्च तद्गुणत्वात् ।
६८. विरो[1]धिनाञ्च तच्छ्रुतावशब्द-त्वाद्विकल्पः स्यात् ।
६९. पृषदाज्ये समुच्चयाद्ग्रहणस्य गुणार्थत्वम् ।
७०. यद्यपि[2] चतुरवत्तीति तु नियमे नोपपद्यते ।
७१. क्रत्वन्तरे वा तन्न्यायत्वात्कर्म-भेदात् ।
७२. यथाश्रुतीति चेत् ।
७३. न चोदनैकत्वात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने दशमस्याध्यायस्य सप्तमः पादः ।

१. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिकृन्मते नास्ति ।
२. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिकृन्मते नास्ति।

अष्टमः पादः

१. प्रतिषेधः प्रदेशेऽनारभ्य विधाने[1] प्राप्तप्रतिषिद्धत्वाद्विकल्पः स्यात् ।
२. अर्थप्राप्तवदिति चेत् ।
३. न तुल्यहेतुत्वादुभयं शब्दलक्षणम् ।
४. अपि तु वाक्यशेषः स्यादन्याय्यत्वाद्विकल्पस्य; विधीनामेकदेशः स्यात् ।

५. अपूर्वे चार्थवादः स्यात् ।
६. शिष्ट्वा तु प्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।
७. न चेदन्यं प्रकल्पयेत्प्रक्लृप्तावर्थवादः स्यादानर्थक्यात्परसामर्थ्यात्[2] ।
८. पूर्वैश्च तुल्यकालत्वात् ।
९. उपवादश्च तद्वत् ।
१०. प्रतिषेधादकर्मेति चेत् ।
११. न शब्दपूर्वत्वात् ।

१२. दीक्षितस्य दान-होम-पाक-प्रतिषेधेऽविशेषात्सर्व-दान-होम-पाक-प्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।
१३. अक्रतुयुक्तानां वा धर्मः स्यात्; क्रतोः प्रत्यक्षशिष्टत्वात् ।
१४. तस्य वाऽप्यानुमानिकमविशेषात् ।
१५. अपि तु वाक्यशेषत्वादितरपर्युदासः स्यात्; प्रतिषेधे विकल्पः स्यात् ।

१६. अविशेषेण यच्छास्त्रमन्याय्यत्वाद्विकल्पस्य तत्सन्दिग्धमाराद्विशेषशिष्टं स्यात् ।
१७. अप्रकरणे तु यच्छास्त्रं विशेषे श्रूयमाणमविकृतमाज्यभागवत्; प्राकृतप्रतिषेधार्थम् ।
१८. विकारे तु[1] तदर्थं स्यात् ।

१९. वाक्यशेषो वा क्रतुनाऽग्रहणात् स्यादनारभ्य विधानस्य ।
२०. मन्त्रेष्ववाक्यशेषत्वं गुणोपदेशात् स्यात् ।
२१. अनाम्नाते[2] दर्शनात् ।
२२. प्रतिषेधाच्च ।

२३. अग्न्यतिग्राह्यस्य विकृतावुपदेशादप्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ।
२४. मासि ग्रहणं च तद्वत् ।
२५. ग्रहणं वा तुल्यत्वात् ।
२६. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

२७. ग्रहणं समानविधानं स्यात् ।
२८. मासि ग्रहणमभ्यासप्रतिषेधार्थम् ।

२९. उत्पत्तितादर्थ्याच्चतुरवत्तं; प्रधानस्य होमसंयोगादधिकमाज्यमतुल्यत्वाल्लोकवद्रुत्पत्तेर्गुणभूतत्वात् ।

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१. ने च न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।
२. र्थ्याच्चेति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।

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१. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिकृन्मते नास्ति ।
२. ते च देति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।

३०. तत्संस्कारश्रुतेश्च ।

३१. ताभ्यां वा सह स्विष्टकृतः सहत्त्वे[1]; द्विर[2]भिघारणेन तदाप्तिवचनात् ।

३२. तुल्यवच्चाभिधाय सर्वेषुभक्त्यनुक्रमणात्[3] ।

३३. साप्तदश्यवन्नियम्येत ।

३४. हविषो वा गुणभूतत्वात्तथाभूतविवक्षा स्यात् ।

३५. पुरोडाशाभ्यामित्यधिकृतानां पुरोडाशयोरुपदेशस्तच्छ्रुतित्वाद्वैश्यस्तोमवत् ।

३६. न त्वनित्याधिकारोऽस्ति; विधेर्नि-(धौ नि-) त्येन सम्बन्धस्तस्मादवाक्यशेषत्वम् ।

३७. सति च[4] नैकदेशेन कर्तुः प्रधानभूतत्वात् ।

३८. कृत्स्नत्वात्तु तथा स्तोमे ।

३९. कर्त्तुः स्यादिति चेत् ।

४०. न गुणार्थत्वात्प्राप्ते न[5] चोपदेशार्थः ।

४१. कर्मणोस्तु प्रकरणे; तन्न्यायत्वाद् गुणानां लिङ्गेन कालशास्त्रं स्यात् ।

४२. यदि तु सान्नाय्यं सोमयाजिनो न ताभ्यां समवायोऽस्ति विभक्तकालत्वात् ।

४३. अपि वा विहितत्वाद्गुणार्थायां पुनः श्रुतौ सन्देहे श्रुतिर्द्विदेवतार्था स्याद्यथाऽनभिप्रेतस्तथाऽऽग्नेयो दर्शनादेकदेवते ।

४४. विधिं तु बादरायणः ।

४५. प्रतिषिद्धविज्ञानाद्वा ।

४६. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

४७. उपांशुयाजमन्तरा यजतीति हविर्लिङ्गाश्रुतित्वाद्यथाकामी प्रतीयेत ।

४८. ध्रौवाद्वा सर्वसंयोगात् ।

४९. तद्वच्च देवतायां स्यात् ।

५०. तान्त्रीणां प्रकरणात् ।

५१. धर्माद्वा स्यात्प्रजापतिः ।

५२. देवतायास्त्वनिर्वचनं; तत्र शब्दस्येह मृदुत्वं; तस्मादिहाधिकारेण ।

५३. विष्णुर्वा स्याद्धौत्राम्नानादमावास्याहविश्च स्याद्धौत्रस्य तत्र दर्शनात् ।

५४. अपि वा पौर्णमास्यां स्यात् प्रधानशब्दसंयोगाद्; गुणत्वान्मन्त्रो यथाप्रधानं स्यात् ।

५५. आनन्तर्यं च सान्नाय्यस्य पुरोडाशेन दर्शयत्यमावास्याविकारे ।

५६. अग्नीषोमविधानात्तु पौर्णमास्यामुभयत्र विधीयते ।

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१. सकृत्त्वे इति न्या. मा. सम्मतः पाठः ।
२. रवघेति तुशब्दोधिको न्या. मा. सम्मतः ।
३. क्रमादिति वृत्तिकृत्सम्मतः पाठः ।
४. ति न चैकेति वृत्तिकृत्सम्मतः पाठः ।
५. प्ते च नोपेति न्या. मा. पाठः ।

५७. प्रतिषिद्धच विधानाद्वा विष्णुः समानदेशः स्यात् ।
५८. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

५९. न चानङ्गं सकृच्छ्रुतावुभयत्र विधीयेतासम्बन्धात् ।
६०. गुणानां[1] च परार्थत्वात्प्रवृत्तौ विधिलिङ्गानि दर्शयति ।
६१. विकारे चाश्रुतित्वात् ।
६२. द्विपुरोडाशायां स्यादन्तरा (त्वगु-णा) र्थत्वात् ।
६३. अजामिकरणार्थत्वाच्च ।
६४. तदर्थमिति चेन्न तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।
६५. अशिष्टेन च सम्बन्धात् ।
६६. उत्पत्तेस्तु निवेशः स्याद्गुणस्यानुपरोधेनार्थस्य विद्यमानत्वाद्विधानादन्तरार्थस्य; नैमित्तिकत्वात् तदभावेऽश्रुतौ स्यात् ।
६७. उभयोस्तु विधानात् ।
६८. गुणानाञ्च परार्थत्वादुपवेषवद् यदेति स्यात् ।
६९. अनपायश्च कालस्य लक्षणं हि पुरोडाशौ ।
७०. प्रशंसार्थमजामित्वम् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने दशमस्याध्यायस्य अष्टमः पादः ।

॥ दशमोऽध्यायः समाप्तः ॥

१. न्यायमालाकृन्मते सूत्रञ्चैतदधिकम् ।

एकादशोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. प्रयोजनाभिसम्बन्धात्पृथक् सतां ततः स्यादैककर्म्यमेकशब्दाभिसंयोगात् ।
२. शेषवद्वा प्रयोजनं प्रतिकर्म विभज्येत ।
३. अविधानात्तु नैवं स्यात् ।
४. शेषस्य हि परार्थत्वाद्विधानात्प्रतिप्रधानभावः स्यात् ।

५. अङ्गानान्तु शब्दभेदात्क्रतुवत्स्यात् फलान्यत्वम् ।
६. अर्थभेदस्तु तत्रार्थेह्यैकार्थ्यादैककर्म्यम् ।
७. शब्दभेदान्नेति चेत् ।
८. कर्मार्थत्वात्प्रयोगे ताच्छब्द्यं स्यात्तदर्थत्वात् ।

९. कर्तृविधेर्नानार्थत्वाद्गुणप्रधानेषु ।
१०. आरम्भस्य शब्दपूर्वत्वात् ।

११. एकेनापि समाप्येत कृतार्थत्वाद्; यथा क्रत्वन्तरेषु प्राप्तेषु चोत्तरावत्स्यात् ।
१२. फलाभावादिति चेत् ।
१३. न कर्मसंयोगात्प्रयोजनमशब्ददोषं स्यात् ।
१४. ऐकशब्द्यादिति चेत् ।

१५. नार्थपृथक्त्वात्समत्वादगुणत्वम् ।

१६. विधेस्त्वेकश्रुतित्वादपर्यायविधानान्नित्यवच्छ्रुतभूताभिसंयोगादर्थेन युगपत्प्राप्तेर्यथाक्रमं स्वशब्दो[1] निवीतवत्तस्मात्सर्वप्रयोगे प्रवृतिः स्यात्।

१७. तथा कर्मोपदेशः स्यात् ।

१८. क्रत्वन्तरेषु पुनर्वचनम् ।

१९. उत्तरास्वश्रुतित्वाद्विशेषाणां कृतार्थत्वात्स्वदोहे यथाकामी प्रतीयेत ।

२०. कर्मण्यारम्भभाव्यत्वात्कृषिवत् प्रत्यारम्भं फलानि स्युः ।

२१. अधिकारश्च सर्वेषां कार्यत्वादुपपद्यते विशेषः ।

२२. सकृत्तु स्यात्कृतार्थत्वादङगवत् ।

२३. शब्दार्थश्च तथा लोके ।

२४. अपि वा संप्रयोगे यथा कामी प्रतीयेताश्रुतित्वाद्विधिषु वचनानि स्युः ।

२५. ऐकशब्द्यात्तथाङगेषु ।

२६. लोके कर्मार्ऽर्थलक्षणम् ।

२७. क्रियाणामर्थशेषत्वात्प्रत्यक्षम (त्यक्षोऽ) तस्तन्निर्वृत्त्याऽपवर्गः स्यात् ।

२८. धर्ममात्रे त्वदर्शनाच्छब्दाथनापवर्गः स्यात् ।

१. स्वशब्द इति वृत्तिकृन्मते न पठचते ।

२९. क्रतुवद्वानुमानेनाभ्यासे फलभूमा स्यात् ।

३०. सकृद्वा कारणै[1]कत्वात् ।

३१. परिमाणं चानियमेन स्यात् ।

३२. फलारम्भनिवृत्तेः क्रतुषु स्यात् फलान्यत्वम् ।

३३. अर्थवांस्तु नैकत्वादभ्यासः स्यादनर्थको यथा भोजनमेकस्मिन्नर्थस्यापरिमाणत्वात्प्रधाने च क्रियार्थत्वादनियमः स्यात् ।

३४. पृथक्त्वाद्विधितः परिमाणं स्यात् ।

३५. अनभ्यासो वा प्रयोगवचनैकत्वात्सर्वस्य युगपच्छास्त्रादफलत्वाच्च कर्मणः स्यात्क्रियार्थत्वात् ।

३६. अभ्यासो वा छेदनसम्मार्गाऽवदानेषु वचनात्सकृत्त्वस्य ।

३७. अनभ्यासस्तु वाच्यत्वात् ।

३८. बहुवचनेन सर्वप्राप्तेर्विकल्पः स्यात् ।

३९. दृष्टः प्रयोग इति चेत् ।

४०. तथेह ।

४१. भक्त्येति चेत् ।

४२. तथेतरस्मिन् ।

४३. प्रथमं वा नियम्येत; कारणादतिक्रमः स्यात् ।

४४. श्रुत्यर्थाविशेषात् ।

४५. तथाचान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

१. द्वा कारेति न्या. मा. पाठः ।

४६. प्रकृत्या च पूर्ववत्तदासत्तेः ।

४७. उत्तरासु न यावत्स्वमपूर्वत्वात् ।

४८. यावत्स्वं वाऽन्यविधानेनानुवादः स्यात् ।

४९. साकल्यविधानात् ।

५०. बह्वर्थत्वाच्च ।

५१. अग्निहोत्रे चाशेषवद्यवागूनियमः ।

५१अ. इति[1] व्याख्यातम् ।

५२. तथा पयः प्रतिषेधः कुमाराणाम् ।

५३. सर्वप्रापिणापि लिङ्गेन संयुज्य देवताभिसंयोगात् ।

५४. प्रधानकर्मार्थत्वादङ्गानां तद्भेदात् कर्मभेदः प्रयोगे स्यात् ।

५५. क्रमकोपश्च यौगपद्ये स्यात् ।

५६. तुल्यानां तु यौगपद्यमेकशब्दोपदेशात् स्याद्विशेषाग्रहणात् ।

५७. ऐकार्थ्यादव्यवायः स्यात् ।

५८. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनं कामुकायनः ।

५९. तन्न्यायत्वादशक्तेरानुपूर्व्यं स्यात् संस्कारस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।

६०. असंस्पृष्टोऽपि तादर्थ्यात् ।

६१. विभवाद्वा प्रदीपवत् ।

६२. अर्थात्तु लोके विधिः प्रतिप्रधानं स्यात् ।

६३. सकृदिज्यां कामुकायनः, परिमाणविरोधात् ।

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१. वृत्तिकृन्मते इदं सूत्रमधिकम् ।

६४. विधेस्त्वितरार्थत्वात् सकृदिज्याश्रुतिव्यतिक्रमः स्यात् ।

६५. विधिवत्प्रकरणाविभागे प्रयोगं बादरायणः ।

६५अ. अपि[1] चैकेन सन्निधानमविशेषको हेतुः ।

६६. क्वचिद्विधानान्नेति चेत् ।

६७. न विधेश्चोदितत्वात् ।

६८. व्याख्यातं तुल्यानां यौगपद्यमगृह्यमाणविशेषाणाम् ।

६९. भेदस्तु कालभेदाच्चोदनाव्यवायात् स्याद्विशिष्टानां विधिः प्रधानकालत्वात् ।

७०. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

७१. विधिरिति चेन्न वर्तमानापदेशात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने एकादशस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

द्वितीयः पादः

१. एकदेशकालकर्तृत्वं मुख्यानामेकशब्दोपदेशात् ।

२. अविधिश्चेत्कर्मणामभिसम्बन्धः प्रतीयेत तल्ल[2]क्षणार्थाभिसंयोगाद् विधित्वाच्चेतरेषां प्रतिप्रधानं भावः स्यात् ।

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१. वृत्ति. न्या. पुस्तकयोर्नास्ति ।

२. येत लक्षेति वृत्ति. पाठः ।

३. अङ्गेषु च तदभावः प्रधानं प्रति निर्देशात् ।
४. यदि तु कर्मणो विधिसम्बन्धः स्यादैकशब्द्यात्प्रधानार्थाभिसंयोगात् ।
५. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
६. श्रुतिश्चैषां प्रधानवत्कर्मश्रुतेः परार्थत्वात्कर्मणोऽश्रुति[1]त्वाच्च ।
७. अङ्गानि तु विधानत्वात्प्रधानेनोपदिश्येरंस्तस्मात्स्यादेकदेशत्वम् ।
८. द्रव्यदेवतं तथेति चेत् ।
९. न चोदनाविधिशेषत्वान्नियमार्थो विशेषः ।
१०. तेषु समवेतानां समवायात्तन्त्रमङ्गानि भेदस्तु; तद्भेदात्कर्मभेदः प्रयोगे स्यात्तेषां प्रधानशब्दत्वात्तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
११. इष्टिराजसूयचातुर्मास्येष्वैककर्म्यात् अङ्गानां तन्त्रभावः स्यात् ।
१२. कालभेदान्नेति चेत् ।
१३. नैकदेशत्वात्पशुवत् ।
१४. अपि वा कर्मपृथक्त्वात्तेषां तन्त्रविधानात्साङ्गानामुपदेशः स्यात् ।
१५. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
१६. तथा तदवयवेषु[2] स्यात् ।

१. श्रुतत्वेति न्या. मा. पाठः ।
२. तथा तदवयवेत्यस्य स्थाने वृत्तिकृ. तदावयेति पाठः ।

१७. पशौ तु चोदनैकत्वात्तन्त्रस्य विप्रकर्षः स्यात्[1] ।
१८. तथा स्यादध्वरकल्पेष्टौ[2] विशेषस्यैककालत्वात् ।
१९. इष्टिरिति चैकवच्छ्रुतिः ।
२०. अपि[3] वा कर्मपृथक्त्वात्तेषां च तन्त्रविधानात्साङ्गानामुपदेशः स्यात् ।
२१. प्रथमस्य वा कालवचनम् ।
२२. फलैकत्वादिष्टिशब्दो यथान्यत्र ।
२३. वसाहोमस्तन्त्रमेकदेवतेषु स्यात् प्रदान[4]स्यैककालत्वात् ।
२४. काल[5]भेदात्त्वावृत्तिर्देवता भेदे ।
२५. अन्ते यूपाहुतिस्तद्वत् ।
२६. इतरप्रतिषेधो वा; अनुवादमात्रमन्तिकस्य ।
२७. अशास्त्रत्वाच्च देशानाम् ।
२८. अवभृथे प्रधानेऽग्निविकारः स्यान्न हि तद्धेतुरग्निसंयोगः ।
२९. द्रव्यदेवतावत् ।
३०. साङ्गो वा प्रयोगवचनैकत्वात् ।
३१. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।

१. वृत्तौ स्यादिति नास्ति ।
२. कल्पेष्टावित्यस्य स्थाने कल्पायामिति पाठो वृत्तौ ।
३. न वा कर्मपृथक्त्वात्तेषां चाङ्गेति वृत्तिपाठः ।
४. प्रधानेति वृ. पाठः ।
५. भेदे त्वावृत्तिरिति वृत्तिग्रन्थे पाठान्तरम् ।

३२. शब्दविभागाच्च देवतानपनयः।
३३. दक्षिणेऽग्नौ वरुणप्रघासेषु देशभेदात्सर्वं विक्रियते।
३४. अचोदनेति चेत्।
३५. स्यात्पौर्णमासीवत्।
३६. प्रयोगचोदनेति चेत्।
३७. त (अ) थेह।

३८. आसादनमिति चेत्।
३९. नोत्तरेणैकवाक्यत्वात्।
४०. अवाच्यत्वात्।

४१. आम्नायवचनं तद्वत्।
४२. कर्तृभेदस्तथेति चेत्।
४३. न समवायात्।
४४. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च।

४५. वेदिसंयोगादिति चेत्।
४६. न देशमात्रत्वात्।
४७. एकाग्नित्वादपरेषु तन्त्रैः स्यात्।
४८. नाना वा कर्तृभेदात्।

४९. पर्यग्नि कृतानामुत्सर्गे प्राजापत्यानां कर्मोत्सर्गः; श्रुतिसामान्यादारण्यवत्तस्माद्ब्रह्मसाम्नि चोदनापृथक्त्वं स्यात्।
५०. संस्कारप्रतिषेधो वा वाक्यैकत्वे क्रतुसामान्यात्।
५१. वपानां[1] चानभिघारणस्य दर्शनात्।

१. पायां चेति वृत्तौ पाठः।

५२. पञ्चशारदीयास्तथेति चेत्।
५३. न चोदनैकवाक्यत्वात्।
५४. संस्काराणां च दर्शनात्।

५५. दशपेये क्रयप्रतिकर्षात्प्रतिकर्षस्ततः प्राञ्चां; तत्समानं तन्त्रं स्यात्।
५६. समानवचनं तद्वत्।
५७. अप्रतिकर्षो वाऽर्थहेतुत्वात्सहत्वं विधीयते।
५८. पूर्वस्मिंश्चावभृथस्य दर्शनात्।

५९. दीक्षाणां चोत्तरस्य।
६०. समानः कालसामान्यात्।
६१. निष्कासस्यावभृथे तदेकदेशत्वात् पशुवत्प्रदान विप्रकर्षः स्यात्।
६२. अपनयो वा प्रसिद्धेनाभिसंयोगात्।
६३. प्रतिपत्तिरिति चेन्न कर्मसंयोगात्।
६४. उदयनीये[1] च तद्वत्।
६५. प्रतिपत्तिर्वाऽकर्मसंयोगात्।
६६. अर्थकर्म वा शेषत्वाच्छ्र[2]पणवत्तदर्थेन विधानात्।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने एकादशस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः।

१. प्रायणीये इति वृत्तौ पाठः।
२. च्छ्रयणेति न्या. मा. पाठः।

तृतीयः पादः

१. अङ्गानां मुख्यकालत्वाद्वचनादन्यकालत्वम् ।

२. द्रव्यस्या¹कर्मकालनिष्पत्तेः प्रयोगः सर्वार्थः स्यात्स्वकालत्वात् ।
३. यूपश्चाकर्मकालत्वात् ।
४. एक²यूपं च दर्शयति ।

५. संस्कारास्त्वावर्तेरन्नर्थकालत्वात् ।
६. तत्कालास्तु; यूपकर्मत्वात्तस्य धर्मविधानात्सर्वार्थानां च वचनादन्यकालत्वम् ।
७. सकृन्मानं च दर्शयति ।

८. स्वरुस्तन्त्रापवर्गः स्यादस्वकालत्वात् ।
९. साधारणो वाऽनुनिष्पत्तिस्तस्य साधारणत्वात् ।
१०. सोमान्ते च प्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात् ।

११. तत्कालो वा प्रस्तरवत् ।
१२. न वोत्पत्ति वाक्यत्वात्प्रदेशात् प्रस्तरे तथा ।

१३. अहर्गणे विषाणाप्रासनं धर्मविप्रतिषेधादन्त्ये प्रथमे वाहनि विकल्पः स्यात् ।

१. व्यस्य चाकेति नय. मा. पाठः ।
२. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिकृन्मते नास्ति ।

१४. पाणेस्त्वश्रुतिभूतत्वाद्विषाणानियमः स्यात्प्रातः सवनमध्यत्वाच्छिष्टे चाभिप्रवृत्तत्वात् ।

१५. वाग्विसर्गो हविष्कृता बीजभेदे तथा स्यात् ।

१६. पशौ च पुरोडाशे समानतन्त्रं भवेत् ।

१७. अग्नियोगः सोमकाले तदर्थत्वात् संस्कृतकर्मणः परेषु साङ्गस्य; तस्मात्सर्वापवर्गे विमोकः स्यात् ।
१८. प्रधानापवर्गे वा तदर्थत्वात् ।
१९. अवभृथे च तद्वत्प्रधानार्थस्य प्रतिषेधोऽपवृक्तार्थत्वात् ।

२०. अहर्गणे च प्रत्यहं स्यात्तदर्थत्वात् ।

२१. सुब्रह्मण्या तु तन्त्रं दीक्षावदन्यकालत्वात् ।
२२. तत्कालात्त्वावर्तेत प्रयोगतो विशेष¹सम्बन्धात् ।

२३. अप्रयोगाङ्गमिति चेत् ।
२४. स्यात्प्रयोगनिर्देशात्कर्तृभेदवत् ।

२५. तद्भूतस्थानादग्निवदिति चेत्त²दपवर्गस्तदर्थत्वात् ।
२६. अग्निवदिति चेत् ।

१. षसंयोगादिति वृत्तिकृन्मते पाठः ।
२. चेदयेति वृत्तिकृन्मते पाठः ।

२७. न प्रयोगसाधारण्यात् ।
२८. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
२९. तद्धि तथेति चेत् ।
३०. नाशिष्टत्वादितरन्यायत्वाच्च[१] ।
३१. विध्येकत्वादिति चेत् ।
३२. न कृत्स्नस्य पुनः प्रयोगात् प्रधानवत् ।
३३. लौकिकेषु यथाकामी संस्का[२]रानर्थलोपात् ।
३४. यज्ञायुधानि धार्येरन्प्रतिपत्तिविधानादृजीषवत् ।
३५. यजमानसंस्कारो वा तदर्थः श्रूयते तत्र यथाकामी तदर्थत्वात् ।
३६. मुख्यस्य[३] धारणं वा मरणस्यानियतत्वात् ।
३७. यो वा यजनीयेऽहनि म्रियेत[४] सोऽधिकृतः स्यादुपवेषवत् ।
३८. न शास्त्रलक्षणत्वात् ।
३९. उत्पत्तिर्वा प्रयोजकत्वादाशिरवत् ।
४०. शब्दासामञ्जस्यमिति चेत् ।
४१. तथाऽऽशिरे ।
४२. शास्त्रात्तु विप्रयोगस्तत्रैकद्रव्यचिकीर्षा[५] प्रकृतावथेहापूर्वार्थवद्भूतोपदेशः ।

१. चशब्दो वृत्तिकृन्मते नास्ति ।
२. रार्थालोपादिति वृत्तिकृन्मते पाठः ।
३. ख्यसाधेति न्या. मा. पाठः ।
४. म्रियते इति पाठभेदः ।
५. कीर्षया कृतेति वृत्ति. पाठः ।

४३. प्रकृत्यर्थत्वात्पौर्णमास्याः क्रियेरन् ।
४४. अग्न्याधेये वाऽविप्रतिषेधात्तानि धारयेन्मरणस्यानिमित्तत्वात् ।
४५. प्रतिपत्तिर्वा[१] यथाऽन्येषाम् ।
४६. उपरिष्टात्सोमानां प्राजापत्यैश्चरन्तीति सर्वेषामविशेषादवाच्यो हि प्रकृतिकालः ।
४७. अङ्गविपर्यासो विना वचनादिति चेत् ।
४८. उत्कर्षः संयोगात्कालमात्रमितरत्र ।
४९. प्रकृतिकालासत्तेः शस्त्रवतामिति चेत् ।
५०. न श्रुतिप्रतिषेधात् ।
५१. विकारस्थान इति चेत् ।
५२. न चोदनापृथक्त्वात् ।
५३. उत्कर्षे सूक्तवाकस्य न सोमदेवतानामुत्कर्षः पश्वनङ्गत्वाद्यथा निष्कर्षेऽनन्वयः ।
५४. वाक्यसंयोगाद्वोत्कर्षः समानतन्त्रत्वादर्थलोपादनन्वयः ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने एकादशस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः ।

१. वर्प्यन्ते इति वृत्तिपाठः ।

चतुर्थः पादः

१. चोदनैकत्वाद्राजसूयेऽनुक्तदेशकालानां समवायात्तन्त्रमङ्गानि ।
२. प्रतिदक्षिणं वा कर्तृसम्बन्धादिष्टिवदङ्गभूतत्वात्समुदायो हि; तन्निर्वृत्त्या तदेकत्वादेकशब्दोपदेशः स्यात् ।
३. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
४. अनियमः स्यादिति चेत् ।
५. नोपदिष्टत्वात् ।
६. लाघवा[1]तिपत्तिश्च ।
७. प्रयोजनैकत्वात् ।
८. विशेषार्था पुनः श्रुतिः ।
९. अवेष्टौ चैकतन्त्र्यं स्याल्लिङ्गदर्शनात् ।
१०. वचनात्कामसंयोगेन ।
११. क्रत्वार्थायामिति चेन्न वर्णसंयोगात् ।
१२. पवमानहविःष्वैकतन्त्र्यं प्रयोगवचनैकत्वात् ।
१३. लिगङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
१४. वचनात्तु तन्त्रभेदः स्यात् ।
१५. सहत्वे नित्यानुवादः स्यात् ।
१६. द्वादशाहे तत्प्रकृतित्वादेकैकमहरपवृज्येत कर्मपृथक्त्वात् ।

१. वापत्तीति वृत्तिकृन्मते पाठः ।

१७. अह्नां वा श्रुतिभूतत्वात्तत्र साङ्गं क्रियेत यथा माध्यन्दिने ।
१८. अपि वा फलकर्तृसम्बन्धात् सह प्रयोगः स्यादाग्नेयाग्नीषोमीयवत् ।
१९. साङ्गकालश्रुतित्वाद्वा स्वस्थानां विकारः स्यात् ।
२०. तदपेक्षं च द्वादशत्वम् ।
२१. दीक्षोपसदां च सङ्ख्या पृथक् पृथक् प्रत्यक्षसंयोगात् ।
२२. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
२३. चोदनापृथक्त्वे त्वैकतन्त्र्यं समवेतानां कालसंयोगात् ।
२४. भेदस्तु; तद्भेदात्कर्मभेदः; प्रयोगे स्यात्तेषां प्रधानशब्दत्वात् ।
२५. तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।
२६. श्वःसुत्यावचनं[1] तद्वत् ।
२७. पश्वतिरेकश्च ।
२८. सुत्याविवृद्धौ सुब्रह्मण्यायां सर्वेषामुपलक्षणं प्रकृत्यन्वयादावाहनवत् ।
२९. अपि वेन्द्राभिधानत्वात्सकृत्स्यादुपलक्षणं कालस्य लक्षणार्थत्वाद् विभागाच्च ।
३०. पशुगणे कुम्भीशूलवपाश्रपणीनां प्रभुत्वात्तन्त्रभावः स्यात् ।

१. नं च तेति वृत्ति. पाठः ।

३१. भेदस्तु सन्देहाद्देवतान्तरे स्यात् ।
३२. अर्थाद्वा लिङ्गकर्म स्यात् ।
३३. अयाज्यत्वाद्वसानां भेदः स्यात्स्वयाज्याप्रदानत्वात् ।
३४. अपि वा प्रतिपत्तित्वात्तन्त्रं स्यात् स्वत्वस्याश्रुतिभूतत्वात् ।
३५. सकृदिति चेत् ।
३६. न कालभेदात् ।
३७. जात्यन्तरे[1]षु भेदः पक्तिवैषम्यात् ।
३८. वृद्धिदर्शनाच्च ।
३९. कपालानि च कुम्भीवत्तुल्यसङ्ख्यानाम् ।
४०. प्रतिप्रधानं वा प्रकृतिवत् ।
४१. सर्वेषां चाभिप्रथनं स्यात् ।
४२. एकद्रव्ये संस्काराणां व्याख्यातमेककर्मत्वम् ।
४२अ. तस्मिन्मन्त्रार्थनानात्वादावृत्तौ; मन्त्रस्यासकृत्प्रयोगः स्यात् ।
४३. द्रव्यान्तरे कृतार्थत्वात्तस्य पुनः प्रयोगान्मन्त्रस्य[2] च तद्गुणत्वात् पुनः प्रयोगः स्यात्तदर्थेन विधानात् ।
४४. निर्वपणलवन[3]स्तरणाज्यग्रहणेषु च एकद्रव्यवत्प्रयोजनैकत्वात् ।

१. न्तरभेद इति वृत्तिपाठः ।
२. स्य तेति वृत्तिपाठः ।
३. वनास्तेति वृत्तिपाठः ।

४५. द्रव्यान्तरवद्वा स्यात्तत्संस्कारात् ।
४६. वेदिप्रोक्षणे मन्त्राभ्यासः कर्मणः पुनः प्रयोगात् ।
४७. एकस्य वा गुणविधिर्द्रव्यैकत्वात्; तस्मात्सकृत्प्रयोगः स्यात् ।
४८. कण्डूयने प्रत्यङ्गं कर्मभेदा[1]त् स्यात् ।
४९. अपि वा चोदनैककालमेककर्म्यं स्यात् ।
५०. स्वप्ननदीतरणाभिवर्षणामेध्यप्रतिमन्त्रणेषु चैवम् ।
५१. प्रयाणे त्वार्थनिर्वृत्तेः ।
५२. उपरवमन्त्रस्तन्त्रं स्याल्लोकवत् बहु[2]वचनात् ।
५३. न सन्निपातित्वादसन्निपातिकर्मणां; विशेषग्रहणे कालैकत्वात्सकृत् वचनम् ।
५४. हविष्कृदध्रिगुपुरोऽनुवाक्यामनोतस्यावृत्तिः कालभेदा[3]त्स्यात् ।
५५. अध्रिगोश्च विपर्यासात् ।
५६. करिष्यद्वचनात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने एकादशस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

॥ समाप्तः एकादशोऽध्यायः ॥

१. भेदः यथेति वृत्तिपाठः ।
२. वच्च वाणीति वृत्तिपाठः ।
३. वृत्तिकृन्मते स्यादिति नास्ति ।

द्वादशोऽध्यायः

प्रथमः पादः

१. तन्त्रिसमवाये चोदनातः समानामेकतन्त्रत्वम्[1] तुल्ययेषु तु भेदः[2] स्यात् विधिप्रक्रमतादर्थ्यात्तादर्थ्यं श्रुतिकालनिर्देशात् ।
२. गुणकालविकाराच्च तन्त्रभेदः स्यात् ।
३. तन्त्रमध्ये विधानाद्वा मुख्यतन्त्रेण सिद्धिः[3] स्यात्तन्त्रार्थस्याविशिष्टत्वात् ।
४. विकाराच्च न भेदः स्यादर्थस्याविकृतत्वात् ।
५. एकेषां चाशक्यत्वात् ।
६. एकाग्निवच्च दर्शनम् ।
७. जैमिनेः परतन्त्र[4]त्वापत्तेः स्वतन्त्रप्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।
८. नानार्थत्वात्सोमे दर्शपूर्णमासप्रकृतीनां वेदिकर्म स्यात् ।
९. अकर्म वा कृतदूषा स्यात् ।
१०. पात्रेषु च प्रसंगः स्याद्धोमार्थत्वात् ।

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१. न्त्रमत्विति वृत्तिपाठः ।
२. भेदो विधिक्रमेति वृत्तिपाठः ।
३. सिद्धः स्येति वृत्तिपाठः ।
४. तन्त्रापेति वृत्तिपाठः ।

११. न्याय्यानि वा प्रयुक्तत्वादप्रयुक्ते प्रसङ्गः स्यात् ।
१२. शामित्रे च पशुपुरोडाशो न स्यादितरस्य प्रयुक्तत्वात् ।
१३. श्रपणं चाऽग्निहोत्रस्य शालामुखीये न स्यात्प्राजहितस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।
१४. हविर्धाने निर्वपणार्थं साधयेतां प्रयुक्तत्वात् ।
१५. अप्रसिद्धिर्वाऽन्यदेशत्वात् प्रधानवैगुण्यादवैगुण्ये प्रसङ्गः स्यात् ।
१६. अनसां च दर्शनात् ।
१७. तद्युक्तं च कालभेदात् ।
१८. मन्त्राश्च सन्निपातित्वात् ।
१९. धारणार्थत्वात्सोमेऽग्न्यन्वाधानं न विद्यते ।
२०. तथा व्रत[1]मुपेतत्वात् ।
२१. विप्रतिषेधाच्च ।
२२. सत्यवदिति चेत् ।
२३. न संयोगपृथक्त्वात् ।
२४. ग्रहा[2]र्थं च पूर्वमिष्टेस्तदर्थत्वात् ।
२५. शेषवदिति चेत् ।
२६. न वैश्वदेवो हि ।
२७. स्याद्[3]व्यपदेशात् ।
२८. न गुणार्थत्वात् ।

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१. मुपेवत्वेति वृत्तिपाठः ।
२. ग्रहणार्थमिति न्या. मा. पाठान्तरम् ।
३. स्याद्वा व्यपेति पाठो वृत्तिकृन्मते ।

२९. सन्नहनञ्च[1] वृत्तत्वात्।

३०. अन्यविधानादारण्यभोजनं न स्यादुभयं हि वृत्त्यर्थम्।

३१. शेषभक्षास्तथेति चेन्नान्यार्थत्वात्।

३२. भृतत्वाच्च परिक्रयः।

३३. शेषभक्षास्तथेति चेत्।

३४. न कर्मसंयोगात्।

३५. प्रवृत्तवरणात्प्रतितन्त्रं वरणं होतुः क्रियेत[2]।

३६. ब्रह्मापीति चेत्।

३७. न प्राङ्नियमात्तदर्थं हि।

३८. निर्दिष्टस्येति चेत्।

३९. नाश्रुतत्वात्।

४०. होतुस्तथेति चेत्।

४१. न कर्मसंयोगात्।

४२. यज्ञोत्पत्त्युप[3]देशे निष्ठितकर्मप्रयोगभेदात्प्रतितन्त्रं क्रियेत[4]।

४३. न वा कृतत्वात्तदुपदेशो हि।

४४. देशपृथक्त्वान्मन्त्रो[5]ऽभ्यावर्तते।

४५. सन्नहनहरणे तथेति चेत्।

४६. नान्यार्थत्वात्।

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१. चशब्दरहितः पाठो वृत्तिक्रमन्ते।

२. क्रियते इति वृत्ति पाठः।

३. शेऽनुष्ठीति वृत्ति पाठः।

४. क्रियते इति वृत्ति पाठः।

५. न्त्रो व्यावेति वृत्ति पाठः।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने द्वादशस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः।

द्वितीयः पादः

१. विहारो लौकिकानामर्थं साधयेत् प्रभुत्वात्।

२. मांसपाकप्रतिषेधश्च तद्वत्।

३. निर्देशाद्वा वैदिकानां स्यात्।

४. सति चोपासनस्य दर्शनात्।

५. अभावदर्शनाच्च।

६. मांसपाको विहित प्रतिषेधः स्याद् वाहु[1]तिसंयोगात्।

७. वाक्यशेषो वा दक्षिणा[2]स्मिन्ना-रभ्य विधानस्य।

८. सवनीये छिद्रापिधानार्थत्वात् पशुपुरोडाशो; न स्यादन्येषामेवमर्थत्वात्।

९. क्रिया वा देवतार्थत्वात्।

१०. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च।

११. हविष्कृत्सवनीयेषु न स्यात्; प्रकृतौ यदि सर्वार्था पशुं प्रत्याहृता सा कुर्याद्विद्यमानत्वात्।

१२. पशौ तु संस्कृते[3] विधानात्तार्तीयसवन- (नि-) केषु स्यात्सौम्याश्विनयोश्चापवृक्तार्थत्वात्।

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१. स्यादाह्विति वृत्तिपाठः।

२. दक्षिणेऽस्मिन्नारेति न्या. मा. पाठः।

३. संशृते इति न्या. मा. पाठः।

१३. योगाद्वा यज्ञाय तद्विमोके विसर्गः स्यात् ।

१४. निशि यज्ञे प्राकृतस्याप्रवृत्तिः स्यात्प्रत्यक्षशिष्टत्वात् ।

१५. कालवाक्यभेदाच्च तन्त्रभेदः स्यात् ।

१६. वेद्युद्धननव्रतं विप्रतिषेधात्तदेव स्यात् ।

१७. तन्त्रमध्ये विधानाद्वा तत्तन्त्रा सवनीयवत् ।

१८. वैगुण्यादिध्मार्बाहर्न साधयेदग्न्याधानं च यदि देवतार्थम् ।

१९. आरम्भणीया विकृतौ न स्यात् प्रकृतिकालमध्यत्वात्कृता; पुनस्तदर्थेन ।

१९अ. सकृ[1]द्वाऽऽरम्भासंयोगात् ।

२०. स्याद्वा कालस्याशेषभूतत्वात् ।

२१. प्रारम्भविभागाच्च ।

२२. विप्रतिषिद्धधर्माणां समवाये भूयसां स्यात्सधर्मत्वम् ।

२३. मुख्यं वा पूर्वचोदनाल्लोकवत् ।

२४. तथा[2] चान्यार्थदर्शनम् ।

२५. अङ्गगुणविरोधे च तादर्थ्यात् ।

२६. परिधिर्द्व्यर्थत्वादुभयधर्मा स्यात् ।

२७. यौप्यस्तु विरोधे स्यान्मुख्यानन्तर्यात् ।

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१. इदं सूत्रं भाष्ये न्यायमालायां च नास्ति; वृत्तिकृन्मतेऽस्ति ।

२. इदं सूत्रं वृत्तिकारमत एव नास्ति ।

२८. इतरो वा तस्य तत्र विधानात् ।

२९. उभयोश्चाङ्गसंयोगः ।

३०. पशुसवनीयेषु विकल्पः स्याद्वै कृतश्चेदुभयोरश्रुतिभतत्वात् ।

३१. पाशुकं वा तस्य वैशेषिकाम्नानात्तदनर्थकं विकल्पे स्यात् ।

३२. पशोश्च विप्रकर्षस्तन्त्रमध्ये विधानात् ।

३३. अपूर्वं च प्रकृतौ समानतन्त्रा[1] चेदनित्यत्वादनर्थकं हि स्यात् ।

३४. अधिकश्च गुणः साधारणेऽविरोधात्कांस्यभोजिवदमुख्येऽपि ।

३५. तत्प्रवृत्त्या तु तन्त्रस्य नियमः स्याद्यथा पाशुकं सूक्तवाकेन ।

३६. न वाऽविरोधात् ।

३७. अशास्त्रलक्षणाच्च ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने द्वादशस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।

तृतीयः पादः

१. विश्वजिति वत्सत्वङ्नामधेयादितरथा तन्त्रभूयस्त्वादहतं स्यात् ।

२. अविरोधो वा[2] उपरिवासो हि[3] वत्सत्वक् ।

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१. तन्त्र चेदेति वृत्तिपाठः ।

२. धो वोपरिवासो वेति वृत्तिपाठः ।

३. वृत्तिकृन्मते हि पदं नास्ति ।

३. अनुनिर्वाप्येषु भूयस्त्वेन तन्त्रनियमः स्यात् ।

४. आगन्तुकत्वाद्वा स्वधर्मा स्याच्छ्रुतिविशेषादितरस्य च मुख्यत्वात् ।

५. स्वस्थानत्वाच्च ।

६. स्विष्टकृच्छ्रवणान्नेति चेत् ।

७. विकारः पवमानवत् ।

८. अविकारो वा प्रकृतिवच्चोदनां प्रति भावाच्च ।

९. एककर्मणि शिष्टत्वाद्गुणानां सर्वकर्म स्यात् ।

१०. एकार्थास्तु विकल्पेरन् समुच्चये ह्यावृत्तिः स्यात्प्रधानस्य[1] ।

११. अभ्यस्येतार्थवत्त्वादिति चेत् ।

१२. नाश्रुतित्वात् ।

१३. सति चाभ्यासशास्त्रत्वात् ।

१४. विकल्पवच्च दर्शयति ।

१५. कालान्तरेऽर्थवत्त्वं स्यात् ।

१६. प्रायश्चित्तेषु चैकार्थ्यान्निष्पन्नेनाभिसंयोगस्तस्मात्सर्वस्य निर्घातः

१७. समुच्चयस्त्वदोष[2] निर्घातार्थेषु ।

१८. मन्त्राणां कर्मसंयोगात्स्वधर्मेण प्रयोगः स्याद्धर्मस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ।

१९. विद्यां प्रति विधानाद्वा सर्वकालं प्रयोगः स्यात्कर्मार्थत्वात् प्रयोगस्य ।

१. प्रधानस्येति वृत्तिकृन्मते नास्ति ।
२. दोषोर्थेष्विति वृत्तिकृन्मते पाठः ।

२०. भाषास्वरोपदेशेषु[1] ऐरवत्प्रवचनप्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।

२१. मन्त्रोपदेशो वा न भाषिकस्य प्रायापत्तेर्भाषिकश्रुतिः ।

२२. विकारः कारणाग्रहणे[2] ।

२३. तन्न्यायत्वाददृष्टोऽप्येवम् ।

२४. तदुत्पत्तेर्वा प्रवचनलक्षणत्वात् ।

२५. मन्त्राणां करणार्थत्वान्मन्त्रान्तेन कर्मादिसन्निपातः स्यात्सर्वस्य वचनार्थत्वात् ।

२६. सन्ततवचनाद्धारायामादिसंयोगः ।

२७. कर्मसन्तानो वा नानाकर्मत्वादितरस्याशक्यत्वात् ।

२८. आधारे च दीर्घधारत्वात् ।

२९. मन्त्राणां सन्निपातित्वादेकार्थानां विकल्पः स्यात् ।

३०. सङ्ख्याविहितेषु समुच्चयोऽसन्निपातित्वात् ।

३१. ब्राह्मणविहितेषु च सङ्ख्यावत् सर्वेषामुपदिष्टत्वात् ।

३२. याज्यावषट्कारयोश्च समुच्चय[3]दर्शनं तद्वत् ।

३३. विकल्पो वा समुच्चयस्याश्रुतित्वात् ।

१. देशादैरेति न्या. मा. पाठः ।
२. ग्रहे इति वृत्तिपाठः ।
३. यस्य देति न्या. मा. पाठः ।

३४. गुणार्थत्वादुपदेशस्य ।
३५. वषट्कारे नानार्थत्वात्समुच्चयः
३६. हौत्रा[1]स्तु विकल्पेरन्नेकार्थत्वात् ।
३७. समुच्चयो वा क्रियमाणानुवादित्वात् ।
३८. समुच्चयं च दर्शयति ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने द्वादशस्याध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः ।

चतुर्थः पादः

१. जपाश्चा[2]कर्मसंयुक्ताः स्तुत्याशीरभिधाना[3]श्च याजमानेषु समुच्चयः स्यादाशीः पृथक्त्वात् ।
२. समु[4]च्चयं च दर्शयति ।
३. याज्यानुवाक्यासु तु विकल्पः स्याद्देवतोपलक्षणार्थत्वात् ।
४. लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ।
५. क्रयणेषु तु विकल्पः स्यादेकार्थत्वात् ।
६. समुच्चयो वा प्रयोगे द्रव्यसमवायात् ।
७. समुच्चयञ्च दर्शयति ।
८. संस्कारे च तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।
९. संख्यासु तु विकल्पः स्याच्छ्रुतिविप्रतिषेधात् ।
१०. द्रव्यविकारं[1] तु पूर्ववदर्थकर्म स्यात् तथा विकल्पे नियमः प्रधानत्वात् ।
११. द्रव्यत्वेऽपि समुच्चयो; द्रव्यस्य कर्मनिष्पत्तेः; प्रतिपशु कर्मभेदादेवं सति यथाप्रकृति ।
१२. कपालेऽपि तथेति चेत् ।
१३. न कर्मणः परार्थत्वात् ।
१४. प्रतिपत्तिस्तु शेषत्वात् ।
१५. शृतेऽपि पूर्ववत्त्वा[2]त्स्यात् ।
१६. विकल्पे त्वर्थकर्म नियमप्रधानत्वात्[3] । शेषे च कर्मकार्यसमवायात्तस्मात्तेनार्थकर्म स्यात् ।
१७. उखायां काम्यनित्यसमुच्चयो; नियोगे कामदर्शनात् ।
१८. असति चासंस्कृतेषु कर्म स्यात् ।
१९. तस्य च देवतार्थत्वात् ।
२०. विकारो वा तदुक्तहेतुः ।
२१. वचनादसंस्कृतेषु कर्म स्यात् ।

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१. वृत्तिकृन्मते क्रियमाणानुवादित्वात्समच्चयो वा होत्राणामित्येवं सूत्रस्य पाठः ।
२. र्मस्विति न्या. मा. पाठः ।
३. नाच्च येति वृत्तिपाठः ।
४. इदं सूत्रं केषुचिद् भाष्यपुस्तकेषु न दृश्यते ।

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१. रं च पू इति वृत्तिपाठः ।
२. वत्त्वात्स्येति न्या. कृन्मते पाठः ।
३. विकल्पे इत्यादि कर्म न्या. मालाकृत्सम्मतः पाठः ।

२२. संसर्गे चापि दोषः स्यात् ।
२३. वचनादिति चेत् ।
२४. तथेतरस्मिन् ।

२५. उत्सर्गे अपि[1] परिग्रहः कर्मणः कृतत्वात् ।
२६. स आहवनीयः स्यादाहुति संयोगात् ।
२७. अन्यो वोद्धृत्या[2]ऽऽहरणात् ।
२८. तस्मिन्संस्कारकर्म शिष्टत्वात् ।
२९. स्थानाद्वा परिलुप्येरन् ।

३०. नित्यधारणे विकल्पो; न ह्यकस्मात्प्रतिषेधः स्यात् ।
३१. नित्यधारणाद्वा प्रतिषेधो गतश्रियः ।

३२. परार्थान्येको यजमानगणे ।
३३. अनियमोऽविशेषात् ।
३४. मुख्यो वाऽविप्रतिषेधात् ।

१. उत्सर्गेपीति न्या. मा. पाठः ।
२. द्धत्य हेति वृत्तिपाठः ।

३५. सत्रे गृहपतिरसंयोगाद्धौत्रवत् ।
३६. आम्नायवचनाच्च ।
३७. सर्वे वा तदर्थत्वात् ।

३८. गृहपतिरिति च समाख्या सामान्यात् ।
३९. विप्रतिषेधे परम् ।
४०. हौत्रे परार्थत्वात् ।
४१. वचनं परम् ।

४२. प्रभुत्वादार्त्विज्यं सर्ववर्णानां स्यात् ।
४३. स्मृतेर्वा स्याद् ब्राह्मणानाम् ।
४४. फलचमसविधानाच्चेतरेषाम् ।
४५. सान्नाय्येऽप्येवं प्रतिषेधः[1] सोमपीथहेतुत्वात् ।
४६. चतुर्धाकरणे च निर्देशात् ।
४७. अन्वाहार्ये दर्शनात् ।

इति श्रीमज्जैमिनिमहर्षिप्रणीते पूर्वमीमांसादर्शने द्वादशस्याध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

।। सम्पूर्णो द्वादशोऽध्यायः ।।

१. षेधोऽसोमेति न्या.मा.पाठः ।

पूर्वमीमांसादर्शनं सम्पूर्णम्

।। शुभमस्तु ।।

GLOSSARY

A

Abhighāraṇa	Sprinkling clarified butter on the fire. Association of goodness with intelligence (p. 272).[1]
Abhimanyu	Name of a son of *Arjuna*, the hero of the *Mahābhārata*. Personification of *abhimāna* or egoism (p. 368).
Abhimāna	Egoism (p. 368).
Achchhāvāka	One of the three assistants of the *Hotṛ* priest. The intellect (p. 407).
Adhrigu	Name of a formula concluding with an invocation of *Agni*. A function of the intellect (p. 229).
Adhvaryu	Name of one of the four *Ritvij* priests. The senses of knowledge and action (p. 71).
Agni	The god of Fire. Intellect (p. 26).
Agnihotra	An oblation to *Agni* or the god of Fire. An intelligent act (p. 146).
Agnishṭoma	Praise of *Agni*; name of a sacrifice. An intelligent act or a function of the intellect (p. 204).
Agnīdhra	One of the three assistants of a *Brāhmana*. The mind functioning in association with the intellect (p. 405).
Agnīshomīya	Relating to *Agni* and *Soma*. A combination of intellect and the mind (p. 377).

[1] The figures within brackets refer to the pages where the primary meanings of words have been explained.

Ahaṅkāra — Egoism. The I-as-an-actor; an aspect of the soul when action takes place, but the soul is conceived to be a non-actor (pp. xviii, 367).

Aitiśāyana — Name of a philosopher (p. 41).

Alekhana — Name of a philosopher (p. 142).

Anagni — Without fire. Without intelligence (p. 154).

Añga — A limb, part; a sub-division of the *Mantras* of the Vedas; an auxiliary part of the Vedas (p. 72).

Anna — Food. A symbol of Nature or *Prakṛti* (pp. 250, 272).

Anushṭup — Name of a metre in *Sanskṛt* (p. 109).

Anuyāja — A secondary or final sacrifice. A good and intelligent action (pp. 82, 83).

Anya — Inexhaustibleness; this world (p. 136).

Apanaya — Taking away; a bad policy. Certain desires that should be taken away or shunned (p. 242)

Aptor-yāma — A division of *Jyotishṭoma*. Cessation of activity; a destructive ray of light (p. 413).

Arjuna — The hero of the *Mahābhārata*. The soul of man (p. cclxxxii n.).

Artha-vāda — A division of the *Brāhmaṇa* part of the Vedas. An explanation of *Vidhi* or the laws of Nature (p. 18).

Asura — A demon. A personification of the forces of Nature, making for evil, pain, or death (p. 213).

Aśva — A horse. A symbol of the senses, specially those of action (pp. 277-278).

Aśvattha — The sacred Fig-tree. A symbol of Nature or *Prakṛti* (p. 159).

Aśvins — Horses. The senses of knowledge and action (p. 239).

Atha — Inexhaustibleness (p. 111).

Ati-rātra — A part of the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice. Beyond the

	night; ultra-violet rays of light (pp. 298, 412).
Atyagnishṭoma	Beyond the rays of the sun; infra-red rays of light (p. 413).
Aushadha	Consisting of medicinal plants. A symbol of the healing powers of Nature (p. 143).
Avabṛtha	The purification of the sacrificer and sacrificial vessels after a sacrifice. A supplementary sacrifice, or good, intelligent and joyous action (p. 173).
Aveshṭi	Expiation by means of sacrifice. Absence of desire (p. 375).

A[1]

Aditya	The sun. Intellect (p. 238).
Agrāyaṇa	The first *Soma* libation at the *Agnishṭoma* sacrifice. The function of the mind in association with the intellect (p. 173).
Ahavanīya	Name of one of the three sacrificial fires; the consecrated fire taken from the householder' perpetual fire and prepared for receiving oblations. The function of the intellect in association with the soul, and referring to the whole world (p. 26).
Ahuti	Offering oblation with fire to the deities. An intelligent act performed in the course of nature, or associated with the forces of Nature (p. 399).
Ajya	Clarified butter. Goodness, as an essential element of desire (p. 52).
Ajya-bhaksha	Drinking clarified butter. A symbol of an element of pleasure in life (p. 256).

[1] The letter *A* at the commencement of words in this list is long.

Asmarthya	Name of a philosopher (p. 142).
Atreya	Name of a great *Rishi*, an author of a number of Vedic hymns (p. 119).

B

Bādarāyaṇa	Name of the author of *Vedānta Sūtras* (p.1).
Bādari	Name of a philosopher (p. 120).
Bhīma	One of the five *Pāṇḍava* brothers in the story of the *Mahābhārata*. The mind of man (p. cclxxxi n.).
Bhṛgu	Name of one of the ten *Maharshis* created by the first *Manu*. The senses of knowledge and action associated with Nature (p. 154).
Bṛhatī	Name of a metre in *Sanskṛt* (p. 109).
Bṛhat-sāman	Name of a verse intended to be chanted (p.150).
Brahmā	One of the three Gods of the Hindu *Trimūrti*, conceived to be the Supreme Creator (pp. ccii, 267, 268).
Brāhmaṇa	The first of the four "castes", consisting of priests. The intellect (p. 57).
Brāhmaṇach-chhaṅsin	One of the three assistants of the *Brāhmaṇa*. *Ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor (p. 405).
Brāhmaṇavatī	Name of a particular brick used in building the sacrificial altar. Neutrality or disinterestedness in action (p. 110).
Buddha	The ninth incarnation of *Vishṇu*. Perfection in the path of death (p. ccxxxii).

C

Chaitra	The first month of the Hindu lunar year (p.144).
Chamasa	A vessel for drinking *Soma*; sweetmeat. Satisfaction in action (p. 71).

Chariot — A symbol to represent the body, which acts as a single unit (p. 323).

Charu — A cloud. A symbol to represent Nature (p. 195).

Chatur — The number four. The mind associated with the senses of knowledge and action (p. 254).

Chhanda — Desire, conceived to be an obstacle (p. 40).

Cow — A symbol to represent the senses of knowledge (p. 131).

D

Dadhi — Curd. A symbol to represent Nature (p. 199).

Dakshiṇa — The south. Skill (p. 26).

Dakshiṇā — A gift given to the priests. Skill (p. 257).

Dakshiṇāgni — The southern altar of *Agni* or the god of Fire. A skilful act of the intellect (p. 358).

Darvi-homa — An oblation made with a ladle. A good and intelligent action or an act of sacrifice (p. 206).

Dāna — An act of charity or gift. An act of renunciation; satisfaction in action (pp. 87, 260).

Deva — A god. A great force of Nature, governed by the law of Sacrifice (p. 244).

Dharma — The law of good and intelligent action (pp. 1-2).

Dhāraṇa — Holding, restraining. Immovable concentration of the mind (p. 240).

Dhenu — A cow. A symbol of the senses of knowledge (p. 275).

Digambara — A school of Jainism, according to which it is believed that a person should not wear any clothes. A school of thought advocating a total renunciation of action (p. 272).

Dravya — An elementary substance in philosophy, e.g. the five "Elements", Time, Space, Mind, and the Soul (p. 26).

E

Ekāshṭakā — The eighth day after the full moon. Nature or *Prakṛti* (pp. 144-145).

Etad — This world (p. 136).

G

Gārhapatya — The house-holder's fire, received from his father and transmitted to his descendants. The function of the intellect in association with the soul (p. 26).

Gāyatrī — Name of a *Sanskṛt* metre (p. 109).

Go — A cow. A symbol of the senses of knowledge (p. 131).

Go-sava — Name of a *Soma* sacrifice. A function of the mind (p. 123).

Gṛha-pati — Master of the house. The soul (p. 315).

Grāva-stut — One of the three assistants of the *Hotṛ* priest. The senses of knowledge and action (p. 407).

Guṇa — An attribute of an object of Nature. There are three such attributes,—*Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas* (p. 3).

H

Haraṇa — A hand, arm (p. 85).

Havis — A sacrifice. The function of the intellect, as distinguished from that of the mind (pp. 136, 207).

Hiraṇya — Gold. Imperishable matter, symbolic of Nature (p. 194).

Hiraṇya-garbha — The Golden Egg. A symbol to represent Nature (p. 194).

Homa	An oblation offered to the gods by pouring clarified butter into the fire. Goodness added to intelligence in action (p. 49).
Horse	A symbol of the senses of action (pp. 277-78).
Hotṛ	Name of a priest. The mind (p. 404).

I

Iḍānta	A word without a meaning (p. 242).
Indra	Name of a god. The self-conscious soul (p. 54).
Ishṭi	Desire (p. 275).

J

Jaimini	The author of *Mīmānsā Sūtras* (p. 62).
Japa	Silent repetition of a sacred name. A pure act of sacrifice (p. 163).
Jauhava	Relating to *Juhū* or a sacrificial ladle. Nature as seen in the light of the senses of knowledge and action (p. 82).
Juhoti	A technical term for certain sacrificial ceremonies. The role of the great forces of Nature in an act of sacrifice (p. 87).
Jyotishṭoma	Name of a *Soma* ceremony. The rays of light (pp. 409-415).

K

Kakubha	Name of a *Sanskṛt* metre (p. 109).
Kalki	The tenth incarnation of *Vishṇu*. A universal conception of God (p. ccxxxii).
Kalpa	A period of a thousand *Yugas* of Time (p. 158).

Kapāla	The alms-bowl of a beggar: a symbol to represent a life of renunciation (p. 150).
Karṇa	A character in the story of the *Mahābhārata*. Grain or Seed, as symbolic of *Prakṛti* (pp. cclxxvii, 194).
Kaśyapa	Name of a *Rishi* or a divine being. A personification of the withdrawal of the senses from their objects (p. 240)
Kavasha	A shield. Protection from the evil effects of desire (p. 240)
Kāla	Time; a serpent. A personification of Time in the form of a Serpent (p. 225).
Kāma-deva	The god of Love or Desire. Desire personified as a god (p. 40).
Kāmukāyana	Name of a teacher or philosopher (p. 350).
Kārshṇājini	Name of a philosopher (p. 160).
Khādira	Made of the *Khadira* tree. A symbol of the mind (p. 132).
Kṛshṇa	The highest incarnation or embodiment of the idea of *Vishṇu* or God. The idea of goodness, intelligence and joy associated with Nature, transforming it into God (pp. cclxxiv n., 185).
Krama	A peculiar manner of reading the text of the Vedas (pp. 28-29).
Kshatriya	The warrior or kingly "caste". A personification of the mind and *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor (p. 418).
Kumbha-karṇa	A character in the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. A personification of the Vegetable Kingdom, as symbolic of Nature or *Prakṛti* (p. 197).
Kuntī	The mother of the *Pāṇḍava* brothers in the *Mahābhārata*. The planet Earth (p. cclxx).
Kūrma	Tortoise. An incarnation of *Vishnu*. A symbol to represent the withdrawal of the senses from their objects (p. ccxxvii).

L

Lāvukāyana	Name of a philosopher (p. 160).
Lokam-pṛṇā	Name of a kind of bricks used in constructing the sacrificial altar. A symbol to represent the idea of penetrating everything (p.110).

M

Mahat	The great. Intellect (p. 158).
Mahādeva	A name of *Siva* (p. ccii).
Maitrā-varuṇa	Descended from *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*. *Ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor (p. 407).
Man-Lion	The fourth incarnation of *Vishṇu*. The essence of joy in Nature (p. ccxxix).
Manotā	A hymn in the *Rig Veda* containing the word *Manota* (p. 383).
Matsya	The Fish. The first incarnation of *Vishṇu*. The individual soul (p. ccxxvi).
Medha-pati	The lord of sacrifice. The soul (p. 231).
Mitra	Name of a sun-god. The function of the intellect and the mind (p. 70).
Mīmānsā	Name of a system of philosophy (p. cx).

N

Nakula	One of the five *Pāṇḍava* brothers in the story of the *Mahābhārata*. The arms of a man (p. cclxxxi).
Nara-sinha	Man-lion; the fourth incarnation of *Vishṇu*. The essence of joy in Nature (p. ccxxix).
Nirmanthya	To be churned. To be understood (p. 181).

Nishāda	Name of a wild non-aryan tribe. One who, leading a life of the senses, rises to a conception of the mind and the idea of sacrifice (p. 123).
Nyāya	Name of a system of philosophy (p. lxii).

O

Odana	Cooked rice. The best kind of food, symbolic of Nature or *Prakṛti* (p. 250).

P

Paraśu-rāma	Name of the sixth incarnation of *Vishṇu*. A perfect student or seeker after knowledge (p. ccxxx).
Paśu	An animal. The senses associated with their objects (p. 248).
Paśu-Soma	The mind of an animal (p. 21).
Pavamāna	Name of certain hymns. Purification of the mind (p. 394).
Payas	Water, symbolic of Nature (p. 349).
Pāka	Cooking. Necessity of performing actions (p. 272)
Pāṇḍavas	The sons of *Pāndu*, and principal characters in the story of the *Mahābhārata*. Five parts of a man,—his intellect, mind, sense-organs through which the soul acts, and arms and legs. (p. cclxxxi).
Potṛ	Name of one of the three assistants of a *Brāhmaṇa*. The senses of knowledge and action associated with their objects (p. 406).
Pṛshṭha	Standing forth prominently. Action (p.179).

Pṛthā — Name of the mother of the *Pāṇḍavas*. The Earth (p. cclxx).

Prahlāda — Name of a demon child devotee of *Vishṇu*. A personification of joy (p. ccxxx).

Prajāpati — The lord of creatures (p. 238).

Prakṛti — Nature, characterised by inherent action (p. 101).

Prastotṛ — Name of one of the three assistants of the *Udgātṛ* priest. The intellect (p. 406).

Prati-hartṛ — Name of an assistant of the *Udgātṛ* priest. The senses of knowledge and action (p. 406).

Prati-prasthātṛ — Name of one of the assistants of the *Adhvaryu* priest. *Ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor (p.407).

Prayāja — A preliminary sacrifice. Desire, which precedes action (p. 247).

Purāṇa — Name of certain sacred books of the Hindus, said to be eighteen in number (p. ccxvii).

Puroḍāśa — A mass of ground rice rounded into a kind of cake, and offered as an oblation. *Prakṛti* associated with the mind, the senses and their objects (p. 180).

Purusha — A person. The individual soul (p. 33).

R

Rajas — Name of one of the three *Guṇas* or attributes of the objects of Nature, referring to action and desire (p. 417).

Rathantara-sāman — Name of certain hymns in the *Rig Veda* (p.150).

Rādhā — Name of a milk-maid, beloved of *Kṛshṇa*. The creative energy of the mind (p. cclxxx).

Rājasūya — Name of a sacrifice. The function of the intellect and the mind in association with the senses of action (p. 355).

Rāma-chandra	Name of the seventh incarnation of *Vishṇu*. A perfect family-man, with a perfectly developed mind (pp .ccxxxi, 197).
Rāvaṇa	Name of the ten-headed king of *Laṅkā*. The ten senses of knowledge and action personified (p. 197).
Rice	The best kind of grain, symbolic of *Prakṛti* (p. 142).
Rudra	Name of certain gods,—specially associated with *Siva*. Eleven *Rudras* are spoken of; and they refer to the ten senses, with the mind as eleventh (p. 238).

S

Sahadeva	Name of one of the five *Pāṇḍava* brothers. Personification of the legs of a man (pp. cclxxxi, 390).
Sarasvatī	Name of a river. A personification of Nature or *Prakṛti* (p. 217).
Sarva-pṛshṭha	Action that conquers everything (p. 178).
Sarva-svāra	Name of a *Soma* sacrifice lasting only for a day. Action involving a limited function of the mind (p. 262).
Sattra	A great *Soma* sacrifice. A great function of the mind (p. 178).
Sattva	The highest *Guṇa* or attribute, making for knowledge and peace (p. 417).
Saudhanvana	The son of *Sudhanvan*. A *śūdra* (p. 123).
Savanīya	Relating to *Soma* libation. The function of the mind (p. 389).
Sāmidhenī	Verses recited when the sacrificial fire is kindled. A description of an intelligent act (p. 66).

Sāmnāyya	A substance mixed with clarified butter and offered as a burnt offering. A good and intelligent action (p. 141).
Sāṅkhya	Name of a system of philosophy (p. xxiii).
Siddhārtha	Name of *Buddha*. One all whose objects are satisfied (p. 86).
Sītā	Name of the wife of *Rāma* in the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. A personification of Sacrifice (p. 197).
Smṛti	Post-Vedic sacred literature (p. 3).
Soma	The moon; wine. The mind (p. 180)
Sreka-parṇa	The relation of the universe to one creator (p. 240).
Sruch	A wooden ladle for pouring clarified butter on the sacrificial fire. Means of stirring the mind or producing an intelligent desire (p. 190).
Sruva	A ladle. The mind associated with the senses and their objects (p. 328).
Stha-pati	A chief; king. One who has raised himself from a lower to a higher station by means of a proper exercise of the mind (p. 123).
Stoma	A hymn; praise. The mind associated with the senses (p. 311).
Subrahmaṇya	One of the three assistants of the *Udgātṛ* priest. The mind (p. 406).
Sudarśana-chakra	Name of a weapon of *Kṛshṇa*. A good action (p. cclxxiv).
Sūkara	A name of the Boar, the third incarnation of *Vishṇu*. A personification of goodness in Nature (p. ccxxxiii).
Svaru	A sacrificial post. Action performed with a purpose or desire (p. 365).
Svāhā	Hail! hail! A blessing on action, calling for its

	repetition (p. 208).
Svāmin	Master, lord. The soul (p. 65).
Svishṭa-kṛt	Properly done. An intelligent action properly performed (p. 53).

S[1]

Sabda	Oral testimony of true and trustworthy persons (p. 34).
Samitṛ	One who keeps the mind calm. Detachment in action (p. 67).
Sara	A name of the number five. The five senses (p. 323).
Sastra	A sword. The senses of knowledge and action associated with the mind (p. 297).
Sata-kratu	A name of *Indra*. Performer of a hundred deeds (p. 379).
Sikhaṇḍin	A character in the *Mahābhārata*, who was born as a woman, and was transformed into a man by means of penance and sacrifice. A personification of the idea of Sacrifice transforming *Prakṛti* into *Purusha* or God (p. 59).
Siva	One of the three principal gods of the Hindus (pp. ccii, 238).
Sruti	Vedic literature (p. 3).
Sunaka	Name of a *Rishi*. The senses of knowledge associated with Nature (p. 154).
Sūdra	A member of the lowest or fourth "caste" of the Hindus. A personification of the inanimate world of Nature which supports the animate (pp. 419-420).
Svah-sutyā	Tomorrow's preparation for *Soma*. The best function of the mind (p. 378).

[1] The letter *S* in this list is as in the word *śure*.

Svetāmbara	A school of Jainism (p. 272).
Syena	A falcon; hawk. Nature characterised by desire (p. 240).

Sh

Shoḍaśin	Consisting of sixteen parts; name of a subdivision of *Jyotishṭoma*. An electro-magnetic ray of light (p. 412).

T

Tad	That; a name of *Brahma*. Sacrifice (p. 136).
Tamas	The lowest of the three *Guṇas* or attributes of Nature (p. 417).
Tapas	Meditation (p. 74).
Tra	Three. The senses of action (p. 297).
Tri	Three. The mind associated with the senses of action (p. 276).
Tryanīkā	Three-faced. The character and functions of mind in association with the senses, when it may be identified with the intellect (p. 304).
Tvashṭṛ	Name of a god,—the heavenly builder and creator of living beings. The supreme Mind which creates things (p. 39).

U

Udgātṛ	One of the four *Ritvij* priests who take part in a sacrifice. *Ahaṇkāra* or the I-as-an-actor (p. 404).
Ukthya	One of the seven sub-divisions of *Jyotishṭoma*. An electric ray of light (p. 412).

Un-netṛ	One of the three assistants of the *Adhvaryu* priest The intellect (pp. 407-408).
Upavesha	A stick of green wood used for stirring the sacrificial fire. Effectiveness in action or sacrifice (p. 84).
Upāñśu-yāja	The full moon. A complete function of the mind (p. 20).
Ushṇik	Name of a *Sanskṛt* metre (p. 109).
Uttara-vedi	The northern altar for the sacrificial fire. Higher knowledge (p. 181).

V

Varāha	The Boar; the third incarnation of *Vishṇu.* Goodness in Nature (p. ccxxxiii).
Varuṇa	The god of waters. An idea of God associated with Nature (p. 70).
Vashaṭ	A special kind of exclamation. An indication that a particular action may be performed (p. 40).
Vasishṭha	Name of a Vedic sage. Intellect, as associated with Nature (p. 153).
Vasu	Name of a god. The *Vasus* are said to be eight in number. A division or creation of *Prakṛti* (pp. 238-239).
Vasu-deva	Name of the father of *Kṛshṇa*. An idea of God in association with Nature (p. cclxxiii).
Vatsa	A young or a dear one. The mind associated with the senses of action and Nature (pp. 270-272).
Vāja-peya	One of the seven sub-divisions of *Jyotishṭoma.* An electric or electro-magnetic ray of light (p. 413).

Vāmana	The Dwarf; the fifth incarnation of *Vishṇu*. A perfect Boy (p. ccxxx).
Vāsa	Clothes. The mind associated with Nature (pp. 270-272).
Vāyu	The god of Air. A personification of the vital breath in man, which constitutes the energy of action; *ahaṅkāra* or the I-as-an-actor (p. 301).
Vaiśeshika	Name of a system of philosophy (p. lxxxiii).
Vaiśvānara	Belonging to all men; a name of *Agni*. The intellect (p. 94).
Vaiśya	The third "caste" of the Hindus, said to consist of producers of wealth. The senses of knowledge associated with Nature (p. 419).
Vedānta	Name of a system of philosophy (p. clxvi).
Vedi	Raised ground prepared for the sacrificial altar. A symbol to represent Nature (p. 66).
Vidhi	A law (p. 18).
Viśva-jit	All-conquering. Action (p. 178).
Viśvāmitra	Name of a Vedic sage. The mind engaged in action, when it may be identified with the intellect (pp. 153-154).
Viśve-devas	All-gods. Nature in all its forms (p. 173).
Vishṇu	The highest of the three principal gods of the Hindus (p. ccii).
Vṛtra	A Vedic demon of darkness, represented as a Serpent. A personification of *Prakṛti* conceived as an evil power (p. 225).

W

Water	A form of Nature or *Prakṛti* (pp. 198-199).
Woman	A personification of *Prakṛti* (p. 217).

Y

Ya	A letter of the alphabet. Intellect (p. 111).
Yajamāna	The sacrificer. The soul (p. 58).
Yoga	Name of a system of philosophy (p. cl).
Yudhishṭhira	The eldest of the five *Pāṇḍava* brothers. The intellect of man (p. cclxxxi).
Yuga	A great period of Time (p. 158).
Yūpa	A sacrificial post. Action meant for the benefit of all (p. 364).
Yūpāhuti	An intelligent and selfless action (p. 357).

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CORRECTIONS

	Incorrect	Correct
p. xviii,n., l. 9	e	be
p. xxii, l. 1	sixteenth	fourteenth
p. xxii, l. 14	A. D.,	A. D., though some would put it later,—
p. xxvii, n. 1, l. 5	From	Form
p. cnxvii, n., l. 2	an	and
p. cxcvii, l. 27	*Purāṇās*	*Purāṇas*
p. cclxxiv, n. 2, l. 22	being of	being of a
p. 95, l. 5	(12-17)	(14-18)
p. 97, l. 1	(22-26)	(23-26)
p. 117, l. 24	*Sandhanvana*	*Saudhanvana*
p. 155 n., l. 2	there they	where they
p. 196, l. 18	(31)	(32)
p. 203, l. 16	(6-8)	(4-8)
p. 204, l. 10	(14-15)	(12-15)
p. 222, n. 2., l. 1	eightsh	eighth
p. 245, l. 12	(8-10)	(9-10)
p. 279, n. 1, l. 11	shady	a shady
p. 301, n. 1, l. 15	freindly	friendly
p. 302, n. 3., l. 3	mus	must
p. 325, n. l. 2	things	things."
p. 389, n. 3, l. 2	refers	refers to
p. 402, l. 6, and p. 405, l. 18	*Brāhmaṇāchchaṅsin*	*Brāhmaṇāchchhaṅsin*
p. 407, ll. 10, 12	*achchā*	*achchhā*
p. 411, l. 20	disivions	divisions